IR 05000324/1985010

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Insp Repts 50-324/85-10 & 50-325/85-10 on 850408-12.No Violation or Deviation Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Independent Insp Effort & Exam of Inconel Buttered Welds Per IE Info Notice 84-41 Recommendations
ML20127P312
Person / Time
Site: Brunswick  Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 05/16/1985
From: Blake J, Coley J
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20127P287 List:
References
50-324-85-10, 50-325-85-10, IEIN-84-41, NUDOCS 8507020377
Download: ML20127P312 (6)


Text

p Rth UNITED STATES q'o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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REGION 11 n

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101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.

  • ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323

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Report Nos.: 50-325/85-10 and 50-324/85-10 Licensee: Carolina Power and Light Company 411 Fayetteville Street Raleigh, NC 27602 Docket Nos.: 50-325 and 50-324 License Nos.:

DPR-71 and DPR-62 Facility Name:

Brunswick 1 and 2 Inspection C d ed-April 8-12, 1985 Inspecto :

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ley Date Signed Approved b.

I (,If Blake, Section Chief D&te Signed

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n neering Branch Di ision of Reactor Safety SUMMARY Scope: This routine, announced inspection entailed 35 inspector-hours on site in the areas of independent inspection effort, examination of inconel buttered welds in accordance with reummendations given in IE Information Notice No. 84-41, re-examination of overlay weld repairs made prior to October 1984, and re-inspection of weld number 1-B32-RECIRC-28"-B-12.

(This weld contained an integranular stress corrosion crack indication, but was not repaired.)

Results: No violations or deviations were identified.

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i 8507020377 850520 PDR ADOCK 05000324 G

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REPORT DETAILS 1.

Persons Contacted

. Licensee Employees

  • E. A. Bishop, Assistant to General Manager
  • B. E. Hinkley, Manager,- Technical Support
  • K. E. Enzor, Director, Regulatory Compliance
  • M. D. Hill, Manager, Nuclear Staff Support
  • W. M. Tucker, Supervisor, Technical Support
  • C. R. Osman, Principal, QA/QC Specialist
  • J. Maciejewski, Principal Engineer
  • B. Monroe, Principal Engineer Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen, engineers, technicians, mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.

NRC Resident Inspectors

  • L. Garner, Resident Inspecter T. Hicks, Resident Inspector r
  • Attended exit interview 2.

Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on April 12, 1985, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.

The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings. Dissenting comments received from the licensee are noted below.

The following new items were identified during this inspection:

a.

Inspector Followup Item 325, 324/85-10-01, Inspection of Inconel Buttering, paragraph 6.a.

b.

Unresolved item 325/85-10-02, Examination Personnel not on the Electric Power Research Institute's Certification List for Examination of Intergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking, paragraph 6.b.

c.

Inspector Followup Item 325/85-10-03, Surface Finish on Overlay Clad Weld Repairs, paragraph 7.b.

d.

Unresolved Item 325/85-10-04, Examination Personnel apparently were not adequately Briefed for Job in High-Radiation Area, paragraph 7.a.

(The Assistant to the General Manager took exception to this finding.

His reason for taking exception and the inspector's determination are described in paragraph 7.)

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e.

Inspector Followup Item 324/85-10-02, Verify Adequate Examination Coverage of Welds Examined During Unit 2 Generic Letter 84-11 Examinations (See Violation 325/84-34-01) paragraph 5.b.

The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the material provided to or reviewed by the inspector during this inspection.

3.

Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters This subject was not addressed in the inspection.

4.

Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to determine whether they are acceptable or may involve violations or deviations.

Two new unresolved items identified during this inspection are discussed in paragraphs 6.b. and 7.a.

5.

Independent Inspection Effort - (92706) Units 1 and 2 a.

The inspector conducted a general inspection of the Unit I containment to observe construction progress and construction activities such as welding, material handling and control, housekeeping and storage.

During this inspection the inspector observed craftsmen using freeze seals to cut class 1 piping in order to replace the reactor instrument penetration isolation valves which were air-operated solenoid-type valves with new excessive flow check valves downstream of manual globe valves.

The air-operated solenoid-type valves relied on both electrical and pneumatic power for valve actuation.

A failure or transient in either of these system could cause spurious isolation valve actuation.

In addition, the air-operated solenoid-type valves caused maintenance concerns generally resulting from moisture in instrument air and faulty diaphragms in the operators. The replacement valves are direct acting, reducing the dependence on support systems and will be less of a maintenance concern.

The replacement of these valves was made using Raychem cryogenic-type fittings (compression fittings) in lieu of welding. The inspector was not familiar with this

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installation process so an in-depth review was made of Carolina Power

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and Light's (CP&L's) evaluation for using these fittings. This review included determining if the margin of safety as defirad by the Technical Specifications had been altered and if the cryogenic fittings met code requirements for replacement fittings.

The applicable code for this installation was the 1967 edition of ANSI B31.1. The inspector held discussions with the licensee's cognizant engineering personnel and reviewed the supporting data. The inspector concluded that the licensee had performed an adequate safety-analysis review and that the application of the cryogenic fittings were an acceptable alternative to welding.

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b.

During the Unit 1 October 1984 outage the inspector identified Violation 50-325/84-34-01 which reported the failure of the licensee to use an appropriate angle ultrasonic transducer to ensure adequate examination coverage on welds with extremely wide weld reinforcements.

A complete review was made of all Unit I welds using construction radiographs and prior weld profiles.

As a result of this review some reinspection was necessary.

The inspector discussed this violation with the licensee cognizant personnel to determine if the Unit 2 welds that were examined in accordance with Generic Letter 84-11 had been reviewed to determine if any discrepancy in coverage existed.

The licensee stated that this had not been done, but a review would be made and any discrepancy in examination coverage would be reinspected during the Unit 2 December 1985 outage.

The inspector will track this commitment with Inspector followup item 324/85-10-02, Verify Adequate Examination Coverage of Welds Examined During Unit 2 Generic Letter 84-11 Examination (See Violation 325/84-34-01).

Within the areas examined, no violations or deviations were identified.

6.

Examination of Inconel Buttered Welds in Accordance with Recommendations Given in IE Information Notice No. 84-41 (92717) Units 1 and 2 a.

On Apri.1 9, 1985,' the inspector observed General Electric (GE)

Ultrasonic (UT) examiners during examination of the nozzle to safe-end inconel butter on weld No. 1-B11-JPI-4"-N88. GE was using a 2.25 MHz, angle beamshear wave transducer in accordance with procedure No. UT 1.39, " Ultrasonic Examination of Small Diameter Nozzle to Safe-end Welds for IGSCC".

However, from the presentation on the ultrasonic instrument screen it was obvious to the inspector that the GE examiners were not examining the inconel welds as required because of an interface signal observed at the steel to inconel interface.

The inspector assumed that this signal was a total-sound deflection and predicted to the examiners that it would plot at the pipe inside diameter (ID) in the area of interest. The inspector later found that the signal for this weld did plot at the ID as predicted and that the plots for all the inconel buttered nozzle welds on Unit 1 also plotted this ultrasonic phenomenon in the same area.

A review of the ultrasonic examination reports for Unit 2 also revealed that these welds had not been examined due to the carbon steel to inconel interface. The inspector discussed this problem in detail with GE's Level III examiner and CP&L's level III examiner and suggested that GE's procedure be changed to require a lower MHz (longer and slower wave length) transducer which utilizes a refracted longitudinal wave in lieu of a shear wave.

Refracted longitudinal wave transducers have been found to be superior to shear waves transducers for the inspection of high-alloy cast and weld metals.

The licensee agreed that the transducer used was not the best attempt possible and that a

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lower MHz refracted longitudinal wave transducer would be tried in order to examine the inconel for intergranular stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC).

The inspector will track the licensee's progress in this area with Inspector followup item 325,324/85-10-01, Inspection of Inconel Buttering, b.

During the inspector's review of equipment and personnel certifications for the examination observed above, the inspector found that one of the ultrasonic examiners inspecting the inconel welds for IGSCC was not on the inspector's list of certified examiners for the inspection of IGSCC.

This list is furnished to NRC by the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) who is responsible for certifying these examiners.

The examiner, however, had a certificate from EPRI indicating that he had challenged the practical and had passed.

The inspector contacted EPRI concerning this discrepancy and found that an individual could challenge the practical examination prior to January 1984, and be considered certified.

However, after that date NRC, EPRI, and the BWR Owners Group signed a Coordination Plan which required examiners to be trained and completely examined at EPRI in order to be considered certified for IGSCC.

GE scheduled this individual to be immediately enrolled in the next class and to be tested in the areas where he had not demonstrated proficiency.

This item was reported as Unresolved Item No. 325/85-10-02, Examination Personnel not on the EPRI Certification List for Examination of IGSCC.

Within the areas examined, no violations or deviations were identified.

7.

Re-examination of Overlay Weld Repairs Made Prior to October 1984 (92703)

Unit 1 a.

On April 9, 1985, the inspector also observed an examiner liquid penetrant inspecting a weld joint adjacent to a weld overlay repair.

The inspector had been previously informed by CP&L that this individual would be examining weld B32 RECIRC 12" BR-H-4, which was an overlay repair weld.

The inspector questioned the examiner as to why he was examining the weld adjacent to the overlay.

The examiner stated that he was supposed to examine weld No. 4 and that the weld he was inspecting was stenciled No. 4.

Further discussions during his liquid penetrant examination of the weld with the examiner, drawing that had been given the examin and review of a finally convinced the individual that he had examined the wrong we The

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examiner then preceded to examine the correct weld. The inspector was

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concerned that the examiner would have provided an acceptable

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examination test report of a weld that, had the inspector not been there to correct him, would have been the wrong weld.

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The inspector concluded that the individual was improperly briefed for l

his job that was performed in a high-radiation area.

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This item was reported to the licensee as Unresolved Item 325/85-10-04, Examination Personnel apparently were not Adequately Briefed for Job in High-Radiation Area.

During the exit meeting, the Assistant to the General Manager took exception to the fact that the individual was inadequately briefed since the individual had a sketch that depicted which weld was weld No. 4.

GE, however, has a specific examination procedure (PT 1.31) for the examination of weld overlays and, had the examiner been properly briefed before going into the high radiation area as to what test procedure was applicable for the examination, the title of the procedure would have informed him that he was on the wrong weld.

b.

The liquid peretrant examination on the weld overlay discussed above was a preliminary surface examination that is required prior to ultrasonic examination of the weld under the overlay.

The purpose of the ultrasonic examination is to determine if the weld overlay had retarded the growth of the previously reported crack.

The inspector, however, noted that the weld beads on the weld overlay were irregular in height and it appears that this condition was severe enough to preclude a meaningful ultrasonic examination.

The inspector reviewed the ultrasonic test reports and strip charts from the initial UT examination that had been performed after the weld had been overlayed and found that the strip charts did not provide any meaningful data.

In each case the reports noted poor surface condition as a contributing factor.

The inspector discussed this condition with the licensee's Level III examiner who assured the inspector that, if surface condition on any weld overlay interferes with obtaining meaningful results this outage, the welds will be ground smoother.

This commitment will be tracked by Inspector followup item No. 325/85-10-03, " Surface Finish on Overlay Clad Weld Repairs."

Within the areas examined,no violations or deviations were identified.

8.

Re-inspection of Weld Number 1-B32-Recirc-2B"-B-12 (92703) Unit 1

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During examinations conducted in accordance with IE Bulletin 83-02, Weld l

Number 1-B32-Recir-28-B-12 was found to have shallow IGSCC.

Analysis of this cracking did not warrant an overlay repair at the time. CP&L, however,

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committed to monitor this weld each outage to determine any additional crack l

growth. On April 10, 1985, the inspector observed the GE Level III examiner attempt to size the IGSCC.

However, the selection of equipment chosen by

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the Level III during this examination was not compatible with the noise level experienced as a result of the material grain structure and the i

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examination had to be postponed until appropriate equipment combination could be determined.

Within the areas examined,no violations or deviations were identified.