IR 05000324/1993021

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Insp Repts 50-324/93-21 & 50-325/93-21 on 930329-31. Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Review of Contractor Criminal History Records
ML20036A101
Person / Time
Site: Brunswick  Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 04/28/1993
From: Masnyk O, Mcguire D
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20036A094 List:
References
50-324-93-21, 50-325-93-21, NUDOCS 9305100046
Download: ML20036A101 (5)


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UNIT ED STATES f,,

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISslON

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101 MARIETTA STREET,N.W.

  • f ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323

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Report Nos.

50-325/93-21 and 50-324/93-21 Licensee: Carolina Power and Light Company l

P. O. 30x 1551 l

Raleigh, NC 27602

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l Docket Nos. 50-325 and 50-324 License Nos. DPR-71 and DPR-62 l

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Facility Name: Brunswick I and 2 f

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Inspection Conducted: March 29-31, 1993

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Inspector:

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0. Mas k,ISafeguards Spddialist Date Signed i

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.b3afeguardsSection

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l Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards Branch

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l Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards l

l SUMMARY j

Scope:

This special, announced inspection was conducted to review the licensee's

review of contractor's criminal history records.

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Results:

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In the areas inspected, a violation of regulatory requirements was

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93-21-01 The licensee does not have a procedure for the adjudication

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of contractor's criminal history records.

l Additionally, it was determined that the licensee's audit program was l

weak in that the above mentioned adjudication process was not reviewed

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during the audit, j

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REPORT DETAILS 1.

Persons Contacted Licensee Employees

  • P. Bressler, Senior Personnel Representative
  • D. Dixon, Safeguards Specialist
  • C. S. Hinnant, Director Site Operations
  • R. Knight, Safeguards Specialist
  • P. Leslie, Security Manager
  • M. Morrison, Human Relations Resource Administrator
  • R. Morgan, Plant Manager, Unit 1
  • G. Warriner, Manager Control and Administration NRC Resident Inspector
  • R. L. Prevatte, Senior Resident Inspector
  • Attended exit interview 2.

The inspector reviewed the licensee's handling of the contractor's criminal history records. Review of security plan requirements and procedures, and discussion with personnel responsible for implementing the Access Authorization program disclosed the following.

Carolina Power and Light Company has a procedure, Screening Practices and Procedure, which delineates the process for implementing the Access Authorization Program. An interface document, dated July 17, 1992, delegates the responsibility for the contractor programs to the Security Department. The Security Department fingerprints contractors, sends the prints to personnel relations who forwards them to corporate offices in Raleigh, and then onto the FBI. When the history comes back from the FBI this process is reversed and the security Department adjudicates the information and maintain the records.

In discussion with Human Relations staff at the Brunswick Plant-~ and with the security manager at the Harris Plant, it was found that the CP&L procedure was used to adjudicate the unfavorable criminal histories, specifically SPP106, Evaluating Acceptability for Level 1 Employment, dated June 12, 1992. This procedure contains criteria to be used in the adjudication, and was written for use with CP&L employees. The Harris security staff has adopted this procedure on its own initiative. No procedure has been developed or issued for use by the CP&L security departments. The Brunswick staff was not using a procedure to implement the adjudication of the contractor's criminal histories. This is a violation of the Brunswick Technical Specification 6.8.1 which requires written procedures to be established, implemented and maintained, covering the activities contained in the Security Plan (Violation 93-21-01). Adjudication is left up to each adjudicator's best

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judgement.

In the case of the security department, the documentation supporting this adjudication was, in some cases, sketchy and lacking detail, requiring the interpretation or recollection of the adjudicator.

Furthermore, there were no controls in place to ensure that the criminal history was processed in a timely fashion.

The inspector noted a weakness in the audit program in that this portion of the access authorization process had not been audited.

Licensee audit personnel advised that the adjudication process was not reviewed to maintain the subject personnel's privacy. The licensee's commitment in the PSP provides for access to records by audit _ personnel. An audit of this area would have disclosed that there appears to be fragmentation in this area. Human Resources and the Harris plant appear to adjudicate differently form the Brunswick security staff. Also the Human Relations and Harris staff has the Human Relations staff research and resolve "No disposition" information on the criminal history records, the Brunswick.

Security Staff asks the subject to provide resolution.

The inspector chose one contractor (Becon) and selected records dealing with access authorization that are maintained by the contractor.

The inspector, accompanied by the Security Specialist who performs the contractor's FBI criminal history reviews, chose several Becon records and questioned the Becon project manager about his record keeping practices. The manager stated that there have been cases where an individual had left arrests and convictions off the application. When the FBI records were received by plant security, the individual was brought into the office and allowed to " correct" his application. The applications were not annotated to reflect that they had been corrected.

The inspector advised that when the records were reviewed it would appear that the record had contained the information all along. The manager stated that he saw that now and would annotate any adjusted records in the future.

Subsequent to the inspection, on August 8, 1993, the licensee initiated a conference call with the inspector and the following persons from CP&L involved:

W. Hatcher, Corporate Security Manager R. Knight, Security Specialist P. Lesley,' Security Manager B. Potateat, Manager Vendor and Equipment Quality F. Underwood, Director Fitness for Duty The purpose of the conference call was to ensure that the inspector was aware of the licensee's actions as a result of the inspection findings and to allow for clarification if necessary. The following information was provided.

The licensee advised that based on their interpretation of the regulations, the auditors did not review criminal history records to allow for subject confidentialit _.

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The licensee stated that an assessment of the CP&L Access Authorization Program was in progress and that the Becon program would be audited during the week of April 12-16, 1993, with an emphasis on possible alteration of records and amendment of application records.

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A procedure is in development to delineate the adjudication process.

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The documentation process will be strengthened. This is being coordinated through the licensee's legal staff.

Quality "arification has been asked to amend the audit checklist as to the way documentation is reviewed to look for record adjustment.

The licensee advised that they were aggressive in resolving contractor clearance problems and offered an example. Their desire to properly resolve any concerns in a timely fashion was stated.

Subsequent to this phone call, the Site Security Manager called to advise that two procedures were available for adjudication and provided copies of the corporate procedure and an informal-procedure titled

" Instructions for Administration of Criminal History Information." He acknowledged that neither of these procedures were in use during the.

inspection, and that the staff was not aware of the second procedure's existence.

The inspector expressed concern over the practice of changing official records in this manner and questioned the validity of the Becon clearance program if this case was a typical example.

Plant' management stated that the Becon program would be audited and the management-sensitized to record keeping. Subsequently the licensee called on April 8,1993, and advised that this audit would be performed during the wrek of April 12-16, 1993.

An audit of the Becon Construction Company was conducted June 22-26, 1992, by the Quality Verification Section and issued by letter dated June 30, 1992. There were four findings:

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No documented evidence that employees are being informed of rights / requirements as specified in paragraph 6.1 and 9.0, Revision 5.

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Psychological tests were not documented as being proctored.

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Evaluation of unfavorable information lacked adequate / detailed adjudication.

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References for eight employees were not updated upon reemployment as required by Revision 4."

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3.

Exit Interview

The inspection scope and results were summarized on March 31, 1993, with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1.

The inspector described the j

areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results.

The inspector expressed concerns relative to the Becon clearance program if the information reviewed was a representative example of the program.

The inspector stated her observations of the adjudication of

contractor's criminal histories,.that no procedure was used in adjudication and the records did not-provide clear information with the licensee's interpretation. The inspector discussed the fragmentation of the program, in that different departments within CP&L adjudicated these

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records differently. The audit program weakness was mentioned, in that the security departments adjudication program was never audited.

Plant Management stated that CP&L.would aggressively self audit in.these areas and employ corrective measures as they were identified. Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.

Subsequently, on April 8, 1993, the inspector and Project Section Chief called the Site Director i

of Operations and advised that an Inspection Report and violation relative to the lack of procedure would be issued.

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