IR 05000335/1995018

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Responds to Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-335/95-18 & 50-389/95-18.Corrective Actions:Location of Key 21 Was Verified & Valve/Switch Deviation Log Entry for Afas Bypass Switch Closed Out on 951004
ML17228B369
Person / Time
Site: Saint Lucie  NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 12/15/1995
From: GOLDBERG J H
FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
L-95-336, NUDOCS 9512270114
Download: ML17228B369 (13)


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MA~MJ.j.7!ACCELERATEDRIDSPROCESSliREGULATORYINFORMATIONDISTRIBUTIONSYSTEM(RIDS)CCESSIONNBR:9512270114DOC.DATE:95/12/15NOTARIZED:NOFACIL:50-335St.LuciePlant,Unit1,FloridaPower&LightCo.50-389St.LuciePlant,Unit2,FloridaPower&LightCo.AUTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATIONGOLDBERG,J.H.FloridaPower&LightCo.RECIP.NAMERECIPIENTAFFILIATIONDocumentControlBranch(DocumentControlDesk)

SUBJECT: Respondstoviolationsnote'dininsprepts50-335/95-18&50-389/95-18.Correctiveactions:locationofkey21wasverified&valve/switchdeviationlogentryforAFASbypassswitchclosedouton951004.DISTRIBUTIONCODE:IE01DCOPIESRECEIVED:LTRENCLSIZE-TITLE:General(50Dkt)-InspRept/NoticeofVioationResponseNOTESDOCKETFT0500033505000389RECIPIENTIDCODE/NAMEPD2-1PDINTERNAL:ACRSAEOD/SPD/RABDEDRONRR/DISP/PIPBNRR/DRPM/PECBNUDOCS-ABSTRACTOGC/HDS3EXTERNALLITCOBRYCEIJHNRCPDRCOPIESLTTRENCL11221111111111111111RECIPIENTIDCODE/NAMENORRIS,JAEOD/DEIBAEOD/TQCPI'hECENTE~RNRR/DRCH/HHFBNRR/DRPM/PERBOEDIRRGN2FILE01NOACCOPIESLTTRENCL111111111111111111NOTETOALL"RIDS"RECIPIENTS;PLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEiiVASTE!CONTACITHEDOCL'CLIENTCONTROLDESK.ROOMPI-37(EXT.504-2083)TOELIXII.'CATEYOUR.CAMEPROD!DISTRIBUTIOiJLISTSI'ORDOClMEN'I'SYOUDON"I'EED!OTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:LTTR20ENCL20 FloridaPower8>>LightCompany,P.O.Box128,FortPierce,FL34954.0128December15,1995L-95-33610CFR2.201U.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommissionAttn:DocumentControlDeskWashington,D.C.20555Re:St.LucieUnitS1and2DocketNo.50-335and50-389ReplytoNoticeofViolationInsectionReort95-18FloridaPowerandLightCompanyhasreviewedthesubjectinspectionreportandpursuantto10CFR2.201theresponsetothenoticeofviolationisattached.Verytrulyyours,J.H.GoldbergPresident-NuclearDivisionJHG/FPSAttachmentcc:StewartD.Ebneter,RegionalAdministrator,USNRCRegionIISeniorResidentInspector,USNRC,St.LuciePlant'r>>512270114'751215PDRADOCK050003359PDRanFPLGroupcompany Re:St.LucieUns1and2DocketNo.50-335and50-389ReplytoNoticeofViolationInsectionReort95-18ViolationATechnicalSpecification6.8.1.arequiredthatwrittenproceduresbeestablished,implemented,andmaintainedcoveringtheactivitiesrecommendedinAppendixAofRegulatoryGuide1~33,Rev2,February1978.AppendixA,paragraph1.dincludesadministrativeproceduresforproceduraladherence.ProcedureQI5-PR/PSL-1,Rev62,"Preparation,Revision,Review/ApprovalofProcedures,"Section5.13.2,statedthatallproceduresshallbestrictlyadheredto.Contrarytotheabove,procedureswerenotadheredtostrictlyinthefollowingexamples:AP1-0010123,Rev99,"AdministrativeControlsofValves,Locks,andSwitches,"required:that"AllvalveorswitchpositiondeviationsorlockopeningsshallbedocumentedinAppendixCValveSwitchDeviationLog...".[step8.1.6];that"TheNPS/ANPS/NWEshallensurethattheverificationofthestatusofallvalves,locksandswitchesunderAdministrativeControlisperformedattherequiredintervalsspecifiedinAP1-0010125...[step8.3.1]which"Verifiesthatlogentriesarecurrentandvalid".[step8.3.2.3];andthat"AlogofkeysissuedshallbemaintainedbytheANPSfortheControlledKeyLocker...AppendixB,RackKeyLog"...[step8.2.2].OnSeptember30,1995,duringaSteamGeneratordrainingevolutiononSt.LucieUnit1,operatorsfailedtomakeanAppendixBlogentrywhentheAFASABBYPASSSWITCH(KeyN21)wasissuedandreturned.Further,theNPS/ANPS/NWEverificationofthestatusoftheAFASABBYPASSSWITCHAppendixClogentryperformedonthemidnightshiftsofOctober1throughOctober3,1995,failedtoverifythatthelogentrywascurrentorvalid.2.AP2-0010123,Rev68,"AdministrativeControlsofValves,Locks,andSwitches,"required:that"AllvalveorswitchpositiondeviationsorlockopeningsshallbedocumentedinAppendixCValveSwitchDeviationLog...".[step8.1.6];andthat"TheNPS/ANPS/NWEshallensurethattheverificationofthestatusofallvalves,locksandswitchesunderAdministrativeControlisperformedattherequiredintervalsspecifiedinAP1-0010125...[step8.3.1]which"Verifiesthatlogentriesarecurrentandvalid"...[step8.3.2.3].OP2-0400050,Rev16,"PeriodicTestoftheEngineeredSafetyFeatures,"requiredthat"Thefollowinglogswillbereviewedpriortotheperformanceofapplicabletestsections...TheValveSwitchDeviationLog."[step5.3.1]

Re:St.LucieUs1and2DocketNo.50-335and50-389ReplytoNoticeofViolationInsectionReort95-18Contrarytotheabove,onOctober7,1995,duringtroubleshootingofAFASChannelDonSt.LucieUnit2,operatorsfailedtomaketheappropriateAppendixClogentrieswhentheAFASCABINETDOOR(Key5202)wasrestoredat2:00PM.orwhentheAFASCABINETDOORwasreopenedandrestoredat2:35PMand4:10PM,respectively.Further,theNPS/ANPS/NWEverificationofthestatusoftheAFASCABINETDOORperformedonthemidnightshiftsofOctober8throughOctober10,1995,failedtoverifythattheAppendixClogentryfortheAFASCABINETDOORwascurrentorvalid.ThisisaSeverityLevelIVviolation(SupplementI).FPLResonse1.CONCURRENCEANDREASONFORTHEVIOLATIONFPLconcurswiththeviolation.Therootcauseofthiseventwasasfollows:(1)failuretofollowproceduresinthattheshiftoperatorsfailedtoadequatelymaintaintheRackKeyLogand,(2)failuretofollowproceduresinthattheoperatorsdidnotadequatelymaintaintheValve/SwitchDeviationLog.Acontributingfactorwasthattheprocedure/checksheetusedformaintainingstatuscontroloftheValve/SwitchDeviationLogdidnotprovideinstructionswithrespecttoensuringthattheValve/SwitchDeviationLogentrieswerecurrentand.valid.Asstatedabove,theoperatorsarerequiredbyAdministrativeProcedureAP1-0010123,"AdministrativeControlsofValves,Locks,andSwitches,"tomaintainalogofkeysissuedfromtheControlledKeyLocker.ThelogisdescribedinAppendixB,RackKeyLog.OnSeptember30,1995,shiftoperatorsfailedtomakeanAppendixBlogentrywhentheAFASABBypassSwitchkeywasissuedfrom(andsubsequentlyreturnedto)theControlledKeyLockertoallowfortheAFASSwitchtobeplacedintheBypasspositionforworkassociatedwithsteamgeneratorcoolingandwetlayup.Therequirementformaintenanceofthislogisclearlydefinedinthesubjectprocedure.Alackofattentiontodetailonthepartoftheoperatorsresultedinafailuretomeettheproceduralrequirements.AP1-0010123alsorequiresthatvalveandswitchpositiondeviationsbedocumentedinAppendixC,Valve/SwitchDeviationLog.ThisAPalsorequiresthataverificationofthestatus(e.g.,position)ofallvalves,switches,andlocksunderadministrativecontrolbeperformedatintervals(specifiedinAP1-0010125)tobeeachmidnightshiftwhileinModes1- Re:St.LucieUs1and2DocketNo.50-335and50-389ReplytoNoticeofViolationInsectionReort95-18OnOctober7,1995,shiftoperatorsfailedtomaketheappropriateAppendixCentrieswhentheAFASCabinetdoor(Keyg202)wasrestored,reopened,andrestoredagain.Thisfailurewastheresultofalackofattentiontodetailonthepartoftheoperators.Inaddition,theoperators'eviewoftheValve/SwitchDeviationLog,performedonthemidnightshiftsofOctober8-10,1995,failedtoverifythattheAppendixClogentriesfortheAFASCabinetdoorwerecurrentandvalid.However,thechecklistfortheimplementingAP(AP1-0010125)forthemidnightshiftverificationonlyrequiredthattheoperatorsreviewtheValve/SwitchDeviationLogtoensurethatnovalvesorswitcheswereinanalignmentwhichcouldcauseaTechSpecLCOtobeexceeded.NodirectionwasgiveninthisAPtoverifythatthelogentrieswerecurrentandvalid.AcontributingfactortothefailuretoadequatelyverifythestatusofthelogentrieswasaproceduraldeficiencyinCheckSheet2ofAP1-0010125.2~CORRECTIVESTEPSTAKENANDRESULTSACHIEVEDA.ThelocationofKey521wasverifiedandtheValve/SwitchDeviationLogentryfortheAFASBypassSwitchwasclosedoutonOctober4,1995.B.ThelocationofKey5202wasverifiedandtheValve/SwitchDeviationLogentryfortheAFASCabinetDoorswasclosedoutonOctober11,1995.3.CORRECTIVESTEPSTOBETAKENTOAVOIDFURTHERVIOLATIONSANightOrderwasissuedonNovember10,1995thatrequiredtheANPStoreviewtheValve/SwitchDeviationLogeachshifttoensurethattheverificationofthestatusofallvalves,locks,andswitchesunderAdministrativeControlisperformedatspecifiedintervalsandthatthelogentriesarecurrentandvalid.B.ATemporaryProcedureChangetoAP-0010125hasbeenimplementedtoincorporatethefollowingchanges:1.TheNPSwillreviewtheValve/SwitchDeviationLogeachshift.2.TheANPSwillreviewtheKeyRackLogeachmidnightshift.,3.TheSTAwillreviewtheValve/SwitchDeviationLogonceperweek.C.AProcedureChangeRequesthasbeensubmittedtopermanentlyincorporatethechangeslistedin(3B)abov Re:St.LucieUs1and2DocketNo.50-335and50-389ReplytoNoticeofViolationInsectionReort95-184.DATEOFFULLCOMPLIANCEFullCompliancewasachievedonOctober11,1995.VIOLATIONBTechnicalSpecification6.8.1.arequiredthatwrittenproceduresbeestablished,implemented,andmaintainedcoveringtheactivitiesrecommendedinAppendixAofRegulatoryGuide1.33,Rev2,February1978.AppendixA,paragraph1.cincludesadministrativeproceduresforequipmentcontrol.ProcedureQI14-PR/PSL-1,Rev25,"Inspection's,TestandOperatingStatus,"Section5.5,statedthatequipmentclearancetagsbeattachedtotheisolatingswitchfuseorvalveaccordingtoOP0010122,Rev59,"In-PlantEquipmentClearanceOrders."Step4.1requiresthataclearanceshallberequiredwhenoperationofequipmentcouldcreateahazardtopersonnelorequipment.ContrarytotheaboveonSeptember15,1995,duringthecleaningofUnit2condenserwaterboxes,the2B2waterboxmanwaywasremovedtoreplacealeakinggasketwithoutimplementingaclearance.Whenthemaintenanceforemanandmechanicattemptedtoremovethemanwaycover,thenegativepressurethatexistedacrossthemanwaysuckedthecoverbackonthewaterboxandseveredaportionofthemechanicsfinger.ThisisaSeverityLevelIVviolation(SupplementI).FPLResonseCONCURRENCEANDREASONFORTHEVIOLATIONFPLconcurswiththeviolation.TherootcauseoftheeventwasafailuretofollowproceduresinthatthepartiesinvolvedfailedtoobtaintheproperworkclearancesinaccordancewithOP0010122,"In-PlantEquipmentClearanceOrders."OnSeptember15,theUnit22B2waterboxmanwaywasobservedtobeleakingfollowingthestartof2B2circulatingwaterpumpafterwaterboxcleaning.Adecisionwasmadetoreplacethemanwaygasket.TheMechanicalMaintenanceforemanworkingthisjobinformedtheANPSthatthegasketreplacementwouldbeashortdurationtask.TheANPSandmaintenanceforemandecidedthataclearancewouldnotberequiredaslongasoperatorswerestationedatboththelocalcirculatingwaterpumppushbuttonstationandatthecontrolswitchonRTGB202,topreventinadvertentpumpstar Re:St.LucieUs1and2DocketNo.50-335and50-389ReplytoNoticeofViolationInsectionReort95-18Atll:41p.m.,the2B2CWPwasstopped.OP2-0620020,Rev26,"CirculatingWaterNormalOperatingProcedure,"Step4.14,statedthat,ifCWpumpswerebeingshutdownoneatatimeforwaterboxcleaning,section8.8oftheaboveprocedurewastobeused.Step8.8.4statedthatagreenflagontheCWpumpcontrolswitchinthecontrolroomindicatedthatthewaterboxvacuumbreakerwouldopenandthesteamsupplyvalvetothewaterboxprimerwouldclose.Basedontheaboveguidance,theCWPcontrolswitchwasgreenflaggedandpermissionwasgrantedbyoperationstomechanicalmaintenancetobeginmanwaygasketreplacement.Themanwaycoverboltswereremovedandthemechanicalmaintenanceforemanandamechanicattemptedtoremovethemanwaycover.Whenthepressuresealwasbroken,themechanicallowedhisrightindexfingertocomebetweenthecoverandthewaterbox.Anegativepressuredevelopedandsuckedthecoverbackontoitsflangeandseveredpartofthemechanicsfinger.AsubsequentreviewofthecontrolwiringdiagramsforthevacuumbreakerfoundthattheCWPbreaker'controlfuseshadtoberemovedtoopenthevacuumbreakers.Areviewoftheeventfoundthat:~NeitherthemaintenanceworkersnortheANPSanticipatedthatavacuumwouldexistoncetheCWPwassecured.~ThestepsintheprocedureforCWPoperationindicatedthatwhentheCWPcontrolswitchwasgreenflagged,nootherprecautionswererequired.~Themaintenanceworkers,afterdiscussionswiththeANPS,didnotverifythatthesystemwasde-energizedpriortostartingwork.2.CORRECTIVESTEPSTAKENANDRESULTSACHIEVED3~A.Theinjuredemployeewastransportedtothehospital.B.Workwascompletedandthesystemrestoredtoservice.CORRECTIVESTEPSTOBETAKENTOAVOIDFURTHERVIOLATIONSA.Disciplinaryactionwas'takenagainsttheOperationsandMaintenancesupervisioninvolvedinthedecisiontoworkwithoutproperclearance Re:St.LucieUs1and2DocketNo.50-335and50-389ReplytoNoticeofViolationInsectionReort95-18B.ASafetyIncident/AccidentReportwascompletedbytheLocalJointAdvisorySafetyCommittee.Thisreportevaluatedthesafeworkpracticerequirementsforthistypeofmaintenance.Expectationsforsafeworkpracticesweredisseminatedthroughthe"SafetyAlert"process.C.OP"1[2]-0620020,"CirculatingWaterNormalOperatingProcedure,"wasrevisedtoclarifytherequirementsassociatedwithopeningthevacuumbreakers.D.OP0010122,"In-PlantClearanceOrders,"wasrevisedtoprovidemorespecificitywithrespecttowhatmaintenanceactivitiescanbeperformedwithoutan,equipmentclearance.E.Themaintenanceprocedureforcondenserwaterboxcleaningandrepair,M-0921,wasrevisedtoaddacautionstatementabouttheremovalofmanways.Also,thestandardNuclearPlantWorkOrderforwaterboxcleaninghasbeenrevisedtoexercisecautionwhenopeningthecondensercoolingsystem.F.TheSiteTrainingDepartmentwillpresentthistopicatafutureIn-HouseEventstrainingclass.4.DATEOFFULLCOMPLIANCEFullcompliancewasachievedonSeptember16,1995.VIOLATION10CFR50AppendixBQualityAssuranceCriteriaforNuclearPowerPlantsandFuelProcessingPlantsrequired,inpart:that"Measuresshallbeestablishedtoassurethatapplicableregulatoryrequirementsandthedesignbasis,asdefinedin550.2andasspecifiedinthelicenseapplication,forthosesystems,structuresandcomponentstowhichthisappendixappliesarecorrectlytranslatedintospecifications,drawings,procedures,andinstructions."..."Thedesigncontrolmeasuresshallprovideforverifyingorcheckingtheadequacyofdesign,suchasbytheperformanceofdesignreviews,bytheuseofalternateorsimplifiedcalculationalmethods,orbytheperformanceofasuitabletestingprogram."[IIIDESIGNCONTROL]

Re:St~LucieUs1and2DocketNo.50-335and50-389ReplytoNoticeofViolationInsectionReort95-18that"Atestprogramshallbeestablishedtoassurethatalltestingrequiredtodemonstratethatstructures,systems,andcomponentswillperformsatisfactorilyinserviceisidentifiedandperformed..."[XITESTCONTROL]Contrarytotheabove,thelicenseeimplementedaUnit2EmergencyDieselGenerator(EDG)controllogicdesignthatdidnottriptheEDGoutputbreakeronreceiptofaCSASorCIASsignalwhenparallelledwithoffsitepower.Thisinadequatedesignresultedinshiftingthegovernortotheisochronousmode,bypassingallprotectiverelaysexceptoverspeedanddifferentialcurrentduringintegratedsafeguardstestingonOctober12,1995.ThisresultedinoperatingtheEDGasasynchronousmotorforapproximately45secondsuntiltheCIASsignalwasreset.Operationintheisochronousmodewhileparalleledwithoffsitepowercouldexposetheengineandgeneratortoexcessivemechanicalstressorelectricalovercurrentconditions.ThisisaSeverityLevelIVviolation(SupplementI).FPLResonseCONCURRENCEANDREASONFORTHEVIOLATIONFPLconcurswiththeviolation.TherootcauseoftheviolationwasafailuretoidentifyadesigndeficiencyduringinitialdesignandtestingandtoadequatelyreviewtherevisedIntegratedSafeguardsTestprocedurepriortoimplementationonUnit2.TheperformanceofarevisedIntegratedSafeguardsTestidentifiedanequipmentconcerninwhichanundesirablelogicresponsecouldoccurfromaspuriousCIASsignalwithoutitsaccompanyingSIASsignal.TheoriginalplantdesignoftheUnit2EDGSIAS/CIAS/CSASlogicwasarrangedsuchthatduringasurveillancerunwiththeEDGconnectedtotheoffsitepowergrid,theEDGcouldhavebeenpotentiallydamageduponreceiptofaspuriousCIASsignal.TherevisedIntegratedSafeguardsTest,whichhadbeenrecentlyenhancedtomorefullytestdiscretecircuitlogicpaths,inadvertentlycreatedthisconditiononthe2AEDG,resultinginareversepowerconditionuntiltheCIASsignalwasresetafterapproximately45seconds.AsubtledifferencebetweenUnit1andUnit2wasdiscoveredasaresultofthereversepowerincidentandisconsideredthemaincontributingcause.TheUnit1EDGsusethesame Re:St.LucieUs1and2DocketNo.50-335and50-389ReplytoNoticeofViolationInsectionReort95-18frequencyreferenceforbothdroop(followsgridfrequency)andisochronous(internalfrequencyreference)modes;thus,switchingfromdrooptoisochronousmodeswouldnotchangethespeedoftheEDG.TheUnit2EDGsusedifferentfrequencyreferencesfordroopandisochronousmodes;switchingofthefrequencyreferenceisdoneusingcontactsfromthesamerelaythatprovidestheEDGstartsignal.TheactualgovernorchangefromdrooptoisochronousforbothUnit1and2EDGsiscontrolledbythe4160Vbusfeederbreakerposition.InthecaseofaUnit2SIASactuation,theEDGoutputbreakerisopened,'fclosed,andtheEDGrunsattheisochronousspeed.However,foraCIASorCSASwithoutSIAS,theEDGoutputbreakerwouldnotopenbuttheEDGspeedwouldswitchtotheisochronousspeed.Withapresetisochronousspeedlowerthanthegridfrequency,theUnit2EDGwouldtrytoslowdown,resultinginareversepowercondition(asoccurredduringthetest).Ifthepresetisochronousspeedishigherthanthegridfrequency,theEDGwouldtrytospeedupandageneratorovercurrentconditionwouldresult.EitherconditionexposestheEDGtopotentialdamage.WhiletheoriginaldesignsatisfiedtheEDGdesignintentforthevariousDesignBasisAccidentscenarios,itfailedtorecognizethepotentialnegativeimpacttoanEDGshouldaspuriousCIASoccurwhenrunninginparallelwithoffsitepower.AsaresultoftheSt.LucieUnits1and2servicewatersystemoperationalperformanceinspectionauditperformedin1991,theUnit1IntegratedSafeguardsTestprocedurewasrevisedtoaddressenhancedtestingoftheswingbusses(Cbusses).TherevisedprocedurewasreviewedtoensurethatallrequiredTechnicalSpecificationshadbeenincluded,thatloadsheddingandsequencingofAandBTrainESFcomponentswereverified,thattheswingbuscomponentsweretestedwiththeswingbussesalternatelyalignedtobothAandBTrainbusses,andthatallcontrollogicpathwaysnecessaryforsafeguardsequipmenttoperformtheirsafetyfunctionswereadequatelytested.Section8.6performsmanualCIAS,SIASandCSASactuationverificationwiththeEDGssynchronizedandfullyloadedinparallelwithoffsitepower.ThissectionwaschangedinordertoensurethatthosecomponentswhichreceivedmultipleESFsignalsarefullytestedforeachsignal.Specifically,componentswhichchangestateforCIASalonewouldneedtobetestedindependentofSIAS,asSIASinitia'tesaCIASsignal.TheCIAStestwasperformedpriortotheSIAStest;therefore,theEDGbreakerremainedcloseduntiltrippedbySIAS.TheUnit1IntegratedSafeguardsTestwasperformedduringthe1994outageusingtherevisedprocedure.NoanomaliesoccurredregardingEDGoperationwhileperformingSection8.6ofthetestprocedur Re:ISt.LucieUs1and2DocketNo.5-335and50-389ReplytoNoticeofViolationInsectionReort95-18TheUnit2IntegratedSafeguardsTestprocedurewasrevisedpriortothe1995Unit2refuelingoutage.ThisrevisionessentiallyduplicatedtheUnit1testprocedure,withchangesasnecessaryforUnit2plantspecificloads.TheUnit2IntegratedSafeguardsTestprocedurewasgivenanextensivereviewsimilartothatdonefortheUnit1procedure.Inaddition,amajorityofthetestprocedurewasmodeledonthesimulator,includingthesectionleadingtothereversepowercondition,withnoanomaliesdetected.Priortothischange,CIAShadnotbeenactuatedwiththeEDGrunninginparallelwithoffsitepower;SIASwasactuatedfirst,whichtrippedtheEDGoutputbreaker.However,inordertotestcomponentswhichchangestateforCIASalone,theUnit1methodologytointitiateCIASbeforeSIASwasused.TheUnit2IntegratedSafeguardsTestwasperformedonOctober12,1995,withtheresultingEDGreversepowerincidentandterminationofthetest.AlthoughtheIntegratedSafeguardsTestprocedurereviewwasveryinvolved,thedifferencebetweentheUnit1and2EDGgovernorspeedcontrolcircuitrywasnotidentified.BasedonthenumerousidenticaloperatingfeaturesbetweentheUnit1and2safeguardsresponsesandtherelativeobscurityofthedesigndifferencesasshownonthecontrolwiringdiagramsandvendordrawings,theinappropriateresponsetoaCIASsignalwasneitheridentifiednorexpected.TherevisedIntegratedSafeguardsTestprocedure,whichwasenhancedinanticipationofthemorestringenttestrequirementsdiscussedintheNRCInformationNotice95-15,discoveredthisundesirablecondition.2.CORRECTIVESTEPSTAKENANDRESULTSACHIEVEDA.Immediatelyfollowingtheincident,EDG2Awasinspectedandtestrununderloadandfoundtobeundamaged.B.Unit1EDGstartlogiccircuitrywasreviewedtoensurethatnosimilarfailuremodesexistedonUnit1.Nosimilarfailuremodeswereidentified.C.PCM156-295,"DeletionofEDGAutomaticStartonCIASandCSAS,"wasimplementedontheUnit2EDGs.PostmodificationandESFAStestingwascompletedonDecember6,1995withnoanomaliesoccurringinEDGfunction.3.CORRECTIVESTEPSTOBETAKENTOAVOIDFURTHERVIOLATIONSA.Designmodificationscurrentlyproducedundergorigorousmulti-disciplinedesignreview,verification,andpost-modificationtestingwiththeintentofdetectingandeliminatingpotential'esignflawssuchasthis.Therefore,anyfuturedesignmodificationswouldbereviewedandtestedunderourpresentdesigncontrolprocesstoensurethattheaffectedcomponentandplantresponsesareappropriat Re:St.LucieU1and2DocketNo.5-335and50-389ReplytoNoticeofViolationInsectionReort95-18B.Engineeringhasdeterminedthatfuturetestprocedurerevisionswhichchangetheorderofinitiatingsignalsmustbereviewedforthepotentialtoadverselyimpactdesignfunctions.ThemethodologyforensuringthatinitiatingsignalorderchangesreceiveincreasedreviewwillbecompletedbyMarch15,1996.4,DATEOFFULLCOMPLIANCEFullcompliancewasachievedonDecember6,1995.10