IR 05000331/1993004
| ML20036B603 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Duane Arnold  |
| Issue date: | 05/17/1993 |
| From: | Mccormickbarge, Ploski T, Reidinger T, Simons H NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20036B601 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-331-93-04, 50-331-93-4, NUDOCS 9305260108 | |
| Download: ML20036B603 (18) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
i Report No. 50-331/93004(DRSS)
Docket No. 50-331 License No. DPR-49 Licensee:
Iowa Electric Light and Power Company IE Towers, P.O. Box 351 Cedar Rapids, IA 52406 Facility Name: Duane Arnold Energy Center Inspection At:
Duane Arnold Energy Center site, Palo, Iowa Corporate Office, Cedar Rapids, Iowa Inspection Conducted: May 3-7, 1993
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Inspectors:
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T. Ploski Date N. S<mm.,
3//7/qq H. Simons Date i
Y N*
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s T. Reidinger u
Date Accompanying Personnel:
J. Hopkins C. Miller
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R. Jickling l
Approved By:
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gg J. W. McCormick-Barger, Chief Date u / Emergency Preparedness and l
Non-Power Reactor Section Inspection Summary Inspection on May 3-7. 1993 (Recort No. 50-331/93004(DRSS))
Areas Inspected:
Routine, announced inspection of the Duane Arnold Energy Center's emergency preparedness (EP) exercise, involving review of the exercise scenario (IP 82302) and observations by six NRC representatives of key functions and locations during the exercise (IP 82301).
Several inspectors also evaluated selected aspects of the operational status of the EP program (IP 82701).
j 93052601Os 930529
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Results: No violations or deviations were identified.
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The licensee's exercise performance was very good. No performance weaknesses
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were identified; however, one concern was identified regarding several
controllers' actions and the use of equipment mockups.
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The exercise scenario was similar to a scenario used in a January 1992 drill,
which involved some decision makers and technical support staff who l
participated in the same or related response positions. The use of similar
scenarios in an exercise and a drill occurring within several years detracted
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both activities.
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Challenging aspects of the scenario included: assembly and accounting for all l
onsite personrel; an onsite medical response; deployment of offsite survey i
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teams; operation of the emergency news center; and the use of a response cell l
to simulate NRC officials for the receipt of reactor safety and protective i
i measures information from TSC and EOF communicators.
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l No actual emergency plan activations occurred since the April 1992 inspection.
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A program revision to delete sensitivity screening of employees for potential
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adverse reactions to potassium iodide was implemented in a thorough manner.
n The technical support center's emergency diesel and emergency ventilation system remained well maintained.
Installation of a remote interrogation and
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shutdown capability for the emergency planning zone's siren system was
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coordinated with county officials and scheduled for completion by 1994. The
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1992 audit and surveillances of the program were excellent.
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4 DETAILS
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NRC Observers and Areas Observed T. Ploski, Control Room Simulator (CRS), Technical Support Center (TSC)
C. Miller, CRS, TSC, Operational Support Center (OSC) and Inplar? Trims J. Hopkins, OSC and Inplant Teams T. Reidinger, OSC and Inplant Teams, Medical Response
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R. Jickling, OSC and Inplant Teams, Medical Response H. Simons, Emergency Operations Facility (E0F)
2.
Persens Contacted
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J. Franz, Vice President, Nuclear D. Wilson, Plant Superintendent P. Serra, Manager, Emergency Planning L. Henderson, Supervisor, Emergency Planning The above and 20 other licensee staff attended the exit interview on May 7, 1993. The inspectors also contacted other licensee personnel during the inspection.
3.
General (IP 82302)
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s An announced, daytime exercise of the licensee's emergency plan was conducted at the Duane Arnold Energy Center on May 5,1993.
This exercise did not require the participation of State or county agencies.
The exercise tested the licensee's capabilities to respond to an
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accident scenario resulting in a simulated release of radioactive effluent.
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l The attachments to this inepection report describe the scope of participation, the exercise objectives and the scenario.
4.
General Observations (IP 82301)
The licensee responded to the accident scenario in an orderly and timely manner in accordance with its emergency plan and related procedures.
If scenario events were real, the licensee's actions would have been sufficient to mitigate the accident and allow State and local officials to take appropriate actions to protect the public's health and safety.
5.
Soecific Observations (IP 82301)
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a.
Control Room Simulator (CRS)
The A - Operating Shift Supervisor (A-0SS) quickly and correctly declared an Unusual Event for a liquid effluent release exceeding
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10 CFR Part 20 limits and an Alert for a fuel handling accident.
State, county and simulated NRC officials were initially notified of both emergency declarations in a detailed and timely manner.
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Following tha Unusual Event declaration, it was correctly recognized that the simulated release of cobalt-50 was less than the relevant limit in the current 10 CFR Part 20, but greater than the limit in the revised Part 20 that would become effective for this licensee in January 1994.
In contrast to such attention to detail, insufficient attention was given to assuring that flow from the canal linking the plant's drainage basin to the Cedar River was fully stopped after the reported closure of a sluice gate.
Technical support center (TSC) staff later took action to further block the canal and to obtain onsite and offsite samples.
The CRS crew's use of procedures and their responses to the fuel handling accident and the medical emergency were excellent.
The emergency coordinator (EC) obtained a good initial briefing in the CRS following the Alert declaration before he proceeded to the TSC. The A-0SS did not provide his crew with periodic briefings on his decisions in response to changing plant conditions.
No violations or deviations were identified.
b.
Onsite Medical Response Security and health physics (HP) technicians quickly responded to the contaminated injured person. This individual was injured while evacuating the refuel floor following the fuel handling accident.
The responders demonstrated excellent concern for the victim's medical and emotional conditions and correctly diagnosed the simulated injuries. The victim's neck was properly immobilized prior to moving the victim. The medical response terminated once the responders adequately briefed simulated ambulance personnel on the victim's medical and contamination conditions.
Contamination control practices were very good with respect to avoiding the spread of contamination on the victim. However, after the victim was determined to be contaminated, several responders touched their glasses or heads with their potentially contaminated hands. After the victim's care was transferred to simulated ambulance personnel, several responders demonstrated poor contamination control techniques while removing protective clothing articles and tossing them into available receptacles.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
c.
Technical Support Center (TSC)
The TSC was activated following the Alert declaration.
Incoming staff prepared to perform their duties in an efficient manner under the direction of the TSC Supervisor. An orderly transfer of
command and control of onsite response activities to the EC occurred 30 minutes after the Alert declaration.
All onsite personnel were ordered to assemble and to be accounted for following the Alert declaration, per procedures.
Initial accountability was completed within 30 minutes.
Persons, who were initially considered to be missing, were located within an acceptable 15 minutes. The simulated evacuation of nonessential personnel was ordered after the Site Area Emergency declaration.
The EC and TSC Supervisor did an excellent job of adjusting priorities as the scenario progressed. Their briefings to TSC and OSC staffs, using a public address system, were frequent and detailed. Status boards were effectively used to post current priorities and action items assigned to the facility's engineering support group.
A status board also listed information on the status of some onsite teams associated with high priority action items. With the exception of a team dispatched to block the drainage canal leading to the Cedar River, key TSC staff were more aware of the onsite teams' status than was apparent from status board information.
Key TSC staff effectively interfaced with counterparts in the emergency operations facility (E0F) regarding assessments of potentially relevant EALs, assessments of degraded plant conditions, priorities and the status of inplant teams.
Engineering staff estimated the time when water in the spent fuel pool would begin to boil and revised this estimate as makeup capability varied.
Protective measures staff closely monitored meteorological conditions, which included a substantial increase in wind speed and a wind direction shift associated with a thunderstorm passage.
Following the storm's passage, visual inspections of the outside of the secondary containment were ordered to better assure that any release from containment would be processed and monitored through the standby gas treatment system.
The storm's passage caused a simulated, brief loss of some TSC lighting and a loss of computerized displays. TSC staff adjusted very well to these disruptions.
A loss of offsite power was also postulated to result from the storm's passage. TSC staff closely monitored the restoration of an offsite power supply. The only available emergency diesel generator was soon postulated to have lost oil from its sight glass. This degraded the diesel's performance and the capability of the affected pumps to continue increasing level to the spent fuel pool. TSC staff quickly assigned high priority to restoration of the diesel's performance, while closely monitoring the decrease in spent fuel pool water level.
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j No violations or deviations were identified.
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Doerational Support Center (OSC) and Innlant Teams
The OSC was staffed in a timely and orderly manner following the j
Alert declaration. The OSC Supervisor exhibited good command and
control of OSC activities. The supervisor remained well aware of
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revisions to priorities established by key TSC staff as plant
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conditions changed. The availability of technicians having
certain areas of expertise was closely tracked. Status boards
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were kept current with information regarding plant conditions,
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current priorities and the status of each repair team.
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i habitability surveys were performed in the OSC.
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With one minor exception, repair teams were formed, briefed and i
dispatched from the OSC in a timely manner. Teams were i
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accompanied by suitably equipped HP technicians, as appropriate d
for plant conditions.
Excellent support was provided by the HP, instrumentation and controls, electrical maintenance and mechanical maintenance supervisors. On one occasion, the TSC/0SC l
operations advisor arrived from the TSC and began forming an
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inplant team for a specific task. OSC staff were already forming
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a team for the same mission. The OSC Supervisor stopped this
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needless duplication of effort
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A number of inplant teams were accompanied in addition to those
associated with the fuel handling accident and the medical i
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response. Team members wore dosimetry, protective clothing and self-contained breathing apparatus, as appropriate for their
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assignments.
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With one exception, the teams were well briefed. An auxiliary
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operator was sent to investigate an operability problem with the
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only available emergency diesel generator. After the operator l
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correctly diagnosed the problem and reported his findings to OSC
staff, he was directed to repai;' the diesel's -sight glass "as best l
J he could", rather than being given additional instruction or
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onscene assistance This operator and other teams successfully demonstrated how they would perform their equipment trouble
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shooting and repair tasks. The teams demonstrated good contamination control practices with several minor exceptions.
i Mockups were used or planned for use to provide some teams with
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more realistic challenges. Concerns related to the performance of some inplant teams' controllers and the use of equipment mockups
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are summarized in Section 7 of this inspection report.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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Emeraency Operations Facility (EOF)
i The emergency response and recovery director (ERRD) conservatively
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i activated the EOF after the Alert declaration.
EOF activation was
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orderly and timely. The ERRD relieved the EC of the lead-
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responsibility for the licensee's emergency response within an i
i hour of decision to activate the facility.
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Information flow from the TSC to key E0F staff was excellent. The ERRD and the radiological and E0F manager provided frequent and i
detailed briefings to the E0F staff on changing plant conditions, l
onsite' responses activities and major decisions.
Excellent.
j command and control was also demonstrated by good delegation of j
properly prioritized action items to appropriate staff.
The E0F's engineering staff provided excellent support to the ERRD. Action items were assigned to specific staff members.
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Progress on items was tracked.
Results were promptly forwarded to
EOF decision makers.
I The operations liaison closely monitored the EALs and kept the i
ERRD well informed of potentially relevant EALs. The ERRD quickly
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and correctly declared a second Alert for the loss of shutdown cooling capability and a Site Area Emergency due to a loss of coolant accident in excess of makeup capability. Offsite
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officials were initially notified of these declarations in a
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timely manner. A procedurally correct protective action
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recommendation (PAR) to place farm animals on stored feed and
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water was issued when the Site Area Emergency was declared.
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i The radiological and EOF manager kept simulated State officials l
informed of potential changes to the current emergency
classification and any associated PAR.-
On one occasion, he informed the State that a General Emergency declaration was being considered. The potential PAR was also discussed. When plant.
conditions soon improved, State officials were promptly told that
consideration of a reclassification and PAR were no longer
necessary.
The radiological assessment group closely monitored plant j
. parameters and meteorological conditions in anticipation of a-
release. Offsite radiological monitoring teams were properly j
positioned to detect an abnormal release.
Following the issuance of a control message, the ERRD conducted a thorough preliminary recovery discussion, which included the
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participation of representatives from the CRS, OSC and TSC staffs.
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Procedural guidance was followed. Action items were compiled and associated lead assignments were made.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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6.
Exercise Ob.iectives and Scenario Review (IP 82302)
The exercise's scope and objectives and complete scenario manuals were submitted for review within the proper time frames. The licensee was l
responsive to NRC's comments on the scenario.
Challenging aspects of the scenario included: assembly and accounting for all onsite personnel; an onsite medical response; deployment of two
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offsite survey teams; operation of the emergency news center; and use of a response cell of controllers to simulate NRC officials for the receipt of reactor safety and protective measures information from TSC and EOF communicators.
Another challenging aspect of the scenario was that its major events
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were a fuel handling accident and a loss of shutdown cooling capability.
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Thus, the scenario was a good preparation for the upcoming refueling outage. However, the scenario used in the May-1993 exercise was similar to a scenario used in a January 1992 integrated facility drill.
Fifteen persons having decision maker or technical support roles in the May 1993 j
exercise were involved in the January 1992 drill in the same or similar response positions. Three of these persons were in the CRS, while four were in the TSC and eight were in the EOF. The use or a somewhat j
similar scenario and a number of the same persons in a drill and an exercise roughly 15 months apart reduced the amount of challenge confronting at least these exercise participants.
Noteworthy similarities in the 1992 drill's and the 1993 exercise's scenarios included: many identical pieces of plant equipment postulated
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as being out of service as initial plant conditions in both scenarios; a
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dropped fuel assembly in the chute between the reactor vessel and the
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spent fuel pool, which warranted an Alert declaration; a loss of i
shutdown cooling capability due to similar failures of the residual heat removal system's components; a nilure of the same core spray pump; and a loss of coolant accident, having different root causes in the two scenarios, which led to co? 'deration of a General Emergency declaration during the drill a6 i the mercise.
Following the loss of coolant accident during the 1993 exercise, an EOF responder, who was later determined to have participated in the January 1992 drill, incorrectly speculated the root cause of this event to be the same as that postulated in the 1992 drill's scenario.
During the l
1993 exercise, key TSC and E0F staffs had several excellent discussions,
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which resulted in a correct decision that a General Emergency declaration was not warranted if the dropped fuel assembly became
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uncovered.
Review of records associated with the January 1992 drill indicated that some of these persons were involved in discussing the-
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same reclassification issue during the 1992 drill. One of that drill's critique items addressed this reclassification issue.
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situations warranting Unusual Event declarations; the postulated accidents causing the onsite medical responses; severe weather only
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during the 1993 exercise, which resulted in a loss of offsite power, concern for maintaining secondary containment integrity and concerns for the safety of plant evacuees and an outdoor repair team; a lubricating oil spill into the drywell and torus; and a temporary degrade in the only available diesel generator's performance, which renewed concerns for maintaining shutdown cooling capability and potential uncovery of the dropped fuel assembly.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Exercise Control (IP 82301)
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There were sufficient numbers of licensee staff controlling the exercise. Overall control of the exercise was good. The following concerns were noted regarding the control of some inplant teams'
activities.
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The scenario included a fuel handling accident and the simulated injury and contamination of an individual evacuating the refuel flooi.
Insufficient preplanning and control of this mini-scenario were evident.
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A controller with the fuel movement team had to improvise an onscene communications link to the CRS instead of using the normally available communications equipment. On several occasions, this controller exhibited concern when preempted by a counterpart in the CRS regarding the status of simulated fuel movements.
A roleplayer wore makeup to realistically portray an injured evacuee from the refuel floor. This roleplayer was observed talking to members of the fuel moving team prior to his simulated accident. His simulated head injury was visible to the team, thereby forewarning them of a
medical response situation later in the mini-scenario. Onscene controllers did not stop the roleplayer from prematurely interacting with the team.
A mockup was used to simulate motor-operated valve (M0)-2137.
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the internals of this mockup differed from those of the actual valve, which confused the repair team and TSC staff, as they attempted to diagnose the valve's malfunction using drawings of the actual valve.
Additional controller inputs were needed to resolve the confusion.
Later, a controller did not locate a nearby mockup of en emergency diesel's sight glass until after an operator adequateV explained how he would diagnose and repair the actual diesel's sight glass.
The difficulties in coordination among controllers and using mockups to simulate actual plant equipment is an Inspection Followup Item ( 50-331/93004-01).
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Exercise Critioues (IP 82301)
i The licensee's controllers held preliminary critiques in each facility t
with participants following the exercise. The licensee provided a summary of its identified strengths and weaknesses, which were in overall good agreement with the inspectors' findings, prior to the exit interview.
9.
Operational Status of thg EP Proaram (IP 82701)
a.
Actual Activations of the Emeraency Plan Based on review of NRC records and discussions with cognizant licensee staff, it was determined that there were no actual emergency plan activations since the April -1992 inspection.
No violations or deviations were identified.
b.
Emeraency Plan and Implementina Procedures Records' associated with a recent revision to an emergency plan implementing procedure (EPIP) were reviewed and discussed with cognizant licensee staff. On May 3, 1993, EPIP.4.5,
" Administration of Potassium-Iodine (KI)", was revised to delete review of form HP-3, " Medical Questionnaire - Iodine Sensitivity",
which licensee staff completed during their general employee training. The site radiation protection coordinator (SRPC) was required to review these forms prior to selecting personnel for_ an emergency task that could involve a projected radioiodine exposure in excess of 25 rem.
Records indicated excellent coordination between emergency planning (EP) staff and the licensee's madical consultants in determining that completion of _the questionnaire was no longer necessary.. The medical consultants advised that KI should not be withheld from licensee staff during an emergency due to concern for a possible sensitivity to KI. The consequences of not taking KI were considered to be greater than the consequences of a radiciodine exposure exceeding 25 rem.
The licensee also determined that other Midwestern power _ reactor licensees i
previously deleted sensitivity screening from their programs.
Records indicated that plant staff were adequately. informed of the discontinuation of the screening form in a weekly notice dated April 23, 1993.
No violations or deviations were identified.
c.
Emeroency Facilities. Eouioment. Instrumentation and Supplies Records indicated that periodic inspections of the TSC's emergency diesel generator were performed as required since April 1992. A i
l cyclic operability test was planned during the upcoming outage.
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Records indicated that periodic surveillances were performed on j
the TSC's emergency ventilation system since April 1992. The j
records alsu showed that the system's high efficiency particulate
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and charcoal filters successfully passed filtration efficiency
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tests in February 1993.
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By letter dated October 30, 1992, the Federal Emergency Management-Agency (FEMA) approved the modified alert and notification system
(ANS) associated with the site's redefined plume' pathway emergency
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planning zone (EPZ). The licensee began upgrading the 143 sirens in the ANS by-installing a remote interrogation capability, which would allow county officials to determine the status of power to each siren and the operability of certain siren components between monthly system tests. County officials would also have the
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capability to remotely shut off a malfunctioning siren. This system upgrade was scheduled for completion by 1994.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Oraanization and Manaaement Control The EP group's size remained excellent and unchanged since April 1992. With the exception of a secretary, the group's membership (
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was unchanged.
The licensee continued to conduct semi-annual, off-hours
a augmentation drills to demonstrate the capability to staff the
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j emergency response facilities in a timely manner. These telephone drills did not involve actual staffing of the response facilities.
Beginning in late 1991, the licensee upgraded the callout methodology by making it more automated. Records indicated that-problems identified during several augmentation drills were resolved in a timely manner as the transition to the upgraded callout methodology was accomplished.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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Trainina
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A member of the emergency preparedness training staff indicated that efforts were underway to revise the training materials from functional to position-specific in nature. This project was about 50 percent finished and was expected to be completed by 1994.
Administrative mechanisms remained in place to assure that only
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persons currently qualified for their assigned emergency response positions were listed'in the callout roster 'and the automated '
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callout methodology.
The licensee continued to conduct several integrated response facility drills as another means to enhance the emergency organization's training, while also fulfilling functional drill
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commitments stated in the emergency plan. Records indicated that I
several integrated drills were conducted and critiqued during 1992 l
in addition to the " practice exercises" performed within a month of the 1992 and 1993 exercises that were evaluated by NRC staff.
Records indicated that the 1992 and 1993 " practice exercise" scenarios were significantly different from those used in the subsequent NRC-evaluated exercises. Concerns related to the similarities associated with a January 1992 integrated facility drill and the May 1993 exercise were summarized in Section 6 of this inspection report.
No violations or deviations were identified.
f.
Audits
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l Records of audits and surveillances of the program performed since April 1992 were reviewed, with the exception of a surveillance of l
the 1993 " practice exercise". That surveillance report was not
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The 1992 audit of the program was excellent and satisfied all
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requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(t). The audit was thorough, including the required assessment of the adequacy of the licensee's interfaces with offsite support organizations.
The auditors contacted representatives from 13 offsite support agencies as part of this assessment.
I Several surveillances of specific aspects of the EP program were conducted. Topics included the upgraded provisions for activating i
the licensee's emergency organization and observations by six
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auditors of an integrated response drill, as well as the associated critique, conducted in late 1992.
Followup on concerns identified during audits and surveillances was very good.
No violations or deviations were identified.
10.
Exit Interview The inspectors held an exit interview on May 7,1993, with those licensee representatives identified in Se:t un 2 to present and discuss the preliminary inspection findings. The licensee indicated that none of the matters discussed were proprietary in nature.
Attachments:
1.
Exercise Scope of Participation 2.
Exercise Objectives 3.
Exercise Scenario Summary
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- l 1.0 SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES
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i l.1 Scope The 1993 Duane Arnold Energy Center Emergency Preparedness Exercise, to be conducted on May 5,1993, will test and provide the opportunity to evaluate Iowa Electric Light and Power Company's emergency plans and procedures.
It will also test each emergency response organization's ability to assess and respond to emergency conditions and coordinate efforts with other agencies for protection of the health and safety of the public. The Exercise will include provisions to test the Refuel Floor Evacuation Plans per 10 CFR 70 and to look at the Shutdown Risks Management Issues.
Whenever practical, the Exercise will incorporate provisions for " Free Play" on the pan of the participants.
The scenario, as driven by the DAEC Control Room Simulator, will depict a simulated i
sequence of events, that result in escalating conditions of sufficient magnitude to warrant
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j mobilization of State and local agencies to respond to the simulated emergency.
1.2 Objectives j
i The Duane Arnold Energy Center (DAEC) 1993 Emergency Preparedness Exercise Program objectives are based on the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) requirements l
delineated in 10 CFR 50.47 and 10 CFR 50, Appendix E and Inspection Procedure No. 82302.
Additional guidance provided in NUREG-0654, NUREG-0696, and NUREG-0737 Supplement 1, was utilized in developing these objectives.
Since FEMA will not be evaluating the off-site emergency response in this Exercise, participation by Linn and Benton Counties and the State of Iowa will be limited and for training purposes only. Consequently, no objectives have been listed for the off-site agencies in this Exercise.
The purpose of the Exercise is to evaluate the integrated capability of a major ponion of
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the basic elements existing within the on-site and off-site emergency plans and emergency response organizations. The specific objectives of the Exercise to be demonstrated are listed on the following pages.
1973 Exercise 1-1 Rev. 2/24/93 i
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1.2.1 IOWA ELECTRIC OBJECTIVES Obiective Comment 1. Demonstrate the adequacy of the DAEC None j
Emergency Plan, Emergency Plan Implementing i
Procedures, Corporate Emergency Response Plan, i
and Corporate Plan Implementing Procedures.
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2. Demonstrate the activation, staffing, and Staff augmentation willinclude ERO operation of emergency response facilities.
supplementing normal shift staffing.
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3. Demonstrate the reliability and effective use of None.
emergency communications equipment and i
procedures.
4. Demonstrate proficiency in recognizing and None.
classifying emergency conditions.
l 5. Demonstrate the notification network to federal, Federal initial notifications only. All l
state, and local, corporate, and plant personnel.
other notificadons will be per procedure.
6. Demonstrate coordination with local emergency Participadon by State, Linn and Benton response organiuttions.
Counties for training purposes only.
7. Demonstrate ability to assess the emergency None.
condition and to take action to mitigate that emergency condition.
8. Demonstrate the ability to perform dose None, calculations utilizing radiological and meteorological information to determine the magnitude and impact of the relece of radioactive materials to the j
environment.
9. Demonstrate the ability to obtain and utilize None.
l information concerning meteorological forecasts in the formulation of protective action recommendations to off-site authorities.
10. Demonstrate the transition of responsibilities None.
between facilities as a result of escalating accident classification.
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1993 Exercise 1-2 Rev. 2/24/93
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IOWA ELECTRIC OBJECTIVES (Cont'd)
Obiective Comment 11. Demonstrate familiarity with Protective Action None.
Guides (PAGs) and recommendation of protective j
actions to off-site authorities.
12. Demonst ate the mobilization of on-site and off-None.
site radiological monitoring teams.
13. Demonstrate appropriate equipment, None.
procedures, and communication for on-site and off-site radiological monitoring.
14 Demonstrate the capability for off-site Sample media will include air, water, radiological monitoring to include collection and soil and vegetation. Samples will be
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analysis of sample media and provision for analyzed by the ORAL as necessary.
communications and record keeping associated with sutvey and monitoring activities.
15. Demonstrate the ability to perform site Site assembly and accountability will be assembly, accountability, and evacuation as demonstrated. Site evacuation using the appropriate.
ORAA will be demonstrated using simulated contaminated personnel as necessary.
16. Demonstrate the capability to obtain and As dictated by the scenario.
analyze samples utilizing the post-accident sampling i
sy stem.
17. Demonstrate the ability to monitor and control Use of self-contained breathing
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I emergency worker exposure within the plant.
apparatus will be demonstrated as dictated by response to the scenario.
18. Demonstrate adequate equipment and None.
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j procedures for decontamination of emergency workers and equipment, as required.
19. Demonstrate the ability to prepare and Emergency News Center will be coordinate news releases, handle public inquiries, activated. Public Rumor Control will control rumors and conduct media briefings.
be demonstrated.
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1993 Exercise 1-3 Rev. a 4/23/93
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i IOWA ELECTRIC OBJECTIVES (Cont'd)
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Obiective Comment 20. Demonstrate use of first aid and/or rescue Will be demonstrated in 1993.
teams.
21. Demonstrate use of licensee's headquarters EOF activation will occur. As dictated support personnel.
by the scenario, Corporate Support Services will be utilized.
22. Demonstrate the use of security personnel to Will be NOT demonstrated in 1993.
provide prompt access for emergency equipment and support.
23. Demonstrate Ingestion Pathway Exercise Will NOT be demonstrated in 1993.
support.
24. Demonstrate decision-making with regards to Will NOT be demonstrated in 1993.
use of potassium iodide (KI).
25. Demonstrate site re-entry / recovery planning.
Planning for re-catry/ recovery will be demonstrated via a 30-60 minute planning consideration period in the late phases of the scenario.
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Note: Objectives based on John F. Franz letter to A. Bert Davis, (2/1/93 NEP-93-0034)
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1993 Exercise 1-4 Rev. 2/24/93
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J 6.1 Narrative Summarv i
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Initial Conditions are as follows: Refueling ~ Outage RFO-12, is in progress, day 8 of 58. Reactor cavity is flooded up, with the core about 1/3 unloaded. A refueling crew is performing NS-81001 (Refueling Bridge Checks), on the refuel floor.
Other activities occurring on the 5th floor include Reactor Vessel Head decon and the re-routing of the air lines, in support of some upcomint in-vessel work. The "B" side of RHR is running, tied into the Fuel Pool Cooling system, for supplemental cooling. The "A" CRD pump is running in support of the core off-load, with the "B" Core Spray pump and the "B" D/G available. The Drywell Equipment hatch and the CRD hatch have been removed. Major systems out of l
service includes: "A / C" RHR pumps, "A / C" RHRSW pumps, "B" CRD pump, "A" ESW pump, the "A" D/G, the l Al Load Center and MO-2004, (the "A" side RHR outboard l
injection valve). Major plant work today includes an extensive tagout to drain the "A" side of (
RHR in support of RHR maintenance and heat exchanger inspection. Major Drywell work includes replacement of lube oil in recirculation pump "B", repair of the leaking RHR "A" check valve. The downcomer bladders will not be installed until Thursday, limiting non-essential work in the Drywell. Drywell work above the 775' level is restricted.
A release of radioactive liquid effluent to the river occurs due to personnel error. A NOUE (A-3), " Liquid discharge effluents greater than 10 CFR 20 Appendix B limits", is declared.
The maintenance team working on the RHR check valve observes increased collection of water in the valve body and inform an operator hanging tags. The operator over-torques the RHR isolation valve (V-20-81) causing its disk to crack and resulting in a leakage path for vessel inventory out through the open RHR check valve. The leak rate is very small at this point. The operator reports the over torqueing to the Control Room.
The Refueling Bridge mast fails ar4 collapses on itself while moving a spent fuel bundle from the core through the cattle chute.
The bundle tips sideways and wedges diagonally in the chute.
The mast failure causes a loss of electrical power to the bridge.
Bubbles are observed escaping from the dropped bundle and rising up through the water.
Local ARMS and CAMS start alarming. The refuel floor and Drywell are evacuated. A Group III Isolation occurs due to the release. An ALERT (B-20), " Fuel handling accident that results in fuel damage with release of radioactivity to the Reactor building", is declared.
On evacuating the Drywell, the team replacing the Recirculation Pump oil inadvertently knock over a 55 gallon drum of spent lube oil. The oil spills across the floor of the drywell.
I 1993 Exercise 6.1-1 Rev. a 4/23/92
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While repair activities commence for the refueling bridge, a loss of Shutdown i
Cooling occurs. The "D" RHR pump trips due to a seized upper motor bearing. The "B" l
RHR pump fails to start, due to a bad electrical relay. Alternate cooling methods are pursued j
in accordance with AOP-149, " Loss of Shutd'own Cooling". Work on repairing the refuehng
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bridge continues.
f The damaged RHR isolation valve disk begins leaking at a high rate. Fuel Pool water level starts dropping. Indications of flow rate show up on the "A" side jet pump flow indicators in the Control Room. Drywell leakage alarms come in and Torus water level starts I
rising. The oil previously spilled on the floor of the Drywellis washed into the torus. Efforts i
commence to try and restore /re-establish Primary Containment and to try and stop leakage i
from the RHR check valv:. The "B" Core Spray pump is started, but its discharge valve does l
not open. The "A" CRD pump is lined up for maximum injection. The SBLC system is l
started as an additional source of makeup. The "A" CRD pump trips on a faulty suction pressure switch.
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Fuel Pool water level drops below the level of the stuck fuel bundle and radiation l
levels on the Refuel Floor rise rapidly. Any work on the 5th floor is halted, due the increased
radiation levels. A SITE AREA EMERGENCY (C-19), " Uncontrolled decrease in Fuel
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Pool water level below fuel level", is declared.
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The "B" RHR pump is repaired and started up with its suction shifted over to the Torus. Fuel Pool water level seems to stabilize, but does not appear to be recoveripg&
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sewre cay anject rate equalleak rate) The RHR pump's flow rate is maximized. A =
= = = 2 0=.
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Vsite caw rec
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subsequently fails. The CRD pump suction switch is repaired.
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The "B" Core Spray pump discharge valve is repaired, and the valve is opened. The diesel governor is repaired allowing operation of the Core Spray and RHR pumps. Fuel Pool water level is slowly recovered. Once the water level is restored to and above the stuck spent fuel bundle, radiation levels on the refuel floor slowly decrease.
Repair efforts on the Refuel Floor re-commence, with priorities on stopping the leak from the RHR check valve, repairing the refueling bridge, and recovery of the spent fuel bundle. Recovery / Reporting issues are discussed.
The exercise is subsequently terminated.
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1993 Exercise 6.1-2 Rev. 2/24/93
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