IR 05000324/1985038

Insp Repts 50-324/85-38 & 50-325/85-38 on 851101-30.No Violation or Deviation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Maint & Surveillance Observation,Operational Safety Verification & TMI Action Plan Items

ML20138Q753
Person / Time
Site:	Brunswick
Issue date:	12/18/1985
From:	Fredrickson P, Garner L, Ruland W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20138Q750	List: IR 05000324/1985038 ML20138Q749
References
TASK-1.C.1, TASK-1.D.2, TASK-2.E.4.2, TASK-2.F.1, TASK-2.F.2, TASK-2.K.3.16, TASK-2.K.3.18, TASK-2.K.3.28, TASK-2.K.3.57, TASK-3.A.1.2, TASK-3.D.3.4, TASK-TM 50-324-85-38, 50-325-85-38, NUDOCS 8512270465
Download: ML20138Q753 (9)

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r F. IUg UNITED STATES

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Do NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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/n REGloN 11 101 MARIETTA STREET, j

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Report Nos. 50-325/85-38 and 50-324/85-38 Licensee: Carolina Power and Light Company P. O. Box 1551 Raleigh, NC 27602 Docket Nos. 50-325 and 50-324 License Nos. DPR-71 and DPR-62 Facility Name: Brunswick 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted: November 1-30, 1985 Inspectors: . s

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.Rulandj/ Dath Signed ,= p!S TlLW alnrler Fog bJ W. Garner Date Signed Approved By: <

P. E. Fredrickson, Section Chief

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' Signed Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY Scope: This routine safety inspection involved 135 inspector-hours on site in the areas of maintenance observation, surveillance observation, operational safety verification, TMI Action Plan Items, plant start-up from refueling, and onsite follow-up of event Results: Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie PDR ADOCK 0500

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I REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employ'ees i.

l - Howe, Vice President - Brunswick Nuclear Project l C. Dietz, General Manager - Brunswick Nuclear Project T. Wyllie, Manager - Engineering and Construction

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G. Oliver, Manager - Site Planning and Control

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! J. Holder, Manager - Outages

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E. Bishop, Manager - Operations L. Jones, Director - QA/QC

J. Moyer, Director - Training M. Jones, Acting Director - Onsite Nuclear Safety - BSEP J.-Chase, Assistant to General Manager J. O'Sullivan, Manager - Maintenance G. Cheatham, Manager - Environmental & Radiation Control K. Enzor, Director - Regulatory Compliance B. Hinkley, Manager - Technical Support V. Wagoner, Director - IPBS/Long Range Planning ,

C. Blackmon, Superintendent - Operations l J. Wilcox, Principal Engineer - Operations W. Hogle, Engineering Supervisor W. Tucker, Engineering Supervisor B. Wilson, Engineering Supervisor R. Creech, I&C/ Electrical Maintenance Supervisor (Unit 2)

R. Warden, I&C/ Electrical Maintenance Supervisor (Unit 1)

W. Dorman, Supervisor - QA W. Hatcher, Supervisor - Security R. Kitchen, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor (Unit 2)

C. Treubel, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor (Unit 1)

R. Poulk, Senior NRC Regulatory Specialist W. Murray,-Senior Engineer - Nuclear Licensing Unit Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen, engineers, technicians, operators, office personnel, and security force member ' Exit Interview (30703)

i The inspection scope and findings were summarized on December 2,1985 with the vice ' president and general manager. The licensee acknowledged the findings without exceptio The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during the ;

inspectio ' Followup on Previous Enforcement Matters (92702) ,

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. Maintenance Observation (62703)

The inspectors observed maintenance activities and reviewed records to verify that work was conducted in accordance with approved procedures, .

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Technical Specifications, and applicable industry codes and standards. The inspectors also verified that: redundant components were operable;

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administrative controls were followed; tagouts were adequate; personnel were qualified; correct replacement parts were used; radiological controls were proper; fire protection was adequate; QC hold points were adequate and observed; adequate post-maintenance testing was performed; and independent i verification requirements were implemented. The inspectors independently verified that selected equipment was properly returned to servic Outstanding work requests and authorizations (WR&A) were reviewed to ensure that the licensee gave priority to safety-related maintenanc The inspectors reviewed maintenance activities related to the failure of

. scram discharge pilot solenoid valves (see paragraph 9).

No violations or deviations were identifie . Surveillance Observation (61726)

The inspectors observed surveillance testing required by Technical Specification Through observation and record review, the inspectors

verified that: tests conformed to Technical Specification requirements; administrative controls were followed; personnel were qualified; instrumentation was calibrated; and data was accurate and complet The inspectors independently verified selected test results and proper return to service of equipmen The inspectors witnessed / eviewed portions of the following test activities:

1-PT-11. Automatic Depressurization System and Safety Relief Valve Operability Test, Rev. 17, 10/23/85 0-PT-11. Safety Relief Valve Primary Position Indication Functional Test, Rev. 1, 1/7/85

1-PT- LPRM Calibration for APRM E

0-PT- Standby Liquid Control System Operability Test, Rev. 22, 11/20/84

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1 MST-HPCI27M -

HPCI and RCIC Condensate Storage Tank Low Water Level Instrument Channel Calibration No violations or deviations were identified.

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3 Operational Safety Verificaticn (71707)

The inspectors verified conformance with regulatory requirements by direct observations of activities, facility tours, discussions with personnel, reviewing of records and independent verification of safety system statu The inspectors verified that control room manning requirements of 10 CFR 50.54 and the Technical Specifications were me Control room, shift supervisor, clearance and jumper / bypass logs were reviewed to obtain information concerning operating trends and out of service safety systems to ensure that there were no conflicts with Technical Specifications Limiting Conditions for Operations. Direct observations were conducted of control room panels, instrumentation and recorder traces important to safety to verify operability and that parameters were within Technical Specification limit The inspectors observed shift turnovers to verify that continuity of system status was maintaine The inspactors verified the status of selected control room annunciator Operability of a selected ESF train was verified by insuring that: each accessible valve in the flow path was in its correct position; each power supply and breaker, including control room fuses, were aligned for components that must activate upon initiation signal; removal of power from those ESF motor-operated valves, so identified by Technical Specifications, was completed; there was no leakage of major components; there was proper lubrication and cooling water available; and a condition did not exist which might prevent fulfillment of the system's functional requirement Instrumentation essential to system actuation or performance was ve.-ified operable by observing on-scale indication anti proper instrument valve lineup, if accessibl The inspectors verified that the licensee's health physics policies /

procedures were followed. This included a review of area surveys, radiation work permits, posting, and instrument calibratio The inspectors verified that: the security organization was properly manned and that security personnel were capable of performing their assigned functions; persons and packages were checked prior to entry into the protected area (PA); vehicles were properly authorized, searched and escorted within the PA; persons within the PA displayed photo identification badges; personnel in vital areas were authorized; effective compensatory measures were employed when required; and security's response to threats.or alarms was acequat The inspectors also observed plant housekeeping controls, verified position of certain containment isolation valves, checked a clearance, and verified the operability of onsite and offsite emergency power source ': - ,.

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During a' plant tour on November 20, 1985, the inspector noted that fire door 410 to the 80 foot East Resin Storage Room was blocked open with a cardboard box. A plant systems engineer and an auxiliary operator, who were still in the area, had placed the box by the door for convenienc The inspector concluded that the door was still operable as long as the individuals were still in the area and still needed frequent access to the room. However, blocking the door is a bad practice since the responsible people could leave, rendering the door inoperable. The box was immediately removed from the doorway. The inspector had no further question Unit 2 was shutdown (all rods in and the mode switch in shutdown) at 11:32 a. m. on November 30, 1985. The licensee shutdown the unit early to modify equipment that did not meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.49, Environmental Qualification of Electrical Equipment Important to Safety for Nuclear Power Plants. The licensee's extension request was denied by commission order dated November 15, 198 No violations or deviations were identifie . TMI Action Plan Items The inspectors reviewed the licensee's current status of TMI Action Plan Items in order to plan future inspection activities. The following items are still open:

I.C.1. I.C.I. Inadequate Core Cooling / Revise Procedures (Units I and 2).

The licensee has completed implementation of the upgraded Emergency Operating Procedures (EOP) required by NUREG-0737, Supplement 1, Requirements for Emergency Response Capability (Generic Letter 82-33) through revision 3 of the E0P' Since revision 4 of the E0P's will be issued by the licensee by about December 31, 1985, this item will be inspected after revision 4 is issue I.D.2. I.D.2. Install and Implement the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) (Units 1 and 2).

This item is on the living schedul Unit 1 and Unit 2 completion dates are July 28, 1989 and December 23, 1988, respectivel *.

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II.E.4. Containment Isolation Dependability - Radiation Signal on Purge Valves (Units 1 and 2).

The living schedule completion dates are August 7,1987 and November 14, 1986, for Units 1 and 2, respectivel These items are open; they were erroneously closed in Report N .

II.F.1.2.B.2 Implementation of Long-Term Iodine / Particulate Sampling (Units 1 and 2).

Awaiting inspectio II.F. Containment Pressure Accident Monitoring (Units I and 2).

Awaitiag inspection.

II.F. Containment Water Level Accident Monitoring (Units 1 and 2).

i Awaiting inspectio II.F. Containment Hydrogen Accident Monitorir.g (Units 1 and 2).

Awaiting inspection.

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II.F.2. Install Level Instruments for 02tection of Inadequate Core i Cooling (Units I and 2).

This requirement is also addressed in GL 84-23, Reactor

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Vessel Water Level Instrumentation in BWR's. The licensee has issued a Task Action Request (TAR 81-007) for engineering evaluation of the still unresolved portions of the item

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(improvement category 1 in GL 84-23). The licensee, in

! response to GL 84-23 dated December 10, 1984, anticipated submitting planned improvements by December 31, 1985.

Brunswick already has analog level transmitters. Therefore,

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no new actions are required by improvement category 2.

i II.K.3.1 Challenges and Failures of Relief Valves - Modify (Units 1 and 2).

Awaiting inspectio II.K.3.1 Modify Automatic Depressurization System (ADS)

Logic (Units 1 and 2).

Unit 1 modifications are done and awaiting inspectio Unit 2 modifications are listed in the living schedule to be completed by November 14, 198 Both of these items were l incorrectly closed in report No. 82-0 This item is open l for both units.

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i 6 II.K.3.28 Qualification of ADS Accumulators (Units 1 and 12).

NRR issued a SER on June 15, 1984, accepting the licensee's approach of seismically qualifying the air system. After the issuance of the SER, the licensee determined that the non-interruptible instrument air compressors could not be environmentally qualified for compliance with 10 CFR 50.4 The design was changed to use a qualified Nitrogen Back-up system to supply the accumulators with a safety-related pneumatic suppl The modification was installed on Unit 1 this last outage and is awaiting inspectio The Unit 2

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modification will be completed during the upcoming outage that begins on December 1, 1985. Completion is scheduled by November 14, 198 II.K.3.57 Manual Actuation of ADS (Units' I and 2).

Will be resolved as part of the I.C.1 (see above) E0P revie III.A.1. Modify Emergency Support Facilities (Units 1 and 2).

Modifications complete with the exception of the SPDS. See Item I.D.2. III.A. Installation of Emergency Freparedness Hardware and Software (Units 1 and 2).

Awaiting SPDS completio See Item I.D.2. III.A. Emergency Preparedness - Full Capability for Facilities (Units 1 and 2).

Regional inspections have been performed in this are Awaiting SPDS completio See Item I.D.2. III.D. Control Room Habitability Modifications (Units 1 and 2).

The living schedule completion date is December 31, 1985 (common control room). This item is open; it was erroneously closed in report No. 84-0 No violations or deviations were identifie . Plant Startup from Refueling (71711)

The inspector reviewed the following core physics related tests for compliance with Technical Specification requirements and satisfactory completion of stated acceptance criteria:

PT-14. Single Rod Scram Insertion Times Test PT-5 LPRM/APRM Initial Sensitivities

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l PT-5 SRM/IRM/APRM Overlap Determination PT-50.12 Measurement of In-Sequence Critical Data During performance of PT-14.2.1, the licensee identified the following: Rod 38-39 had a slow 5% (notch 48 to notch 46) insertion time, 0.917 secon Rod 46-11 had a slow 5% insertion time,1.383 second Rod 50-35 was not timed. Time was estimated at 5 seconds before it would scram, Rod 38-35 was determined to be uncoupled when it was fully withdrawn after timin Rods 50-35 and 38-35 were immediately declared inoperable and actions were taken in accordance with Technical Specification 3.1. 'Upon completion of PT-14.2.1, the average scram insertion time of all

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operable control rods to notch 46 was 0.317 second. Because this exceeded the Technical Specification 3.1.3.3 limit of 0.31 second, one of the slow ,

rods, rod 38-39, was declared inoperable per Technical Specification

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3.1.3.1. This resulted in an acceptable average of 0.309 second. All other average insertion times,1. e. , to notch 36, to notch 26, and to notch 6 were within Technical Specification value The reactor was shutdown on November 13, 1985 for replacement of the drive on the uncoupled rod 38-3 Prior to shutdown, the scram valve sole ioid valves on rods 38-39 and 50-35 were replaced and the rods successfully timed and returned to servic Disassembly of these valves revealed excessive use of lubricant. The licensee believes that the lubricant mt3 have blocked some of the valves'

internal parts, thereby contributing so the slow scram times. No other problem was found with these solenoids. Prior to restart the Plant Nuclear Safety Committee reviewed the solenoid problem for generic applicability (all solenoids had been rebuilt during the refueling outage). The licensee concluded that the current test on the other rods and the periodic retest of 10% of rods every 120 days per Technical Specification 4.1.3.2 provides sufficient assurance that a problem does not exist with the other solenoids or that it would be discovered before a safety problem could develo The slow time of rod 46-11 was attributed to tight packing on the scram valve. Cycling of the valve resulted in a normal insertion tim ,

No violations or deviations were identifie i

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4 Onsite Follow-up of Events (93702)

. Unit 2 scrammed from 70*4 power on November 22, 1985 at 6:28 p. An ARPM upscale alarm was received at the time of the scram. The licensee had been operating the 2A recirculation. pump motor generator set with an open winding

,- in the voltage _ regulator transformer. Based on conversations with General Electric'(GE) that no equipment damage would occur or a safety problem

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existed, the licensee decided to continue to operate the MG set at reduced

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power. . The.2A. recirculation pump flow recorder was inoperable at the time of the scram; thus, the licensee could not pinp' into the cause of the APRM upscale alarm due to a flow decrease in the 2A pump but it appears the most :

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likely caus The inspector verified that the plant safety committee  !

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~ November 24, 198 The 2A recorder, a non-technical specification instrument, and the voltage regulator were repaired prior to unit start-u No violations or deviations were identified.

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