IR 05000305/1982006
| ML20052G055 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Kewaunee  |
| Issue date: | 04/22/1982 |
| From: | Axelson W, Oestmann M, Pagliaro J, Paperiello C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20052G053 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-305-82-06, 50-305-82-6, NUDOCS 8205140270 | |
| Download: ML20052G055 (9) | |
Text
-,
.
"
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Report No'. 50-305/82-06(DEPOS)
Docket No. 50-305-License No. DPR-43 Licensee: Wisconsin Public Service Corporation Post Office Box 1200 Green Bay, WI 54305 Facility Name: Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant Inspection At: Kewaunea Site, Kewaunee, WI Inspection Conducted: February 22-24, 1982
.
Inspectors:
J.
'P gliaro
[
b-Team Leader
'/
'
[/
( 6(Gt v
/p
,
,
F M.
. Oestmann M
C. J er
'/!1t'[f1 Approved By: W Ax ef Em ency P anning Section 7*
C. J.
aper e
I
'
Emergency Preparedness and Program Support Branch Inspection Summary f
Inspection on February 22-24, 1982 (Report No. 50-305/82-06(DEPOS)
Areas Inspected: Routine, announced inspection of the Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant small scale emergency exercise involving observations by seven NRC repre-sentatives of key functions and locations during the exercise. The inspection involved 126 inspector-hours onsite by four hTC inspectors (one resident inspector) and three consultants.
Results: No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
8205140270 820423 PDR ADOCK 05000305 G
.
.., - -.
_.
_
m._
_g
- -
,
..
.
.
..
-
-
____- _ _ _ _ _________ _____
~
>
I
DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted NRC Observers and Areas Observed Bill E. Fitzpatrick, Resident Inspector, NRC, Region III, Control Room Thomas H. Essig, NRC Consultant, Technical Support Center and Post-Accident Sampling M. Lindell, NRC Consultant, Emergency Operations Facility and Joint Public Information Center G. Martin, NRC Consultant, Fire Brigade, Search and Rescue, In-Plant Health Physics, Primary Coolant Sample C. J. Paperiello, NRC, Region III, Technical Support Center M. J. Oestmann, NRC, Region III, Offsite Monitoring Teams, Site Access Facility J. A. Pagliaro, NRC, Region III, Technical Support Center, Emergency Operations Facility Wisconsin Public Service Corporation (WPS)
D. J. Ristau, WPS C. A. Schrock, WPS J. Morrison, WPS C. R. Chace, S&W E. H. Salomon, S&W R. E. Wood, S&W G. R. Larson, S&W C. A. Mazzola, S&W J. Gibson, S&W R. R. Gallagher, S&W E. J. Michael, S&W M. O'Brien, S&W R. P. Pulec, WPS K. A. Flanagan, WPS C. W. Giesler, WPS D. S. Nalepka, WPS John Wallace, WPS R. W. Lange, WPS R. K. Westfahl, S&W R. L. Low, S&L D. C. Hintz, WPS M. L. Marchi, WPS Clark Steinhardt, WPS David A. Dow, WPS Charles Louma, WPS John Richmond, WPS Rod Draheim, WPS James E. Knorr, WPS Stone and Webster Consultants (S&W)
Tom Meinz, WPS All persons listed above were present at the exit interview.
2.
General An exercise of the licensee's emergency plan was conducted at the Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant on February 23, 1982, testing the response of the licensee, and to a limited degree the response of the State and local agencies to a simulated emergency. The exercise tested the licensee's capability to respond to a hypothetical accident involving a major release of noble gases and iodine, a fire, and a medical emergency.
Attachment 1 describes the scenario. The exercise tested the communica-tion links between the licensee and state and local agencies.
- - - _ - _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _. _
.
.
The scenario was developed in part by the use of microcomputers on which simulated plant parameters were presented to participants in much the same fashion as would be available in a real accident. This appeared to be an valuable and innovative approach to scenario development.
Some weaknessess were noted but can be easily corrected in future exercises.
These were: controllers had to prevent control room operators from initiating some actions because, although they were appropriate, they would have solved the problem and terminated the exercise prematurely; the compressed timing of the scenario did not allow the health physics organization to show their capability in very high radiation area entry; some of the radiological consequences were inconsistant with the apparent source term; and the radioiodine collected on the SPING would have exceeded the counting capability of the instrument.
3.
. General Observations a.
Procedure This exercise was conducted in accordance with 10 CFR 50,_ Appendix E requirements using the Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant Emergency Plan, and the Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures.
b.
Coordination The licensee's response was coordinated, orderly and timely.
If the event had been real, the licensee's actions would have been sufficient to permit the State and local authorities to take appropriate actions.
for protection of the public.
c.
Observers Licensee contractor representatives observed and critiqued this exercise, as well as seven NRC observers.
d.
Critique The licensee held a critique following the exercise on the morning of February 24, 1982. The NRC and the licensee identified the deficiencies which are discussed in the exit-interview.
4.
Summary of Areas for Improvement Problems identified by the NRC observers and discussed during the exit interview include areas in which additional attention should be given.
They are listed below.
a.
Health Physics technicians who are responsible for performing calculations to estimate concentratiens of radioactivity in releases must be trained in the use of the appropriate procedures.
b.
The exercise demonstrated that the permanant Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) must be relocated to a more suitable location to minimize potential exposure to occupants and have adequate space
.
.
'
for the number of personnel required to perform EOF functions.
During the exit interview.the licenses stated they planned to locate the EOF to a facility in Tko Rivers.
Other items, of lesser significance, which should be upgraded appear in the details of the report. The items given will be reviewed during a subsequent emergency preparedness inspection.
5.
Specific Observations a.
Control Room Control Room operators generally performed well by following appropriate procedures in responding to the scenario. The opera-tors, in most cases, were able to determine and follow the plant status based on the hypothetical situations established in the exercise. However, at one point, some confusion arose in not knowing precisely the plant condition based on the scenario.
It is believed that this is due to the simulation of plant operations for the scenario running concurrently with normal plant operations.
A solution to the problem is to have plant status boards for the control room.
Telephone communications for the control room were adequate between the Technical Support Center and other stations.
It was noted that occasionally the noise level in the control room impeded the use of the ENS telephone, the volume of the ENS transmission was not loud enough to compete with the noise environment, b.
Technical Support Center An inspector observed licensee activities in the Technical Support Center (TSC) during the entire exercise. The TSC was fully ac-tivated within 20 minutes after the initiating event. The TSC fully performed those functions provided as guidance in NUREG-0696.
The TSC was well managed and had good internal and external com-munications. The well coordinated activities of an adequate staff demonstrated a good level of training for TSC personnel. The TSC followed and trended plant parameters presented on a simulated display. Display boards were used for plant parameters, maintenance work in progress, meteorological data, offsite dose projections and emergency classification and notifications.
The TSC had adequate space for all personnel. The licensee simulated the activation of the emergency ventilation system.
Continuous direct radiation and airborne radioactivity monitors were in operation. Ant 1-contamination and respiratory protective equipment were availab?e but did not have to be used in the TSC.
Plant drawings were available and were extensively used.
Briefings were given for TSC personnel to inform them of plant status. The TSC appeared to function very well.
. - _...
.
.
.
'
c.
Radiation Protection Office (RPO)
The RPO functioned well in terms of briefing teams entering the protected area, supplying Health Physics support, maintaining accountability of teams, issuing dosimeters, and recording ex-posures. The RPO coordinators did not have a Health Physics technician available to monitor the collection of a primary coolant sample. The lack of emergency procedures for the SPING system caused the RPO's response to the SPING data to be somewhat tentative and hesitant.
It was noticed during the course of the exercise that there was entirely too much interplay between the controller and the participants and interplay took the form of direct guidance and prompting on several occasions.
In general it was felt that the scenario did not adequately challenge the plant's Health Physics capabilities.
During release rate calculations in the Radiological Analysis Facility (RAF), it became apparent that the technicians were not familiar with the procedures for performing hand calculations.
This indicates a need for further training.
In addition the technician involved in release calculations questioned the con-troller about the procedure resulting in the controller providing direct instruction and guidance.
d.
Radiological Analysis Facility (RAF)
At 0919 (Site Emergency declaration), the decision was made to activate the RAF. At 0925, the RAF was staffed and operational, in accordance with Procedure EP-RET-2A.
The facility was staffed with the Radiation Protection Director and two support personnel for data coordination and communication with the other ERFs at the Kewaunee Plant. The RAF appeared to function reasonably well, but could have been aided with a status board or other means of making key events visible. A tape recorder was used for this purpose by the Radiation Protection Director to record all key actions taken by the RAF. Chemistry personnel were requested at 0929 to muster at the Cold Chemistry Lab.
The inspectors accompanied a post-accident sampling team during the attempted collection of the first reactor coolant sample (RCS)
following suspected core damage. This mission commenced with very little briefing of the two individuals involved (a Health Physics Technician and a Chemistry Technician), and was aborted due to e prematurely high radiation level in the sample room. The RCS sample team wore only lab costs and shoe covers for this effort.
As a result of the Health Physics organization being primarily involved prior to the General Emergency, (i.e., prior to the time when inplant radiation levels would have become significant), the NRC inspectors were unable to observe the following being used.
These areas should be tested in future exercises.
a
.
'
Protective clothing and equipment for exposure to high levels
.
of surface and airborne contamination.
High range dosimeters (bodf and extremity).
.
Risk-benefit decision making for high exposure situations.
.
Pre planning of mission; team briefings.
.
For the remainder of the time until a General Emergency was declared at 1231, the inspector noted that the RAF functioned effectively in directing two site teams (onsite, out-of-plant surveys), directing chemistry technicians to collect three RCS sample and coordinating in-plant radiation level data. The major source of inplant data was the SPING readout which provided air-borne and area radiation monitoring data.
Inplant I-131 data reported via the SPING system should have been reported as counts per minute rather than microcuries on the scenario data sheets.
Among the data utilized from this system were real-time iodine monitoring data for the plant vent. The inspector does not believe that the high level iodine data contained in the scenario would be available on a real-time basis because:
1.
The number of microcuries of I-131 on the data sheets (up to 900) was well beyond the upper limit of detection of the detector (upper limit = 1E+06 counts per minute which is approximately equal to 10 microcuries) and; 2.
In a real situation, the saturation problem discussed above would have required an entry to the Auxiliary Building to retrieve the iodine cartridge for subsequent laboratory analysis. Real time iodine monitoring does not exist for the high levels contained in the data sheets.
Following the declaration of a General Emergency, the complexion of the RAF changed significantly. At 1236, all RPO staff reported to the RAF, following evacuation of the Auxiliary Building.
Several individuals immediately began estimating effluent release using Procedure EP-RET-2B.
The observer noted that at 1 cast two of the individuals' involved did not appear to be familiar with the procedure; a problem which could likely be corrected by providing training to these individuals.
In spite of this apparent lack of familiarity, the release rate calculations were timely, being completed in about 10 minutes.
An instance of controller prompting was noted by another NRC inspector during this time. Activities emanating from the RAF during the afternoon entailed site team direction and control and tracking of in plant radiation level data, including release rate assessment. No situations arose after radiation levels significantly increased in the Auxiliary Building which challenged the plant Health Physics organization. This lack of challenge appeared to be a scenario problem.
.
'
e.
Operational Support Facility (OSF)
The OSF was activated promptly with appropriate personnel reporting to the area. Fire equipment lockers were opened and records manage-ment functions were initiated. Fire brigade personnel utilizing respiratory equipment were dispatched in a timely manner to put out the simulated fire in the Reserve Auxiliary Transformer. Personnel accountability in the OSF was completed in one half hour. Individual operations support personnel were dispatched under the direction of the Support Activities Director to perform specific work assignments and repair. No provisions for issuing dosimeters, protective clothing, or protective equipment to operational support personnel were made at this location.
Status boards on plant maintenance jobs were kept but the times or names of personnel when assignments were initiated or completed were not provided. With the separation of the OSF staff between the Assembly Room and the Conference Room, there was no mechanism for keeping the entire OSF staff up-to-date on plant conditions as the emergency evolved. A plant status board in the assembly room would have been helpful.
Communications with the TSC, RAF and Control Room were adequate.
The communicator performed well in documenting telephone messages.
The TSC, however, had to call the OSF several times to obtain the status of the plant repairs. The OSF was intermittently monitored for radiation levels by Radiation Protection personnel. However, no air samples in the OSF, were taken. Health physics coverage in the OSF needs improvement in the area of personnel exposure control and protective equipment.
f.
Fire Brigade and Search and Rescue At the beginning of the exercise the fire brigade assembled and was dispatched in a timely fashion. The fire fighting techniques and equipment were adequate to handle the situation. Coordination between teams and the control room and communications were hampered by the lack of radios. The Gaitronics system as the only system for communication by the fire brigade is inadequate. The fire brigades were not briefed prior to leaving the OSF nor did the brigade leaders discuss a fire fighting plan. Upon returning to the OSF there was no debriefing of the brigade leaders by the OSF coordinator. -In general the overall performance of the fire brigade was adequate to handle the situation.
Upon notification by the Control Room that one of their operators working in the Auxiliary Building did not respond to the page, the RP0 coordinator dispatched a search team to locate him. The team conducted an effective search and located the operator in a timely fashion. After requesting a rescue team, the search team properly surveyed the injured oparator and administered first aid. Some members of the rescue team handled the patient prior to donning protective gloves. The patient was transported to the RPO and was transferred to a contaminated personnel carrier and then to an ambulance for transport to the hospital.
During the search and
_
,
.
.
.
'
rescue operation appropriate attenrion was given to contamination, and exposure control and first aid was administered.
g.
Environmental Monitoring Teams The environmental monitoring teams were assembled in a timely manner in the Site Access Facility (SAF). The Environmental Team coordinator at the SAF briefed the teams including advising the teams which roads to follow to avoid unnecessary exposure to the plume. Record keeping, data transmission and radiocommunications between the teams and the coordinator were handled well.
Team members conducted offsite surveys and took appropriate beta-gamma readings to determine plume location.
It appeared that the team members had been well trained for the job that they had to perform. Discussion with the team members. indicated
'
that they had up to 13 training sessions on how to conduct surveys.
The team members were also kept well informed by the Environmental Coordinator as to the existing plant conditions.
The Site Access Facility (SAF) appeared to be well organized with adequate supplies and had good communications with the EOF.
An Onsite Monitoring Team stationed at the SAF performed personnel monitoring of the environmental team members upon return from the field. Adequate step-off pad procedures were followed.
h.
Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
Activation of the EOF proceeded smoothly and quickly from the Alert status to the Site Emergency classification. Personnel-reporting to the EOF promptly initiated tasks such as making communications checks, getting initial briefings from the TSC and making notifications to offsite organizations.
Status data for plant and the environment were obtained frequently and routed to appropriate personnel.
Important messages were announced by the Emergency Response Manager prior to being logged. Overall, the flow of information went well in the EOF during the course of the exercise.
Although the EOF communications has sufficient staff to accomplish its duties, they are located in too small a space. Crowding would occur even if all observers were not in the EOF. Observers snould
,
i be expected in exercises and' actual emergencies. There would be space problems in logging in data on status boards and in having appropriate space to hold consultation meetings. At times, rising noise levels in the EOF impaired effective communications.
Status boards, charts, status display, and maps showing the hypo-thetical radiologically effected area in the 10 mile Emergency Planning Zone were in place in the EOF and used effectively.
The dose projection model used in this exercise was computerized and estimated dose projections were timely. According to a
l
.
.
.
.
.
licensee representative, the computer program is to be revised to include lake breeze effects and elevated release considerations.
The model at present provides a dose rate for whole body and thyroid (in rem /hr) but does not give total projected whole body and' thyroid dose.
Projected total exposure time is not programmed into the computer.
A conservatively based duration of release should be established and introduced into the computer program so that conservative protective action may be recommended for potentially effected populations in the plume EPZ.
i.
Joint Public Information Center (JPIC)
The JPIC had an adequate staff size to accomplish its function.
The staff were well trained and relayed information from the EOF to the media promptly and effectively.
Since this was a small i
scale exercise, State of Wisconsin public information officers were not present, therefore, it was not possible to determine how the release of information (especially information concerning recommended protective actions) would be coordinated.
6.
Exit Interview The inspectors held an exit interview with licensee representative denoted in Paragraph 1 on February 24, 1982. The licensee agreed to correct the inspector's concerns stated in Paragraph 4.
Attachment: Exercise Scenario
.
f
w-T'
'
' ' ^ ^
'
" * ' " ^
M "