IR 05000321/2009004
| ML093030329 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hatch  |
| Issue date: | 10/30/2009 |
| From: | Scott Shaeffer NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB2 |
| To: | Madison D Southern Nuclear Operating Co |
| References | |
| IR-09-004 | |
| Download: ML093030329 (22) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ber 30, 2009
SUBJECT:
EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000321/2009004 AND 05000366/2009004 AND OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS SYNOPSIS
Dear Mr. Madison:
On September 30, 2009, the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2. The enclosed integrated inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on October 21, 2009, with you and other members of your staff. Also, enclosed is the synopsis of the Office of Investigations (OI) completed investigation that was initiated to determine whether a contractor formerly employed by General Electric (GE) Water Systems willfully failed to report an arrest to Southern Company access authorization officials in order to gain unescorted access to the Hatch Nuclear plant.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities and interviewed personnel. Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified.
Regarding the investigation, OI did not substantiate that the GE employee willfully failed to report and arrest. Based on the NRCs review of the investigation report no further action is warranted.
SNC 2 In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, its enclosures, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Scott M. Shaeffer, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos.: 50-321, 50-366 License Nos.: DPR-57 and NPF-5
Enclosures:
Inspection Report 05000321/2009004, 05000366/2009004 w/Attachment 1: Supplemental Information Attachment 2: Office of Investigations Synopsis
REGION II==
Docket Nos.: 50-321, 50-366 License Nos.: DPR-57 and NPF-5 Report Nos.: 05000321/2009004 and 05000366/2009004 Licensee: Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
Facility: Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Location: Baxley, Georgia 31513 Dates: July 1 - September 30, 2009 Inspectors: E. Morris, Senior Resident Inspector E. Crowe, Senior Resident Inspector at Farley M. Cain, Senior Resident Inspector at Vogtle J. Hickey, Senior Resident Inspector at Robinson P. Niebaum, Resident Inspector T. Lighty, Project Engineer T. Chandler, Resident Inspector at Vogtle Approved by: Scott M. Shaeffer, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000321/2009-004, 05000366/2009-004; 07/01/2009-09/30/2009; Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear
Plant, Units 1 and 2, integrated report The report covered a three-month period of inspection by four senior resident inspectors, two resident inspectors, and one project engineer. No violations or findings of significance were identified.
NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings
None.
Licensee-Identified Violations
None.
REPORT DETAILS
Summary of Plant Status
Unit 1 operated at or near full Rated Thermal Power (RTP) for the entire inspection period.
Unit 2 operated at or near full RTP until a condenser water box tube leakage occurred on July 12, which resulted in increased reactor coolant system conductivity and chloride concentration. Operators took actions to reduce reactor power to approximately 37%
RTP in accordance with established chemistry parameter procedural guidelines. Unit 2 returned to 100% RTP on July 18 and remained at or near full RTP for the remainder of the inspection period.
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity
1R01 Adverse Weather
a. Inspection Scope
External Flooding. The inspectors performed a review of licensee readiness to cope with external flooding. The inspectors performed walkdowns of the systems listed below to verify that equipment was in place to mitigate the potential impacts from external flooding. The inspectors reviewed licensee procedure 34AB-Y22-002-0, Naturally Occurring Phenomena, to verify guidance existed to cope with an external flood.
Additionally, the inspectors reviewed licensee documentation that shows design flood levels for area containing safety-related equipment. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
- Unit 1 & 2 plant service water
- Unit 1 & 2 residual heat removal service water (RHRSW)
- 1B emergency diesel generator (EDG) standby service water system
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R04 Equipment Alignment
a. Inspection Scope
Partial Walkdowns. The inspectors performed partial walkdowns of the following three systems when the opposite train was removed from service, a remaining operable system/train with high risk significance for the plant configuration exists, or a system/train that was recently realigned following an extended system outage or a risk significant single train system exists. The inspectors checked system valve positions, electrical breaker positions, and operating switch positions to evaluate the operability of the opposite trains or components by comparing the position listed in the system operating procedure to the actual position. Documents reviewed are listed in the
.
- Unit 1 A train of standby liquid control system while B train was out of service for maintenance
- Unit 1 B residual heat removal (RHR) train while the A RHR train was out of service for maintenance Complete System Walkdown. The inspectors performed a complete walkdown of the Unit 2 high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system. This inspection sample was completed using the guidance listed in Operating Experience Smart Sample: OpESS FY2009-02, Negative Trend and Recurring Events Involving Feedwater Systems. The inspectors performed a detailed check of valve positions, electrical breaker positions, and operating switch positions to evaluate the operability of the system or components by comparing the required position in the system operating procedure to the actual position. The inspectors also interviewed personnel and reviewed control room logs to verify that alignment and equipment discrepancies were being identified and appropriately resolved. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R05 Fire Protection
a. Inspection Scope
Fire Area Tours. The inspectors toured the following five risk significant plant areas to assess the material condition of the fire protection and detection equipment, verify fire protection equipment was not obstructed, and that transient combustibles were properly controlled. The inspectors reviewed the Fire Hazards Analysis drawings H-11846 and H-11847 to verify that the necessary fire fighting equipment; such as fire extinguishers, hose stations, ladders, and communications equipment; was in place. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
- Unit 2 reactor building northeast diagonal RHR and core spray (CS) pump room
- Unit 2 reactor building northwest diagonal reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) pump and turbine room
- Unit 2 reactor building southwest diagonal control rod drive pump room
- Unit 2 reactor building HPCI pump and turbine room
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R06 Internal Flood Protection
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed selected risk-important plant design features and licensee procedures intended to protect the plant and its safety-related equipment from internal flooding events. The inspectors reviewed flood analysis and design documents, including the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), engineering calculations and abnormal operating procedures for licensee commitments. The inspectors walked down the area listed below to verify plant design features and plant procedures for flood mitigation were consistent with design requirements and internal flooding analysis assumptions. The inspectors reviewed flood protection barriers, which included plant floor drains, condition of room penetrations, condition of the sumps in the rooms, and condition of water-tight doors. The inspectors also reviewed condition reports (CRs) to verify the licensee was identifying and resolving problems. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
- Unit 1 reactor building elevations 158 and 130
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification
a. Inspection Scope
Resident Quarterly Observation The inspectors observed the performance of licensee simulator scenario LT-SG-51068-03, which included a load reduction due to circulating water pump trip, a loss of reactor water level indication, and a small loss of coolant accident that resulted in an automatic reactor scram due to high drywell pressure. The inspectors reviewed the proper classification in accordance with the Emergency Plan and licensee procedures 10AC-MGR-019-0, Procedure Use and Adherence, and DI-OPS-59-0896, Operations Management Expectations, to verify formality of communication, procedure usage, alarm response, control board manipulations, group dynamics, and supervisory oversight. The inspectors attended the post-exercise critique of operator performance to assess if the licensee identified performance issues were comparable to those identified by the inspectors. In addition, the inspectors reviewed the critique results from previous training sessions to assess performance improvement.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Evaluation
a. Inspection Scope
For the following four time periods below, the inspectors reviewed Plan of the Day documents to verify that risk assessments were performed prior to components being removed from service. The inspectors reviewed the risk assessment and risk management controls implemented for these activities to verify they were completed in accordance with licensee procedure 90AC-OAM-002-0, Scheduling Maintenance, and 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(4). For emergent work, the inspectors assessed whether any increase in risk was promptly assessed and that appropriate risk management actions were implemented.
- July 4 through July 10, Unit 1 RCIC pressure switch functional test and calibration (FT&C), Unit 1 reactor water level differential pressure FT&C, 2D RHRSW pump replacement
- July 11 through July 17, 1B standby service water pump out of service for maintenance, 1C condensate booster pump out of service for design change, 1A reactor building closed cooling water pump out of service for maintenance
- July 18 through July 24, Unit 1 RHR surveillance testing, Unit 1 reactor manual scram functional Test, 2H 125 volt direct current (VDC) battery charger preventive maintenance
- August 15 through August 21, Altamaha River dredging, 1B EDG out of service, Unit-2 HPCI system for planned maintenance
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R15 Operability Evaluations
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the following four operability evaluations and compared the evaluations to the system requirements identified in the Technical Specifications (TS)and the UFSAR to ensure operability was adequately assessed and the system or component remained available to perform its intended function. Also, the inspectors assessed the adequacy of compensatory measures implemented as a result of the condition. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
- U1 and U2 safety relief valves
- U1 1E 125 VDC battery charger discolored wire identified
- U2 2D RHRSW pump minimum flow valve failed to fully close
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R18 Plant Modifications
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the following two plant temporary modifications (TM) to ensure that safety functions of important safety systems have not been affected. Also, the inspectors verified that the design bases, licensing bases and performance capability of risk significant structures, systems and components have not been degraded through modifications. The inspectors verified that any modifications performed during increased risk-significant configurations did not place the plant in an unsafe condition. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
- TM 2-09-009, installation of stainless steel spacer in standby service water system check valve, 2P41F321
- TM 2-09-010, installation and removal of blind flange isolating 1B EDG from the standby plant service water pump, 2P41-C002
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R19 Post Maintenance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
For the following five post maintenance tests, the inspectors reviewed the test scope to verify the test demonstrated the work performed was completed correctly and the affected equipment was functional and operable in accordance with TS requirements.
The inspectors also reviewed equipment status and alignment to verify the system or component was available to perform the required safety function. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
- Rebuild of standby diesel plant service water pump, 2P41-C002
- Replacement of standby gas treatment filter inlet air operated valve, 1T48-F001B, operator seal
- Inspection of 1C RHR service water pump suction pit
- Cleaning of piping for 1B EDG standby service water
- Unit 2 RCIC pump power supply
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R22 Surveillance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed licensee surveillance test procedures and either witnessed the test or reviewed test records for the following five surveillances to determine if the scope of the test adequately demonstrated the affected equipment was operable. The inspectors reviewed these activities to assess for preconditioning of equipment, procedure adherence, and equipment alignment following completion of the surveillance.
The inspectors reviewed licensee procedure AG-MGR-21-0386, Evolution and Pre-and Post-Job Brief Guidance, and attended selected briefings to determine if procedure requirements were met. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
Surveillance Tests
- 34SV-E41-002-1, HPCI Pump Operability, Ver. 25.16
- 57SV-S32-002-2, Emergency Buses 2E, 2F & 2G [Under Voltage] Relay FT&C, Ver.
12.11
- 34SV-X43-001-1 Fire Pump Test, Ver. 1.8
- 34SV-R43-003-1, Diesel Generator 1C Monthly Test, Ver. 16.17 In-Service Test
- 34SV-E21-001-1, Core Spray Pump Operability, Ver. 18.7
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness
1EP6 Drill Evaluation
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed the following emergency plan evolution. The inspectors observed licensee activities in the simulator and Technical Support Center to verify implementation of licensee procedure 10AC-MGR-006-0, Hatch Emergency Plan. The inspectors reviewed the classification of the simulated events and the development of protective action recommendations to verify these activities were conducted in accordance with licensee procedure 73EP-EIP-001-0, Emergency Classification and Initial Actions. The inspectors also reviewed licensee procedure 73EP-EIP-073-0, Onsite Emergency Notification, to verify the proper offsite notifications were made. The inspectors attended the post-exercise critique to assess the licensees effectiveness in identifying areas of improvement. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
- Emergency Plan drill conducted on September 16, 2009
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems
.1 Daily Screening of Corrective Action Items
As required by Inspection Procedure 71152, Identification and Resolution of Problems, and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into the licensees corrective action program. This review was accomplished by either attending daily screening meetings that briefly discussed major CRs, or accessing the licensees computerized corrective action database and reviewing each CR that was initiated.
.2 Annual Sample
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a detailed review of the operator workarounds list to verify the full extent of the issues were identified, an appropriate evaluation was performed and appropriate corrective actions were specified and prioritized.
- Operations significant workarounds and burdens dated September 02, 2009.
b. Findings and Observations
No findings of significance were identified.
4OA3 Event Followup
.1 Unit-2 Load Reduction from 100% to 37% due to Condenser Water Box Tube Leakage
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors verified that the operators responded correctly and in accordance with the applicable abnormal operating procedures as this event developed. Additionally, the inspectors held discussions with licensee Chemistry, Operations and Engineering departments to gain an understanding of the events and assess followup actions. The inspectors later reviewed the licensees apparent cause determination to assess the detail of the review, adequacy of the apparent cause and corrective actions prior to returning the unit to full RTP. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4OA5 Other Activities
.1 Quarterly Resident Inspector Observations of Security Personnel and Activities
a. Inspection Scope
During the inspection period, the inspectors observed security force personnel and activities to ensure that the activities were consistent with licensee security procedures and regulatory requirements relating to nuclear plant security. These observations took place during both normal and off-normal plant working hours.
These quarterly resident inspector observations of security force personnel and activities did not constitute any additional inspection samples. Rather, they were considered an integral part of the inspectors normal plant status review and inspection activities.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Resident Inspector Observation of Helium Leak Rate Testing of Holtec Multi-Purpose
Canister (MPC)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed Helium leak rate testing of Holtec MPC serial number 0199 utilizing the inspection guidance found in NRC Inspection Procedure 60853. The inspectors verified the leak testing procedure was performed satisfactorily and the leak testing results were with in the acceptance criteria. Document reviewed are listed in the
.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.3 Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) Report Review
During this inspection period the final INPO Evaluation Report dated November 2008 was reviewed. The report contained no safety issues which were not already known by the NRC.
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit
On October 21, 2009, the resident inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Madison and other members of his staff. The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was not provided or examined during the inspection.
ATTACHMENT:
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee personnel
- S. Bargeron, Plant Manager
- G. Brinson, Operations Manager
- J. Dixon, Health Physics Manager
- B. Hulett, Engineering Design Manager
- G. Johnson, Engineering Director
- J. Lewis, Site Support Manager
- D. Madison, Hatch Vice President
- S. Soper, Engineering Support Manager
- J. Thompson, Nuclear Security Manager
- R. Varnadore, Maintenance Manager
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Opened
None Opened &
Closed
None
Closed
None
Discussed
None