IR 05000302/1976007
| ML19317G143 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crystal River  |
| Issue date: | 04/16/1976 |
| From: | Jape F, Robert Lewis NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19317G142 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-302-76-07, 50-302-76-7, NUDOCS 8002280678 | |
| Download: ML19317G143 (22) | |
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UNITED STATES S
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
h REGION 11
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230 PEACHTREE STREET. N. W. SUITE 018
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ATLANTA GEORGIA 30303
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IE Inspection Report No. 50-302/76-7
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Licensee:
Florida Power Corporation 3201 34th Street, South F. O. Box 14042 St. Petersburg, Florida 33733
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Facility Name: Crystal River 3
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Docket No.:
50-302 License No.:
CPPR-51 Category:
B1 i
Location:
Crystal River, Florida
Type of License: B&W, PWR, 2452, Mwt Type of Inspection: Routine, Announced Dates of Inspection: March 10-11, 13-19, 25-26, and 30-31, 1976 Dates of Previous Inspection: February 18-20 and March 2-5, 1976 Inspectors:
R. F. Rogers, Reactor Inspector j
Reactor Projects Section No. 2 Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch (March 13-19 and 30-31, 1976)
G. L. Troup, Radiation Specialist Radiation Support Section Fuel Facility and Materials Safety l
Branch I
(March 16-19, 1976)
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J. W. Hufham, Radiation Specia~ist
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Environmental and Special Projects Section Fuel Facility and Materials Safety Branch (March 10-11 and 25-26, 1976)
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Accompanying Inspectors: None
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IE Rpt. No. 50-302/76-7-2-
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Other Accompanying Personnel:
ne Principal Inspector:
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F. Jape, Reahtor Inspector Date Reactor Projects Section No. 2 Reactor Operations and Nuolear Support Branch.
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Reviewed by:
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Date R. C. Lewis, Chief Reactor Projects Section No. 2 Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch
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IE Rpt. No. 50-302/76-7-3-
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SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
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I.
Enforcement Items None II.
Licensee Action on Previously Identified Enforcement Matters
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Infraction Storage of HEPA Filters and Charcoal Adsorbers The licensee response to the notice of noncompliance had not been received at the conclusion of the inspection. This item remains open.
(Details II, paragraph 2)
III. New Unresolved Items
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None IV.
Status of Previously Identified Unresolved Items 75-8/4 Contamination control in The Hot Machine Shop
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Administrative controls have been established and additional equipment procured. This item is closed.
(Details II,
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paragraph 3)
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75-8/6 Instrumentation Inside of Shielded Cubicles I
i Review and evaluation of instrument locations is still in progress. This item remains open.
(Details II, paragraph 4)
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75-8/7 Installation of Primary Sample Coolers The design of the sample cooler shielding has been approved i
and the material received. This item is closed.
(Deta.ils II, paragraph 5)
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75-15/9 Qualification of Personnel Staff training required by the FSAR remains to be completed.
This item was also addressed in Unresolved Item 75-16/2 and will continue to be followed. Unresolved Item 75-i 15/9 is closed.
(Details.III, paragraph 3)
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IE Rpt. No. 50-302/76-7-4-
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75-15/10 Training Formal training programs for plant employees have been implemented. This item is closed.
(Details III, paragraph 4)
75-19/4 Testing of Radioactive Waste Sample Lines
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The program for verifying representative sampling and evaluating sample line losses has not been Laplemented.
This item remains open.
75-19/5 Determination of Discharge Tank Volume Tank volumes have been determined by measurement. This item is closed.
(Details II, paragraph 6)
75-19/6 Evaluation of Sampling Media Collection Efficiencies The licensee's evaluation is still in progress.
This
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item remains open.
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75-19/7 Management Approval of Radiation Protection Training Program Administrative Instruction (A/I)- 1200 has been approved by the plant superintendent. This item is closed.
(Details II, paragraph 7)
76-3/1 Test Procedure for HEPA Filters and Charcoal Adsorbers The test procedure requires revision. This item remains
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open.
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V.
Unusual Occurrences
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None VI, Other Significant Findings Project Status
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Hot functional testing was commenced and normal plant operating l
pressure and temperature was achieved on March 30, 1976. Problems with reactor coolant pumps precluded continuation of this testing.
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Pump repairs'will be required to complete the hot functional testing program.
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J IE Rpt. No. 50-302/76-7-5-
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VII. Management Interviews A management interview was held on March 19, 1976, with J. Alberdi, The findings of the Project Manager, and members of his staff.
inspection relating'to preoperational testing end radiation protec-tion were discussed.
(Details II and III)
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A second management interview was held on March 26, 1976, with G. P. Beatty, Nuclear Plant Superintendent, and members of his The findings of the inspection relating to emergency planning staff.
were discussed.
(Details I)
A third management interview was held on March 31, 1976, with The findings J. Alberdi, Project Manager, and members of his staff.
of the inspection relating to preoperational testing were discussed.
(Details III)
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IE Rpt. No. 50-302/76-7 I-1
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DETAILS I Prepared by:II, hart f aA ! Mt.
NV[74 J.W.HufhangRadiati'onSpecialist
' Date Environmental and Special Projects Section
Fuel Facility and Materials Safety Branch i
Dates of Insputiou: March 10-11, 1976
March 25-26, 1976
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l Reviewed by:
/.. 84itfad
- [//!7d R. L. Bangart// Chief
'Dat!e Environmental and Special Projects
Section Fuel Facility and Materials Safety
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Branch
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1.
Individuals contacted
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Florida Power Corporation - Crystal River Nuclear Plant G. P. Beatty - Nuclear Plant Superintendent E. E. Froatz - Manager, Site Surveillance i
J. R. Wright - Chem / Rad Engineer D. Pederick - Compliance Engineer i
i 2.
Emergency Facilities and Equipment s
a.
Emergency Kits
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The availability and completeness of the emergency kits were discussed with a representative of the licensee. The inspector was informed that the required equipment was available in the
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emergency kits and the kits were placed in their designated
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locations. The inspector confirmed the availability and
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l ccepleteness of the emergency kits in the temporary emergency
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assembly center and the control room. The inspector defined
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the completion of the emergency kits as a closed item.
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b.
Emergency Assembly Center Construction of the permanent emergency assembly center was still not complete at the time of this inspection but the temporary emergency assembly center was. The inspector had confirmed on previous inspections that the temporary
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IE Rpt. No. 50.-302/76-7 I-2
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emergency assembly center would be accepted, if the emergency supplies and communication systems were available in the facility. The inspector confirmed that the temporary emergency assembly center was acceptable and defined the completion of the facility as a closed item, c.
Onsite Medical Facility
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The inspector discussed and observed the onsite medical facility.
The inspector ve.rified that the facility was complete and supplied but was still staffed by the construction personnel.
The inspector
_s informed that after the construction of the plant was complete the operating plant would assume the respon-sibility of the facility. The inspector accepted the facility as satisfactory but reminded the licensee representative that the facility would have to remain appropriately supplied af ter the construction section turns the facility over to the operating section. The inspector defined the onsite medical facility as a
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closed item.
d.
Plant Emergency Vehicle (PEV)
The inspector discussed the plant emergency vehicle and observed the use of the vehicle during the emergency exercise. The in-spector considered the plant emergency vehicle acceptable and defined this issue as a closed item.
Cot,letion of the Control Center (Nuclear Plant Control Room)
e.
The inspector discussed the progress that had been performed since the last inspection relating to the completion of the control center (nuclear plant control room). The inspector received the following information concerning the facility:
(1) Installation of the Appropriate Filters in The Emergency Ventilation System of the Control Room The " inspector was informed that the HEPA and charcoal filters for the emergency ventilation system had not been
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installed. The inspector was also informed that surveil-lance procedures to satisfy the surveillance requirements of Technical Specifications, Section 3/4.7.7, were still being written and had not been approved. The inspector
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l defined the incomplete emergency ventilation system in
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the control room and the associated surveillance test procedures as an outstanding item.
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-IE Rpt. No. 50-302/76-7 I-3
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l (2) Area and Process Radiation Monitoring Equipment The inspector confirmed that the area and process radiation monitoring system was not complete. The inspector confirmed
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that the system still needed to be calibrated and the calibration procedures needed to be approved. The inspector defined the incomplete installation of the area and process monitoring system as an outstanding item.
(3) Installation and Testing of the Reactor Building Evacuation Alarm During,this inspection, the inspector confirmed that the e
reactor building evacuation alarm was installed and the Surveillance Procedure No. 222 had been approved for the periodic testing of the alarm. The inspector accepted the alarm as installed but the inspector was not able to verify the testing of the alarm due to construction work in the area. The inspector informed the licensee repre-sentative that the Principle Inspector would be asked to
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witness.the testing of the alarm.
The inspector defined the reactor building evacuation alarm as a closed item.
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(4) Installation ard Testing of The Reactor Plant. Site Evacuation Alarm
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l During this inspection, the inspector confi: med that the reactor plant site evacuation al' arm was installed and the
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Surveillance Procedure No. 222 had been approved for the l
periodic testing of the alarm. The inspector verified the testing of the alarm during the emergency exercise
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that was sponsored on March 11, 1976. The inspector defined the installation and testing of the reactor plant
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j site evacuation alarm as a closed item.
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(5) Installation and Testing of The Plant Coastunication Systems J
i During this inspection, the inspector confirmed that all
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of the communication systems defined in Section 2.5.4 of
the FSAR were available 2nd operable except the Power
Radio Service Base. The inspector observed the testing of the existing communication systems during the emergency
drill. The installation and testing of the Power Radio i
Ser'vice Base in the nuclear control room was defined by
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the inspector as an outstanding item.
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(6) Meteorological Readout Panels In The Control Room During this inspection, the inspector confirmed that the meteorological readout panels in the control room were installed. The inspector was also informed that the Surveillance Procedure No. 158 for the testing of the meteorological instrumentation had been approved. The inspector defined the installation of the meteorological readout panels in the control room as a closed item.
(7) Food and Water Supplies for the Control Room During this inspection, the inspector confirmed that the food and water supplies defined in Section 2.4.1, Appendix 123, of the FSAR were not available in the control room.
The inspector was informed that food and water would be available in the control room. The inspector defined the absence of food and water in the nuclear control room as an outstanding item.
3.
Training
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a.
Fire Training of General Plant Personne!
The inspecter confirmed again during this inspection that the fire train!.ng of the general plant personnel as defined in Section 7.0, Paragraph 7.2.2, Appendix 123, of the FSAR, had not been completed. The. inspector was informed that the fire training was still not completed because the FSAR was in the process of being amended to change this requirement. The inspector defined the incomplete fire training of general plant personnel as an outstanding item.
b.
Emergency Training For General Plant Employees The inspector confirmed by a review of training records that 90 percent of the personnel permanetntly assigned to the nuclear plant had been trained in emergency procedures. The inspector defined the completion of this training at this percentage
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level as a closed item.
I c.
Emergency Training For All Personnel Entering the Generating Station Area The inspector confirmed by a review of training records that construction and fossil plant personnel had been trained in O
the appropriate emergency procedures. The inspector defined the completion of this training as a closed item.
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4.
(a) Onsite Emergency Exercise Arrangements were made by representatives of the plant staff to perform an emergency exercise to test the effec-tiveness of the Crystal River Emergency Organization on March 11, 1976. The exercise consisted of simulated emergency conditions that required that all personnel except those essential for the operation of the plant to be evacuated for accountability. Construction personnel were also evacuated from the nuclear plant and accounted for. Provisions were also provided for the accountability
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of fossil plant personnel.
Emergency Drill Response by The Emergency Coordinator With the initial emergency conditions of a simulated accident, the emergency coordinator performed the following functions:
(1) Determined the classification of the accident b
(2) Announced the evacuation routes and sounded the site g\\ -
evacuation alarm
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(3) Contacted the off-site radiological response team (4) Established communications with the security personnel (5) Determined the availability of the Medical Team and Reentry Team (6) Notified the State Duty Officer (7) Notified the off-site medical facility (8) Notified the U.S.N.R.C - Region II office in Aclanta, Georgia (9) Finalized accountability of all personnel
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(b) ' Emergency Drill Response By the Site Emergency Teams During the exercise, the Medical Team, Reentry Team, and Radiation Monitoring Team were organized to simulate reentry into the plant for the recovery of an injured individual and for radiation monitoring purposes.
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(c), Emergency Drill Critique The drill was evaluated during the exercise by the Compliance Section of the nuclear plant organization. After the exercise main participants met with the Plant Superintendent to discuss
the problem areas that had been defined by the participating individuals. The inspector reviewed Interoffice Correspondence that verified a' eas of concern throughout dated March 22, 1976, r
the energency organization as a result of the drill. The inspector informed representatives of the licensee that corrective i
action relating to weaknesses in the emergency organization that were defined by the emergency exercise would be followed during future inspections. After observing the emergency exercise and
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reviewing the results of the drill, the inspector defined the onsite emergency exercise as a closed item.
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5.
Offaite Emergency Exercise Arrangements were made by representatives of the State of Florida and
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the Florida Power Corporation to perform an emergency exercise on
March 25, 1976, to determine the offsite capabilities for the Crystal River Nuclear Plant. The simulated conditions of the exercise required that all of the offsite agencies be contacted and requested to perform their designated emergency responsibilities. The Florida Power Corporation Offsite Support Group also assembled to assist with the
coordination requests of the offsite agencies.
(a) Offsite Emergency Exercise
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An evaluation of the offsite emergency exercise was held
on March 26, 1976, to evaluate the coordinated activities
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of the agencies involved. The inspector attended the evaluation and noted all of the comments and evaluations of each agency represented. The agencies appeared to be aware of their individual responsibilities relative to an emergency at the plant. Representatives of the agencies
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did express a request for better communications between
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the plant and the offsite agencies as well as additional training by the plant staff for some of the agencies. The plant management confirmed that both requests would be
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considered.
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IE Rpt. No. 50-302/76-7 I-7
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(b) Participating Offsit,t Support Group
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State of Florida Office of. Disaster Preparedness a
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Department of Hinnan Resources
_2 Citrus County Citrus County Sheriff a
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Citrus County Civil Defense (c) Federal Agencies Represented at The Drill Evaluation In addition to the U. S. NRC representative, representa-tives from the following federal agencies were present either during the drill or at the drill evaluation:
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U. S. Environmental Protection Agency 2,
U. S. General Services Administration - Federal Preparedness Agency
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U. S. Defense Civil Preparedness Agency
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~~ IE Rpt. No. 50-302/76-7 II-l
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DETAILS II Prepared by:
baa J/!76 G. L. Trbup, Radipfion Specialist
'Date Radiation Support Section Fuel Facility and Materials Support Branch Dates of Inspection: March 16-19, 1976 O!J/ D Reviewed by:
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h A. f. Gibson, Chief Date Radiation Support Section
Fuel Facility and Materials Support Branch 1.
Individuals Contacted J. Alberdi - Project Manager G. P. Beatty, Jr. - Nuclear Plant Superintendent J. R. Wright - Chemical and Radiation Protection Engineer G. D. Perkins - Health Physics Supervisor s
J. L. Harrison - Assistant Chemical and Radiation. Protection Engineer
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D. W. Pedrick, IV - Compliance Engineer J. E. Barrett - Compliance Plant Engineer E. D. Yochheim - Radiochemist (B&W)
L. A. Smith - Nuclear Engineer (B&W)
K. O. Vogel - Computer and Controls Engineer j
Dr. P. Y. Daniels - Nuclear Support Specialist E. E. Froats - Manager, Site Surveillance R. S. Dorrie - Quality Engineer J. C. Hobbs, Jr. - Manager, Generation Testing 2.
HEPA Filter and Charcoal Adsorber Warehousing This infraction was originally discussed in IE Report No. 50-302/76-3, Details II, paragraph 3, and dealt with apparent improper storage of filtert ad charcoal adsorbers for ventilation systems.
At the time of th.s inspection the written response from the licensee concerning corrective actions taken on this item had not been
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received.
However, a licensee representative showed the inspector that the filters and adsorbers had been moved into an environmen-tally controlled warehouse. The filters had been individually stacked and the adsorbers had been stacked four units high based on the manufacturer's suggestions.
The inspector informed licensee management that the storage appeared to be satisfactory but that this item would remain open pending receipt of the licensee's response and a followup inspection of the corrective actions.
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IE Rpt. No. 50-302/76-7 II-2
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3.
Contamination Controls in tha Hot Machine Shop (75-8/4)
a.
This item was orginally discussed in IE Report No. 50-302/75-8, Details III, paragraph 3, and dealt with the need to establish controls to minimize the generation and spread of contamination in the hot machine shop. Specific items identified were ventilation requirements around machines, administrative controls for the access doors, handling of contaminated cutting oil and decontamination of equipment prior to machining.
b.
The inspector. reviewed revision 1 to Administrative Instruc-tion AI-600, " Conduct of Maintenance," which established administrative controls for the hot machine shop.
Included in the controls are lock and key controls for the doors, radiation work permit requirements for the performance of work and decontamination requirements prior to the start of work, A licensee representative informed the inspector that a review c.
of the ventilation system in the machine shop indicated that it was impractical to install temporary ventilation ducts to the machines. In order to provide temporary ventilation two large vacuum cleaners were procured to be used around the machines.
The inspector acknowledged that this appeared to be an r:cceptable alternative. The inspector observed that the vacuam cleaners had been received and were in the machine shop.
d.
The inspector informed licensee management that based on the controls established in AI-600 and the procurement of the vacuum cleaners, he had no further questions and that this item was considered closed.
4.
Instrumentation Inside of Shielded Cubicles (75-8/6)
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a..
This item was originally discussed in IE Report No. 50-302/75-8, Details III, paragraph 5, and dealt with potentially high
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personnel exposures resulting from the maintenance and cali-
J bration of instrumen;5 *er:ted inside of shielded cubicles.
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b.
A licensee representative provided the inspector with a copy
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of a review of the instrumentation prepared by the architect-engineer, which discussed proposed solutions to the installation of the instrumentation. The consensus of the review was that the instr' mentation-could be maintained and calibrated when u
the associated equipment is out of service. However, a licensee
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representative informed the inspector that the calibration schedule for the various instruments had noc been established; s
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removed from service to perform calibrations.
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IE Rpt. No.-50-302/76-7 II-3 i
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c.
The inspector asked licensee management if the position esta-b11shed in the architect-engineer's meno was the position of
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the licensee. Licensee management stated that the recommenda-j tions made by the architect-engineer were being reviewed and
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that the licenses had not made a decision on the recommenda-tions. The inspector advised licensee management that this item remains open.
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5.
Installation of Primary Sample Coolers (75-8/ 2
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This item was originally discussed in IE Report No. 50-302/75-8,
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a.
Details III, paragraph 6, and dealt with potential high I
personnel exposures from unshielded sample coolers in the
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primary sample room. As discussed in IE Report No. 50-302/76-3, Details I, paragraph 3, a design review of the installation i
had determined that a mirimum of 1-3/4" of lead shielding
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would be required for oaa of the coolers and that the shielding would be field installed. The item was left open in the
absence of approved drawings or sketches for the installation.
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A licensee management reprecantative informed the inspector that an engineering change notice (ECN-3000) nad been issued j
showing the general configuration of the shielding and the metho. of installation. The representative also informed the inspector that the required materials were on-site. The inspe: tor reviewed the instructions of ECN-3000 and had no questions at that time. The inspector advised licensee management that this was considered closed based on the approval of ECN-
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3000 and that the installation would be reviewed at a later date.
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6.
Determination of Discharge Tank Volumes (75-19/5)
l This item was originally discussed in IE Report No. 50-320/75-a.
l 19 Details III, paragraph 3, and dealt with the need to l
determine the actual volume of waste discharge tanks. The
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actual as-built volumes are required for accurate determination l
of the volumes of waste discharged ur transferred from the
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plast.
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b.
A licensee representative provided the inspector with a copy of the results of the volume determinations, which were based Volumes on physical measurements and pipe and tank drawings.
were determined for the conditions of operation, e.g.,
liquid tank volumes were determined up to but ne': including overflow I
lines and gas tank volumes included the volumes in pipes up to the isolation valves.
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IE Rpt. No. 50-302/76-7 II-4
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h The inspector advised licensee management that based on the c.
actions taken, he had no further questions and that this item
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was. considered closed. However, the inspector pointed out
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that the tank volumes were required by the plant staff for use
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in preparing procedures for waste discharge. A licensee representative stated that the volume dats would be forwarded
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to the plant staff for their use.
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7.
Management Approval of Radiation Protection Training Programs (75-19/7)
This item was originally discussed in IE Report No. 50-302/75-19, Details III, paragraph 5 and dealt with need for management approval
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of the radiation protection training program which was in effect.
Administrative Instruction AI-1200, " Conduct of Training," which'
l includes the requirements f or radiation protection training, was reviewed by the Plant Review Committee on January 31, 1976, and was l
approved by the Nuclear Plant Superintendent on February 26, 1976.
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The inspector informed licensee management that based on the approval
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of AI-1200, this item was considered closed.
8.
Power Ascension Test Program FSAR Tables 13-3 and 13-4 contain the test summaries for Zero a.
and Low Power Tests and Power Tests, respectively.
Included in these tables is a summary of the tests for the effluent monitors and for chemical and radiochemical tests.
In reviewing the appropriate test procedures the inspector noted differences between the FSAR tables and the test procedures.
l (1) Test Procedures TP 7-1-800-28, " Effluent and Effluent i
Monitoring System Test," TP 7-2-500-1, " Reactor Coolant Chemistry Test," and TP 7-2-500-03, " Initial Radiochemistry Test," specify that data are to be collected at 0, 15%,
j 40%, 75% and 100% power plateaus. FSAR Table 13-3 states that the power plateaus will be 0, 25%, 50%, 75% and 100%.
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(2) FSAR Table 13-3, paragraph 10, lists four tests which are I
to be performed for the effluent monitors. Test Procedure TP 7-2-800-28 covers only one of the four testu. Procedures have not yet been assigned for the performance of the other tests.
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In discussing the test program with licensee management, the
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inspector pointed out that the three tests specified by the
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h FSAR are also specified in the proposed Technical Specifica-j
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tions as periodic tests and calibrations so that a test could l
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IE Rpt. No. 50-302/76-7 II-5
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be performed multiple times using two separate procedures.
While accomplishing multiple tests does not degrade the equip-ment and has no deleterious effects, the purpose of having these overlapping tests (one based on time periods, the other based on reactor power level) was not clear.
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A licensee management representative stated that the power c.
levels specified in FSAR Tables 13-2 and 13-4 are in error and The that the power levels in the procedures are correct.
representative stated the FSAR would be revised at the next convenient time to reflect the power levels. Regarding the effluent monitors, the representative stated that the test program would be reviewed and the FSAR revised accordingly.
9.
Status of Facility The fume hoods in the radiochemistry laboratory are inoperable a.
due to incomplete work in the ventilation system. Consequently,
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chemical analyses involving radioactive materials can only be done using a temporary fume hood. This has delayed technical training in the procedures and has prevented completion of
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capability tests. The inspector emphasized to licensee manage-
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ment the need to get the radiochemistry facilities operable l
for training and to demonstrate radiochemistry capability
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prior to licensing. These comments were acknowledged by licensee management.
b.
The equipment decontamination room is presently being used as a pipefitter work area; no decontamination facilities (tanks, sink, etc.) art installed. As plant administrative procedures
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specify that material shall be decontaminated prior to being worked in the hot machine shop, some capability. is required prior to licensing. Licensee management acknowledged this comment and stated that the final arrangement and equipment were still under study but some capability would be provided prior to licensing.
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DETAILS III Prepared by:
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R. F. Rogers,Mleactor Inspector Date Reactor Projects Section No. 2 Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch Dates of Inspection: March 13-19, 30-31,1976 M/
7d Reviewed by: [. d.
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Date R. C. Lewis, Chief Reactor Projects Section No. 2
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Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch 1.
Personnel Contacted J. Alberdi - Project Manager G. P. Beatty - Plant Superintendent J. C. Hobbs, Jr. - Manager Generation Testing E. E. Froats - Manager S Lte Surveillance
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D. W. Pedrick, IV - Compliance Engineer W. B. Mathis - System. Test Engineer B. Seaholtz - System Test Engineer D. Bienkowski - Quality Engineer R. Dorrie - Quality Engineer 2.
Witness of Preoperational Testing Portions of the following tests were witnessed by the inspector.
The perforcance of each test was evaluated against the requirements j
of ANSI N18.7 - 1972 Section 6, " Test and Inspections," ANSI N45.2 -
1971Property "ANSI code" (as page type) with input value "ANSI N45.2 -</br></br>1971" contains invalid characters or is incomplete and therefore can cause unexpected results during a query or annotation process. Section 12, " Test Control," and FSAR Chapter 13, " Initial
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Tests and Operations."
I a.
TP 71-600-14 Pipe and Component Hanger Hot Inspection Test
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The inspector reviewed the hanger d'isplacement tneasurements j
obtained at ambient temperature and at the 250 F plateau.
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Measurement techniques were observed at the 250 F pisteau and the inspector spot checked approximately 30 of the major
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hangers and restraints in the containment for thermal growth interference (March 13-14). Noise in a second main coolant pump necessitated a plant cooldown prior to the completion of the hanger and restraint testing at 532 F.
A licensee representa-tive stated that no problems were noted in the measurements that were taken (approxtnately 50% of total required). Hot functional testing will resume, following repair of the coolant Hot functional testing was being conducted with one of pumps.
the four main coolant pumps secured, due to excessive vibration.
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IE Rpt. No.' 50-302/76-7 III-2 i
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TP 72-330-3 Control Rod Drive Functional Test The inspector observed and reviewed the results of CRDM functional testing. Run and latching current values for each mechanism
. I were being checked. Position indication (PI) tube performance was being evaluated. Twelve (12) of the PI tubes were found
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to be defective. A licensee representative stated that these tubes would be repaired or replaced.
3.
Qualification of Personnel The status of uncompleted staff training required by FSAR Figure 12.2.1 was reviewed. This was the remaining open item of several
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concerns initially identified as Unresolved Item 75-15/9. A licensee representative stated that an amendment to the FSAR to modify
j training requirements would be issued in the near future. Since Unresolved Item 75-16/2, " Training Completion and Documentation,"
also documents this concern, Unresolved item 75-15/9 will be closed.
4.
Training Administrative instructions were reviewed to determine if formal training associated with the licensee's QA program and operator requalification had been established.
This concern was initially
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identified in Unresolved Item 75-15/10. The inspector reviewed Administrative Instruction 1200, " Conduct of Training," which implements QA and requalification training and had no further
questions. This item is closed.
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f 5.
Review of Preoperational and Startup Test Procedures The following procedures were reviewed for consistency with the
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requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.68, Appendix C, " Preparation of Procedures," FSAR Section 13.4, " Test Program Plan," and the below referenced Regulatory Guides.
a.
TP 71-710-1 Zero Power Physics Test
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A draft of this procedure was reviewed for conformance to RG 1.68, Appendix C, Section C, "Startup to Critical Procedures."
- The inspector noted that the limiting values for measured moderator temperature coefficient and control rod group rod withdrawal rate in Section 10.2 appeared to be less conservative i
than the values in FSAR Table 14-3 for the startup rod withdrawal accident.- A licensee representative stated that this would be
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resolved..This procedure will be reviewed on a subsequent
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inspection.
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IE Rpt. No. 50-302/76-7 III-3
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b.
SP 298 Reactor Vessel and Internal Inspection 1
This partially completed procedure was reviewed for conformance
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to Safety Guide 20, " Vibration Measurements on Reactor Internals."
The visual and nondestructive avamination of reactor internals required subsequent to hot functional testing had not yet been a
l performed. The inspector made it clear at the exit interview on March 19, 1976, that for this test to meet the guidance provided in SG 20, the minimum total cycles required to be accumulated on the reactor internals would require all four
j (4) pumps to be in operation.
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c.
Low Power Test Procedure Verification
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The scope of the low power test program was reviewed to ascertain.
whether prepared and approved test procedures were available i
for required testing. The testing planned was evaluated against Regulatory Guide 1.68, Appendix A, Section C, " Low Power Tests" and FSAR Section 13.4.8, " Post Criticality Test
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Program." One test procedure (TP 71-710-1) remained to be approved.. This procedure will be revieved on a subsequent inspection.
d.
Power Ascension Procedures Verification i
The scope of the power ascension test program was reviewed to assure that prepared and approved test procedures were available for required testing. The testing planned was evaluated against Regulatory Guide 1.68, Appendix A, Section D, " Power-
l Ascension Tests" and FSAR Section 13.4.8, " Post Criticality
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l Test Program." The inspector noted that the part-length rod tests required by RG.1.68, Appendix A, Section D.1.M did not j'
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appear to be scheduled for completion. A licensee representative stated that this test was not planned since the Induced Power i
Oscillation Test was performed on Oconee 1 and C::ystal River 3 l
is an Oconee type plant (B&W). The inspector will review this position at the regional office. This item is open.
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e.
Natural Circulation Test
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In accordance with the provisions-of Regulatory Guide 1.68, Appendix A, Section D.1.a.,
the licensee plans to substitute the requirement to conduct a natural circulation test by com-parison of adequate flow data with the performance of previously tested plants of like design. The previously tested plant is Oconee 1.
The inspector indicated that this cocparison should be documented by the licensee as being acceptable.
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IE Rpt. No. 50-302/76-7 III-4
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6.
Preoperational Test Results Evaluation The inspector attempted to review the results of selected category I and category II preoperational tests to assure that plant personnel are performing an adequate evaluation of test results and that results are acceptable. None of the approximately ten (10) procedures selected had yet been reviewed and accepted by the licensee. Test results will be reviewed on a subsequent inspection.
7.
Plant Tour An inspection tour of the plant was conducted with emphasis on construction progress within the containment building. It appeared that the licensee's programs and procedures for routine housekeeping activities during construction required attention. The inspector noted loose construction materials (nuts, bolts, welding rods, tools, pipes, angle iron, etc.) and debris in some areas even though it appeared that local construction activities had been
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This concern was discussed with a responsible licensee representative
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with emphasis on the need for a thorough cleaning prior to the
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containment pressurization tests.
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