IR 05000313/1993019
| ML20045H329 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
| Issue date: | 07/12/1993 |
| From: | Murray B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20045H327 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-313-93-19, 50-368-93-19, NUDOCS 9307200093 | |
| Download: ML20045H329 (9) | |
Text
.
.
-
-
.
.
,
APPENDIX U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
Inspection Report:
50-313/93-19 50-368/93-19 Operating Licenses: DPR-51 NPF-6
,
Licensee:
Entergy Operations, Inc.
Facility Name:
Arkansas Nuclear One
Inspection At:
Russellville, Arkansas Inspection Conducted:
June 21-25, 1993 Inspectors: Daniel M. Barss, Team Leader, Emergency Preparedness Branch, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation D. Blair Spitzberg, Ph.D., Emergency Preparedness Analyst Facilities Inspection Programs Section, Region IV Wesley Holley, Senior Radiation Specialist Facilities Inspection Programs Section, Region IV Linda J. Smith, Senior Resident Inspector Arkansas Nuclear One Accompanying Personnel:
Patrick J. Brown, Entek Solutions, Inc.
Robert D. Mogle, Battelle-Pacific Northwest Laboratories
,
Approved:
._
/ A'//
97
, < -
B. fiuFray,' Chief Fgiyies' Inspection Date Programs Sect'on
'
{
inspection Summary Areas Inspected (Units 1 and 2J:
Routine, announced team inspection of.the licensee's performance and capabilities during an annual exercise of the emergency plan and procedures.
The team observed activities in the Control Room, Technical Support Center, Emergency Operations Facility, and Operations Support Center.
Results:
The Control Room staff performance was good.
Event classification and
notifications were performed in a timely manner (Section 2.1).
9307200093 930713 PDR ADOCK 05000313 O
..
.
._
-
.
..
..
. = -
.
-
.
.
. -
-2--
,
i The Technical Support Center staff responded appropriately in their e
technical support tasks during the exercise.
Proactive contingency planning and accident mitigation activities were employed by the
.
Technical Support Center (Section 3.1).
The overall effectiveness of the staff ir the Emergency Operations
facility was good.
Effective leadership was demonstrated by the i
Emergency Operations facility in its command and control responsibilities (Section 4.1).
,
The actions taken by the Operations Support Center to support
_
operational needs were effective. The new Operations Support Center facility improved the efficiency of support team activities (Section 5.1).
The licensee's self-critique was effective (Section 6.1).
- Summary of Inspection Findings:
Exercise Weakness (313/9219-01; 368/9219-01) was closed (Section 7.1).
- Exercise Weakness (313/9219-02; 368/9219-02) was closed (Section 7.2).
- Exercise Weakness (313/9219-03; 368/9219-03) was closed (Section 7.3).
Attachment:
Attachment - Persons Contacted and Exit Meeting
,
L J
i 4 1
'v
~ ' '
'
m
~"
-
" - ~ -
" ~ ~
"
-
^ ^ ^ ^
~
.
-3-DETAILS 1 PROGRAM AREAS INSPECTED (82301)
The licensee's annual emergency exercise began at 9 a.m., June 23, 1993.
The exercise involved participation by the State of Arkansas and the Counties of Yell, Pope, Logan, Johnson, and Conway.
The inspection team observed licensee activities in the Control Room, Technical Support Center, Operational Support Center, and Emergency Operations
,
facility during the exercise. The team evaluated the licensee's implementation of the emergency plan and procedures including:
(1) emergency i
response organization staffing; (2) emergency response facility activation, detection, classification, and notification of emergencies; and (3) technical
'
assessment, emergency communications, and formulation of protective action recommendations.
In addition, the inspectors evaluated in-plant medical teams, repair teams, and recovery operations.
Inspection findings are documented in the following sections.
The exercise scenario events centered in Unit 2.
Initial conditions placed the reactor in Mode 5 with mid-loop operation in progress and the No. 2 emergency diesel generator tagged out for maintenance. During maintenance on a breaker, a short and ground developed which caused an explosion of the breaker, injury to a worker, and a small fire. The ground resulted in a lockout of one vital engineered safety feature bus which required the declaration of an Alert.
Later in the scenario while workers were repairing some steel building siding, a piece of siding was dropped and cut one offsite
,
power line and shorted out another. When the No. I emergency diesel generator started, a water hammer in the service water system resulted in a rupture to
'
,
the system and a loss of cooling to the No. I emergency diesel generator.
When the emergency diesel generator overheated, it was shut down, resulting in a loss of all AC power to Unit 2.
With no power available for forced cooling i
of the core, gravity feed of water to the core from the refueling water storage tank was initiated.
With a station blackout lasting greater than 15 minutes, declaration of a Site Area Emergency was appropriate.
Exercise realism was enhanced by the use of the simulator in a dynamic mode and by several " mock-ups" for repair actions and medical scenarios.
2 CONTROL ROOM (82301-03.02.b.1)
The inspection team observed and evaluated the Control Room staff as they performed tasks in response to the exercise.
These tasks included detection and classification of events, analysis of plant conditions, implementation of corrective measures, notifications of offsite authorities, and adherence to the emergency plan and implementing procedures.
2.1 Discussion l
The Control Room staff initially classified the emergency as a Notice of Unusual Event and at 9:28 a.m. upgraded the classification to Alert.
In both instances, NRC and the Arkansas Department of Health were notified within 15 minutes of the declaration by facsimile and the notifications were verified
,
,
.
.
, -, _ _,,
. - -,
, _ _. - -.,. _ _
-
,,r
-
..-.
--
.. -
..
- _
._
-. -.
.
.. - - -.
.
.
.
_4_
and authenticated by telephone.
Forms were filled out promptly and all required information was provided.
Performance in this area from the Control Room was good.
.
The Shift Supervisor was especially effective in command and control practices with regard to the utilization of staff resources.
In several instances, he assigned responsibilities to off-shift personnel to research alternatives.as well as potential impacts and to report the results of the research to the operators.
He continually challenged new areas which could be researched'and was very effective at the "What if?" management style.
It was additionally noted that there was very effective use of status updates that the Control Room operators were continually focused on the priorities and were provided the latest information on casualty control available to the Shift Supervisor.
Procedures were consistently used by the Control Room. staff.
Even during the rush to reenergize vital buses for power to critical loads, the Control Room crew paused to refresh their understanding of the sequence and steps as required by the established procedures and collectively talked through important evolutions.
2.2 Conclusions The Control Room staff performance was good.
Event classification and notifications were performed in a timely manner.
3 TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER (82301-03.02.b.2)
,
The inspectors observed and evaluated the Technical Support Center staff as
,
they responded to simulated accident conditions of the scenario.
The inspectors evaluated the staffing, technical assessment and support to operations, and adherence to the emergency plan and implementing procedures.
3.1 Discussion The Technical Support Center was activated within approximately 30 minutes of the Alert declaration.
The licensee's staffing for the Technical Support Center was ample.
One additional function, an Assistant Technical Support Director, not listed in the emergency response plan also played an important role at the Technical Support Center.
The licensee stated that he was in a
'
training capacity to become a future Technical Support Director.
He was most valuable initially.
The plant status board updates did not begin until approximately 10 minutes after the Technical Support Center was activated.
However, the Assistant Technical Support Director maintained an accurate listing of plant conditions and major activities in progress from just a few
'
minutes after the Alert classification was declared.
The overall performance of the staff was excellent.
Several examples of proactive contingency planning and accident mitigation were observed by the inspectors.
For example, the staff attempted to stop the sheet metal work above the switchyard which did turn out to be the scenario event that caused loss of offsite power.
A containment spray pump was partially aligned so that it could be placed in service should a failure of the low pressure safety
!
l
_ - _ _ _
_
, _
..
..
-. -
-
.
-
,
..
-
.
. --
-- -.--
.
.
-
.
.
f
-5-
,
injection pump occur.
Self-contained breathing apparatuses were staged for
!
the personnel working on the equipment hatch so they would be available to support continued efforts to close the equipment hatch if boiling began.
j Contingency planning was performed to ensure long-term supply and driving
,
force for injecting borated water into the core during the loss of offsite power following loss of gravity head from the refueling water storage tank.
l Evidence of good coordination with the other operating unit was also observed.
'
The emergency action level review was thorough; however, the bases for recommendations were not clearly communicated to the Emergency Operating
,
'
Facility.
Initially, the Technical Support Director recommended that the energency classification be upgraded to Site Area Emergency based on Emergency Action Level 9.4 in that conditions at that time were not covered by any other emergency action level and two fission product barriers were challenged.
However, the Emergency Operating Facility Director did not concur.
The second
,
time the Technical Support Director recommended an upgrade to Site Area
'
Emergency he used Emergency Action Level 7.10 based on the condition that the
.
sheet metal falling from the Turbine building that initiated the loss of
offsite power was a missile and the potential loss of both trains of shutdown cooling was eminent due to loss of service water on the only train with an operable emergency diesel generator.
He was aware that the criteria for upgrade under Emergency Action Level 4.4 or station blackout greater than 15 minutes would be reached shortly.
The bases for declaration under Emergency Action Level 7.10 was not clearly communicated and personnel in the Emergency Operating Facility believed a missile had somehow ruptured the service water system, which was not the case.
Briefings were routinely conducted by the Technical Support Center director.
These briefings included current plant status, an overview of the activities in progress and the relative priority of each.
Good staff discussions occurred regarding priorities and Emergency Action level recommendations.
Transitions from the emergency approach to restoring equipment versus restoration per normal procedures were discussed thoroughly.
As a result, all decisions were conservative and well thought out.
Command and control was transferred directly from the Control Room to Emergency Operating Facility.
This was clearly stated.
Plant evacuation and site accountability was simulated.
3.2 Conclusions
,
The Technical Support Center staff responded appropriately in their technical support tasks during the exercise.
Proactive contingency planning and accident mitigation activities were employed by the Technical Support Center.
4 EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY (82301-03.02.b.3)
The inspectors observed and evaluated the Emergency Operations Facility staff
[
as they performed tasks in response to the exercise scenario.
The inspectors
evaluated activation of the Emergency Operations Facility, staffing, change of
'
command and control from the Control Room, accident assessment, j
i
'
,
,-, --
- - -,.
--
, -.,.. ~
,4m.
,
. - - -. -
-
-_
~
--~- -
.
-
,
..
.. -
- -. - -
.-
.
.
.
'
.
r-6-
.
classification, limited offsite dose assessment, notifications, interaction
,
with State officials, and very limited protective action decisionmaking.
4.1 Discussion
,
,
Emergency direction and control was clearly transferred from the Control _ Room to the Emergency Operations Facility. Transfer from the Control Room was conducted telephonically in a formal-manner between the Control Room Shift i
Superintendent and the Emergency Operations Facility Director.
Transfer of command to Emergency Operations Facility was made explicitly clear to Emergency Operations facility personnel by the Emergency Operations facility Director making a public address announcement.
j Definite and effective leadership was established and maintained by the Emergency Operations facility Director. Delegation of duties and distribution-of assignments were made by the Emergency Operations Facility Director in such a manner as to preserve his oversight.
The Emergency Operations Facility Director made clear and timely announcements of emergency class changes to others in the command room and other response centers.
.
A late entry by the Status Board Keeper after 12 p.m. for an 11:45 a.m. event-which reflected the start of gravity feed, caused incorrect important information to be provided by the Emergency Operations facility Assistant i
Director to the NRC emergency response team during their in-briefing. This
!
was corrected in a later briefing once the correct information was available to the Assistant Emergency Operations Facility Director.
4.2 Conclusions The overall effectiveness of the staff in the Emergency. Operations Facility was good.
Effective leadership was demonstrated by the Emergency Operations facility in its command and control responsibilities.
,
5 OPERATIONS SUPPORT CENTER (82301-03.02.b.4)
'
The inspectors evaluated the performance of the Operations Support Center staff as they performed tasks in response to the exercise scenario to determine whether the Operations Support Center would be. effective in providing support operations.
These tasks included activation of the Operations Support Center and the coordination of emergency in-plant response
'
teams.
The inspectors observed simulated in-plant medical rescue, equipment repair, and health physics surveys.
5.1 Discussion j
\\
The licensee's new Operations Support Center facility was noted to be a significant improvement over the previous facility and increased the efficiency of its functions. The Operational Support Center was staffed, activated, and quickly became fully functional.
The Operations Support Center
l
_
,
__
.
.
-
. --. -.
. ~.
..
-
-..
-.
-
_ _-
,
.
,
-7-
,
had a magnetic sign staffing board where responders placed their names,
showing at a giante the stages of readiness and staffing, i
The emergency medical team arrived within a few minutes at the site of the injured person and effectively managed to provide appropriate care for the-victim.
The fire brigade extinguished the simulated fire in an efficient
'
manner, and the in-plant repair teams performed their tasks in a safe and effective way.
Communication and information flow among the Technical Support Center, the Operations Support Center, and in-plant -teams were good.
Status boards were accurate and descriptive of ongoing actions and priorities.
The Operations Support Center Coordinator consistently briefed the staff and had health physics perform habitability surveys.
Throughout the exercise,
emergency response teams were briefed effectively by maintenance personnel.
In-plant teams were tracked ef ficiently by using status boards.
Ten in-plant
teams were used during the exercise, and many of these teams were tracked simultaneously.
5.2 Conclusions
,
The actions taken by the Operations Support Center to support operational
needs with in-plant teams and to protect workers from radiological hazards while they accomplished their tasks were effective.
The licensee's new Operations Support Center facility improved the efficiency of support team
activities.
i 6 LICENSE SELF-CRITIQUE (82301-03.02.b.12)
The inspectors observed and evaluated the licensee's self-critique to
'
determine whether the process would identify and characterize weak or deficient areas in need of corrective action.
6.1 Discussion
The licensee's self-critique process was thorough and involved participation of higher management.
The inspectors noted that the licensee was able to properly identify problem areas and improvement items.
Licensee findings were l
'
consistent with findings by the inspection team.
6.2 Conclusions
!
The licensee conducted an effective self-critique.
,
!
1
?
-, -
.
,,.,,..
-
.m
-,
,,
. m.-
- - -,
.m.
---.., -. - -., -,
-...c
.,,%..
-,,r
-
m
_-.
..... - -,._
_-
,
.
i
-8-7 FOLLOWUP ON PREVIOUS INSPECTION FINDINGS
7.1 1 Closed) Exercise Weakness (313/9219-01: 368/9219-01):
During the 1992 exercise several observations were made which indicated a weakness in the licensee's notification process.
The licensee had revised their notification procedures to include a designation of mandatory information to be provided to the NRC on initial
,
notification of event declaration.
The procedure now includes instructions for confirmation of faxed notification forms and inclusion of status of the unaffected unit.
Personnel assigned notification duties had been trained on the revised procedures.
During the 1993 exercise, the notification process was observed in the Control Room and the Emergency Operations facility to be
,
performed in accordance with established procedures.
7.2 (Closed) Exercise Weakness (313/9219-02: 368/9219-02):
During the 1992 exercise the briefinq qiven to the NRC site team upon their arrival at the site was considered to be inadequate and was an exercise weakness.
The licensee had revised Procedure 1903.067, " Emergency Response Facility -
l Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)," to contain guidelines for conducting briefings.
During the 1993 exercise, the licensee had a team of three controllers play the part of an NRC emergency response site team.
The team was provided an initial in-briefing and later an update briefing.
The briefings were conducted by the Assistant Emergency Operations Facility Director using the new guidelines.
The briefings were noted to be improved.
Questions asked by the team that could not be answered during the briefing were quickly resolved after the briefing.
The Assistant Emergency Operations f acility Director actively pursued and provided followup information to the team.
The Communication Liaison was effectively used to ensure current
,
information was provided to the simulated NRC site team.
7.3 (Closed) Exercise Weakness (313/9219-03: 368/9219-03):
During the 1992 exercise, the inspectors noted that the offsite monitoring teams did not take adequate contamination control measures while in the radioactive plume because protective clothing was not used, nor was it readily available to them.
Subsequent to the 1992 exercise, the licensee had initiated a training practice for all drills and exercises for offsite team personnel to locate and take protective clothing with them.
This was instituted with the August 18, 1992 Emergency Response Organization drill. During the 1993 exercise, the inspectors noted that an abundant supply of protective clothing was made available for offsite monitoring teams use as needed.
- i
>
'
-
-, - -.
-
-
- - - - - -
-
)
.
.
ATTACHMENT 1 PERSONS CONTACTED 1.1 Licensee Personnel
.
- R. Edington, Plant Manager, Unit 2
- J. Fisicaro, Director, Licensing
- B. Bement, Manager, Training and Emergency Planning
'
- F. Van Buskirk, Supervisor, Emergency Planning
- C. Fite, Acting Director, Quality
- J.
Teter, Simulator Instructor
- T. Green, Emergency Planner
- R. King, Supervisor, Licensing
- R. Lane, Manager, MCS Design
- B. Eaton, Director, Design Engineering
- J. McWilliams, Manager, Modifications
- R. Johannes, Technical Assistant, General Manager, Plant Operations
- R. Gresham, Senior Emergency Planner
- J. Crawford, Emergency Planner
- S. Boncheff, Licensing Specialist The inspection team also held discussions with other station and corporate personnel in the areas of health physics, operations, training, and emergency response.
- Denotes those present at the exit interview.
2 EXIT MEETING The inspection team met with the licensee representatives indicated in Section 1 of this attachment on June 25, 1993, and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection as presented in this report.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to, or reviewed by, the inspectors during the inspection.
..
- - -