IR 05000324/1980023
| ML19338D978 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Brunswick  |
| Issue date: | 08/04/1980 |
| From: | Hardin A, Long F, Marsh R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19338D970 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-324-80-23, 50-325-80-26, NUDOCS 8009240284 | |
| Download: ML19338D978 (15) | |
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h UNITED STATES 8'
i NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100 b
AT LANT A, GEORGI A 30303 o
INVESTIGATION REPORT NOS. 50-325/80-26 and 50-324/80-23
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SUBJECT: Carolina Power and Light Company Brunswick Steam Electric Plant Units 1 & 2 Southport, North Carolina Unmonitored Radioactive Release from Auxiliary Boiler at the Brunswick Steam Electric Plant on February 22, 1980.
DATES OF INVESTIGATION: June 2 - 6, 1980 INVESTIGATOR:
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%8#-D R. J. Mar Regional Investigator Date Signed Office he Director INSPECTOR:
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ector Date ' Signed R ctfr[Operationsan Nuclear Support Branch
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PEVIEWED BY
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F. J. Long, Acting Deputy K rector
'Dat'e Signed Office of the Director soog u o 2 F'l
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TABLE OF CONTEiiTS Section I.
SIE1ARY OF INVESTIGATION A.
Introduction B.
Scope of Investigation C.
ConclusionsSection II.
DETAILS OF INVESTIGATION A.
Persons Contacted
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B.
System Description C.
Chronology Developed As Result of Investigation
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SECTION I
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SUrefARY OF INVESTIGATION BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 June 2-6, 1980
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INTRODUCTION During a telephone call to the NRC, Region II, on the evening of February 22, 1980, on matters independent of this investigation, the Plant General Manager of Carolina Power and Light's (CP&L)_ Brunswick Steam Electric Plant near Southport, NC, advised that the plant had experienced a leak of radioactively
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contaminated water from an auxiliary boiler earlier that day. The General Manager advised that the event was not considered reportable since it was felt that no offsite release of the contaminated water had occurred.
On March 26, 1980, the NRC Senior Resident Inspector at the Brunswick site was informed by CP&L corporate staff that, based on environmental samples subsequently taken in the Brunswick site environs (to a distance of eight miles), an airborne radioactive release was concluded to have taken place.
2ne release was assumed by CP&L to have taken place February 22, 1980, when a tube leak occurred in the unit I auxiliary steam boiler. The released water leaked through the bottom of the firebox and dropped to the ground beneath. Some of the tube leakage flashed to steam and in combination with the combustion gases was swept up and out of the exhaust stack in to the
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atmosphere. Although initial observation of the water and steam releases was made by an Operating Shift Foreman at approximately 0100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br />, the combustion in the auxiliary boiler firebox was not extinguished until i
approximately 0700 hours0.0081 days <br />0.194 hours <br />0.00116 weeks <br />2.6635e-4 months <br />. Analyses of subsequent environmental surveys con-ducted over the next 33 days, until March 26, 1980, by CP&L staff revealed
that Technical Specification (Appendix B, Section 5.4.2 b) limits regarding the release of radioactivity to the environment had been exceeded during
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the event. On March 26, 1980 notification to the NRC was made by CP&L.
During an NRC inspection conducted March 10-14, 1980, and March 29 - April 3, 1980, questions arose concerning actions taken by the CP&L staff during the release on February 22, 1980, and the degree of deliberation by the operating control room staff associated with these actions.
In other words, were conscious decisions to continue the uncontrolled, unmonitored release of knowingly contaminated water / steam made based upon operational expediency?
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A routine unannounced inspection of the Brunswick site was conducted by the NRC during the periods March 10-14, 1980, and March 29 - April 3,1980, which included an inspection of the site environmental monitoring program and an investigation concerning radioactive material released from the auxiliary boiler system to the restricted and unrestricted areas. The results of this inspection are reported in IE Report Nos. 50-325/80-12 and 50-324/80-11.
The results of this inspection formed the basis for escalated enforcement action by the NRC which culminated in a $24,000 civil penalty being assessed to Carolina Power and Light Company on June 13, 1980.
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SCOPE OF INVESTIGATION As a result of the findings detailed in the inspection reports cited above and due to comments of plant workers made to the NRC inspectors during the conduct of that inspection, an investigation was initiated on J;.ne 2, 1980, under the authority provided by Section 161.c of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. The purpose of this investigation was to ascertain:
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The facts and circumstances surrounding the February 22, 1980, release 2.
The actions taken by plant personnel at the time of the release.
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The communication flow through which details of the event were provided to plant supervision / management.
NRC personnel involved in receipt of initial notification of the event or who participated in the March 10-14, 1980, and March 29 - April 3, 1980, inspection were interviewed during the investigation.
Interviews were also conducted with the CP&L Brunswick Plant General Manager, seven CP&L Radiation Control and Test (RC&T) personnel and five Operations (Control Room) personnel.
Fertinent procedures, analyses data, written correspondence, logs, and listorical records were reviewed. The unit I and 2 control room and auxiliarf boiler facilities were observed by the investi-gators.
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CONCLUSIONS The investigation identified no evidence to support a conclusion that a conscious decision was made by operating shift perscnnel or CP&L management to knowingly permit an uncontrolled and unmonitored rel' ease of radioactively contaminated steam to continue as an operational expedient (e.g., in order to inert containment drywells through use of the CAC liquid nitrogen vaporizer).
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.In the absence of'such evidence it is concluded.that a decision by the
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Operating Shift Foreman to continue the auxiliary boiler in operation when he was aware radioactive contaminated water was leaking from the firebox area was based upon:
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previous plant experiences with similar leaks of the-auxiliary boiler system and an apparent complacent attitude towards radioactive contam-
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ination in cases where it was " controlled" (defined by several operating staff personnel as "being contained on CP&L property");
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a professed failure to relate any radiological safety significance to the observed steam release from the boiler stack while acknowledging
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awareness of the contaminated status of leaking water; and 3.
the recognition that the cause of the leakage from the unit I auxiliary boiler was a tube failure that would lead to the loss of availability of the boiler during repair. It is believed that this created a sense of " urgency" in the mind of the Operating Shift Foreman to reduce the q
oxygen level in both containments (to as low as possible) by use of the CAC liquid nitrogen vaporizer. It is believed this was done to provide an operational safety margin below Technical Specification drywell oxygen concentration limits.
The delay associated with the analysis of the leakage to ascertain and quantify the degree of contamination and the delay in passing to the Operat-ing Shift Supervisor any word of problems with the auxiliary boiler system are also concluded to further show the degree of acceptance placed on this
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" routine" release of radioactively contaminated water and steam.
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Regarding the. knowledge and. actions taken by CP&L management-in connection with.the early stages of this event, it is concluded that the Plant General Manager was aware of the release of steam, ar well as liquid, when he dis-cussed the release with NRC ' regional staff on the evening of the event.
However, since the Plant General Manager's staff had failed to identify any radiological significance associated with the steam release and had, to the J
contrary, informed.him of its unimportance, the General Manager. limited his remarks to the handling of the liquid leakage.
INo items of noncompliance with NRC rules and regulations beyond those already identified'and cited in IE Report Nos. 50-325/80-12 and 50-324/80-11, were identified during this investigation.
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SECTION II DETAILS OF INVESTIGATION BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 i
JUNE 2-6, 1980
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PERSONNEL CONTACTED'
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-Carolina Power and Light Company
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A. C. To11ison, Jr... Plant General Manager
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W. M. Tucker, Manager, Technical and Administrative J. M. Brown, Manager, Operations
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R. M. Poulk, NRC Coordinator -
L. F. Tripp, Environ;sental and Radiation Control Supervisor Other licensee employees contacted included members of the licensee's RC&T-and Operations staff.
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Nuclear Regulatory Commission P. J. Kellogg, Chief, Reactor Projects Section, Region II J. E. Ouzts, Senior Resident Inspector, Brunswick Steam Electric Plant J. M. Puckett, Radiation Specialist, Region II
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SYSTEM DESCRIPTION The auxiliary steam system is described in CP&L's Brunswick Steam Electric Plant Units 1 and 2 (BSEP-1&2) FSAR, paragraph 10.18-1 and BSEP System Description SD40. The two auxiliary boilers utilized dre each of the fuel-oil-fired, water-tube type rated at 55,000_ lb/ hour of saturated steam at 250 psig. The auxiliary boilers are normally operated individually at.a nominal operating pressure of 210 to 215 psig. The boilers and auxiliary equipment
.are located outdoors with an enclosure provided to shelter the control panel, boiler feed pumps, forced draft fans, and additional supporting equipment.
The auxiliary steam system is described by SD40 as having the purpose of providing a source of steam independent of the nuclear steam supply system to the following balance of plant and related reactor support systems:
Steam sealing of the main turbines during plant start-up when the mechnical vacuum pumps are in service for the purpose of condenser evacuation (condenser hogging).
Steam blanketing protection for the reheater units during system outages
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to prevent corrosion from entrained oxygen.
Building heating and makeup air heating requirements.
Steam heating service for fuel oil and caustic unloading stations.
Steam to the radwaste concentrator, hot water heater, and heating and ventilation system for the radwaste building.
Steam to the Augmented Off Gas (A0G) recombiner preheater and CAC vaporizer.
An eight (8) inch temporary line off of the auxiliary steam supply header permits operational testing of the reactor feed pumps and HPCI and RCIC turbines.
Commencing in April 1978 the auxiliary boiler system, specifically Boiler j
No. 1, experienced a series of incidents and equipment maintenance problems
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that resulted in radioactive contamination of the system's contents. The j
degree of contamination rose and fell commensurate with corrective actions taken by the plant staff, but the characterization of the auxiliary boiler
" contaminated" grew until its reputation at the time of the
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system as February 22 release was common knowledge among plant staff.
A detailed evaluation of the problems encountered with the auxiliary boiler system is provided in IE Report Nos. 50-325/80-12 and 50-324/80-11, Details II, Para-l graph 3 and will not be repeated here.
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CHRONOLOGY DEVELOPED AS RESULT OF INVESTIGATION The investigation was initiated with a review of Inspection Reports 50-325/_
80-12'andl50-324/80-11 and discussions with NRC staff personnel cognizant of CP&L's efforts associated with.the release and subsequent notification to the NRC. The onsite phase of the investigation was initiated at the Brunswick Steam Electric Plant. near Southport, NC on' June 3,1980.
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Through interviews of CP&L employees and the review of available records
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in CP&L's 30-Day Nonroutine Radiological Environmental Event Report" dated
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April 22',1980 (CP&L File: B09-13516.2, Serial: BSEP/80-691).
Theinvestigatorsreviewedthe"AuxiliaryBoilerLog"forFebiuary 21, 1980 to determine the pre-event status of the auxiliary steam system. Entries-on the log form reveal that during the 1600-2400 hour shift neither the 20 8Pm nor. the 50 gpm Waste Concentrators were in operation. The " Unusual-Conditions" section of the log for Febru sry 21, 1980 contained entries-reflecting the following:
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"#1 Boiler contaminated
- 2 Boiler shutdown at 125 PSIG at 0100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> - open vent at (approxi-mately) 15 psig 2100 opened vent on #2 boiler".
Following a shif t change at midnight, the control room Auxiliary Operator.
(Aux Operator) with responsibility for "outside" operations began his rounds.
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In an interview with the investigators, the Aux Operator stated he arrived
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the auxiliary boiler facility (aux boiler) as the second stop on his at rounds.
He' estimated his arrival time as approximately 0030 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br /> on February 22, 1980.
Note: Throughout the series of investigative interviews the subjects indicated their. recollection of specific times was poor. Most attri-buted this to two factors:
(1) the lapse of time (three months) si u the' incident and (2) their interpretation of the event Lat the time of its happening as a '? routine" (or non-extraordinary) occurrence. Most time references cited by the interviewees were _ viewed by the investigators as within:a'plus.or minus span of 15 minutes. Attempts to more closely identify the precise time of specific events were unsuccessful.
Upon his arrival, the Aux Operator stated, he observed steam being emitted from the. exhaust stack of the unit 1 aux boiler. He indicated he notified the control room of his-observation and requested that the-Operating Shift'
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Foreman ?come to the aux boiler facility. Weather conditions at the time were described as being " foggy with light rain".-
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II.C.2 The ' Aux Operator recalled that the Operating Shift Foreman accompanied by the Shift Foreman (radwaste) appeared at his location promptly. He estimated their arrival at between 0045 and 0100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br />..The two shift foremen both observed the presence of apparent steam in the exhau.st gas at the top of the stack. The Shift Foreman (radwaste) examined aux boiler #1 and verbally noted that water was falling to the ground from the firebox area. The Operating Shif t Foreman indicated to the investigators that he e'stimated the water leakage from the firebox to be approximately I gpm at low pressure and the steam emission to be light.
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In an entry (no time entered but second entry for 0000-0800 shift, 2/22/80)
in the Radwaste Log the Shift Foreman (radwaste) indicated:
"There is'a bunch of steam coming from the stack of the #1 aux boiler. There is water running out of the flue pipe after the economizer and water running out of the bottom of the firebox. LNo. I aux boiler is going to be S/D (Shutdown)
I after drywells 'are inerted."
When questioned by the investigators the Operating Shift Foreman stated tha'. "their" (his and the Shift Foremc_ (radwaste)) conclusion at the time wa r, that a tube leak was involved and C.at the leaking water was radioac-tively contaminated. The Operating Shift Foreman further indicated that he l
felt the liquid release was occurring v, der controlled conditions where no i
potential for offsite release was appe-st.
He stated no consideration was given to the steam emmission as to its
>ssible contaminated status or its potential for release beyond the plan-boundaries.
The Operating Shift Foreman said that the concern-that he
'A have was over controlling the seepage of the contaminated water leaking irom the aux boil r.
The Aux Operator. stated he was instructed by the control ro, m at approximately 0130 hours0.0015 days <br />0.0361 hours <br />2.149471e-4 weeks <br />4.9465e-5 months <br /> to proceed from the aux boiler site to the A0G building. He was instructed to tend the nitrogen vaporizer in preparation for the inerting of unit I and 2 containments. He stated he was unable to i ecall if inerting was begun at that time of not. At approximately 0330 hours0.00382 days <br />0.0917 hours <br />5.456349e-4 weeks <br />1.25565e-4 months <br />, the Aux Operator stated, he left the plant site for duties at the Caswell Bea:h pump station; a remote location. He stated he did not return to the plaat site until near the end of his shift at 0730 hours0.00845 days <br />0.203 hours <br />0.00121 weeks <br />2.77765e-4 months <br />.
The investigators identified an entry in the unit 2 log indicating that the drywell was being inerted at 0530 hcurs.
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When investigators interviewed - a Radiation Control and Test technician (RC&T), he told of encountering an unidentified Aux Operator at approximately 0530 hours0.00613 days <br />0.147 hours <br />8.763227e-4 weeks <br />2.01665e-4 months <br /> who requested the technician to sample water leaking from an aux boiler. ~ The technician stated he observed, upon approaching aux boiler #1, heavy billowing steam which he described as being " like a freight train".
- The - RC&T technician asked the Aux Operator if the steam was contaminated and was informed that. it "probably was" since a tube leak was involved.
The technician stated he took dip smears of water he observed. leaking to the groun,d and proceeded to the RC&T laboratory to count these samples.
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When questioned by the investigators the technician indicated the smear.
were taken from the water already on the ground (a known contaminateu area).
The RC&T log was found by the investigator to contain a " late entry" for 0600 hours0.00694 days <br />0.167 hours <br />9.920635e-4 weeks <br />2.283e-4 months <br /> stating "took dip smear of (water) coming f' rom unit I aux boiler.
Results:
874 tc 108? dpm. SS #0222-5.
Also noticed a great amount of steam coming from unit I aux boiler stack. Notified control room of situ-ation."
The technician told the investigator that in telephoning the results to the control room he was informed by an operator that the boiler was being used and could not be shutdown. He stated he then departed th-RC&T office area for the control room to discuss the matter further.
In an interview of the Operating Shif t Supervisor the investigators were informed that it was at about this same time, 0600 hours0.00694 days <br />0.167 hours <br />9.920635e-4 weeks <br />2.283e-4 months <br />, that the problem with the unit I aux boiler was first brought to his attention. The Shift Supervisor stated his Operating Shift Foreman advised him of the " billowing" steam problem. In their discussion it was surmised that a tube failure had taken place and that this was the most probable source of the water observed to be leaking to the ground. The Shif t Supervisor acknowledged to the investigators that he was aware the leaking water would be contaminated.
He stated his considerations upon being informed of the problem were:
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what additional damage (by steam impingement) might be done to the boiler's interior by the leaking tube, and (2) how best to handle the contaminated water. He stated he did not consider the steam release at that time. The Shift Supervisor advised that at the conclusion of his discussions with the Operating Shift Foreman (0615 to 0630 hours0.00729 days <br />0.175 hours <br />0.00104 weeks <br />2.39715e-4 months <br />) he ordered the Operating Shift
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Foreman to shutdown the unit I aux boiler and reduce the internal steam pressure (nominally 210 to 215 psig) by using the CAC liquid nitrogen vaporizer to draw heat out of the Auxiliary Steam System. In this way, he
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indicated, he sought to reduce the internal pressure on the system, thereby reducing the liquid release rate, and inert the containments at the same time. He further stated the employment of the CAC vaporizer was, in his
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I opinion, the quickest method of reducing the pressure within the Auxiliary Steam System.
l At approximately 0615 to 0630 hours0.00729 days <br />0.175 hours <br />0.00104 weeks <br />2.39715e-4 months <br /> the RC&T technician arrived at the control room and met with the Operating Shift Foreman and Shift Supervisor.
The technician states he advised them of the results of his survey and raised the question of whether tLa Shift Foreman and Supervisor knew that
" contaminated steam is being released through the stack". The technician l
told the investigators that the Shift Supervisor then said a release rate
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was known and that *the matter was under control.
The RC&T technician stated he then returned to the RC&T area and advised the RC&T Foreman who was appearing early for assumption of duties at the 0730 hours0.00845 days <br />0.203 hours <br />0.00121 weeks <br />2.77765e-4 months <br /> s ift change.
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II.C.4 The RC&T Foreman in the company of the Plant Chemist viewed the unit 1 aux boiler area noting heavy steam being released from the stack and a heavy
" dripping", estimated by the RC&T Foreman at 4 to 6 gpm of water, from the firebox area. The RC&T Foreman and Chemist then proceeded to the control room.
An entry in the unit 2 log indicates that at 0655 hours0.00758 days <br />0.182 hours <br />0.00108 weeks <br />2.492275e-4 months <br /> the CAC nitrogen vaporizer had been noted as frozen and that inerting was being accomplished as it defrosted.
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The RC&T Foreman with the Plant Chemist appeared at the control room, according to his estimate, at about 0715 hours0.00828 days <br />0.199 hours <br />0.00118 weeks <br />2.720575e-4 months <br /> and met with the Operating Shift Supervisor (referenced for clarity as Shift Supervisor. B) for the oncoming shift. The RC&T Foreman states he advised Shift Supervisor B that
"an uncontrolled and unmonitored release was underway and that aux boiler 1 shotid be shutdown."
The RC&T Foreman states he was informed by Shift Supervisor B that an evolution was in progress and that the control
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room would be unable to shutdown the aux boiler until the evolution was complete. Shift Supervisor B had no recollection of this conversation but
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the Operating Shift Supervisor (or Operating Shif t Supervisor A) who was l
still on duty with the 2400 to 0800 hour0.00926 days <br />0.222 hours <br />0.00132 weeks <br />3.044e-4 months <br /> shift told the investigators that he recalled telling the RC&T Foreman at about 0715 hours0.00828 days <br />0.199 hours <br />0.00118 weeks <br />2.720575e-4 months <br /> that instructions to shutdown the unit one aux boiler hsd been given.
A substantial degree of confusion was identified by the investigators in their attempts to specifically determine who actually shutdown the unit I aux boiler and at what time. The memories of CP&L personnel are admittedly hazy and much was occurring during the 0700-0730 hour period preceding the shift change on February 22, 1980.
Conflicting testimony was received concerning specific actions taken and d!-cussions held during this time
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period, but the general scenario which was developed indicates that fire within the unit 1 aux boiler was extinguished at approximately 0700-0715 hours. Removal of steam from the aux boiler system to the nitrogen vaporizer may have continued for an additional period of time.
The oncoming Aux Operator (Aux Operator B) provided information to Shif t Supervisor B that at 0730 hours0.00845 days <br />0.203 hours <br />0.00121 weeks <br />2.77765e-4 months <br /> the fire in the: unit 1 aux boiler was already out and that aux steam system pressure was approximately 60 psig (down from the nominal operating range of 210 to 215 psis). Aux Operator B also noted only " wispy" steam was being released from the stack The Environmental and Radiation Control (E&RC) Supervisor stated to the investigators that he saw steam streaming from the plant upon his arrival to begin work at approximately 0710 hours0.00822 days <br />0.197 hours <br />0.00117 weeks <br />2.70155e-4 months <br />.
In a telephone call to the control room at approximately 0710 hours0.00822 days <br />0.197 hours <br />0.00117 weeks <br />2.70155e-4 months <br />, the E&FC Supervisor informed Operating Shift Supervisor A that "the situation could not be tolerated.".
The E&RC Supervisor stated he'was informed that the boiler shutdown was in progress.
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II.C.5 Prior to departing the site at the end of the 2400-0800 hour shift, Oper-ating Shift Supervisor A wrote a memorandum to the E&RC Superviser asking the following questions: "Does lifting of concentrator reliefs and blowing of steam out of aux boiler stack present problems from a radiation protection standpoint?"
The E&RC f,upervisor advised the investigators that his own checks' revealed the unit 1 aux boiler to be shutdown with a cessation of any steam or water leakage a +. 1100 hours0.0127 days <br />0.306 hours <br />0.00182 weeks <br />4.1855e-4 months <br />.
A maintenance clearance was posted for the aux boiler at 1300 hours0.015 days <br />0.361 hours <br />0.00215 weeks <br />4.9465e-4 months <br />.
The E&RC Supervisor briefed the Plant General Manager on the events during the early afternoon of February 22, 1980. The E&RC Supervisor states he principally responded to two questions of the General Manager: (1) What do you feel the significance of the steam is and (2) what is your evaluation of the situation? The E&RC Supervisor advised the investigators that seither he nor his staff had realized the full significance of the steam release.by the time this meeting was held. He stated he was under the impression that the steam leak had not begun until approximately 0600 hours0.00694 days <br />0.167 hours <br />9.920635e-4 weeks <br />2.283e-4 months <br />. This, combined with his knowledge that weather conditions included
" blustering winds" in a direction such that CP&L property extended for nearly one mile, caused him to conclude that even if a release of radio-active contamination had occurred in the steam, it would still be "under control" on CP&L property.
The E&RC Supervisor had a filter from an environmental air sampler located downwind of the steam release removed for analysis at approximately 1400 hours0.0162 days <br />0.389 hours <br />0.00231 weeks <br />5.327e-4 months <br />. This was done in an attempt to determine if the released steam had contained contaminants. He indicated a count of the filter (accomplished at the Brunswick plant prior to the transfer of the filter to the CP&L corporate Energy Center's Environmental Counting Room for detailed analysis)
revealed no grossly elevated levels. The E&RC Supervisor states that at that time this finding further supported his assumption that no release had occurred. He admitted his awareness that the initial onsite count of the filter had been accomplished on equipment with matginal capabilities, for a minimal time period, in an environment containing a hi h background level
of radiation (e.g., conditions which could easily produce erroneous or masked results).
At approximately 1900 hours0.022 days <br />0.528 hours <br />0.00314 weeks <br />7.2295e-4 months <br /> that evening the Plant General Manager placed a phone call to an NRC regional staff member on another matter. During the conversation the Plant General Manager mentioned that indications of a tube failure had been observed in an auxiliary boiler earlier that day and the boiler had been shutdown. The General Manager stated a leakage of contami-nated water had subsequently occurred.
He detailed the clean-up procedures implemented and indicated the leakage problem did not seem to be reportable. The possibility of a radioactive release by way of flue gases or steam was not discusse,
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Maintenance work on the unit 1~ aux boiler was performed under CP&L Work -
Request and Authorization Form, ' Serial '2-M-794,- dated 2/23/80. This Work Request confirmed the existence and repair of a hole in one of the boiler tubes of the' unit 1 aux boiler.
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Subsequent actions - by ' CP&l,' invclving the recognition that a technical
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specification limit had been exceeded and the resultant notification to-the NRC are. adequately detailed in the previously referenced NRC inspeqtion reports and will not be repeated he.re.
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