IR 05000305/1982013
| ML20027D075 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Kewaunee  |
| Issue date: | 10/06/1982 |
| From: | Nelson R, Reyes L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20027D064 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-305-82-13, NUDOCS 8210280232 | |
| Download: ML20027D075 (10) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGUALTORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Report No. 50-305/82-13(DPRP)
Docket No. 50-305 License No. DPR-43 Licensee: Wisconsin Public Service Corporation P. O. Box 1200 Green Bay, VI 54305 Facility Name: Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant Inspection At: Kewaunee Site, Kewaunee, WI Inspection Conducte Ju-August 31, 1982 Ne son
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Inspector: /
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Approved By:
. A. Reyes lef,
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(O Reactor Pro cts Section 2B
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Inspection Summary Inspection on July 1-August 31, 1982 (Report No 50-305/82-13(DPRP))
Areas Inspected: Routine resident inspection of Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings; Operational Safety Verification; Monthly Maintenance Observation; Monthly Surveillance Observation; Licensee Event Report Followup; Independent Inspection; Fire Protection / Prevention; and Followup on Significant Event. The inspection involved a total of 190 inspector-hours by one inspector including 45 inspection-hours onsite during off-shifts.
Results: Of the eight areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were involved in six areas. One item of noncompliance was identified in one area (Failure to maintain control of combustible materials - Paragraph 8) and one item of deviation was identified in another area (Deviation from a Commit-ment - Paragraph 2).
8210280232 821013
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PDR ADOCK 05000305 O
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DETAILS l
1.
Persons Contacted
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- D. C. Hintz, Plant Manager
- M.
C. Marchi, Technical Supervisor
- R. W. Lange, Superintendent, Maintenance
- C. R. Steinhardt, Superintendent, Operations W. J. Richmond, Plant Services Superintendent D. W. McSwain, Assistant Superintendent, Instrument and Control K. H. Evers, Reactor Supervisor
- D. Flatynski, Fire Technician
- C, S. Smoker, Fire Marshall
- S.
L. Bernhoff, Nuclear Engineer The inspector also talked with and interviewed members of the Operations, Maintenance, Health Physics, Instrument and Control, Quality Control, and Security Groups.
- Denotes those attending one or more exit interviews.
2.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Unresolved Item (305/81-05-03): Technical Specification requirement of two Auxiliary Feedwater pumps would not meet the Final Safety Analysis Report for a Steam Line Break event. Technical Specification 3.4.a.2, Amendment No. 45, dated June, 2, 1982, now requires three operable Auxiliary Feodwater pumps.
(Closed) Noncompliance (305/80-24-01): Fire Watch requirements not being implemented. Observations by the resident inspector and review of approximately 400 Maintenance Work Requests indicates that licensees
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corrective actions have been effective in preventing a recurrance of this type noncompliance.
f (Closed) Unresolved Item (305/80-24-04): Fire brigade and fire team training and drills. Subsequent to the 1980 inspection, the licensee rewrote Administrative Control Directive (ACD) 13.2 " Fire Brigade Training." The subject matter is now addressed in ACD 14.5 " Fire Brigade / Fire Team Training", ACD 14.5 includes the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.I.3.b.
The resident inspector randomly selected ten percent of the fire brigade / fire team members and reviewed tneir training records. Of those reviewed, all require-ments of ACD 14.5 had been met.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (305/80-24-03): No administrative procedures identifying proper locations for combustible materials, also no assur-ance of systematic inspection of all areas of the plant for fire hazards.
Subsequent to the 1980 inspection, ACD 14.3 requires regular plant tours by the Fire Marshall or his alternate, and documenting the results.
In addition, the ACD provides guidelines for housekeeping, designated storage
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areas, and storage and control of transient combustibles. Observations by the resident inspector indicate adherence by the licensee to the ACD guidelines, with one exception. Reference Paragraph 8.f of this inspec-tion report.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (305/80-24-05): Fire emergency and fire fighting procedures. Subsequent to the 1980 inspection, the licensee developed a Fire Area Strategies Manual. The manual provides guidelines for coping with fires throughout the plant by subdividing the plant area into 24 distinct areas. For each of the 24 areas, information is provided pertaining to the fire source, fire extinguishing equipment required, directions of attack, and precautions and hazards. All fire team and fire brigade equipment storage lockers have a copy of the manual. The equipment lockers are inventoried and sealed.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (305/80-24-06): All valves in the fire water system for safety-related areas not provided with tamper indicating seals. Corrective action was implemetend immediately for the valves identified during the 1980 inspection.
The licensee has implemented Surveillance Procedure 08-183, " Fire System Valve Cycling and Lineup",
which requires sealing of all valves which are critical to supplying fire water to safety-related areas. Observations by the resident inspector have indicated adherance to SP 08-183.
(Closed) Open Item (305/78-06-02): Qualification of containment elec-trical penetration terminal blocks with respect to radiation exposure.
This item will be resolved by NRR, following their review of the licensee's response to IEB 79-01B.
(0 pen) Noncompliance (305/81-18-01): Service water valves SW-1300A and B rendered inoperable due to operator error. The inspection of the corrective action revealed that the commitment to issue an opera-tions memorandum was not complied with. A deviation was issued in Inspection Report No. 50-305/82-13.
3.
Operational Safety Verification The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during the months of July and August. The inspector verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to service of affected components. Tours of auxiliary and turbine buildings were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance. The inspector by observation and direct interview verified that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the station security plan.
The inspector observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions and implementation of radiation protection controls. During the months of July and August, the inspector walked down the accessible portions of the auxiliary feedwater, fire protection, service water, emergency diesel
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generator, high head safety injection, containment spray, residual heat removal, component cooling, spent fuel pit cooling and radiation monitor-ing systems to verify operability.
These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility operations were in conformance with the requirements established under
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technical specifications, 10 CFR, and administrative procedures.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
4.
Monthly Maintenance Observation Station maintenance activities of safety related systems and com-ponents listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards and in conformance with technical specifications.
The following items were considered during this review:
the limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by quali-fled personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; and, fire prevention controls were implemented.
The following maintenance activities were observed / reviewed:
MWR No.
Problem / Corrective Action 19646 Body-Bonnet leak on SI-201A/ Replaced bonnet and seat gasket 19607 Packing gland leak on SI-209/ Adjusted packing 18124 Overload tripping on MOV-400B/ Rebuilt operator 19647 Packing gland leak on SI-11A/ Repacked valve 19398 SI-300B would not close electrically / Cycled valve manually-retested per Surveillance Procedure 34-099 19191 1B2 Service Water Pump inoperative seal water flow indicator / Cleaned float and sightglass 19327 1A1 Service Water Pump filter DPI failed /Recalibrated meter 19402 1A2 Service Water Pump failure to start / Replaced breaker closing coil
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19257 Replaced 1B Residual Heat Removal pump discharge pressure transmitter with an enviromentally qualified transmitter 19258 Replaced Residual Heat Removal pump flow transmitter with an enviromentally qualified transmitter 19322 Stem nut loose on IB Residual Heat Removal pump manual discharge valve RHR-6B/ Reinstalled nut with Locktite 442 18590 Component Cooling Pumps discharge sampling valve leaks through seat / Replaced valve Following completion of maintenance on MWR's 19398, 19402 and 18124, the inspector verified that these systems had been returned to service properly.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
5.
Monthly Surveillance Observation The inspector observed / reviewed the following technical specifications required surveillance testing: observation / review indicated that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that test instru-mentation was calibrated, that limiting conditions for operation were met, that removal and restoration of the affected components were accomplished, that test results conformed with technical specifications and procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel.
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SP 48-003 Nuclear Power Range Instrument Channel Test SP 45-49.1 Channel 1 Radiation Monitoring System SP 45-49.11 Channel 11 Radiation Monitoring System L
SP 05B-104 Motor-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Test SP 05B-105 Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Test SP 42-109
"A" Diesel Generator Manual Test No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
6.
Licensee Event Reports Followup i
Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to pre-
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82-02/3X Update to correct instrument number 82-09/3X Update to correct coding 82-18/3L 1A RHR pump seal replacement 82-19/3L 1B Shield building ventilation fan tripping due to loose connection 82-10/3L Operator error in reinitializing Prodac-250 82-22/lT 1A Containment fan tripped during start due to backdraft damper being open 82-23/3L 1A Emergency diesel out of service due to failure of starting air compressor 82-24/3L Failure of T-AVG signal conditioner
82-25/3L Failure of liquid waste radiation detector No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
7.
Independent Inspection The inspector conducted a general inspection of operations, mainten-ance, health physics, security, quality assurance and administrative activities.
During the July 12-15, 1982, inspection of TMI-2 Task Items by Regional inspectors, it was determined the licensee could not definitively state if the containment high range monitors were calibrated and operational.
Following the inspection, the licensee determined that incorrect con-nections of the signal and high voltage lines had been made at the containment penetration and one amplifier was faulty. Subsequent actions by the licensee were:
corrected penetration connections; ordered a new amplifier; and ordered a calibration source. At the present time one channel is functional to the point that the output of one channel is available in the relay room. The above findings and information were
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presented to the Regional inspectors by the resident inspector for resolution.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
8.
Fire Protection /Provention The inspector examined the licensee's installed fire detection and suppression systems, manual fire fighting equipment, fire brigade training, and administrative controls over combustible materials and ignition sources. These aspects of the fire protection program were reviewed using the requirements of the Technical Specifications and the fire protection / prevention program implementing procedures.
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a.
Control of Ignition Sources The inspector reviewed / observed four active and 15 completed Ignition Control sheets. The review / observations indicated that ignition sources were being controlled as delineated in Adminis-trative Control Directive 14.4, Revision B " Control of Ignition Sources".
b.
Technical Specification Surveillance The inspector reviewed the following Surveillance Procedures which had been performed during the last 12 months:
SP 08-081 Fire Pump Test SP 08-183 Fire System Valve Cycling and Lineup SP 08-186 C0 System (Cardox) Test SP 08-188 Fire Pump Flow Test SP 08-189 Fire Hose Station Inspection The inspector observed the performance of SP 08-186 for the "A" Emergency Diesel Generator. All surveillances required by the Technical Specifications had been performed within the applicable time period.
c.
Manual Fire Fighting Equipment The inspector reviewed the manual fire fighting equipment available
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The equipment included adequate fire fighter apparel, sealed-beam hand-held lights, self contained positive pressure breathing apparatus (MSA Air Pack),
portable smoke exhausters, fire extingushers and hose stations.
The onsite supply of breathing air is sufficient for 65 man-hours of fire fighting.
d.
Training The inspector randomly selected ten percent of the fire brigade /
fire team members and reviewed their training records. The review determined that the requirements of Administrative Control Directive (ACD) 14.5 " Fire Brigade / Fire Team Training" had been met.
ACD 14.5 includes the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.I.3.b.
e.
Fire Suppression and Detection Systems
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The inspector examined the automatic suppression and detection systems, fire barriers, and cable penetration seals for operability.
All components appeared to be operational. All valves in the fire water system that protect safety-related areas were provided with tamper indicating seals.
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f.
Ifousekeeping and Control of Combustible Materials The inspector reviewed results of plant tours, dating back to January 4, 1982, conducted by the Fire Marshall. The review indicated that plant tours had been conducted more frequently than required by administrative controls and noted descrepancies had been satisfactorily resolved. Observations by the inspector indicate that housekeeping and control of combustible materials has in general continued to be very good.
One exception was noted on August 26, 1982, in the relay room j
area. Observations revealed indications of smoking, a wipe cloth laying in a safety related cable tray, and one section of non-fire resistant scaffolding.
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These indications are not in accordance with facility operating license No. DPR-43, Amendment 23, Part 3.1.25 of the Fire Pro-tection Safety Evaluation Report which states, in part, "Proce-dures are being developed or changed to incorporate controls over combustible materials..." Administrative Control Directive (ACD)
14.3 " Combustible Materials Control" states, in part, "Only pressure treated wood impregnated with fire retardant chemicals should be used in the vital area. All non-treated wood should be removed and its use limited to non-safety related areas. Non-
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treated wood may be used for temporary scaffolding or structures provided the Fire Marshall or designated alternate, reviews each situation in which the wood is used and evaluates the circumstances."
Discussion with the Fire Marshall revealed that this situation had not been reviewed and evaluated. ACD 14.3 further states, in part,
" Smoking is not allowed in any safety related area and any other area designated, i.e., posted with "N0 SM0 KING" signs. This is considered an item of noncompliance (305/82-13-02).
The licensee upon being notified of the inspector's findings immediately corrected the situation.
Further corrective action by the licensee included; presentation of the inspector's findings to attendees of the August 23, 1982, morning meeting; issuance of a n'morandum by the Fire Marshall to the plant manager, all group supervisors, and contractor supervisors detailing the inspector findings and reiterating the responsibility of all plant personnel to maintain the plant in a
" fire-safe" condition. The supervisor responsible for the subject e i
area issued a memorandum to his personnel detailing their daily and j
weekly housekeeping duties. The licensee has taken action to correct and prevent recurrance of this noncompliance and need not respond to the notice of noncompliance.
No other items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
9.
Followup on Significant Event While performing flow tests on the containment cooling fan units, the licensee determined that total flow with four units operating was 124,640 SCFM. Design flow for each fan unit is 41,000 SCFM, therefore l
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the total flow was 76 percent of four fan capacity. The Technical Specifications (T.S.) require four operable fans, if one fan is in-operable the facility is operating under a seven day Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO). Based on the above circumstances, the Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC) determined that with approximately the equivalent flow of three units the T.S.
LCO was applicable and implemented the applicable T.S. reporting requirements. Further investigation by the licensee and ventilation consultants indicated the ducting was undersized for four fan design flow and the undersized ducting with resultant high backpressure was causing the fans to operate in a " stall" region of the fan flow curve.
It was also indi-cated, in the event of a Design Bases Accident with two fans available, the flow requirements assumed in the Facility Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) would be met.
The FSAR assumes a total air flow of 82,000 SCFM with one containment spray pump available.
Followup by the licensee in response to the inspector's request for data which would indicate DBA required flow was available in the event of a single active failure i.e.,
failure of an emergency diesel generator, revealed that train "A" fans would provide approximately 93 percent of the required flow. The licensee verified the test data and found it to be correct. To obtain the DBA required flow an in-spection cover was removed which reduced the backpressure and increased the flow rate to greater than DBA requirements. A test was conducted af ter the removal of the inspection cover to verified the flow re-quirements were met.
The test results confirmed that FSAR flow re-quirements were met.
The Kewaunee FSAR assumes containment depressurization following a DBA can be accomplished with the combined heat removal capacity of two con-tainment fan coolers and one containment spray pump. Review of Inservice Test (IST) data, dating back to October 1979, for the containment spray pumps indicates that either pump will develop greater than 100 percent of design shutoff head. The FSAR containment spray pump design parameters indicate a shutoff head of 550 feet. The IST data indicates a shutoff head averaging approximately 630 feet, 14.5 percent greater than design.
This excess spray capability as revealed by the IST data more than compensates for the 7% flow deficiency for the "A" train fans. There-fore, since the containment cooling function is provided by both the
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containment spray and containment fan coolers, the containment cooling function was not lost for the worst single active failure.
Review of test data from pre-operational testing conducted in May 1973, indicates that FSAR fan flow requirements had been attained. Following pre-operational testing there was no NRC or licensee requirement to obtain further data on a periodic or case basis. Therefore, the point in time which train "A" total air flow decreased to 93 percent of FSAR required flow cannot be accurately determined.
It is suspected by the licensee that during the 1982 refueling outage, a register in the "A" reactor coolant pump vault was shut and not re-opened prior to resuming power operations.
An inspection of the register is not possible during poacr operations due to high radiation in that area.
(Reference Licensee Event Report No. 50-305/82-021/01X-1)
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During the course of the investigation the licensee noted the ventila-
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tion ducting associated with the fan units was typed safety Class 2.
Each fan unit has two discharge /backdraft dampers installed in the ducting, which are opened by fan discharge pressure and are closed by a balance weight when the fan is secured to prevent reverse wheeling of the fan and diversion of air flow. The licensee concluded that it could not be assumed the dampers, installed in a safety Class 2 system, would open in the event of an accident. The dampers have been mechanically secured in the position required for proper operation of the fans to preclude the possibility of a damper not opening.
System conditions as of August 31, 1982, are; all containment fan units in operation; discharge /backdraft dampers mechanically secured in the position for maximum flow rate; and any combination of two or more fans capable of providing DBA flow requirements. The licensee is actively pursuing methods of upgrading the ventilation ducting and discharge /
backdraft dampers to safety Class 1, and modifying the ducting to reduce flow resistance. The licensee reported their findings on LER 82-21.
A revision of the LER is being prepared and will be submitted shortly.
This is an unresolved item (305/82-13-03).
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
10.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable-items, items of non-compliance, or deviations. An unresolved item disclosed during the inspection is discussed in Paragraph 9.
11.
Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)
throughout the months of July and August and at the conclusion of the inspection on August 27, 1982, and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities. The licensee acknowledged the statement by the inspector with respect to the item of noncompliance and deviation.
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