IR 05000311/1983018
| ML20024D318 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 07/20/1983 |
| From: | Kister H, Norrholm L, Roxanne Summers NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20024D300 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-311-83-18, NUDOCS 8308040533 | |
| Download: ML20024D318 (3) | |
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Enclosure 3 U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
050311-830424 Report No. 50-311/83-18 Docket No. 50-311 License No. DPR-75 Priority Category C
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Licensee:
Public Service Electric and Gas Company 80 Park Plaza Newark, New Jersey 07101 Facility Name:
Salem Nuclear Generating Station - Unit 2 Inspection At:
Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey Inspection Conducted:
May 9-18,1983 Inspectors:
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ab lk (M L. J. Mor 01, Senior Resident Inspector date k/M3 r
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R. Sumer esident Inspector da,te date Approved by:
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A 4A go no H. B. Kister? Chief, Projects Sebtion No. 2B, C/ dWte
Division of Project and Resident Programs Inspection Summary:
Inspection on May 9-18,1983 (Report Number 50-311/83-18)
Special inspection (12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />) to review the circumstances surrounding the loss of reactor coolant system overpressure protection event of April 24, 1983.
Results: One violation was identified (Failure to meet a Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation - Paragraph 2).
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i Region I Form 12 (Rev. February 1982)
8308040533 830720 PDR ADOCK 05000272 G
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DETAILS
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1.
Persons Contactea J. Driscoll, Assistant General Manager-Salem Operations L. Fry, Operations Manager N. Gerrity, Senior Operations Supervisor J. Gueller, Operating Engineer J. Zupko, Jr., General Manager-Salem Operations 2.
Loss of Low Temperature Overpressure Protection Event On April 23, 1983, with the plant in Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown) and the reactor vessel head installed, both Pressurizer Overpressure Protection (POPS) relief valves were inoperable due to closed block valves which were tagged to support on going maintenance. Technical Specification 3.4.10.3 requires that, with the reactor coolant system temperature less than 312 degrees F and the vessel head installed, one of the following methods of overpressure protection must be available:
Two POPS relief valves with a lift setting less than or equal to 375 psig, or, The Reactor Coolant System (RCS) be depressurized and vented through a vent of at least 3.14 square inches.
With the PDPS valves inoperable as described above, the plant was being maintained in a depressurized condition via a vent path established through an open flange established by pressurizer safety valve 2 PRS removal. The vent path was checked once per shift by sending operators into containment to confirm that the valve was not installed on the flange.
On April 21, 1983 the shift supervisor signed authorization of a work order requesting that a blank be installed at 2PR5 flange in preparation for safety injection (SI) system full-flow tests, and at about 6:00 a.m.
on April 24, 1983 maintenance department personnel installed the blank.
This action eliminated the established overpressure protection for the reactor coolant system. Subsequent statements of the shift supervisor indicated that he intended only to authorize fabrication of the blank and expected verbal notification prior to blank installation in order to establish an alternate vent path. The installation of the blank at 2 PRS flange apparently took place with no further contact between maintenance and operations personnel.
At about 6:45 a.m. on April 25, operations personnel were informed that the blank may have been installed during the preceding weekend. The flange was checked and the blank found in place at about 8:45 a.m.
Immediate steps were initiated to establish an alternate vent path by clearing tags on the PORV block valves, opening a block valve, and blocking open a PORV. This path was established at about 1:58 p.m. on April 25, 1983.
Technical Specification 3.4.10.3 requires that, if both POPS valves are or become inoperable, the plant is to be depressurized and vented through a 3.14 square inch vent within eight hours.
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- The following additional findings are pertinent to this event; Operators sent into containment apparently verified the safety valve
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not installed, by visually observing removed valve 2 PRS. They
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apparently did not routinely check the mounting flange opening.
During the interval that the vent path was closed, no challenge to
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the overpressurization system occurred.
During this interval, all charging pumps and safety injection pumps
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were unavailable and tagged off. The safety injection accumulators were depressurized and the pressurizer heaters were tagged off.
For the duration of this event, the RCS was in a partially drained
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condition with level maintained at abuut the centerline of the loop nozzles.
In this condition, the pressurizer is empty.
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No procedural guidance was provided to establish a preferred vent path, nor were any defined controls established to ensure that the vent path was not voided, other than the once per shift surveillance inspection.
Failure to maintain the required reactor coolant system vent path when no POPS relief valves were operable constitutes a violation of Technical Specification 3.4.10.3 (311/83-18-01).
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Exit Interview The inspectors met with licensee management on May 19, 1983 to discuss the scope and findings of this special inspection.
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