IR 05000317/2001014
| ML020780224 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Calvert Cliffs  |
| Issue date: | 03/18/2002 |
| From: | Marilyn Evans Reactor Projects Branch 1 |
| To: | Cruse C Constellation Nuclear |
| References | |
| IR-01-014 | |
| Download: ML020780224 (18) | |
Text
March 18, 2002
SUBJECT:
CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT - NRC INSPECTION REPORT 50-317/01-14, 50-318/01-14
Dear Mr. Cruse:
On February 16, 2002, the NRC completed an inspection at your Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Units 1 & 2. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings which were discussed on March 8, 2002, with Mr. Katz and other members of your staff.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel. No findings of significance were identified.
Immediately following the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the NRC issued an advisory recommending that nuclear power plant licensees go to the highest level of security, and all promptly did so. With continued uncertainty about the possibility of additional terrorist activities, the Nation's nuclear power plants remain at the highest level of security and the NRC continues to monitor the situation. This advisory was followed by additional advisories, and although the specific actions are not releasable to the public, they generally include increased patrols, augmented security forces and capabilities, additional security posts, heightened coordination with law enforcement and military authorities, and more limited access of personnel and vehicles to the sites. The NRC has conducted various audits of your response to these advisories and your ability to respond to terrorist attacks with the capabilities of the current design basis threat (DBT). On February 25, 2002, the NRC issued an Order to all nuclear power plant licensees, requiring them to take certain additional interim compensatory measures to address the generalized high-level threat environment. With the issuance of the Order, we will evaluate Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Inc. compliance with these interim requirements.
Charles In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web Site at http://www/nrc.gov/reading-rm.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Michele G. Evans, Chief Projects Branch 1 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos.
50-317 50-318 License Nos. DPR-53 DPR-69
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 50-317/01-14 and 50-318/01-14 Attachment 1 - Supplemental Information
REGION I==
ii Docket Nos:
50-317, 50-318 License Nos.: DPR-53, DPR-69 Report No:
50-317/01-14; 50-318/01-14 Licensee:
Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Inc.
Facility:
Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 Location:
1650 Calvert Cliffs Parkway Lusby, MD 20657-4702 Dates:
December 30, 2001 - February 16, 2002 Inspectors:
David Beaulieu, Senior Resident Inspector Leonard Cline, Resident Inspector Jason Jang, Senior Health Physicist Michael Modes, Senior Reactor Inspector Approved by: Michele G. Evans, Chief, Projects Branch 1 Division of Reactor Projects
iii SUMMARY OF FINDINGS IR 05000317-01-014, IR 05000318-01-014, on 12/30/2001-02/16/2002, Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Plant, Inc.; Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2. Resident Inspector Report.
The inspection was conducted by resident inspectors, a regional senior health physicist, and a regional senior reactor engineer. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using IMC 0609 Significance Determination Process (SDP).
Findings for which the SDP does not apply are indicated by No Color or by the severity level of the applicable violation. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described at its Reactor Oversight Process website at http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/ASSESS/index.html A.
Inspector Identified Findings No findings of significance were identified.
B.
Licensee Identified Findings A violation of very low safety significance which was identified by the licensee has been reviewed by the inspector. Corrective actions taken or planned by the licensee appear reasonable. This violation is summarized in Section 4OA7 of this report.
Report Details Unit 1 operated at or near 100 percent power from the beginning of the inspection period until a coast down began on January 23, 2002. Unit 1 was shutdown for a refueling outage and steam generator replacement on February 16, 2002.
Unit 2 operated at or near 100 percent power for the entire inspection period except for a one day period beginning February 1, 2002, when power was reduced to 85 percent for main turbine valve testing and planned maintenance.
1.
REACTOR SAFETY Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, and Emergency Preparedness 1R04 Equipment Alignment
.1 Partial Walkdown a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors conducted an equipment alignment partial walkdown to evaluate the operability of a selected redundant train or backup system, while the affected train or system was inoperable or out of service. The walkdown included a review of system operating instructions to determine correct system lineup and verification of critical components to identify any discrepancies which could affect operability of the redundant train or backup system. The inspectors performed partial system walkdowns on the following systems:
On January 28, 2002, while the 2A Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) was out of service for unplanned maintenance, the lineup for the Unit 1 and Unit 2 auxiliary feedwater systems, was verified to be in accordance with licensee operating procedures.
- On January 29, 2002, the 0C EDG lineup was verified to be in accordance with licensee commitments as stated in the Notice of Enforcement Discretion Request from Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, dated January 29, 2002.
The inspectors reviewed the following Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant documentation:
Notice of Enforcement Discretion (NOED) for Constellation Nuclear Regarding Calvert Cliffs Unit 2, NOED No. 2002-01-01, dated January 31, 2002.
- Notice of Enforcement Discretion Request from Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Inc., dated January 29, 2002.
- Operating Instruction OI-21C, 0C Diesel Generator
Operating Instruction OI-32A, Auxiliary Feedwater System, Unit 1 b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R05 Fire Protection - Fire Area Tours
a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors conducted tours of areas important to reactor safety to evaluate conditions related to: (1) licensee control of transient combustibles and ignition sources; (2) the material condition, operational status, and operational lineup of fire protection systems, equipment and features; and (3) the fire barriers used to prevent fire damage or fire propagation. The inspectors used administrative procedure SA-1-100, Fire Prevention, during the conduct of this inspection.
The areas inspected included:
0C Diesel Generator Building
Unit 1 Cable Spreading Room
Unit 2 Cable Spreading Room b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification a.
Inspection Scope On February 14, 2002, the inspector observed licensed operator just-in-time simulator training for the upcoming Unit 1 shutdown. In particular, the inspector observed the pre-evolution brief for the shutdown, operator adherence to the down power strategy developed by Nuclear Fuel Management, and operator response to abnormal shutdown transients such as a stuck open main turbine bypass valve.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R12 Maintenance Rule Implementation a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed performance-based problems involving selected in-scope structures, systems, or components (SSCs) to assess the effectiveness of the maintenance program. Reviews focused on: (1) characterization of failed SSCs; (2)
safety significance classifications; (3) 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(1) and (a)(2) classifications; and (4) the appropriateness of performance criteria for SSCs classified as (a)(2), and goals and corrective actions for SSCs classified as (a)(1). The inspectors reviewed the most recent system health reports and system functional failures of the last two years. The following SSCs were reviewed:
Unit 1 and 2 instrument air check valves. The licensee appropriately classified the following instrument air check valves, 1-IA-729, 1-IA-730, 1-IA-732, 2-IA-300, 2-IA-301, and 2-IA-315A, as maintenance rule (a)(1) due to repeat functional
failures. The check valves, which are in the instrument air supply header for the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system, each failed their as-found seat leakage test.
The inspector evaluated the acceptability of the licensees corrective action plan as documented in Issue Report IR3-017-760.
- The inspector evaluated the licensees determination of the amount of maintenance rule unavailability incurred during the unplanned maintenance performed on the 2A emergency diesel generator between January 25 and 31, 2001.
- The inspector reviewed the licensee corrective action plan for the 21 battery charger which was classified as maintenance rule (a)(1) when it exceeded the unavailability performance criterion. The unavailability was incurred when the feeder breaker to the 21 battery charger failed to trip open at the DC high voltage setpoint.
The inspectors also reviewed the following Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant documentation:
- Station Procedure MN-1-112, Managing System Performance
Maintenance Rule Scoping Document
Maintenance Rule Indicator Report, January 2002 b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Evaluation a.
Inspection Scope For the selected maintenance orders (MO) listed below, the inspectors verified: (1) risk assessments were performed in accordance with Calvert Cliffs procedure NO-1-117, Integrated Risk Management; (2) risk of scheduled work was managed through the use of compensatory actions; and (3) applicable contingency plans were properly identified in the integrated work schedule.
- MO 2200200255 This emergent work and risk assessment was associated with the Notice of Enforcement Discretion that the NRC granted on January 26, 2002, to allow repairing 2A emergency diesel generator. Unusual wear was observed on the gear drive assembly that drives auxiliary pumps. The apparent cause was that the lube oil pump had no backlash and two bearing bores in the gear drive assembly were out of alignment. These conditions existed since original assembly. The flexible drive gear wear was appropriately identified by the licensee during the biannual inspection. No violation of NRC requirements was identified.
- MO 1200103714 The 13 high pressure safety injection pump was removed from service on February 12, 2002 for planned maintenance.
- MO 2200102808 The 21 A&B salt water air compressor was removed from service on February 4, 2002, for preventive maintenance.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R15 Operability Evaluations a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed selected operability evaluations affecting risk significant mitigating systems to assess: (1) technical adequacy of the evaluations; (2) whether continued system operability was warranted; (3) whether other existing degraded conditions were appropriately addressed with respect to their collective impact on continued safe plant operation; and (4) where compensatory measures were involved, whether the measures were in place, would work as intended, and were appropriately controlled. The following evaluations were reviewed:
Operability of Units 1 and 2 Switchgear Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HVAC) regarding whether entry into the technical specification action statement for switchgear room electrical equipment is required with switchgear HVAC in a degraded equipment. The issue was evaluated with respect to a single failure of switchgear HVAC and the fact that there is no specific technical specification for the system but is covered under the operability definition as a support system.
The inspector reviewed the alarm response procedure for high switchgear room temperature which requires a plant shutdown if both trains of switchgear HVAC are inoperable and they are unable to maintain room temperature below the design basis temperature of 104F. The licensee stated they plan to enhance this alarm response procedure to change the word and to or.
- Operability Determination No.02-002 - During the performance of surveillance procedure STP 007A-2, A Train Engineered Safety Features Logic Test, a containment spray actuation signal logic alarm failed to lock in.
- Operability Determination No.01-020 - An error was discovered in methodology used for accident analysis regarding the manner transients are analyzed to determine the Required Over Power Margin.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed post-maintenance test procedures and associated testing activities for selected risk significant mitigating systems to assess whether: (1) the effect of testing on the plant had been adequately addressed by control room and engineering personnel; (2) testing was adequate for the maintenance performed; (3)
acceptance criteria were clear and adequately demonstrated operational readiness, consistent with design and licensing basis documents; (4) test instrumentation had current calibrations, range, and accuracy for the application; (5) tests were performed, as written, with applicable prerequisites satisfied; and, (6) that equipment was returned to the status required to perform its safety function. The following maintenance orders were reviewed:
MO2200200254, 2A Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) flexible gear replacement, which was satisfactorily retested by successfully performing a timed fast speed start of the 2A EDG, followed by a paralleled run of the 2A EDG, both in accordance with procedure STP-08A-2, Test of 2A Diesel Generator and 21 4kV Bus LOCI Sequencer.
- MO1200000689, Replace the key switch at control room panel 1C09 for the 13 high pressure safety injection (HPSI) pump disconnect switches, which was successfully retested by cycling the 13 HPSI pump disconnect switches using the installed key switch.
- MO1200104544, 11 switchgear room cooler temperature control valve corrective maintenance, which was retested satisfactorily by performing a 12-hour test run of the 11 switchgear room cooler.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R20 Refueling and Outage Activities a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the licensees pre-outage planning to verify that risk, industry experience, and previous site specific problems were considered. Selected portions of the following procedures and documents were reviewed:
Nuclear Operations (NO)-1-103, Conduct of Lower Mode Operations. This procedure provides instructions and guidance for: outage planning, scheduling, and control; contingency planning for higher risk evolutions; reduced inventory operations; and, electrical system reliability.
- NO-1-207, Nuclear Operations Shift Turnover. In conjunction with NO-1-103, this procedure provides controls for the minimum essential equipment during lower modes of operation.
- NO-1-117, Integrated Risk Management. This procedure provides instructions and guidance for assessing and classifying the risk significance of work considering the categories of radiological safety, industrial safety, nuclear safety, environmental safety, and corporate safety.
- Shutdown Safety Summary Schedule.
- Detailed Outage Schedule.
- Major Job Path Summary Schedules for Primary, Vital, and Secondary Systems.
The inspectors observed the Unit 1 reactor shutdown on February 16, 2002. In particular the inspectors observed the initiation of shutdown cooling, and reviewed reactor coolant system (RCS) temperature data during that period to verify that the RCS cool down rate did not exceed technical specification limits.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R22 Surveillance Testing a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors witnessed performance of surveillance test procedures and reviewed test data of selected risk-significant systems, structures, and components (SSCs) to assess whether the SSCs satisfied Technical Specifications, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Technical Requirements Manual, and licensee procedure requirements. The inspectors assessed whether the testing appropriately demonstrated that the SSCs were operationally ready and capable of performing their intended safety functions. The following tests were witnessed:
STP O-8A-2 Test of the 2A Diesel Generator and 4 kV Bus 21 LOCI Sequencer, was inspected on January 31, 2002.
- STP O-5A-1 Auxiliary Feedwater System Quarterly Surveillance Test, was inspected on February 12, 2002.
- STP O-62-1 Unit 1 Monthly Valve Position Verification; the inspection focused on the licensees method for controlling the position of motor-operated valves that are required by the final safety analysis report to be locked open or locked shut.
b.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1EP6 Drill Evaluation a.
Inspection Scope On February 5, 2002, the inspector observed the performance of an emergency preparedness drill. The simulator scenario involved a loss of both trains of the saltwater system while the unit was in Mode 5, resulting in a loss of shutdown cooling and a heat up of the reactor coolant system (RCS) into Mode 4. The inspectors evaluated whether the operators appropriately declared an Unusual Event for abnormal shutdown cooling conditions and an Alert due to the RCS heat up into Mode 4. The inspector also observed whether declarations were made and notifications were initiated within the required 15 minutes.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
2.
RADIATION SAFETY Cornerstone: Public Radiation Safety 2PS1 Gaseous and Liquid Effluents a.
Inspection Scope (71122.01)
The inspector reviewed the following documents to evaluate the effectiveness of the licensees radioactive gaseous and liquid effluent control programs. The requirements of the radioactive effluent controls are specified in the Improved Technical Specifications and the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ITS/ODCM).
- the 2000 Radiological Annual Effluent Release Reports including projected public dose assessments;
review of the ODCM (Revision 5, May 14, 2001), including technical justifications for ODCM changes made;
selected 2001 analytical results for charcoal cartridge, particulate filter, and noble gas samples;
implementation of the compensatory sampling and analysis program when the effluent radiation monitoring system (RMS) is out of service;
selected 2001 radioactive liquid and gaseous release permits;
associated effluent control procedures, including analytical laboratory procedures;
implementation of the IE 80-10 (Procedure CP 224, Monitoring Radioactivity in Systems Normally Uncontaminated);
- review of 10CFR50.75(g) file for the very-low-level radioactive material identified at the 002 Outfall;
calibration results for chemistry laboratory measurements equipment (gamma and liquid scintillation counters);
implementation of the measurement laboratory quality control program, including effluent intra-laboratory and inter-laboratory comparisons and control charts;
2000 Radiological Effluent Self-Assessment, February 1, 2001;
Low Level Liquid Radwaste Assessment, June 2000;
Issue Reports (IRs) and corrective actions (IR3-050-220, IR3-054-975, IR3-044-699, IR3-055-466, IR3-0441-838, and IR3-007-889, IR3-055-417, IR3-043-437, IR3-043-575, and IR3-079-596);
Special Report-Unit 1 Wide Range Noble Gas Monitor out of service more than 30 days;
review of the 2001 Nuclear Performance Assessment Department Audit (Audit Number 2001-01) for the implementation of the radioactive liquid and gaseous effluent controls and the ODCM;
most recent Channel Calibration and Channel Functional Test results for the radioactive liquid and gaseous effluent radiation monitoring system (RMS) and its flow measurement devices, listed in the Tables 4.3-11 and 4.3-12 of the ODCM for both units.
Waste Gas Holdup Noble Gas Monitor;
Plant Vent Noble Gas Monitors (Low and High Ranges);
Liquid Radwaste Effluent Line Monitor; and
Steam Generator Blowdown Effluent Line Monitor; Flow Rate Measurement Devices:
Waste Gas Holdup System, Effluent System Flow Rate Measuring Device;
Liquid Radwaste Effluent Line Flow Rate Monitor; and
Steam Generator Blowdown Effluent Line.
Most recent surveillance testing results (visual inspection, delta P, in-place testings for HEPA and charcoal filters, air capacity test, and laboratory test for iodine collection efficiency) for the following air treatment systems listed in Section 5.1.11 of the ITS for both units:
containment iodine removal system;
penetration room exhaust air filtration system;
control room emergency ventilation system (common);
CCS pump room exhaust air filtration system; and
spent fuel pool ventilation system (common).
The inspector also toured and observed the following activities to evaluate the effectiveness of the licensees radioactive gaseous and liquid effluent control programs.
- walkdown for determining the availability of radioactive liquid/gaseous effluent RMS and for determining the equipment material condition;
walkdown for determining operability of air cleaning systems and for determining the equipment material condition;
observed radioactive particulate filter, charcoal cartridge, and liquid sampling; and,
observed preparations for gamma spectrometry measurements.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
4.
OTHER ACTIVITIES 40A1 Performance Indicator Verification a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed performance indicator (PI) data for the below listed cornerstones to verify individual PI accuracy and completeness. This inspection examined data and plant records from 1999 through the second quarter of 2002, including review of PI Data Summary Reports, Licensee Event Reports, operator narrative logs, and the monthly and quarterly projected dose assessment results due to radioactive liquid and gaseous effluent releases. The information contained in these records was compared against the criteria contained in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 2, to verify that all conditions that met the NEI criteria were recognized, identified, and reported as a Performance Indicator.
- Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hours, Units 1 and 2.
- Scrams with a Loss of Normal Heat Removal, Units 1 and 2.
- Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hours, Units 1 and 2.
- RETS/ODCM Radiological Effluent.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
4OA3 Event Follow-up
.1 (Closed) Licensee Event Report 50-318/2001-002: Misunderstood Technical Specification Causes Containment Closure Deviation Licensee Event Report (LER) 50-318/2001-002-00 stated that during the 2001 Unit 2 refueling outage (RFO), operators violated the Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO)
for Technical Specification (TS) 3.9.4. On April 4, 2001, while shut down cooling was secured to support local leak rate testing (LLRT) of containment penetration No. 41, operators cycled the normal containment sump drain valves several times to drain the
normal containment sump, which was contrary to the containment closure requirements specified by TS 3.9.4. The licensee determined the root cause of this TS violation to be a misunderstanding of the intent of TS 3.9.4 which was incorrectly incorporated into the operating procedure. This licensee identified violation is considered more than minor because it had a credible impact on safety. During the time that shut down cooling was secured and the normal containment sump drain valves were open, a pathway to the outside atmosphere existed. Using the Significance Determination Process, this event was determined to be of very low safety significance because the likelihood of an accident leading to core damage was not affected, and because the valves were only opened for a short period of time. This licensee identified violation was documented in the licensees corrective action program (Issue Report IR3-072-901) and in Section 4OA7 of this report. LER 50-318/2001-002 is closed.
4OA5 Other
.1 Steam Generator Replacement (50001)
a.
Inspection Scope The inspector reviewed the Eddy Current Pre-Service Inspection Program implemented by Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant for the replacement steam generators. The program consisted of 100% Bobbin inspection, special interest inspection with motorized rotating pancake coil, 100% of top of tubesheet with motorized rotating pancake coil, and the first three rows of the heat treated tight U-bend radius tube bends and the first two rows of the non-heat treated tight U-bend radius tubes. The inspector reviewed selected documents, procedures and test reports, and interviewed the Calvert Cliffs Steam Generator Nondestructive Evaluation Engineer in order to evaluate program conformance with American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section XI and V, and the Electric Power Research Institute Pressurized Water Reactor Steam Generator Examination Guidelines TR-107569-V1, Revision 5.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
4OA6 Exit Meeting Summary On March 8, 2002, the inspector presented the inspection results to licensee management and other staff who acknowledged the findings.
4OA7 Licensee Identified Violations The following finding of very low safety significance (GREEN) was identified by the licensee and is a violation of NRC requirements which meetsSection VI of the NRC Enforcement Policy, NUREG-1600, for being dispositioned as a Non-Cited Violation.
NCV Tracking Number Requirement Licensee Failed to Meet
50-318/01-014-01 The LCO for TS 3.9.4 allows operators to secure shutdown cooling loops during local leak rate testing (LLRT), as long as all containment penetrations that provide direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere are closed by manual or automatic isolation valve, blind flange, or equivalent. On April 4, 2001, while shut down cooling was secured to support LLRT of containment penetration No. 41, operators cycled the normal containment sump drain valves several times to drain the sump, contrary to TS 3.9.4. This violation is in the licensees corrective action program as Issue Report IR3-072-901.
If you deny this NCV, you should provide a response with the basis for your denial, within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant.
ATTACHMENT 1 a.
Key Points of Contact C. Cruse, Vice President M. Geckle, Director, Nuclear Regulatory Matters D. Holm, Superintendent, Nuclear Operations P. Katz, Plant General Manager M. Korsnick, Superintendent, Work Management M. Navin, Superintendent, Technical Support K. Nietmann, Manager, Nuclear Performance Assessment Department T. Pritchett, Manager, Nuclear Engineering Department J. Spina, Superintendent, Nuclear Maintenance R. Szoch, General Supervisor, Plant Engineering L. Weckbaugh, Manager, Nuclear Support Services b.
List of Items Opened, Closed, and Discussed Opened and Closed 50-318/01-014-01 NCV Violation of Limiting Condition for Operation for Technical Specification 3.9.4 Shutdown Cooling and Coolant Recirculation - High Water Level (Section 4AO7)
Closed 50-318/2001-002-00 LER Violation of Limiting Condition for Operation for Technical Specification 3.9.4 Shutdown Cooling and Coolant Recirculation - High Water Level (Section 4AO3)
c.
List of Documents Reviewed Pre-Service Eddy Current Inspection Report, BWC-TR-2001-0013 Degradation Assessment for the B & W Replacement Steam Generators at Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Data Acquisition Procedure for Pre-Service Eddy Current Inspection of Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Replacement Steam Generator Tubing Analysis Guidelines for Pre-Service Eddy Current Inspection of Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Replacement Steam Generator Tubing Guidelines for the Evaluation of Bobbin Profilometry in the Tubesheet Area for Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Replacement Steam Generator Tubing
Attachment 1 (contd)
Project Execution Plan - Eddy Current Pre-Service Inspection of Replacement Steam Generators June 2001 - May 2002.
ETSS#1 - Examination Technique Specification Sheet for Bobbin Examination ETSS#2 - Examination Technique Specification Sheet for 3 Coil Plus Point MRPC Examination ETSS#3 - Examination Technique Specification Sheet for Single Coil Plus Point RPC Examination d.
List of Acronyms ADAMS NRCs document management system AFW Auxiliary Feedwater CCNPPI Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Inc.
CFR Code of Federal Regulations DBT Design Basis Threat EDG Emergency Diesel Generator HEPA High Efficiency Particulate Air (filter)
HPSI High Pressure Safety Injection HVAC Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning IR
Inspection Report
LER
Licensee Event Report
LCO
Limiting Condition for Operation
Local Leak Rate Test
Offsite Dose Calculation Manual
Quality Control
Radiation Monitoring System
TS
Technical Specifications
MO
Maintenance Order
Non-cited Violation
NEI
Nuclear Energy Institute
Notice of Enforcement Discretion
NRC
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Publicly Available Records
Refueling Outage
Radiation Monitoring System
System, Structure, or Component