IR 05000335/1995012
| ML17228B231 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 07/28/1995 |
| From: | Landis K, Prevatte R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17228B232 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-335-95-12, 50-389-95-12, NUDOCS 9508090359 | |
| Download: ML17228B231 (47) | |
Text
pe Rf0y UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W., SUITE 2900 ATLANTA,GEORGIA 303234199 Report Nos.:
50-335/95-12 and 50-389/95-12 Licensee:
Florida Power
& Light Co 9250 West Flagler Street Hiami, FL 33102 Docket Nos.:
50-335 and 50-389 Facility Name:
St.
Lucie 1 and
License Nos.:
DPR-67 and NPF-16 Inspection Conducted:
Lead Inspector:
une 4 through July 1, 1995 7 a-y>
Approved by:
. Prevatte, Senior Resident Inspector H. Hiller, Resident Inspector G.
HacDon Re tor Inspector K.
andis, Chief Reactor Projects Section 2B Division of Reactor Projects D
e Signed te igned SUHHARY Scope:
This routine resident inspection was conducted onsite in the areas of plant operations review, maintenance observations, surveillance observations, plant support, and engineering support.
Inspections were performed during normal and backshift hours and on weekends.
Results:
Plant operations area:
Operations continued to be conducted in a safe manner.
Preparations for the installation of a jumper around an inoperable Unit 1 battery cell were thorough.
Two examples of weak operator log-keeping were identified.
Haintenance and Surveillance area:
Haintenance activities observed during the period were conducted well.
Repeated examples of a failure to properly apply the licensee's Jumper/Lifted Lead program were identified and were the subject of a non-cited violation.
9508090359 95072EI PDR ADOCK 05000335 Q
o Plant Support area:
A review of the licensee's fire protection program indicated th'at weaknesses existed in fire fighting techniques and the respirator qualification program.
An audit of the licensee's Special Nuclear Naterials storage resulted in a non-cited violation involving a failure to properly tag three pieces of radioactive material.
Within the areas inspected, the following non-cited violations were identified:
NCV 50-335/95-12-01, Failure to Invoke the Jumper/Lifted Lead Process, paragraph 3.d. I).
NCV 50-335,389/95-12-02, Failure to Properly Tag Radioactive Haterials, paragraph S.c,
REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees R. Ball, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor W. Bladow, Site Quality Manager L. Bossinger, Electrical Maintenance Supervisor H. Buchanan, Health Physics Supervisor
- C. Burton, St.
Lucie Plant General Manager
- R.
Dawson, Licensing Manager D. Denver, Site Engineering Manager J.
Dyer, Maintenance Quality Control Supervisor H. Fagley, Construction Services Manager P. Fincher, Training Manager R. Frechette, Chemistry Supervisor K. Heffelfinger, Protection Services Supervisor J. Holt, Plant Licensing Engineer G. Madden, Plant Licensing Engineer J. Harchese, Maintenance Manager W. Parks, Reactor Engineering Supervisor
- C. Pell, Outage Manager
- L. Rogers, Instrument and Control Maintenance Supervisor D. Sager, St.
Lucie Plant Vice President
- J. Scarola, Operations Manager
- D. West, Technical Manager
- J.
West, Site Services Manager
- C.
Wood, Operations Supervisor W. White, Security Supervisor Other licensee employees contacted included engineers, technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.
NRC Personnel G. HacDonald, Reactor Inspector
- H. Hiller, Resident Inspector
- R. Prevatte, Senior Resident Inspector S. Sandin, Senior Operations Officer, AEOD
- Attended exit interview 2.
Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the last paragraph.
Plant Status and Activities a.
Unit
Unit 1 operated at essentially full power throughout the inspection period, with the exception of a reduction to approximately
percent power on June 11 to support the installation of a jumper across a
18 battery cel b.
C.
Unit 2 Unit 2 operated at essentially full power throughout the inspection period with the exceptions of power reductions on June 10 and 15 for condenser waterbox cleanings.
NRC Activity S.
Y. Jang, a representative of the Korean Institute of Nuclear Safety, visited the site from Hay 30 through June 22.
His activities included accompanying the inspectors in the performance of resident inspection activities and familiarization with site operations.
3.
Plant Operations
'a ~
Plant Tours (71707)
The inspectors periodically conducted plant tours to verify that monitoring equipment was recording as required, equipment was properly tagged, operations personnel were aware of plant conditions, and plant housekeeping efforts were adequate.
The inspectors also determined that appropriate radiation controls were properly established, critical clean areas were being controlled in accordance with procedures, excess equipment or material was stored properly, and combustible materials and debris were disposed of expeditiously.
During tours, the inspectors looked for the existence of unusual fluid leaks, piping vibrations, pipe hanger and seismic restraint settings, various valve and breaker positions, equipment caution and danger tags, component positions, adequacy of fire fighting equipment, and instrument calibration dates.
Some tours were conducted on backshifts.
The frequency of plant tours and control room visits by site management was noted.
The inspectors routinely conducted main flow path walkdowns of ESF, ECCS, and support systems.
Valve, breaker, and switch lineups as well as equipment conditions were randomly verified both locally and in the control room.
The following accessible-area ESF system and area walkdowns were made to verify that system lineups were in accordance with licensee requirements for operability and equipment material conditions were satisfactory:
1)
1A Containment Spray Train Walkdown The inspector performed a walkdown of the Unit 1 "A" train of the Containment Spray system, including the NaOH injection system.
In general, the walkdown indicated that the system was in good condition and was adequately maintained; however, the following discrepancies were noted and provided to the Unit
ANPS for correction:
Numerous cases in which the noun-name descriptions provided on valve tags differed from that listed in the system lineup delineated in OP 1-0420020, Rev 30,
- Initial Valve Alignment" Loose handwheel on V07104 No identifying tag on V07160 V07163 locked closed, as opposed to closed as stated in procedure SE-07-18/28 listed erroneously as A NaOH header admission valves in procedure V07230 was found closed without a locking device 2)
Unit 2 A Train HPSI/LPSI Walkdown The inspector conducted a walkdown of Unit 2 A train HPSI and LPSI major system flowpath valve alignments.
The inspector found the lineup and the conditions of system components generally satisfactory; however, the following discrepancies were identified:
~
V3821, V3826, and V3805 were found locked closed, as opposed to closed as called for in OP 2-0410020, Rev 23,
"HPSI/LPSI - Normal Operation."
PCRs were prepared to change the procedural designation to locked closed.
~
HCV-3615, LPSI loop 2A2 isolation valve, was found to indicate 10 percent open, as opposed to closed as required by the subject procedure.
Work Request 95010357 was initiated to correct this condition.
3)
Unit 1 Emergency Diesel Generator Fuel Oil System Walkdown The inspector conducted a walkdown of the Unit
EDG FO system and found the system's alignment to be satisfactory; however, numerous areas of localized corrosion were identified, including:
~
FO tanks'tructural and manway covers.
~
FO tank overflow pipe.
~
Pipes 1-3-DO-9 and -10.
~
Valve V17202 bonnet.
These items were discussed with the licensee, who stated that painting for the EDG FO storage area was scheduled for the near futur )
Equipment Tag/Procedure Discrepancies The inspector discussed the equipment tagging/procedure designation discrepancies identified above (and in IR 95-10)
with Operations personnel.
The licensee stated that the issue was being considered, and that initial plans included examining electrical and instrumentation labeling, comparing the labeling applied to the needs of both maintenance and operations personnel, and comparing existing labels to the Total Equipment Database designations for consistency.
Additionally, the licensee stated that 36 month procedure reviews were being considered as a means for comparing field labeling to procedural designations.
The inspectors concluded that the licensee was prudently considering the issue and will continue to follow the licensee's actions in this area.
b.
Plant Operations Review (71707)
The inspectors periodically reviewed shift logs and operations records, including data sheets, instrument traces, and records of equipment malfunctions.
This review included control room logs and auxiliary logs, operating orders, standing orders, jumper logs, and equipment tagout records.
The inspectors routinely observed operator alertness and demeanor during plant tours.
They observed and evaluated control room staffing, control room access, and operator performance during routine operations.
The inspectors conducted random off-hours inspections to ensure that operations and security performance remained at acceptable levels.
Shift turnovers were observed to verify that they were conducted in accordance with approved licensee procedures.
Control room annunciator status was verified.
No deficiencies were observed.
c.
Clearances (71707)
The inspector reviewed clearances 1-95-06-12
-
CCW Heat Exchanger 1A and 1-95-06-050
-
1A EDG Control Power.
All valves and breakers were found to be in the correct position and all tags were in place.
d.
Technical Specification Compliance (71707, 40500, 62703)
Licensee compliance with selected TS LCOs was verified. This included the review of selected surveillance test results.
These verifications were accomplished by direct observation of monitoring instrumentation, valve positions, and switch positions, and by review of completed logs and records.
Instrumentation and recorder traces were observed for abnormalities.
The licensee's compliance with LCO action statements was reviewed on selected occurrences as they happened.
The inspectors verified that related plant procedures in use were adequate, complete, and included the most recent revision B Battery Cell
Low Voltage On June 5, the licensee identified a low voltage condition on the 1B battery, cell 43.
The condition was identified during the performance of Maintenance Procedure 0960164, Rev 11,
"125 VDC System quarterly Maintenance."
The cell in question measured 2.06 volts.
TS 3.8.2.3 required the operability of the 1B battery, and TS surveillance requirement 4.8.2.3.2 required that individual cell float voltage be greater than 2.07 volts.
The AS associated with the subject TS required that the battery be returned to operability within two hours or the unit be placed in Hot Standby within the next six hours and in Cold Shutdown within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
The battery was declared out of service at 2:32 p.m.
Approximately 15 minutes later, a single cell charger was applied to the cell in question and the 1B battery was placed on an equalizing charge.
After approximately one hour, the single cell charger was removed, the battery returned to a float charge and the cell voltage was verified to be greater than the 2.07 VDC TS limit.
The cell was monitored for the next 45 minutes and voltage stabilized at greater than 2.07 VDC.
At 4:32 p.m., operators began recirculating the pressurizer in preparation for a downpower maneuver.
At 4:40 p.m., the battery was declared operable due to the sustained recovery of voltage.
The TS AS was exited and no reduction in reactor power was initiated (although the commencement of recirculation of the pressurizer was performed as a preparation for a downpower maneuver).
At 4:50 p.m., the battery was again placed on an equalizing charge and remained on the equalizing charge until approximately 8:00 a.m.
on June 7,
when a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> monitoring period on a float charge was initiated.
The subject cell was monitored for voltage throughout the equalizing period.
At approximately 3:00 a.m.
on June 6, the inspector discussed the current status of the battery with the Unit 1 ANPS.
The ANPS stated that operators were recording cell voltage every hour with an installed voltmeter and that electricians were determining cell specific gravity every two hours.
The inspector asked whei,her a J/LL request had been prepared for the installation of the voltmeter across cell 43.
The ANPS stated that one had not been prepared and that one should be employed unless the data taken with the meter was obtained with a "hand held" jumper, as described in AP 0010124, Rev 34, "Control and Use of Jumpers and Disconnected Leads."
The voltmeter was subsequently removed.
The inspector toured the 1B battery room at approximately 5:00 a.m.
and found that the voltmeter was again attached across the subject cell.
The inspector informed the ANPS, who directed that the meter be removed.
Subsequent inspection tours of the battery room found the voltmeter remove AP 0010124, Rev 34, "Control and Use of Jumpers and Disconnected Leads," 3.2, "Discussion," stated, in part, that
"When an alteration is not controlled by an approved procedure (i.e. troubleshooting electronic equipment or temporary modifications to permit interim operation)
and is unattended (not hand held), it shall be recorded in the..." J/LL log.
The licensee's failure to control the subject volt meter via the J/LL process was not in compliance with the J/LL program.
This failure constitutes a violation of minor significance and is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation, consistent with Section IV of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
This will be identified as NCV 50-335/95-12-01,
"Failure to Invoke the Jumper/Lifted Lead Process."
STAR 9500595 was initiated to document the conditions experienced in cell 43.
Its resolution directed, should the cell in question require an equalizing charge, that a single cell charger be placed across the cell for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
Safety evaluation JPN-PSL-SEES-95-011 was prepared, which found that the placement of a single cell charger across cell 43 with in-line lE fuses would not represent an unreviewed safety question.
The inspector reviewed the safety evaluation and found that it satisfactorily considered the issue.
Throughout the week ending June 10, the licensee had been preparing plans to install a jumper around cell 43.
Safety Evaluation JPN-PSL-SEES-95-009 was prepared per
CFR 50.59 which concluded that the 1B battery could perform its safety function with up to two cells jumpered out.
The SE also considered the method of jumper installation, which involved aligning the 1C battery to the 1B battery bus (replacing the 1B battery, which would be removed from the bus while the jumper was installed) via the IAB bus.
The 1C battery was a non-safety-related battery, and its use was chosen to minimize the potential for voltage fluctuations on the DC bus due to ripples in battery charger output sometimes encountered when the chargers supply a
DC bus without a battery present.
The licensee formed a cross-functional team to assess the installation of the jumper and to provide recommendations and a
procedure for the evolution.
The team prepared an initial draft of 1-LOI-100,
"1B D.C. Battery Bus, Cell 43 Jumper Installation."
The team's assumption was that the jumper would be installed in Mode 3.
A second team was then formed, with the task of performing an independent review of, the evolution with the assumption that the jumper would be installed in Mode 1.
The second team utilized the plant simulator and design reviews to produce the final version of the LOI.
On June 8, a complete set of individual cell voltages were obtained on the 1B battery.
Cell 43, while meeting TS acceptance criteria for voltage, was found to unacceptably
deviate (based upon IEEE and vendor recommendations)
from average cell voltage.
At 12:00 noon on June 8, a single cell charger was applied to cell 43, commencing a 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> single cell charge.
At 1:05 p.m.
on June 11, the single cell charger was disconnected and cell voltage immediately began to decrease from 2. 118 VDC.
At 3:22 p.m. the same day, cell voltage dropped below the TS limit of 2.07 VDC and the associate AS was entered.
A unit downpower commenced at 3:40 p.m.
The inspector observed control room activities and found the downpower to be well-controlled.
With the 1B battery inoperable, TS required the licensee to be in Hode 3 by 11:22 p.m.
The licensee stated that it was their intention to install the battery jumper with the unit in Hode 1, employing the following methodology:
o The unit would be reduced in power to allow the removal of the B HFP from service, due to the loss of B HFP control power in the event of a loss of the 1B DC bus.
o Controllers (e.g. pressurizer level) would be transferred to channels powered from A-side instrument buses.
Hajor redundant equipment would be similarly aligned.
~
The 1B instrument bus would be transferred to the maintenance bus such that a failure deenergizing the 1B DC bus would not result in two deenergized instrument buses (such an occurrence would have resulted in a reactor trip and actuation of a number of ESFAS subsystems).
~
The 1C battery would be aligned to the 1B DC bus via the 1AB DC bus.
~
The 1B battery would be removed from service and the jumper installed.
~
The 1B battery would be realigned to the 1B DC bus, the IAB DC bus would be divorced from the 1B bus (separating the 1B a'nd 1C batteries)
and original equipment lineups would be reestablished.
The inspector attended the tailboard meeting conducted prior to the execution of the LOI.
The meeting was attended by operators, maintenance personnel involved in the upcoming work, engineering personnel, and a number of plant managers.
The discussions included background information on the issue, a
discussion of industry events relating to the loss of DC buses, a step-by-step review of the LOI to describe the bases of the steps, and the delineation of management expectations for the evolution.
The inspector found the briefings to be conducted in a thorough manne ~
The inspector observed the conduct of the LOI and found that the licensee performed the activities in accordance with its instructions.
The inspector witnessed the installation of the jumpers around cell 43, which was conducted in accordance with PWO 65/0962.
Workers followed the PWO instructions.
The installation of the jumpers progressed well, until it was found that the original fasteners used to secure the intercell links on cell 43, which were to be used in installing the jumpers, were too long for the application.
The terminating hardware on the jumpers was found to be thinner than the original links; thus, when nuts were threaded onto the original shoulder bolts, there were insufficient threads to allow for complete engagement and torquing.
As a result, a scope change to the PWO was prepared to allow for the use of washers as spacers, which effectively thickened the joint the bolts were fastening.
As the PWO had been FRG-approved, the scope change was reviewed in a FRG meeting conducted in the TSC.
The inspector attended the meeting and found that a quorum, made up of licensee management covering the evolution, was present.
The critical characteristics of the fastening hardware were established and the use of additional washers to allow proper torquing was approved.
The inspector witnessed the final installation activities associated with the jumpers.
Additional washers were installed per the FRG-approved scope change to the PWO.
gC was present for the torquing of the fasteners.
The torquing was performed satisfactorily.
The inspector observed micro-ohm and voltage testing of the jumpers and battery, respectively, and noted that results were acceptable.
Following the installation of the jumpers, the battery was returned to service, per the LOI, without incident.
Equipment was subsequently returned to pre-evolution configurations, the TS AS was exited at 9:51 p.m.,
and the unit achieved 100 percent power at 6:45 a.m.
on June 12.
The inspector reviewed the RCO chronological log during and after the events surrounding the failure of cell 43.
The inspector noted the following deficiencies:
~
The log did not reflect:
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Placing the 1B battery on an equalizing charge or the installation of a single cell charger at 2:45 p.m.
on June
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Placing the 1B battery on a float charge and the removal of a single cell charger at 3:45 p.m.
on June
o Placing the 1B battery on an equalizing charge at 4:50 p.m.
on June
~
Commencing a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> float on the 1B battery at 8:00 a.m.
on June
~
Installing a single cell charger across cell 43 at 12:00 noon on June
~
The log contained an entry at 4:40 p.m.
on June 5 which stated that a resolution to STAR 9500595 was received, the cell was placed on a single cell charger and the 1B battery was returned to service.
In actuality, the single cell charger was installed at 2:45 p.m.,
was removed at 3:45 p.m.,
and the battery was declared back in service at 4:40 p.m.
The inspector reviewed AP 0010120, Rev 72,
"Conduct of Operations,"
Appendix F,
"Log Keeping,"
and found the following guidance:
~
Per step 2.A.2.i, the RCO log should contain
"New or abnormal lineups."
The following examples were given:
"1.
Safety related and other important equipment with maintenance in progress."
"4.
Installation of temporary modifications (including jumpers)
and their effect on plant equipment."
The inspector concluded that, while the procedural guidance above did not constitute a firm requirement (as would be denoted by shall versus should),
an expectation of log entries similar to the deficiencies listed above existed.
Consequently, the inspector found that control room operators were weak in recording activities related to the 1B battery maintenance performed on cell 43.
In conclusion, the inspector found the licensee's actions relating to the noted deficiencies in cell 43 to be cautious and deliberate.
Actions relating to the installation of the jumper around the cell showed proper review and execution.
Weaknesses were identified in the areas of J/LL control (voltmeter installed across the cell)
and control room log keeping (omissions and inaccuracies).
Operator Logs On June 12, the licensee began a mid-cycle cleaning of the lA CCW heat exchanger.
The work was preplanned under the licensee's CHH process.
During the process, the inspector reviewed the control room equipment out-of-service log and found that, while 1A CCW, 1A
HPSI, and IA LPSI were declared out-of-service, other safety-related components which required CCW to perform their functions were not.
The inspector questioned the need to declare the IA and 1B containment fan coolers, the 1A containment spray train, and the IA shutdown cooling heat exchanger out-of-service.
Operators stated that they had considered that, but had decided that, by declaring the CCW train out-of-service, the other, dependent, systems were assumed to be out-of-service.
The inspector reviewed OP 0010129, Rev 24,
"Equipment Out-Of-Service,"
and found section 3.2, "Discussion," to state, in part,
"All equipment required by Tech Specs shall be logged in the Equipment Out of Service Log when the equipment is determined to be inoperable."
The inspector brought this to the attention of operators, who subsequently recorded the appropriate equipment out-of-service.
Additionally, Operations management reinforced this requirement in a
memo to operators.
Additional examples of weak log-keeping practices were identified during events relating to Unit 1 battery maintenance and are discussed in paragraph 3.d. l.
f.
Effectiveness of Licensee Controls in Identifying, Resolving, and Preventing Problems (40500)
1)
gA Audit Review A.
(SL-OPS-95-07, gA Audit of Emergency Planning This audit reviewed the Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures and the annual drill.
The review consisted of a document review and observation of field activities.
The review appeared to be detailed and thorough.
No significant deficiencies were identified.
B.
gA Audit Report gSL-OPS-94-26 The inspector reviewed the subject gA audit report, which documented the results of a number of performance monitoring activities conducted at the end of 1994.
Areas examined included survey/release of clean waste from the RCA, the use of Merlin-Gerin alarming dosimeters, RWP compliance, determination of Unit 1 HTC, a number of outage-related maintenance activities, and radioactive source control.
Two findings, both related to radioactive, source control, were identified; one related to source labeling and the second related to the storage of SNN.
The inspector reviewed STAR 0-94120539, which documented the SNN storage finding, and found the issue to be addressed adequately, Overall, the inspector found the audit to be comprehensive in scope and thorough indetail.
The results of the
inspector's followup to issues of SNN storage is contained in paragraph 5.c.
2)
STAR Program quarterly Trend Report The licensee recently completed their first trend report of the STAR program which was implemented in mid 1994.
The STAR program was implemented to consolidate the several reporting systems that they had used to document deficiencies.
After approximately nine months'se, the licensee determined that they had sufficient information to develop useful trends and indicators.
The first quarter 1995 report showed the following:
371 STARS were generated between January 1 and Harch 31, 1995 Average age of open STARS was 100 days
STARS were gC deficiency reports
STARS were NCR issues
STARS were identified as operator work arounds The four predominant categories of STARS were:
Equipment Procedure/Policy Regulatory/Industry item Others
~
The three predominant causal factors of STARS were:
work practices written communications equipment conditions The licensee's conclusion from this summary was that:
Procedures need to be followed more closely Sign-offs were not always being completed Procedural deficiencies have led to mistakes Procedure technical reviews need improvement Improvements were needed to reduce harsh environment corrosion The inspector reviewed the above report and noted that it closely matched information that the inspector has obtained from routine STAR reviews and daily plant inspections.
This is the licensee's initial effort at developing trends based on STAR reports.
It appears to be a tool that can be used to develop corrective action for adverse trends or conditions.
Q
4.
Maintenance and Surveillance a.
Maintenance Observations (62703, 40500)
Station maintenance activities involving selected safety-related systems and components were observed/reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with requirements.
The following items were considered during this review:
LCOs were met; activities were accomplished using approved procedures; functional tests and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; and radiological controls were implemented as required.
Work requests were reviewed to determine the status of outstanding jobs and to ensure that priority was assigned to safety-related equipment.
Portions of the following maintenance activities were observed:
1)
NPWO 65/0970 1A EDG Speed/Frequency Control Problems This NPWO was prepared on June 7 after control room operators reported being unable to control EDG frequency during a
surveillance test.
When released from idle speed (400 rpm),
the EDG accelerated to 62 Hz indicated frequency and did not respond to governor control inputs from the control room.
The EDG was subsequently secured by operators.
Troubleshooting performed following the failure involved checks of governor control power and power supply fuses and a
verification that the K-13 relay, which shifted governor power sources from the 1A 125 VDC bus to the output of the EDG, picked up appropriately.
No discrepancies were found, the EDG was restarted, and the surveillance test was performed with satisfactory results.
As the cause for the lack of speed control was not positively identified, the licensee did not declare the EDG operable per TS and plant management directed that additional troubleshooting be performed.
The inspector accompanied electrical maintenance department personnel as the troubleshooting initially performed per the NPWO was repeated.
The inspector noted that the personnel performing the work were mindful of the NPWO's scope, limiting their activities to verifications of fuse continuity and K-13 contact resistance.
No additional information was obtained.
The inspector discussed the issue with the maintenance engineer directing the troubleshooting effort, who stated that, as the EDG frequency rose to 62 Hz, he believed the problem to be associated with a lack of power to the governor's electrical speed control.
It was explained that, in the event that the electrical speed control failed, the mechanical governor was
set to maintain speed at 62 Hz.
He further stated that, due to the fact that the EDG performed well at idle speed, he felt the problem lay in the governor power supply which was derived from the EDG's output and was normally aligned through the K-13 relay when EDG speed exceeded 870 rpm.
The inspector reviewed applicable control wiring diagrams with the maintenance engineer and found the theory plausible.
A scope change was prepared for the subject NPWO which allowed for a changeout'f the governor's power supply, a calibration of the speed switch which actuated the K-13 relay, and inspection for tightness of various terminal connections.
Prior to the installation of the new power supply, a two hour burn-in was performed on a test bench to assure proper power supply operation.
The inspector witnessed portions of the terminal board inspections and noted that several loose connections were identified; however, none were loose enough, in the inspector's judgement, to preclude proper governor operation.
Terminal connections were tightened as appropriate.
The inspector witnessed the calibration check of the speed switch, conducted in accordance with the appropriate sections of maintenance procedure 1-EMP-59.01.
The inspector found that the procedure was appropriately employed and that MME was within calibration intervals.
The speed switch was shown to perform satisfactorily.
The subject power supply was then replaced and the EDG was tested satisfactorily.
The EDG was subsequently returned to an operable status.
Following the replacement of the governor power supply, the removed power supply was bench tested and found to exhibit low terminal voltage under load.
The licensee determined that this was the most probable cause for the originally identified inability to control EDG speed.
The inspector agreed with the licensee's conclusion.
The inspector concluded that the subject troubleshooting effort was planned and conducted in a methodical and well-controlled manner.
NPWO 61/5082 lA CCW Heat Exchanger Cleaning/Inspection The inspector observed portions of the mid-cycle cleaning and inspection of the 1A CCW heat exchanger, conducted June 13 as a
part of a CMM outage on Unit
A train components.
The CMM was conducted in accordance with AP 0010460, Rev 3, "Critical Maintenance Management."
The inspector reviewed the work package, which specified that the cleaning be performed in accordance with Job 28A of Appendix A to 1-M-0018, Rev 40,
"Mechanical Maintenance Safety-
Related Preventive Haintenance Program," which directed the cleaning to be performed by hydrolasing the tubes.
A pressure band of 7,500 to 10,000 psig had been specified for the operation of the hydrolasing equipment, with a total time of spray head transit specified to be one minute to one minute, fifteen seconds.
IR 94-13 documented a similar cleaning, in which the inspector discovered spray pressure in excess of 12,000 psig.
The inspector verified that the current evolution was performed within the specified pressure band, at a nominal pressure of 9,000 psig.
A dedicated worker 'was monitoring pressure, and red duct tape had been applied to the periphery of the pressure gage to highlight the allowable pressure band.
The inspector witnessed a number of tube cleanings and timed the period of spray travel and found them to be acceptable.
PWO 61/5243 Repair of HSIV Drain Line The subject PWO was initiated when a small steam leak was identified in a main steam drain line immediately upstream of the 1B HSIV.
STAR 950670 was prepared to document the condition.
Inspections of the area indicated that a pin-hole leak had developed due to corrosion on the OD of the pipe downstream of V08476 (the root valve for the affected line).
The inspector reviewed the interim engineering disposition to the STAR, which called for replacement of the affected pipe by cutting bounding socket-welded elbows, removing one elbow and the affected pipe, and replacing the pipe and elbow.
The replacement was complicated by a small amount of seat leakage past V08476 from the B main steam line.
The engineering evaluation addressed the replacement of the affected components and detailed a methodology for fabrication of two new socket welds, involving drawing a vacuum on the line after fitup, to ensure that the welds would not be adversely affected by moisture due to the seat leakage.
An additional complication was encountered when, due to the operating conditions upstream of V08476 and the noted seat leakage, a hydrostatic test of the new weld was deemed as impractical.
Consequently, engineering referenced ASHE code case N-416, referenced in the Unit 1 ISI program (ISI-PSL-100, App B), which allowed deferral of a hydrostatic test, provided each weld pass was satisfactorily PT'd or HT'd and a
satisfactory inservice leak test was performed.
The subject STAR and implementing PWOs were reviewed by the FRG in a meeting conducted June 27.
The inspector attended the meeting and found that the FRG appropriately considered the technical adequacy of the proposed resolution, the replacement methodology, and contingencies to be affected should moisture
due to seat leakage adversely impact the ability to obtain a
satisfactory weld.
Of particular note, the Operations representative to the FRG identified unsatisfactory retest specifications in the subject PWO, necessitating revision.
The inspector observed portions of the work performed per the PWO.
Observed activities included removal of the discrepant pipe, fabrication of the replacement pipe, PT of welds, and initial fitup of the replacement pipe.
The inspector noted that procedures and packages were on-hand, gC involvement was constant, the replacement pipe was properly cut and pre-fabricated, and replacement fitup was dimensionally satisfactory, allowing for easy installation.
Welds were made satisfactorily and a VT-2 examination of the replacement under normal system pressure verified the replacement to be leak-free.
The portion of the pipe which had developed the leak was forwarded to the licensee's engineering laboratory for root cause determination.
In addition to the above, several PWOs were observed in the fire protection area, paragraph 5.
b.
Haintenance guick Response Team In order to provide for rapid response to minor maintenance and minor material condition deficiencies, the licensee implemented a
quick response team in June 1995.
This team is comprised of and an Operations SRO, a foreman or comparable position from each maintenance discipline, two mechanics, one electrician, one I&C specialist and two or three utility workers.
The SRO is assigned the accountability of team leader and identifies the items to be worked on.
The maintenance supervisor assigns the appropriate maintenance personnel needed to accomplish the task.
All work must meet the following guidance to be accomplished by this team:
~
Work will be performed under the direction of the assigned SRO
~
Work will be performed IAW AP-0010432, Rev 8, Section 8.4.3.A.
"Nuclear Plant Work Orders" which states that the minor maintenance work must meet the following criteria:
Not safety related or TS equipment Not Eg equipment Not seismically mounted No welding involved No clearance required No packing adjustment Work not used to close a
STAR Work is not complicated Can be worked under existing minor maintenance work order for Unit 1 or Unit 2 Work can be performed under normal skills of journeyman
The licensee performed several activities under this program during the month and seeks to build and improve on this program as experience is developed.
The inspector reviewed this program with maintenance management and the SRO team leader.
It appears to provide timely repairs for minor work without imposing significant work planning and implementation paperwork.
The licensee also appears to have provided adequate controls to ensure that the work activities will not degrade or jeopardize important plant equipment.
c.
Surveillance Observations (61726)
Various plant operations were verified to comply with selected TS requirements.
Typical of these were confirmation of TS compliance for reactor coolant chemistry, RWT conditions, containment pressure, control room ventilation, and AC and DC electrical sources.
The inspectors verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, test instrumentation was calibrated, LCOs were met, removal and restoration of the affected.components were accomplished properly, test results met requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel.
The following surveillance test was observed:
1)
OP 1-22000508, Rev 21,
"1B Emergency Diesel Generator Periodic Test and General Operating Instructions" The inspector witnessed the June 12 surveillance test on the subject EDG.
The SNPO performing pre-start checks had the procedure in-hand and was found to comply with its requirements.
Prestart checks proceeded satisfactorily.
Upon engine idle-start, the inspector noted the EDG to come to approximately 430 rpm and operate smoothly.
The inspector witnessed the EDG being paralleled to'ff-site power, followed by loading, from the control room.
The RCO performing the evolution was found to be complying with the subject procedure.
The test was completed satisfactorily.
Four surveillances in the fire protection area were also observed and documented in paragraph 5.
5.
Plant Support (71750)
a.
Fire Protection/Prevention Program (64704)
1)
Procedure Review The inspector performed a detailed review of the following Fire Protection/Administrative Control Procedure ~
AP 0005729, Rev 10, "Fire Protection Training, gualification and Requalification"
~
AP 1800022, Rev 15, "Fire Protection Plan"
~
AP 0010434, Rev 30, "Plant Fire Protection Guidelines"
~
AP 0010239, Rev 10, "Fire Protection System Impairment"
~
1-0010125A Surveillance Data Sheets 2-0010125A Overall these procedures were found to be satisfactory with the following discrepancies or observations:
A.
AP 0005729, Rev 10, "Fire Protection Training, gualification and Requalification"
~
Section 5.2 required that the Fire Protection Supervisor establish the Fire Protection Training Guide.
Section F of this Guide, "Self Contained Breathing Apparatus,"
dated 12/9/91, required that training in the use of respirators be provided to fire brigade personnel by the Fire Protection Supervisor.
AP 0010598, Rev 1, "Non-Radiological Respirator Program",
Section 5.2, stated that the Training Department would provide training for personnel who may be required to use respirators.
The inspector questioned the Fire Protection Supervisor as to who is really responsible for implementing respiratory training and about this apparent contradiction.
He stated that Fire Brigade training on the use of SCBAs is the responsibility of the Fire Protection Supervisor and not the Training Department.
~
Section 7.3 stated that the Hedical Examination Computer Printout Record of St.
Lucie Plant Personnel or its equivalent would be prepared by the HP staff.
This record identified the health status information required to qualify personnel for fire fighting activity.
There was no equivalent record prepared or maintained by the HP staff.
The computer printout record available was REHACS, prepared by the Training Department, which tracked the status of respiratory examinations for respiratory qualification.
This record did not track Fire Brigade physicals.
The health unit maintained a separate computerized database known as OHH (Occupational Health Hanagement),
however, no information on an employee's health status was available outside of the health
unit.
The licensee plans to add a new computer code to REHACS for tracking fire brigade physicals.
~
Section 8.5, "Fire Brigade Trainee Proficiency Evaluation and gualification," stated that the PSL Fire Protection Supervisor should establish a method of trainee proficiency evaluation which may include the following techniques:
B)
C)
D)
These requirements were met in initial training; however, requalification training proficiency was evaluated by the fire protection supervisor using only direct field observation and documenting the training and topics covered.
No written test was administered to evaluate individual knowledge.
The requalification program was found to be very subjective and did not contain strong documentation.
The licensee has agreed to evaluate and improve this area.
"A)
Written examination
- (multiple choice, matching, fill-in, essay, etc.)
Oral board or interview examination Walk-through examination Other type as appropriate to assess the level of fire protection knowledge and performance capability" B.
1800022, Rev 15, "Fire Protection Plan"
~
Section 8.7.6 stated that the fire brigade would respond to areas outside the protected area in event of a fire emergency.
This included the Nuclear Training Center and the B-11 and B-12/Fitness for Duty complex.
The Fire Protection Supervisor did not schedule drills for these areas due to the Operations Department not wanting on-shift licensed operators to go outside of the protected area.
This approach could result in the fire brigade not gaining familiarity with this area.
The licensee is currently evaluating this item to determine what changes are needed.
~
Section 8.7.6.A required that fire brigade members pass an annual fire brigade physical.
The Health Unit used various medical and respirator examination forms, i.e., fire brigade member, licensed operator, respirator only, diver, etc.
This practice has, at least on one occasion, resulted in a fire brigade member not receiving the correct annual physical examination.
The licensees corrective actions stated in paragraph 5.a.5.b will address this ite Fire Protection Surveillance Procedures The inspector reviewed OP 1800053, Rev 38, "Fire Protection Water System" annual and three year tests including a
verification of selected fire water header isolation valves.
The twelve month fire system flush as performed in step 8.2 provided for temporary installation of a hydrant gate valve at fire hydrant 813 for flushing of the power block fire headers and then at fire hydrant 831 to flush the east dead leg portion outside the power block.
The inspector questioned both the fire protection engineer and fire protection supervisor as to the maximum length of the dead leg fire hydrants, specifically fire hydrant 812, which are not flushed per this procedure.
The fire protection engineer estimated that the unflushed dead leg was approximately 50 ft in length.
A licensee review of NFPA 824 (Private Fire Hains)
found that it did not address flushing of dead legs.
The inspector also questioned why flushing of the non-power block dead leg through fire hydrant 831 (east portion)
was performed with no corresponding flush through fire hydrant 838 (west portion).
The fire protection supervisor stated that flushing of the non-power block portion is based on good fire practices and that the west portion of piping was recently added.
The licensee agreed to review this procedure to ensure that NFPA requirements and good fire practices for flushing are met.
The inspector noted that the valve descriptions in the procedure differed from the nameplate descriptions appearing on the valves.
An example of this is the 2-V15531 (West Sectionalizer Post Indicator) whose nameplate reads V15531 (FP Hain Loop West Isol).
Other than the above, the procedure was found to be adequate and the system's material condition was satisfactory.
Fire Protection System Surveillance Inspections and Tests The inspector reviewed several completed surveillances and observed the monthly inspection of fire extinguishers, fire hoses and a startup transformer deluge test.-
A.
The following completed surveillances on Unit 1 were reviewed and no discrepancies were identified:
PWO 865/0665 MP 0940066, Rev 16, "Portable Emergency Lighting Maintenance and Inspection" PWO 861/4813 HP 1-H-0018F, Rev 21,
"Mechanical Maintenance Safety-Related Preventative Maintenance Program (Fire PH'S)
PH 8261"
PWO 865/7598 HP 0959063, Rev 8,
"Deluge and Sprinkler System Test" PWO 861/4683 HP 1-H-0018F, Rev 21,
"Hechanical Haintenance Safety-Related Preventative Haintenance Program (Fire PH'S)
PH /f264" B.
Routine monthly fire protection surveillances on fire extinguishers and hoses.
PWO 61/5036 performed the monthly fire hose station inspection for Unit 1 per GHP 1-H-0018F, Rev 21, Appendix A (PH260).
The inspector accompanied and observed the journeyman mechanic perform this PH at 11 hose stations in the Unit 1 turbine building.
The inspector verified that the journeyman mechanic observed the requirements specified in the PH and was knowledgeable of the acceptance criteria.
Each fire hose station was inspected for:
Valve handle in place and handwheel nut tight Hose disconnected and threads lubricated, if needed, with graphite Fire nozzle and hookup hose seal integrity Fire nozzle freedom of adjustment and presence of debris Overall condition of fire hose Cleanliness of fire hose cubicle Accessibility Once the above inspections were completed for a fire hose station, the journeyman mechanic entered the inspection date and initialed the inspection record attached at each hose station.
The inspector identified three items, one related to housekeeping and two associated with hose station identification.
The housekeeping item involved storage of replacement lamps inside hose station 15-13 cabinet for the fire protect'ion panel hydrogen seal oil and a hose spanner wrench inside hose station 15-1 cabinet.
The other two items appeared to be related.
Each fire hose station was uniquely identified by a plastic placard and had an inspection record attached.
The inspection record has three columns for Date, Inspected By, and Extinguisher Location.
The extinguisher location is left blank with the hose station identification annotated in the top left corner of the tag.
In general, the journeyman mechanic verified the location by comparing the plastic placard with the inspection record.
However, the inspector noted that the
inspection record for the last two hose stations was annotated the same, i.e., HS-15-1.
A comparison of the next to last hose station determined that the inspection record should have read HS-15-12 and that the journeyman mechanic had signed off this inspection as HS-15-1.
The inspection record was corrected and the PM reviewed for completeness.
The other item related to this misidentification appeared to be fadeout of certain handwritten entries on inspection records exposed to direct sunlight.
This problem was noted on the inspection records for hose station HS-15-14 (replaced by the mechanic)
as well as HS-15-12.
The licensee is currently attempting to find a solution for this problem.
Overall, the inspector found that the surveillance was performed in a satisfactory manner.
PWO 69/4446 performed the monthly fire extinguisher inspection for Unit 2 per GMP 2-M-0018F, Rev 16, Appendix A (PM5401).
The inspector accompanied and observed the journeyman mechanic perform this PM for approximately ten fire extinguishers in the Unit 2 turbine building.
The inspector verified that the journeyman mechanic observed the requirements specified in the PM and was knowledgeable of the acceptance criteria.
Each fire extinguisher was inspected for:
Location in designated place Accessibility Operating instructions on nameplate legible and facing outwar'd Seals present and intact Fire extinguisher fully charged No indication of damage, corrosion, leakage, or clogged nozzle Housekeeping Once the above inspections were completed for a fire extinguisher, the journeyman mechanic entered the inspection date and initialed the inspection record attached to each fire extinguisher.
The inspector noted two items, the first being the fire extinguisher at location T-44 was specified in the checklist provided by the fire protection supervisor as a dry chemical when, in fact, it was CO and a procedural deficiency in that the date of annual inspection was not included as a monthly inspection attribut The inspector discussed the fire extinguisher located at T-44 with the Fire Protection Supervisor.
Of specific interest to the inspector was the criteria used in selection of the various types available and the implication of staging a
CO, vice dry chemical.
The Fire Protection Supervisor stated that fire extinguishers were selected at various locations based on the fire hazard analysis which determined what type of fire could occur for that portion of the plant.
However, he stated that he did not believe that the T-44 location in the Unit 2 turbine building was listed in the F"AR.
The inspector reviewed Unit
FSAR and found that Table 9.5A-SD (Turbine Building Fire Extinguishers) identifies a dry chemical 20 lb fire extinguisher at this location.
The licensee has corrected this item and reviewed the FSAR Table to ensure that fire extinguishers specified PH 5401 checklist is consistent with those specified in the FSAR.
The inspector observed that verification of a current annual inspection is not one of the attributes included in the monthly inspection.
The journeyman mechanic explained that a separate PH performed the annual inspection of the fire extinguishers at one time which, in this case, was January 1995.
The inspector noted that one of the fire watch fire extinguishers received its annual inspection in June 1994 and, although still within the allowed annual inspection period, this monthly inspection would not flag the mechanic to remove this fire extinguisher from service prior to expiration in June 1995.
The mechanic removed this fire extinguisher from service.
The inspector discussed this apparent procedural weakness with the Fire Protection Supervisor, who agreed to change the procedure to address this item.
The journeyman mechanic's inspection of the fire extinguishers observed by the inspector was thorough and methodical.
Overall, the inspector found that the surveillance was performed in a satisfactory manner.
C.
Startup Transformer Deluge and Sprinkler Test The inspectors observed the annual surveillance testing of the Unit 1 startup transformer deluge and sprinkler system conducted on June 9.
Testing was supervised by a fire protection inspector who exercised positive control and ensured that communications via handheld radios kept all parties informed.
The inspector noted several problems
associated with HP 0959063, Rev 8,
"Deluge and Sprinkler System Test," Section 1 and the system under test:
Step 8. 1.3 identifies 4 valves for repositioning by stating
"Close the OS&Y (Outside screw
& yoke)
isolation valve and open the main drain valve".
The non-licensed operator questioned whether these valves were uniquely identified.
The isolation valves had tags with valve identifiers V15907 (1A Startup Transformer)
and V15901 (2A Startup Transformer),
however, the drain valves did not.
The licensee has placed temporary tags on this equipment until permanent tags can be made.
(2)
Step 8. 1.4 verified that the local panel trouble light and horn actuate after closing the isolation valves.
The results were recorded on data sheet ¹5.
There were two separate headers, each with an isolation valve and limit switch which actuated a
common local trouble alarm
& horn.
The 1A header isolation valve V15907 was repositioned first.
Neither the trouble alarm or horn actuated.
An inspection of the limit switch found that its thimble was broken not allowing the alarm circuit to electrically actuate.
The 1B isolation valve V15901 was then closed.
The trouble light actuated but the horn did not.
The fire protection supervisor tapped the face of the horn which then sounded.
A PWO was issued and the horn was replaced on June 28.
This step had no signoff on data sheet
¹5 documenting that control room annunciator C-57,
"XFHR FIRE DELUGE SYS LOCAL ALARH," actuated.
The procedure HP 09509063 was modified to correct this item.
(3)
Step 8. 1.5 activated each H.A.D. device with verification that the solenoid valve functioned and reset when the heat was removed and checked the local alarm light & bell.
This step also included "Verify control room received alarms on the system."
The results were recorded on data sheet ¹5.
The inspector observed that the fire protection inspector conducting the test had established radio communication with the individuals applying the heat source, but not with the control room.
When questioned how data sheet
¹5 step 8. 1.5 (control room alarm received)
would be signed off, the fire protection inspector contacted the control room to verify that they had received an alarm.
The fire protection inspector informed the inspector that a
single control room alarm verifies this signoff requirement.
The inspector reviewed the CWDs and questioned several I&C engineers regarding control
room annunciator C-58,
"TRANSFORMER FIRE."
CWD ¹859 incorrectly showed a total of 20, instead of 24, detectors installed, each connected in parallel to TB-2 of the transformer fire protection local control panel.
Appropriate changes have been made to the test procedure to correct these items.
The discrepancy noted on the CWD was documented on Drawing Change Request Notice 074-195-5211 for correction.
(4)
A portion of the 2A startup transformer deluge piping developed a leak during testing.
The apparent cause was piping failure due to corrosion as a result of prolonged service (about 23 years).
The discrepancy was noted and a soft patch applied.
STAR 950608 was generated to evaluate Unit 1 transformer deluge system piping.
The current plans are to replace the affected piping at the nearest practical date.
An engineering evaluation and inspection of the piping on Unit 2 is also planned.
(5)
Step 8. 1.8 identified between six and eight partially or completely clogged heads on startup transformer lA deluge system.
The heads were disassembled, cleaned and retested.
Additional heads clogged during the first retest.
The heads were disassembled, cleaned and retested.
Again, several more heads clogged.
A visual examination of. the material removed from the clogged heads concluded that sloughing of the pipe was occurring and that further testing would not result in a satisfactory surveillance test.
The fire protection supervisor terminated the surveillance and directed test personnel to reset the clappers for both headers.
At 11:35 a.m.
the startup transformers deluge and sprinkler system was declared inoperable and a clearance was issued.
Appropriate compensatory measures were taken which included the staging of fire fighting equipment at a nearby fire hydrant.
Overall, the surveillance was conducted in a professional manner and all participants were well-briefed and prepared to conduct the test.
The fire protection inspector conducted the test in a very controlled manner and signed off procedural steps as they were completed.
Discrepancies noted during testing were annotated in the procedure margin to ensure that a
STAR would be generated.
Declaring the startup transformer deluge and sprinkler system inoperable after repeated clogging of the heads was prudent and will ensure that proper management attention is focused on correcting this problem.
The number of procedural deficiencies identified by the inspector clearly indicate that test personnel have not been paying
strict attention to procedural details during previous tests.
4)
Fire Protection Audit The inspector reviewed Quality Assurance Audit QSL-OPS-95-02 performed on April 21, 1995.
The audit was thorough with no findings in the fire protection program.
This audit was previously reviewed by the NRC and documented in IR 95-10.
5)
Fire Brigade A.
Composition The shift fire brigade consists of five members including the fire brigade leader (usually the NWE) selected each shift from the current, up-to-date Emergency Team Roster.
The brigade did not include "the NPS, nor the three other members of the minimum shift crew necessary for the safe shutdown of the unit and any personnel required for essential functions during a fire emergency."
The composition could be less than the five members for a period not to exceed two hours to accommodate unexpected absences, provided immediate action was taken to restore the composition to five.
The inspector noted that the fire brigade was staffed entirely by operators.
Recent industry events have found that this could result in conflicting duties and weaken the plant's ability to respond to a concurrent fire and other plant event or emergency.
This was discussed with the licensee and they agreed to review this item and determine if staffing changes are needed.
The inspector questioned several items on the emergency team roster.
~
The fact that home telephone numbers and addresses for fire brigade members were not current.
~
The inclusion of individuals who have past fire brigade training but are not currently qualified and have no emergency team response function.
The fire protection supervisor agreed that the emergency team roster is used to assign on-shift fire brigade members and was not aware of any mechanism or requirement to maintain current personnel home telephone numbers and addresses.
The "alumnus" fire brigade members have no emergency team function.
The licensee is currently reviewing this list and has agreed to correct any administrative error B.
Training and gualification AP 1800022, Rev 15, "Fire Protection Plan," specifies the qualifications of the fire brigade.
Each member must meet the following requirements:
Pass annual fire brigade physical Satisfactory completion of initial and requalification training Attendance at a minimum of two fire brigade drills annually Annual participation in fire brigade practical field exercises Respirator qualified The annual fire brigade physical is'dministered at the onsite healthunit staffed by contract employees under the
, supervision of the Protective Services Department.
Included in this physical examination is a respirator
,examination.
The results of the physical are provided in the summary block
, i.e.,
"The examinee is QUALIFIED WITHOUT RESTRICTIONS",
"The examinee is NOT QUALIFIED" and
"The examinee is QUALIFIED WITH THE FOLLOWING RESTRICTIONS."
The inspector reviewed the medical records of all currently qualified fire brigade personnel (55 total)
and noted the following:
~
One fire brigade team member completed the respirator-only examination in February 1995.
A prior licensed operator medical examination given February 1994 was on file.
The fire protection supervisor's training records showed that the medical qualification was met on 1 Harch 1995.
A search of records in the vault could not verify medical qualification.
As a result, the licensee removed this individual from fire brigade duties pending a
medical examination.
~
One fire brigade team leader in 1992 and 1994 was reported as
"The examinee is QUALIFIED WITH THE FOLLOWING RESTRICTIONS," specifying the use of corrective lenses.
In 1993 the same individual was reported as
"The examinee is QUALIFIED WITHOUT RESTRICTIONS."
This individual wore contact lenses.
The medical history portion of the form did not specifically ask if one wore contact lenses.
~
Several fire brigade personnel had a licensed operator examination and respirator examination given within the past twelve months.
According to the Fire Protection Supervisor, this examination satisfied the requirement for an annual fire brigade member
examination and respirator examination, as it was more stringent.
This was a biannual examination and would only apply for twelve months after the examination was administered.
There was no written instruction describing this practice available for inspector review.
The licensee had the various procedures and medical examinations forms used under review.
~
Ten of the 55 fire brigade personnel were medically
'qualified with restrictions requiring the use of corrective lenses.
The visual acuity criteria for no restrictions was 20/40 or better in either eye uncorrected.
The results reported for these individuals ranged from >20/40 to 20/200 (largest character on eye chart)'.
This medical restriction precluded the use of glasses with temple pieces as specified in HP-73, Rev 3,
"PORTACOUNT PLUS FIT TEST SYSTEM."
During the respirator fit test, contact lenses could not be worn.
Additional training was provided by the fire protection supervisor in the use of SCBAs.
As stated by the fire protection supervisor, it was not FP&L policy to require the use of corrective lenses for those individuals assigned to the fire brigade.
However, FPEL would provide, at no cost, either corrective lenses for respirators or RK if requested by the individual and approved by the Operations Supervisor.
A list of fire brigade personnel requiring corrective lenses was provided to the licensee for clarification.
~
A review of the REMACs SCBA qualified operations personnel showed that in one instance, a recently qualified fire brigade team leader was not SCBA qualified.
The fire protection supervisor and the inspector confirmed this individual had completed training and that REMACs was in error.
In response to the above deficiencies, the licensee formed a team
~to review this area and develop a plan to correct all identified weaknesses.
This team was composed of supervisors from Protection Services, Security, Health Physics, Corporate Safety, and the contract site medical officer.
The team reviewed applicable industry standards and decided to implement a site wide standard requirement for wearing corrective lens with respirator.
This standard will require corrective lens if uncorrected vision is greater than 20/40 far vision.
This new standard, when implemented, will permit wearing of respirator face piece glasses or contact lens with a respirator.
If contact lens are worn, then that person must qualify and practice wearing a respirator with
contact lens to ensure that they can perform effectively in that environment.
The licensee will also modify the REHACS database to ensure that all persons who may use respirators are fully qualified.
The tracking system for this program will be maintained by HP.
The licensee has stated that this new program will be fully implemented by September 1,
1995.
The inspector had discussed this issue in detail with the licensee and believes these changes will improve fire brigade effectiveness.
Fire Brigade Fire Fighting Strategies The inspector reviewed the firefighting strategies for Unit 1 and Unit 2 turbine building and found them to be satisfactory.
Fire Brigade Drill An unannounced fire drill conducted on June 5 was observed and evaluated.
This exercise involved a simulated Class
"B" fire on the Unit 2 DEH Platform.
The fire was called in to the control room from the scene by the exercise evaluator.
The location and class of fire was correctly announced over the plant page system.
A non-licensed operator arrived on the scene approximately three minutes after the announcement and partially removed a fire hose from the closest hose station.
Five additional plant operators arrived on the scene to assist as needed.
None of the above personnel were dressed in firefighting gear.
Approximately one minute later the fire brigade appeared on the scene.
All brigade members were dressed out but only one person was wearing a
SCBA.
The inspector noted that the first hose to approach the fire was not completely removed from the rack and properly faked out on the floor to prevent hose kinking.
A second hose that was used to approach the fire for the opposite side of the turbine building was also not completely removed and faked out properly until questioned by the inspector.
Approximately seven minutes after the fire was announced over the page system the brigade made an approach with a fire hose and the evaluator declared the fire out.
The inspector made the following additional observations of the exercise:
~
the response by the brigade was timely
~
no clear guidance is provided as to the use of SCBAs in the turbine building fires
hoses were not properly removed from the racks and tended during firefighting fire teams turned their back on the fire and walked away from the scene when the fire was declared out.
A reflash could have resulted in personnel injury no reflash watch was established one fire brigade member was wearing glasses.
The inspector questioned if he had SCBA glasses.
The individual stated that he generally wore glasses for reading and did not need glasses when wearing SCBA.
Followup inspection found this individual's vision to be 20/200 and 20/50, which required corrective lenses.
This area was looked into further.
See paragraph 5.a.5.b.
the brigade leader did not appear to take positive control and direct firefighting efforts communications from the brigade leader to the control room were good security responded with keys to locked areas and to request offsite assistance, if needed the drill critique was not thorough and did not add value to the exercise A second inspector observed the fire drill from the lower level of the turbine building.
Two operators were assigned by the fire brigade leader to this area to assist.
Neither operator had turn out gear.
The closest fire hose was removed from the reel with one operator manning the hose and the other staged at the shutoff valve.
One turn of the fire hose remained on the rack which the operator removed when the inspector asked whether this would interfere with the pressurizing the hose properly.
The fire brigade leader briefed both operators, had them refake the fire hose such that it remained behind the operator holding the nozzle and demonstrated a circular pattern for spraying the area.
The inspector verified that both operators were knowledgeable of where to draw turn out gear.
Located beneath the DEH platform on the first deck of the turbine building was a locked maintenance cage containing a
flammable liquid storage locker.
Neither operator was aware of this locker.
The inspector verified that this area was accessible by requesting on-scene security to unlock the cage.
Overall, the drill was considered satisfactory.
The inspector noted that the drill lacked realism and that firefighting techniques were weak and need additional attention.
The licensee has stated that additional emphasis will be placed on these exercise )
Plant Tour and Inspection of Fire Protection Equipment A.
System Lineups/Area Walkdowns During the inspection period selected portions of the fire protection system and general area walkdowns were performed.
(1)
On June 22, 1995, the inspector walked down that portion of the fire protection system adjacent to both city water storage tanks including suction piping, valves, pumps and above ground discharge piping to the buried fire protection headers.
The inspector verified an adequate water supply existed in both city water tanks (>300,000 gallons each).
However, the inspector noted that suction cross-tie valve V15282 placarded as a locked open valve did not have the lock installed.
This condition was brought to the attention of a Unit 1 control room operator for correction.
A followup inspection of this valve on June 23, 1995, verified that a replacement lock was installed.
All valves inspected were found in the normal operating lineup.
(2)
The inspectors also performed an area walkdown of both Unit 1 and Unit 2 switchgear and cable spreading rooms, the ESF battery rooms and the EDG buildings, examining fire extinguishers, fire hoses, emergency lighting, fire detectors and fire barriers to include fire doors, stops, piping penetrations electrical cable trays.
The absence of combustibles and fire hazards was also verified.
The following deficiencies were identified:
~
In the Unit
RAB, a gap in cable tray ¹10 mounting frame adjacent to HS 15-32, and a cover off fire detector in 1A battery room.
The licensee submitted PWOs to correct these items.
~
In the Unit
EDG Buildings, the fire protection piping was not painted red.
In the Unit 2 RAB, fire extinguisher A-91 was overcharged.
This extinguisher was subsequently replaced.
A loose wire, taped above RA-RB-1, PP-223 penetrating wall, was also found.
This item was identified to electrical maintenance who is currently investigating it.
In the Unit 2 EDG buildings, fire extinguisher D-7 annual inspection that expired at the end of
February 95, was found.
This extinguisher was replaced on June 29.
B.
Permanent Plant Fire Protection Features The inspector visually inspected the accessible fire barrier penetrations in the above areas and they appeared to be satisfactory condition.
All visible Thermo-Lag and cable tray Flamastic appeared to be intact and in good physical condition.
On June 16, 1995, the inspectors accompanied both the corporate fire protection engineer and the fire protection supervisor in a random check of fire barriers located in the Unit 1 piping penetration area and ECCS pump rooms.
Several observations were made during this inspection:
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Penetration 050-S-8 (24" diameter opening with a 14" diameter pipe passing through located in the floor slab in the piping penetration area)
was identified and examined.
An evaluation of the fire barrier itself was inconclusive due to the presence of an installed boot.
The inspectors learned that the fire barrier inspection for this type of penetration involves a visual inspection of the condition of the boot which is not removed.
The boot is attached with adhesive.
The penetration is also inspected from the side that does not have a boot installed.
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Penetration 050-S-2 (22" diameter opening with a 12" diameter pipe passing through located in floor slab accessible from at the -10 ft elevation in the 1A LPSI pump room)
showed evidence of slumping between 2"-4" with a circumferential crack extending approximately 180'n the side facing containment.
The inspector requested that the licensee evaluate this penetration.
This item was reinspected on June 19, 1995 (see below).
~
Several conduit fire stops were checked.
Cracking of the spray on fire retardant material was noted on the side with the installed fire resistant board.
The inspector requested that a qualified gC inspector accompany the fire protection supervisor and inspector on a more thorough walkdown of selected fire dampers, ECCS pump room pipe penetrations, and fire stops.
On June 19, 1995, the inspector was accompanied by the fire protection supervisor and a
gC inspector in the continuing evaluation of fire barrier seals in the ECCS
pump rooms, electrical conduit fire stops, and two fire dampers located in the rod drive HG set area.
Penetration 050-S-2 was evaluated using a feeler gage.
Separation of the fire barrier material had occurred up to approximately 10" as measured from elevation-10 ft upwards through the slab.
As a result of this deficiency, the licensee issued a breech permit which requires hourly roving fire watch inspection of this area.
The inspector requested that the boot installed on the topside of this penetration be removed for inspection.
The licensee concurred in the need for this inspection and is issuing a
STAR.
A safety evaluation of a suitable boot replacement will delay the actual inspection several weeks.
One additional pipe penetration located through the wall above the stairs going down to the 1A RCDT Pump showed signs of separation from the wall.
A closer inspection of this penetration will be performed by the licensee.
Fire damper FDPR-25-110 and FDPR-25-110 access covers were removed and the fire dampers examined.
Direct observation confirmed that the dampers were intact and clean.
The licensee recently inspected all plant fire dampers and replaced a large number of broken springs.
A routine inspection of several other fire dampers did not identify any additional deficiencies.
An examination of an electrical conduit fire stop found a
void portion in an area on the top.
Observation on the bottom side of the fire stop showed that the void did not extend through due to the presence of the fire retardant board.
This was determined to be acceptable by gC and the inspector.
7)
Fire Protection Engineer The fire protection engineer graduated from an accredited university in 1978 with a dual degree in both nuclear and mechanical engineering.
He has been employed by FPLL since graduation in progressively more responsible engineering positions including assignment as the corporate fire protection engineer since 1986 and meets the qualification requirements for this position.
It was noted that the fire protection engineer works in the corporate office in Juno Beach and is responsible for St.
Lucie and Turkey Point plants.
He is charged with engineering oversight of this program.
A review of the site access log for the last twelve months showed monthly visits with sufficient time onsite to perform assigned duties including access to vital areas.
The actual day-to-day operation and
administration of the plant fire protection program is directed by the plant fire protection supervisor.
8)
Appendix R Fire Protection Features Appendix R to Part 50 - Fire Protection Program for Nuclear Power Facilities Operating Prior to January, 1979,Section III.H states,
"Self-contained breathing apparatus...shall be provided for fire brigade, damage control, and control room personnel".
The licensee does not maintain an emergency roster of damage control or "re-entry team" personnel.
HP and shop workers receive SCBA training as determined by their department conducted by either qualified HP instructors or the training department.
No control room personnel other than SROs qualified as fire brigade leaders are currently SCBA qualified.
This was discussed with the licensee and they are currently evaluating this item to determine what changes are needed.
Overall, the licensee fire protection program was found to be satisfactory.
The weaknesses identified during the inspection have been discussed in detail and the licensee has agreed to make the necessary changes.
The inspector plans to review these changes as they are implemented.
9)
Fire Protection Survey The following information was provided by the licensee in response to questions arising from the Waterford 3 fire of June.
The responses are presented in the format requested by NRC Region II.
A.
What is the composition of the fire brigade and their normal duties (other than fire brigade)?
The PSL Fire Brigade is composed of plant operations personnel.
The five man brigade includes the Nuclear Watch Engineer (Senior Reactor Operator, Fire Brigade Leader)
who is in charge of the remaining four brigade members, the on-shift field operators.
The Nuclear Watch Engineer is the operating foreman for the field operators under normal operations, and has no specific duties called out under the Emergency Operating Procedures or the Emergency Plan.
The Associate Nuclear Plant Operator is responsible for the water treatment plant, intake areas and other miscellaneous out-lying facilities.
The Nuclear Plant Operator is responsible for the turbine building and it's associated equipment.
The Senior Nuclear plant Operator is responsible for the equipment located inside the RC When would the fire brigade be activated?
(i.e. first report of smoke, after flames are confirmed, after stabilizing the plant, after being relieved for post, etc.)
The PSL Fire Brigade would be activated to respond to a
fire after the control room has received notification of a fire.
In the event of a fire concurrent with additional plant events, the Nuclear Plant Supervisor would analyze plant conditions and prioritize the appropriate corrective actions to ensure reactor safety is maintained.
Would other events/duties take priority over manning the fire brigade?
(e.g. operational event, security event, restarting a diesel, loss of power to security alarm requiring a compensatory post, etc.)
See response to item 2 above.
What is the criteria to call a fire?
(i.e.
smoke only is enough, flames are required, etc.)
Verification of smoke is sufficient to report a fire to the control room.
Is the fire alarm in the control room audible and visible during other annunciations such as would be seen during a
reactor trip or LOOP?
Annunciation, both audible and visible, for sprinkler systems and fire pumps running are located on the Reactor Turbine Gauge Boards in the control rooms.
The Fire Detection Computer provides an audible alarm in the control room.
This system also provides indication of the affected zone and provides the control room operators with the ability to call up a graphical representation of the alarmed area.
Would the licensee combat an electrical switchgear fire with water fog and under what conditions?
(i.e. verify busses are deenergized)
During training, Fire Brigade members are trained in the use of water for fighting fires in motors and metal clad switchgear.
The first step is to deenergize the equipment.
Brigade members are trained to use electrical fog nozzles and maintain at least six feet of distance from the equipment and always assume it is energized.
Initial training involves use of a video tape presentation regarding the use of water on energized equipment.
Training does not involve actual water spray on energized electrical equipmen G.
Are there any fire brigade manning differences during backshift?
The five man fire brigade is maintained 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> a day regardless of shift, day of week, holiday or other circumstances.
H.
How often does the licensee test the fire brigade during backshifts.
CFR 50 Appendix "R" states each shift should have at least one fire drill on the backshift a year.
In 1994, a
total of 12 fire drills were given on the backshift at PSL; each shift received at least one drill on the back shift, most received more than one.
E I.
What fire conditions would cause the declaration of an NOUE, alert, etc.?
From Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure 3100022E
"Classification of Emergencies":
Notice of Unusual Event:
Uncontrolled fire within the plant lasting more than ten minutes.
Alert:
Uncontrolled fire, 1. Potentially affecting safety systems AND 2. Requiring off-site support in the opinion of the Nuclear Plant Supervisor/Emergency Coordinator.
Site Area Emergency:
Fire compromising the function of safety systems (i.e. both trains rendered INOPERABLE)
General Emergency:
Refer to Potential Core Helt Event J.
What criteria is used to request off-site assistance?
From Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure 3100025E "Fire Emergencies":
If the fire is too large to be controlled by available plant forces, then off-site fire assistance shall be called by the Emergency Coordinator.
b.
Physical Protection During this inspection, the inspector toured the protected area and noted that the perimeter fence was intact and not compromised by erosion or disrepair.
The fence fabric was secured and barbed wire was angled as required by the licensee's PSP.
Isolation zones were maintained on both sides of the barrier and were free of objects which could shield or conceal an individua The inspector observed personnel and packages entering the protected area were searched either by special purpose detectors or by a physical patdown for firearms, explosives and contraband.
The processing and escorting of visitors was observed.
Yehicles were searched, escorted, and secured as described in the PSP.
Lighting of the perimeter and of the protected area met the 0.2 foot-candle criteria.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Radiological Protection Program Radiation protection control activities were observed to verify that these activities were in conformance with the facility policies and procedures, and in compliance with regulatory requirements.
These observations included:
Entry to and exit from contaminated areas, including step-off pad conditions and disposal of contaminated clothing; Area postings and controls; Work activity within radiation, high radiation, and contaminated areas; RCA exiting practices; and, Proper wearing of personnel monitoring equipment, protective clothing, and respiratory equipment.
As a result of gA audit findings of two examples of SNH control deficiencies (material stored in areas not in compliance with AP 0010433, Rev 27, "Special Nuclear Haterial Control, Records and Reports" ) the inspector conducted an audit of the licensee's storage of accessible SNH.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's inventory of SNH, prepared in accordance with the subject procedure, and, with the assistance of HP personnel, verified the locations of 18 pieces of SNH.
Of the 18, 12 pieces were stored as replacement items (incore and excore fission chambers)
in the G-1 warehouse.
Of the 12, 3 pieces (replacement moveable incore fission chambers)
were found without radioactive material identification tags.
The balance were properly identified.
Further, the 12 total pieces stored in the warehouse were found to be stored on racks amidst other stores items.
The inspector reviewed HPP-80, Rev 0, "Receipt of Radioactive Haterial,"
and noted the following procedural requirements:
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"5.9 HP shall ensure that radioactive materials packages, once received and inspected are properly tagged,
"Caution, Radioactive Haterial".I'sic]
Packages of radioactive material that are to be left in NHH control awaiting inspection or release shall
~
"7.14 be maintained in a properly posted and locked area.
This is a
NMM responsibility."
[after survey of receipt material] Place a 'Caution, Radioactive Material'ag on the outer package..."
~
"7.20 Ensure that packages of radioactive material that are to be left in NMM control are kept in properly posted and secured Radioactive Materials Area."
Following the identification of the 3 pieces in question, HP personnel surveyed and tagged the outer containers appropriately.
The inspector noted that the containers had been originally identified via a form, placed on the containers in accordance with a previous revision of AP-0010433, which required HP notification prior to the movement of the SNM.
On the form, the sources were identified isotopically as
.01 micro-Ci of U-235,
.25 micro-Ci of U-234, and
.01 micro-Ci of Co-60.
The inspector noted that
CFR 20. 1904(a) required, in part, that each container of licensed material bear "...a durable, clearly visible label bearing the radiation symbol and the words
'CAUTION, RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL'r 'DANGER, RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL...'," unless, as provided in 10 CFR 20. 1905, the container held material in quantities less than those specified in appendix C to
CFR 20. 1001-20.2401.
The inspector referenced the subject appendix and found the threshold levels for U-234 (.001 micro-Ci) and U-235 (.001 micro-Ci) to be below the inventoried levels in the subject pieces.
Consequently, the licensee's failure to appropriately label the subject containers prior to the inspector's finding is a violation.
However, the inspector noted that the licensee took quick action to place radioactive material tags on the containers in question and that HPP-80 (which came into effect after the material was received)
required tagging of radioactive material containers upon receipt (conceivably protecting against recurrence.
This failure constitutes a violation of minor significance and is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation, consistent with Section IV of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
This will be identified as NCV 50-335,389/95-12-02,
"Failure to Properly Tag Radioactive Materials."
The inspector noted that
CFR 20. 1903(c) stated that
"A room or area is not required to be posted with a caution sign because of the presence of a sealed source provided that the radiation level at 30 cm from the surface of the source container or housing does not exceed 0.005 rem (.05 mSv) per hour."
The inspector verified that surveys taken of the containers indicated dose rates below this threshold value.
However, the licensee's failure to post a
radioactive materials area around the 12 pieces stored in the G-1 warehouse was in contradiction of the requirements of step 7.20 of HPP-80.
The inspector discussed this matter with members of the licensee's HP organization, who pointed out that the materials in question were received on site prior to the.,issuance on HPP-80 (May,
1995),
thus the procedure had not been applied to the subject material upon receipt.
The inspector examined previous revisions of HP-40A, "Receipt of Radioactive Haterial," the predecessor of HPP-80, and verified that there was no previous requirement for the storage of the subject pieces in designated radioactive material storage areas.
Therefore, the inspector concluded that the failure to store the subject material per HPP-80 requirements was the result of an oversight on the part of HP personnel, in that material stored previous to the issuance of HPP-80 were not reviewed under the new requirements.
The area containing the materials was subsequently labeled as a radioactive materials storage area.
Engineering Support (37550)
Power Range Nuclear Instrumentation Temporary Modification (IP37550)
On May 30, 1995, Unit 1 Power Range Nuclear Instrumentation System (NIS)
Excore Detector Channel D (detector no. 8) was exhibiting erratic behavior.
The axial shape index showed a drop which led to the initiation of Nuclear Plant Work Order NPWO 63/3639 to investigate this condition.
The low output signal from safety related NIS linear power range channel D (LRD) could be caused by a faulty detector or a short in the detector cable.
The problem was determined to be located inside the containment and could not be repaired at power.
The detector/cable insulation resistance acceptance criteria was a one megohm and the measured values reported in the work order ranged from 90 to 20,000 ohms from center conductor to shield.
The normal Reactor Protective System NIS trip logic was two out of four.
However, with the faulty detector channel in trip the trip logic was reduced to one out of three.
St.
Lucie Action Report, STAR 1-950581 was written for this issue.
The STAR recommended using non-safety related B train control channel (CC2)
NIS detector No.
10 to replace LRD, detector No. 8, by use of a jumper in the main control room from detector No.
10 to NIS channel D drawer.
Unit 1 temporary modification, Jumper and Lifted Lead (JLL), JLL-1-95-018 implemented this change.
A part of the STAR 1-950581 evaluated the initial operability and concluded that the temporary modification did not affect plant operability.
Safety Evaluation JPN-PSL-SENP-95-049, Alternate NIS Excore Detector Arrangement, revision 1, provided justification for the jumpers.
The safety evaluation concluded that plant technical specifications were met and that the plant design basis was met except for electrical separation between excore NIS channels B
and D.
The Unit 1 design basis required conformance to IEEE standard 279-1971, Criteria For Protection Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations.
The standard requires channel independence to protect against environmental factors of electrical transients, physical accidents, and to reduce interactions due to channel malfunctions.
Electrical separation design basis requirements of 4 feet vertical and
inches horizontal for NIS channel B and control channel
(now channel D)
were not met from inside containment junction box B1072 to control room panel RTGB104.
The channel B and control channel 2 cables were routed in the same raceways.
The safety evaluation determined that this was acceptable because the cables were not part of the Unit 1 safe shutdown circuits and that the cables were signal cables of low power/energy.
Additionally, the cables were not routed in areas where they would be exposed to significant physical hazards.
The A and C channel NIS cables were not routed with the B and D channel NIS cables.
The safety evaluation concluded that the temporary jumpering of the CC2 detector to NIS LRD drawer was acceptable and that at the first outage jumpers would be installed inside containment between LRD detector No.
10 and CC2 detector No.
8 which would maintain the channel separation requirements until the next refueling outage when the detector/cable could be repaired or replaced.
The inspectors performed a walkdown and verified that the jumper configuration was installed in accordance with Jumper and Lifted Lead (JLL) 1-95-018 requirements.
The control room Jumper and Lifted Lead Log contained marked up drawings showing the jumpers.
All the jumpers and affected switches were properly installed and tagged.
The reactor regulating switch was selected to channel 1 and the power rat'io calculator switch for control channel 2 was in the off position.
The inspectors reviewed the Unit 1 Essential Equipment List 8770-B-049, revision 1,
and verified that the NIS linear power range detector circuits were not required for Appendix R safe shutdown.
The inspectors reviewed drawing 8770-B-327, sheet 61, revision 10, and 8770-B-327, sheet 63, revision
and verified that isolation between safety related and non-safety related circuits was maintained.
No non-safety related power was connected to the safety related NIS linear channel D drawer/cabinet.
The inspectors reviewed licensee printouts from the procurement database and noted that detectors no.
8 and 10 were supplied on the same purchase order to the same specification requirements and quality level.
NIS channel A and C received power from the same train of power and NIS channels B and D received power from the opposite train of power.
The inspectors reviewed selected cables from raceways HB-L121, L125, L31, L35, and L39 and verified that the cables were not channel A or C cables.
The inspectors also verified that these trays which carried signal cables did not contain power cables.
The cables reviewed included:
10056D, 10056E, 10056F)
10083A, 100988, 10376D, 10376E, 11031H)
11031J, 11031S, 11031T, and 11031P.
After reviewing the JLL-1-95-018 installation and the safety evaluation, the inspectors concluded that the safety evaluation determined that the alternate excore detector arrangement was acceptable.
The arrangement did not violate technical specifications and met the Unit 1 plant design basis except for electrical separation.
The temporary alternate detector electrical separation arrangement was judged to be acceptable due to the low power of the circuits involved and the lack of physical hazards in the locations of the circuits.
The safety evaluation stated that the
licensee will place jumpers from detector no.
10 to detector no.
8 inside the containment at the next mode 3 or mode 4 outage and will repair or replace the faulty detector/cable at the next refueling outage.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on June 30, 1995, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.
The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results listed below.
Proprietary material is not contained in this report.
Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.
~T e
Item Number NCV 50-335/95-12-01 Closed Failure to Invoke the Jumper/Lifted Lead Process, paragraph 3.d. 1).
NCV 50-335,389/95-12-02 Closed Abbreviations, Acronyms, and Initialisms Failure to Properly Tag Radioactive Materials, paragraph 5.c.
AC AEOD ANPS AP AS ASME ATTN CC CCW CFR CMH CWD DC DEH DPR ECCS EDG EHP EQ ESF ESFAS FO FPL FRG FSAR GMP H.A.D.
Alternating Current Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data, Office for (NRC)
Assistant Nuclear Plant Supervisor Administrative Procedure Action Statement American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Attention Cubic Centimeter Component Cooling Water Code of Federal Regulations Critical Maintenance Management Control Wiring Diagram Direct Current Digital Electro-Hydraulic (turbine control system)
Demonstration Power Reactor (A type of operating license)
Emergency Core Cooling System Emergency Diesel Generator Electrical Maintenance Procedure Environmentally Qualified Engineered Safety Feature Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Fuel Oil The Florida Power
& Light Company Facility Review Group Final Safety Analysis Report General Maintenance Procedure Heat Activating Device
HCV HP HPP HPSI I&C IAW IEEE IR ISI J/LL JPN LCO LOI LOOP LPSI M&TE HFP HP HSIV HT HTC NaOH NCR NCV NMH No.
NOUE NPF NPS NPWO NRC NWE OD ohm OHM OP PCR PH psig PSL PSP PT PWO QA QC RAB RCA RCDT RCO REHACS Rev RII
Engineers perating license)
s Control System Hydraulic Control Valve Health Physics Health Physics Procedure High Pressure Safety Injection (system)
Instrumentation and Control In Accordance With Institute of Electrical and Electronics
[NRC] Inspection Report InService Inspection (program)
Jumper/Lifted Lead (Juno Beach)
Nuclear Engineering TS Limiting Condition for Operation Letter of Instruction Loss of Offsite Power Low Pressure Safety Injection (system)
Measuring
& Test Equipment Hain Feed Pump Maintenance Procedure Hain Steam Isolation Valve Magnetic Particle Test Moderator Temperature Coefficient Sodium Hydroxide Non Conformance Report NonCited Violation (of NRC requirements)
Nuclear Materials Management Number Notice of Unusual Event Nuclear Production Facility (a type of o Nuclear Plant Supervisor Nuclear Plant Work Order Nuclear Regulatory Commission Nuclear Watch Engineer Outside Diameter Unit of Electrical Resistance Occupational Health Management Operating Procedure Procedure Change Request Preventive Maintenance Pounds per square inch (gage)
Plant St. Lucie Physical Security Plan Liquid Penetrant Test Plant Work Order Quality Assurance Quality Control Reactor Auxiliary Building Radiation Control Area Reactor Coolant Drain Tank Reactor Control Operator Radiation Exposure Monitoring and Acces Revision Region II - Atlanta, Georgia (NRC)
RK rpm RWP RWT SCBA SE SNH SNPO SRO St.
STAR TS TSC UFSAR VDC Radial Keratotomy Revolutions per Hinute Radiation Work Permit Refueling Water Tank Self Contained Breathing Apparatus Safety Evaluation Special Nuclear Haterial Senior Nuclear Plant [unlicensed]
Operator Senior Reactor [licensed] Operator Saint St.
Lucie Action Request Technical Specification(s)
Technical Support Center Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Volts Direct Current