IR 05000315/2024004
| ML25056A100 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cook  |
| Issue date: | 02/25/2025 |
| From: | Nestor Feliz-Adorno NRC/RGN-III/DORS/ERPB |
| To: | Ferneau K Indiana Michigan Power Co |
| References | |
| IR 2024004 | |
| Download: ML25056A100 (1) | |
Text
SUBJECT:
REISSUE - DONALD C. COOK NUCLEAR PLANT - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000315/2024004 AND 05000316/2024004
Dear Kelly Ferneau:
This reissuance corrected information contained in the description and corrective action sections for non-cited violation (NCV) 05000315,05000316/2024004-01 which was previously sent to you dated January 27, 2025 (ADAMS Accession No. ML25023A140).
On December 31, 2024, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant. On January 15, 2025, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as an NCV consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant.
February 25, 2025 This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, Néstor J. Féliz Adorno, Chief Engineering and Reactor Projects Branch Division of Operating Reactor Safety Docket Nos. 05000315 and 05000316 License Nos. DPR-58 and DPR-74
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Numbers:
05000315 and 05000316
License Numbers:
Report Numbers:
05000315/2024004 and 05000316/2024004
Enterprise Identifier:
I-2024-004-0056
Licensee:
Indiana Michigan Power Company
Facility:
Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant
Location:
Bridgman, MI
Inspection Dates:
October 01, 2024, to December 31, 2024
Inspectors:
A. Guieb, Project Engineer
T. Hartman, Senior Project Engineer
Z. Helgert, Resident Inspector
E. Kokkinis, Project Engineer
J. Kutlesa, Senior Emergency Preparedness Inspector
J. Mancuso, Senior Resident Inspector
L. Rodriguez, Senior Reactor Analyst
Approved By:
Néstor J. Féliz Adorno, Chief
Engineering and Reactor Projects Branch
Division of Operating Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Failure to Identify and Correct Condition Adverse to Quality Causes Damage to Rod Control Cluster Assembly Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Barrier Integrity Green NCV 05000315,05000316/2024004-01 Open/Closed
[H.12] - Avoid Complacency 71152A A self-revealed finding of very low safety significance (i.e., Green) and an associated non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Actions, were identified for the licensees failure to assure that conditions adverse to quality are promptly identified. Specifically, the licensee failed to identify an interference to the fuel upender during refueling activities. This interference contacted several safety-related rod control cluster assemblies (RCCAs) on top of the fuel assemblies (F/As) ultimately damaging the RCCA on F/A LS69.
Additional Tracking Items
Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status URI 05000316,05000315/20 23011-01 Safety-Related Motor Control Center Bus Bar Commercial Grade Dedication 71111.21N.03 Closed LER 05000316/2024-002-00 LER 2024-002-00 for Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant, Unit 2, Manual Reactor Trip Following Rapid Downpower for Steam Leak 71153 Closed LER 05000316/2024-002-01 LER 2024-002-01 for Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant, Unit 2, Manual Reactor Trip Following Rapid Downpower for Steam Leak 71153 Closed
PLANT STATUS
Unit 1 began the inspection period at rated thermal power. On November 21, 2024, Unit 1 experienced a power transient from a full open turbine control valve caused by a faulty controller. In response, the unit was manually lowered to 95 percent of rated thermal power. After fixing the controller, the unit returned to full rated thermal power on November 22, 2024, and remained at or near full rated thermal power for the remainder of the inspection period.
Unit 2 began the inspection period at rated thermal power. On December 14, 2024, Unit 2 reduced power to approximately 90 percent of rated thermal power for main turbine valve testing. The unit returned to full rated thermal power later the same day and remained at or near full rated thermal power for the inspection period.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs)in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, observed risk significant activities, and completed on-site portions of IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection
Seasonal Extreme Weather Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated readiness for seasonal extreme weather conditions prior to the onset of seasonal cold temperatures on November 19, 2024
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
- (1) Unit 1 west essential service water (ESW) following planned surveillance on November 25, 2024
71111.05 - Fire Protection
Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:
- (1) Fire Zone 29 A/B: Unit 1 east/west ESW pump rooms, 591' elevation on October 4, 2024
- (2) Fire pump house on October 24, 2024
- (3) Fire Zone 12/22: quadrant 2 piping tunnel, Unit 1/2, 587'-0" on October 31, 2024
- (4) Fire Zone 1/1A/B/E/F: auxiliary building basement and containment spray pump rooms, Unit 1/2, 573' on November 8, 2024
Fire Brigade Drill Performance Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the onsite fire brigade training and performance during an unannounced fire drill on October 30, 2024
71111.07A - Heat Exchanger/Sink Performance
Annual Review (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated readiness and performance of:
- (1) 2-HE-15W, Unit 2 west component cooling water heat exchanger on December 18, 2024
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (2 Samples)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated RQ-S-4905 as-found simulator practice evaluation on October 22, 2024.
- (2) The inspectors observed and evaluated an as-found simulator evaluation scenario on October 29, 2024.
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness
Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples 1 Partial)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function:
(1)
(Partial)
Unit 1 and 2 250 Volt Safety-Related Batteries
- (2) Unit 2 Train B post-accident hydrogen monitoring system (PACHMS) and its 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(1) monitoring plan
- (3) Auxiliary building Spent Fuel Pool ventilation system and its 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(1)monitoring plan
Quality Control (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance and quality control activities to ensure the following SSC remains capable of performing its intended function:
- (1) AB loop feed enclosure parts
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:
- (1) Risk management during 2 AB emergency diesel generator (EDG) work on October 16, 2024
- (2) Risk management during 1W ESW relay testing on November 20, 2024
- (3) Risk management during Unit 2 Train A reserve auxiliary transformer unplanned outage on December 12, 2024
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples 1 Partial)
The inspectors evaluated the licensees justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
- (1) AR 2024-6650; Ice Bed Temperature Following Glycol Restoration on October 15, 2024
- (2) AR 2024-8471; 1-HV-CLV-2A Lower Containment Fan Breaker failure on November 21, 2024
- (3) AR 2024-5485; Neutra Clean on Batteries on December 9, 2024
- (4) AR 2024-8838; Crack Identified on Cell 57 on December 11, 2024 (5)
(Partial)
AR 2024-9165; Unit 2 West ESW Outlet Check Valve Sticking on December 16, 2024.
71111.24 - Testing and Maintenance of Equipment Important to Risk
The inspectors evaluated the following testing and maintenance activities to verify system operability and/or functionality:
Post-Maintenance Testing (PMT) (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
(1)2-MRV-213 steam generator 1 power operated relief valve (PORV) PMT on October 7, 2024
- (3) Unit 1 CD EDG surveillance run following maintenance on October 29, 2024
- (4) Unit 2 south safety injection pump run following preventative maintenance on December 19, 2024
Surveillance Testing (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
- (1) Unit 2 CD EDG monthly surveillance on October 3, 2024
- (2) U2 turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump planned quarterly surveillance run, on October 30, 2024
Inservice Testing (IST) (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) North Spent Fuel Pool surveillance, on November 7, 2024
71114.04 - Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes
Inspection Review (IP Section 02.01-02.03) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the following submitted Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan changes.
- DC Cook Nuclear Plant Emergency Plan, Revision 48
- DC Cook Nuclear Plant Emergency Plan, Revision 49
- PMP-2080-EPP-101, Emergency Classification, Revision 30
- PMP-2080-EPP-101, Emergency Classification, Revision 31 This evaluation does not constitute NRC approval.
71114.06 - Drill Evaluation
Additional Drill and/or Training Evolution (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated:
- (1) RQ-E-4906; as-found simulator practice evaluation on December 10,
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
MS06: Emergency AC Power Systems (IP Section 02.05)===
- (1) Unit 1 (October 1, 2023, through September 30, 2024)
- (2) Unit 2 (October 1, 2023, through September 30, 2024)
BI02: RCS Leak Rate Sample (IP Section 02.11) (2 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 (October 1, 2023, through September 30, 2024)
- (2) Unit 2 (October 1, 2023, through September 30, 2024)
71152A - Annual Follow-up Problem Identification and Resolution Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (Section 03.03)
The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:
- (1) Damage to the rod control cluster assembly on August 12, 2024
- (2) Containment fire alarm response procedures and preparation changes on December 31, 2024
71152S - Semiannual Trend Problem Identification and Resolution Semiannual Trend Review (Section 03.02)
- (1) The inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective action program to identify potential trends in battery cell cracks that might be indicative of a more significant safety issue on November 15, 2024
- (2) The inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective action program to identify potential trends in transients related to feedwater control that might be indicative of a more significant safety issue on November 25, 2024
===71153 - Follow-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Event Follow-up (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample 1 Partial)
(1)
(Partial)
The inspectors evaluated the unexpected opening of a turbine control valve and licensees performance on November 21, 2024
- (2) The inspectors evaluated an Unusual Event declaration due to an invalid fire alarm within containment and licensees response on November 3, 2024 Event Report (IP Section 03.02)===
The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event reports (LERs):
- (1) LER 05000316/2024-002-00, Unit 2 Manual Reactor Trip Following Rapid Downpower for Steam Leak, (ADAMS Accession No. ML24197A088) and LER 05000316/2024-002-01, Unit 2 Manual Reactor Trip Following Rapid Downpower for Steam Leak, (ADAMS Accession No. ML24256A172). The inspectors determined that the cause of the condition described in these LERs was not reasonably within the licensees ability to foresee and correct, and therefore was not reasonably preventable. No performance deficiency nor violation of NRC requirements was identified. These LERs are Closed.
INSPECTION RESULTS
Unresolved Item (Closed)
Safety-Related Motor Control Center Bus Bar Commercial Grade Dedication URI 05000316,05000315/2023011-01 71111.21N.03
Description:
On August 31, 2023, the NRC issued inspection report 2023011-01 (ADAMS Accession Number ML23233A187) which opened unresolved item (URI) 05000316,05000315/2023011-01, Safety-Related Motor Control Center Bus Bar Commercial Grade Dedication. The URI was related to Design Specification ES-BUS-BAR-0001-QCN, Purchase and Design Specification for Vertical Bus Bar, Revision 0, and commercial grade item Dedication Evaluation 34780, Bus, Bar, Vertical, Set of 3, Tin Plated Copper, Three Phase, Without Hardware, Revision 0. These documents supported the dedication of Cutler-Hammer 9800 Series motor control center (MCC) vertical bus bars. To disposition the URI, the inspectors reviewed the licensees white paper titled, DC Cook Response to Proposed Non-Cited Violation. The inspectors also reviewed documents related to the bus bars such as procurement documents and procedures, design documents, preventive maintenance procedure, safety classification determination procedures, vendor manual, and installation work orders. The inspectors also interviewed licensee staff.
The inspectors identified a minor violation for the licensees failure to assure the purchased tin plated copper bus bars conformed to procurement documents, which was contrary to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion VII, Control of Purchased Material, Equipment, and Services, and a performance deficiency (PD). Specifically, since the licensee failed to identify the tin plating as a critical characteristic to be verified for the dedication of the bus bars in evaluation 34780, they failed to ensure the tin plating conformed to the procurement documents. The tin plating of the bus bars had a safety function to maintain circuit integrity because electrical current had to pass through the plating to get to the copper base of the bus bars, therefore it had the same safety function as the copper in the bus bars. The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was of minor safety significance because they answered no to the questions of Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0612 Appendix B, Issue Screening Directions, Block 4, Is the performance deficiency More-than-Minor? Specifically, since the licensee procured the bus bars from a reliable company that only had the capability to apply four different metallic coatings, all of which could perform the safety function, and the licensee performed a receipt inspection of the bus bars which could reliably detect a non-conductive coating on the bus bars, the inspectors determined the PD was of minor safety significance.
The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program (CAP) as AR 2023-4974 and AR 2024-9269.
This failure to comply with 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion VII, constitutes a minor violation that is not subject to enforcement action in accordance with the NRCs Enforcement Policy.
Failure to Identify and Correct Condition Adverse to Quality Causes Damage to Rod Control Cluster Assembly Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Barrier Integrity Green NCV 05000315,05000316/2024004-01 Open/Closed
[H.12] - Avoid Complacency 71152A A self-revealed finding of very low safety significance (i.e., Green) and an associated non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Actions, were identified for the licensees failure to assure that conditions adverse to quality are promptly identified. Specifically, the licensee failed to identify an interference to the fuel upender during refueling activities. This interference contacted several safety-related rod control cluster assemblies (RCCAs) on top of the fuel assemblies (F/As) ultimately damaging the RCCA on F/A LS69.
Description:
On April 18, 2024, during core reload activities, an overload alarm occurred while transporting F/A LS69 with the fuel upender. The licensee placed the upender in the down position and visually inspected it (without using a camera), finding no apparent interferences.
Because the alarm coincided with a faster portion of the upending process, which causes additional drag, the licensee concluded that this condition triggered the alarm. F/A LS69 was then upended without further alarms.
The fuel handling tool in containment, however, was unable to latch onto F/A LS69. After initial troubleshooting, the licensee decided to replace the RCCA on LS69 and transferred the assembly through the canal into the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP). Once there, the SFP tool also could not latch onto the F/A, prompting additional troubleshooting. Inspection via a camera revealed that the RCCA on LS69 was damaged, preventing engagement by either fuel handling tool.
Further licensee troubleshooting identified a pipe plug, which was installed in a port for local leak rate testing, was protruding into the upenders path. The licensee adjusted the fuel transfer carts tolerance setpoint, raising its top and moving the RCCAs away from the pipe plug protrusion. The licensee also inspected other RCCA-equipped F/As already in the core, finding no additional issues. Following the replacement of LS69s RCCA, fuel moves resumed and were completed without further issues.
During their investigation, the licensee noted that three prior overload alarms had occurred during the fuel upending process, all involving F/As with RCCAs. In each case, the licensee performed only a visual inspection without a camera and, therefore, did not detect the protruding pipe plug. They concluded, as with F/A LS69, that the alarms were caused by the speed-up zone of the fuel upender and, thus, did not identify the plugs interference until the damage to LS69s RCCA prompted further scrutiny.
Corrective Actions: Immediate corrective actions were replacement of the damaged RCCA and adjustment of the fuel transfer carts tolerance setpoint. Long term corrective actions include plans for replacing the protruding pipe plug and the implementation of lessons learned to prevent similar troubleshooting failures in the future.
Corrective Action References: AR 2024-3442 Fuel Assembly Unable to be Grappled Due to RCCA Interference
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The licensees failure to identify and correct a protruding pipe plug that was contacting RCCAs, a condition adverse to quality, was contrary to 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, and was a performance deficiency.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more-than-minor because if left uncorrected, it would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, while this incident only damaged the RCCA on F/A LS69, if left uncorrected, it would have the potential to result in damage to F/As or the introduction of foreign material, thereby increasing the likelihood of fuel damage.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power.
The finding screened as Green, or very low safety significance, because the inspectors answered no to the Exhibit 3, Barrier Integrity Screening Questions, Section A questions.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.12 - Avoid Complacency: Individuals recognize and plan for the possibility of mistakes, latent issues, and inherent risk, even while expecting successful outcomes. Individuals implement appropriate error reduction tools. Specifically, the refueling team did not challenge earlier troubleshooting decisions, even as recurring alarms suggested potential errors, thereby overlooking the possibility of mistakes in the previous work.
Enforcement:
Violation: 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, requires, in part, that measures be established to ensure that conditions adverse to quality, such as deficiencies and nonconformances, are promptly identified and corrected.
Contrary to the above, between April 17, 2024, and April 18, 2024, the licensee failed to identify and correct a condition adverse to quality associated with an obstruction along the path of the fuel upender. Specifically, the licensee failed to identify and correct an obstruction contacting multiple safety-related RCCAs during core reload, despite multiple alarms and repeated troubleshooting attempts. This failure ultimately caused damage to the RCCA on F/A LS69, a safety-related component.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was controlled to protect from public disclosure.
- On January 15, 2025, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to K. Ferneau, Executive VP and Chief Nuclear Officer, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On December 17, 2024, the inspectors presented the emergency action level change and emergency plan change inspection results to D. Burgoyne, Emergency Preparedness Manager and other members of the licensee staff.
- On December 18, 2024, the inspectors presented the commercial grade dedication unresolved item 2023011-01 follow-up inspection results to K. Ferneau, Executive VP and Chief Nuclear Officer, and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
2-IHP-5040-
EMP-004
Plant Winterization and De-Winterization
07/08/2024
2-OHP-4022-
001-009
Seiche
2/05/2023
2-OHP-4022-
001-010
Severe Weather
10/29/2024
Procedures
PMP-5055-001-
001
Winterization/Summerization
10/15/2024
Procedures
1-OHP-4030-119-
2W
West Essential Service Water System Test
D.C. Cook
Nuclear Plant
Fire Safety
Analysis
Fire Area: AA11 Unit 1 Quadrant 2 Piping Tunnel
(El. 591 ft)
D.C. Cook
Nuclear Plant
Fire Safety
Analysis
Fire Area: AA27 Unit 2 Quadrant 2 Piping Tunnel
(El. 591 ft)
Fire Pre-Plans
Volume I
Fire Zone 85: Turbine Building Unit 2 (S.E. Portion)
Elev. 591'-0"
Fire Pre-Plans
Volume I
Turbine Building Unit 2 (S.W. Portion) Elev. 591'-0"
Fire Pre-Plans
Volume I
Fire Zone 22: Quadrant 2 Piping Tunnel Unit 2 Elev. 591'
Fire Pre-Plans
Volume I
Fire Zone 12: Quadrant 2 Piping Tunnel Unit 1 Elev. 591'
Fire Plans
Fire Pre-Plans
Volume II
Support Buildings and Yard Areas
Miscellaneous
Drill No: 424-016-
C
Unit 2 TAC Pump Motor
000
Procedures
2-EHP-8913-
001-002
Heat Exchanger Inspection
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
2-OHP-5030-019-
2W
West Essential Service Water System Flush and Flow
Data Collection
RQ-S-4905-U12-
T1
Period 4905 U12 Training Session 1 - Practice Eval
Miscellaneous
TRP-2070-TAP-
300-OPS
Operations Training Examination and Simulator Exercise
Guide Development
06/04/2024
23-5586
Failure of Both 12-HV-BD-AFX-1/2
08/02/2023
24-0624
2-QC-596-1 Failed its 15% As Found Quarterly Check
01/23/2024
24-1102
PACHMS-02 Exceeded Condition Monitoring Criteria
2/07/2024
24-5176
AFX Volumetric Calculation Flow Rate Not in Band
06/22/2024
24-7884
2-HV-AFX Flow Rate Out of Band
10/20/2024
24-8196
EACE 2024-5586-16 CAs Failed Effectiveness Review
10/31/2024
Corrective Action
Documents
24-8609
Risk Tracking for Failure of Both HV-BD-AFX-1/2
11/20/2024
Drawings
OP-12-5148
Auxiliary Building Ventilation
Maintenance Rule Scoping Document - Auxiliary Building
Spent Fuel Pool Ventilation System
Engineering
Evaluations
Auxiliary Building Spent Fuel Pool Ventilation
System - (a)(1) Action Plan
03/27/2024
Loop Feed Enclosure Materials and Quality Levels
10/09/2024
IEEE Recommended Practice for Maintenance, Testing,
and Replacement of Vented Lead-Acid Batteries for
Stationary Applications
2/09/2010
2-THP-6020-
PAS-619
PACHMS Calibration
Miscellaneous
PMP-2350-INS-
001
Inspection Contact and Information Request
10/09/2024
NDE Reports
VTD-COMS-0001
COMSIP Instruction Manual for Units 1 & 2 Post-Accident
Containment Hydrogen
03/18/2004
1-OHL-5030-
SOM-005
Unit 1 Auxiliary Tour
2-IHP-4030-
28-001
Spent Fuel Pool Exhaust Ventilation System Surveillance
Procedures
2-MHP-4050-
FHP-006
Control of Loads Over the Spent Fuel Pool and Fuel/Insert
Handling in the Spent Fuel Pool
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
2-OHP-4021-
28-011
Auxiliary Building Ventilation
2-OHP-4030-
28-028
Fuel Handling Area Exhaust Ventilation System Test
Corrective Action
Documents
AR 2024-9093
TR201CD Thermistor String Post Unsupported
and Leaning
2/12/2024
E-1300
345/34.5kV One Line Diagram
OP-1-12002
Main Auxiliary One-Line Diagram Bus C & D
Engineered Safety System (Train A)
Drawings
OP-2-12001
Main Auxiliary One-Line Diagram Bus A & B
Engineered Safety System (Train B)
Procedures
PMP-2291-OLR-
001
On-Line Risk Management
2013-8916
Ann122 drop 81 Ice Cond Temp High Pt Reading 24.6
06/18/2013
23-9354
Cracks on Walls of Battery 1-BATT-AB Cells 55 and 113
2/13/2023
24-3070
Crack Identified in 1-BATT-AB Cell 22
04/09/2024
24-5037
Possible Check Valve Hung Up On ESW
06/14/2024
24-6650
Ice Bed Temperature Following Glycol Restoration
06/30/2024
24-8171
AR Was Not Appropriately Upgraded from NCAP
to A CAQ
10/30/2024
24-8471
1-HV-CLV-2A Fan Breaker Failure
11/13/2024
24-8838
Jar Wall Crack Identified on 1-BATT-AB Cell 57
2/03/2024
Corrective Action
Documents
24-9165
Additional Analysis Needed for Already Identified
Condition
2/16/2024
DC-15156
Westinghouse Ice Condenser Temperature Monitoring
System
09/24/2021
OP-1-12002-83
Main Auxiliary One-Line Diagram Bus C & D
Engineered Safety System (Train A)
01/25/2023
Drawings
OP-1-12032-21
MCC Aux One-Line 600v Bus 11C, 11D Engineered
Safety System (Train A)
1-EZC-C-4B
Question Response
11/21/2024
Miscellaneous
Instrument
Configuration
Document 1-
Ice Condenser Temperature Recorder 1-SG-7
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
REC-007
Procedures
1-OHP-4030-132-
217A
DG1CD Load Sequencing and ESF Testing
2/06/2024
Corrective Action
Documents
AR 2023-3275-1
Revise Procedure 12-HIP-5030-EMP-013 to Replace
Aluminum Bus
06/28/2023
AR 2023-4974
NRC Inspection - Design Control Violation
07/06/2023
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
AR 2024-9269
Minor Violation from URI on NRC CGD Inspection
2/18/2024
Engineering
Changes
Replacement Vertical Bus, MCC 2-ABD-B
Engineering
Evaluations
34780
Commercial Grade Dedication Evaluation for Vertical
Bus Bar
09/10/2020
White Paper - DC Cook Response to Proposed
Non-Cited Violation
07/18/2023
1-2-EDS-606
Approved Terminals Fastening Method
197350
Receipt Inspection Report for Vertical Bus Bar
09/24/2020
CE-NEYS-0010
Penetrox A and Penetrox A-13
DCCPS-604-
QCS
Cable Terminations and Splices
ES-BUS-BAR-
0001-QCN
Purchase and Design Specification for Vertical Bus Bar
and 1
Miscellaneous
VTD-CHAM-0056
Cutler-Hammer Instruction Manual for Unitrol Motor
Control Center
2-EHP-5043-
CGD-001
2-EHP-5043-
SCD-001
Safety Classification Determinations
2-IHP-5030-
EMP-013
Electrical Enclosure 10 Year Preventive Maintenance and
MCCB/TOLR Testing
2-MMP-3120-
NETS-001
Receipt Inspection of Safety Related/Safety Interfaced
Material and Equipment
71111.21N.03
Procedures
GUIDE-T-0015
Guideline for Implementing the Safety Classification
Determination Process
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
55538754-05
Replace Degraded 2-AB-D Bus Bars
05/05/2021
55553408-01
Perform Detailed Inspection and Cleaning of
MCC 1-TBG-BW
04/21/2022
Work Orders
55553408-05
1-TBG-BW; Replace MCC Bus Bars
04/21/2022
Corrective Action
Documents
22-6192
Terry Turbine Trip latch engagement
08/01/2022
Drawings
OP-2-5106A-60
Flow Diagram Aux Feedwater Unit No 2
Miscellaneous
IST Program 5th
Interval, Rev 5
Donald C. Cook IST Program Plan - 5th Interval
1-OHP-4021-032-
001CD
DG1CD Operation
2-OHP-4030-
018-130N
North Spent Fuel Pit Pump Surveillance Test
2-OHP-4030-208-
051S
South Safety Injection Pump System Test
2-OHP-4030-232-
-27CD
CD Diesel Generator Operability Test (Train A)
10/03/2024
2-OHP-4030-232-
27CD
DG2CD Slow Speed Start
10/05/2024
2-OHP-4030-256-
017T
Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater System Test
Procedures
PMI-5071
Inservice Testing
C10045579001
2-MRV-213: 2-IHP-6030-IMP-427
10/07/2024
C10045579005
2-MRV-213
10/07/2024
C10063594001
2-MRV-213-F, Replace Filter Element
10/07/2024
C10074649001
OPS: 256-017T, TURBINE DRIVEN AUX FW TEST,
GROUP B
10/31/2024
C10074894001
OPS: 12-OHP-4030-018-130N N Spent Fuel Pit Pump
Qtrly Surv
11/7/2024
C10076893
South Safety Injection Pump Group B Test
2/19/2024
C10076969001
MTI, 1-V2H-R8N6S1, Check for Loose Connections,
Replace V/I Converter Card if necessary
10/09/2024
Work Orders
C10077355005
MTI, 1-DGCD-AVAR-REM, Check Potentiometer Knob
and Indicating Plate
10/29/2024
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
C10077355012
OPS: DG1CD, Inoperable Perform 1-OHP-4030-114-021
- 20
10/29/2024
CEP - 48
DC Cook Nuclear Plant Emergency Plan
CEP - 49
DC Cook Nuclear Plant Emergency Plan
PMP-2080-EPP-
101
Emergency Classification
Procedures
PMP-2080-EPP-
101
Emergency Classification
Miscellaneous
RQ-E-4906-U2-A
Simulator Evaluation Exercise Guide Period 4906
As Found Simulator Evaluation Unit 2 Primary
Corrective Action
Documents
24-7969
May 2024 Failure of 2AB EDG not Counted
as MSPI Failure
10/22/2024
PMP-7110-PIP-
001
Reactor Oversight Program Performance Indicators and
Monthly Operating Report Data Sheets and MSPI
Derivation Sheets (Emergency AC Power System;
October 2023 through September 2024)
PMP-7110-PIP-
001
Reactor Oversight Program Performance Indicators and
Monthly Operating Report Data Sheets and MSPI
Derivation Sheets (Reactor Coolant System Leakage;
October 2023 through September 2024)
71151
Miscellaneous
PRA-MSPI-Basis
MSPI Basis Document
10/03/2023
24-8233
Containment Fire Circuit
11/03/2024
24-8234
Lack of Circuit Cards Slowed Response to Alarming
Condition
11/04/2024
Corrective Action
Documents
24-8267
2-OHP-4024-201 Drop 92 and PMP-2270-SDR-001
Require Change
11/05/2024
20-7975
1-BATT-AB Jar Lid Cracking
10/01/2020
23-9311
1-BATT-AB Cracks Developing on Additional Batteries
2/12/2023
23-9354
Cracks on Walls of Battery 1-BATT-AB Cells 55 and 113
2/13/2023
24-3070
Crack Identified in 1-BATT-AB Cell 22
04/09/2024
24-3222
Unit 2 AB Batter Has at Least 10 Cells with Cracks on Lid
04/12/2024
24-5220
U-1 BOP Cell 109 Crack
06/25/2024
Corrective Action
Documents
24-5485
Battery Acid Cleaner for Station Batteries
07/09/2024
Calculations
ENPM 99-070
2-QRV-251 Actuator Sizing/Capability Evaluation
05/28/1999
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
11/21/2024
Hourly LEFM RX Power Over 100% During Transient
11/21/2024
2013-11790
Chesterton 5800 Packing Kits with No End Rings
08/12/2013
24-8233
Containment Fire Circuit
11/03/2024
24-8234
Lack Of Circuit Cards Slowed Response to
Alarming Condition
11/04/2024
24-8252
E-plan implementation MSP Not Contacted Within
Minutes
11/03/2024
24-8641
SPC Failure While Swapping on CV2 in Unit 1
11/21/2024
Corrective Action
Documents
24-8641
SPC Failure While Swapping on CV2 in Unit 1
11/21/2024
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
24-8267
2-OHP-4024-201 Drop 92 and PMP-2270-SDR-001
Require Change
11/05/2024
Drawings
OP-2-98974-2
Fire Protection Containment Detection Sheet #1
Elementary Diagram
Unit 1 Control Room Narrative Log
11/21/2024
Miscellaneous
Apparent Cause
Evaluation
U2 Identified RCS Leakage from 2-QRV-251
10/09/2024
1-OHP-4021-011-
001
At-Power Operation Including Load Swings
1-OHP-4021-050-
001
Turbine Generator Normal Startup and Operation
2-OHP-4024-201
Annunciator #201 Response: Plant fire System
OHI-4000
Conduct of Operations
143
Procedures
PMP-2270-SDR-
001
Fire Protection Suppression, Detection Systems, and
Rated Assemblies
29