IR 05000298/1982008
| ML20055A979 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cooper  |
| Issue date: | 06/30/1982 |
| From: | Jay Collins, Hackney C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20055A975 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-298-82-08, 50-298-82-8, NUDOCS 8207200211 | |
| Download: ML20055A979 (11) | |
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'd,S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION I
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REGION IV
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Report No. 50-298/82-08 g'
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Docket No. 50-Zag,
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Licensee:
Nebraska Public Power District
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P. O. Box 499'
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Columbus, Nebra h 68601
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Facility llam3: / C30per Nuclear Station 1,,
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Inspection ati Coaper jJuclear Station, Brow.wille, Ne','rasita'
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Inspection Conducted:
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Inspector:
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Charles.A. Hackney, Emergeng Preparedness-Ana yst
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Accompanying Personnel:
P. A. Bolton H. D'fIChiiiy'~
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D. L. DuBois S'. C. Hawlcy
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J. C. Mann
=C. W. Wis~ner
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B. Murray D. M. Rohrer a
B. L. Siegel L. Wilborn j
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Approved by:
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p n T. Collins, Regional Administrator, Region IV;
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~ Summary
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Inspection Cc.nducted Dydn_g Pj, <riod of March 9711, 1982.i '/ ; Y ;3
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Report No. 50-298/82-O'8'J
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Areas Insp'ectede "This touting,pannounced inspection of Cooper Nucleae Station involved 390 inspection hoyes'which includes onsite inspector hours 5for rtht(
emergency exercise and coordinated meetings with the licensee, the Federal
Emergency Management Agency,' State, and local agencies.
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ResultS:
No vio,1ations or deviations wereiidentified.
Five open' items are '/,
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discussed in.Sr.ction 7.
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8207200211 PDR ADDCK 9500CRCJ f.,,.
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DETAILS qi 1(
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ly-Persons Contacted
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Lic.cnsee Personnel
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. r; R,' E. Buntain, Division Manager, Power Operations, NPPD
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J.; Flash, Information Coc,rdinator, NPPD-CNS
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,C.'E. Jones, Assistant General Manager, Operations, NPPD R. Kamber, Senior Division Manager, Power Operations y, p L'.' C. Lessor, CNS Station Superintendent
i" J. M. Pilant, Division Manager, Licensing and QA, NPPD
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j J. Sayer, Emergency Planning Coordinator, NPPD-CNS
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2. ' Other Organizations
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S. Ferris, Federal Emergency Management Agency
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B. Stephenson, Federal Emergency Management Agency
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F. Laden, Nebraska Civil Defense Headquarters f
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3.
" Scope of Inspection
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e N he purpose of this inspection was to observe the licensee's onsite
' 2 emergency organization, emergency response facilities, and the licensee's
' interface with other emergency response organizations pursuant to 10 CFR 50, Appendix E.
4.
' Entrance Interview The entrance interview was conducted on March 9, 1982.
5.
Exit In,terview s:)
The exit meeting was held March 11, 1982, at the Cooper Nuclear Station
auditorium.
The meeting was conducted by Mr. John T. Collins, Regional Administrator, and his staff.
The licensee was represented by Mr. Cecil R. Jones, Assistant General Manager / Operations, and his staff.
The licensee was given a summary of the staffs observations and comments on the emergency exercise conducted on March 10, 1982, at the Cooper Nuclear Station.
6.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Not Inspected.
7.
Open Items Identified During This Inspection Five open items were identified during this inspection.
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a.
This item is considered open (82-08-01) pending:
Provisions are made to provide adequate space for NRC and Technical Support Center response personnel in the TSC (outside the control room). (Section 11)
b.
This item is considered open (82-08-02) pending:
(1) Provisions are made to provide adequate space for the NRC, State, local, and the emergency operations facility personnel in the EOF.
(Section 12)
(2) Personnel are assigned to make telephone calls, thus allowing the Emergency Director to direct the emergency exercise and minimize time spent on the telephone.
(Section 12)
c.
This item is considered open (82-08-04) pending:
s (1) Provisions are made for enabling backshift personnel to establish timely initial dose assessment values.
(Section 13)
(2) Development of procedures which address requirements for collecting and analyzing charcoal cartridges and determining iodine releases associated with effluent release pr.thways.
(Section 13)
(3) Development of a method for displaying the maximum centerline pluce doses on the TSC and E0F radiological status boards.
(Section 13)
(4) Development of a computer program which contains a calculational program for projecting dose in the downwind direction of the plume.
(Section 13)
d.
This item is considered open (82-08-05) pending:
The review of the postaccident sampling system design and correct system operation such that a representative primary coolant sample can be obtained during a loss of onsite and/or offsite power.
(Section 14)
e.
This item is considered open (82-08-05) pending:
Development and implementation of offsite radiological plume characteristic monitoring procedures, e.g., procedures to lead the offsite monitoring teams to direct and characterize the radiological plume.
(Section 17)
8.
Violations No violations were identified during the exercise.
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9.
Operations Support Centers (OSC's)
Health Physics / Chemistry (HP/ Chem) OSC The HP/ Chem OSC was activated very quickly and according to the procedure EPIP 5.7.8.
The HP OSC supervisor used the checklist (Attachment A of 5.7.8.) and proceeded to start the Emergency Action Log, which was a tablet of preprinted forms.
A status board was set up and updated throughout the exercise, although, there were times when updating became a problem.
The transition from one Emergency Action Level (EAL) to another EAL was very smooth.
The inspectors noted that following the Site Area Emergency, the OSC supervisor was receiving two calls for every message, however, it was not noted that any messages were contradictory.
Radios were obtained from the guardhouse for the onsite monitoring teams.
The radios were tested at the guardhouse, however, there were reception problems between the OSC and the monitoring teams.
The inspectors noted that the HP OSC monitoring personnel received initial briefings from the HP OSC supervisor and the Technical Support Center (TSC) supervisor prior to being dispatched for onsite radiological assessment.
The inspectors noted, on several occasions, that one individual was dispatched to perform certain tasks when in fact two people should have been dispatched.
The OSC supervisor maintained accountability of OSC personnel during the exercise.
The accident scenario (total power failure) developed some confusion for the onsite monitoring personnel; e.g., how to take radioactive air samples (without onsite power), and what communications would be available inside the protected area.
The inspectors noted that there were adequate:
protective clothing, dedicated radiation detection instrumentation, and monitors to alarm and indicate both radioactive air and gamma activity in the OSC.
Further, each radiation monitor would alarm with a visual and audible alarm upon exceeding a preset level.
The inspectors noted that most personnel relied on their memory for performing their duties and did not reference the Emergency Plan or Emergency Procedures.
Instrument Shop and Maintenance Shop (OSC)
Personnel reported to their respective OSC for accountability and further instructions.
Personnel dispatched from the OSC's were accounted for and remained in their respective areas during the exercise.
There was limited activity for the personnel assembled at the Instrument and Maintenance Shop OSC's.
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It should be noted that both OSC's had radiological monitoring devices to indicate radioactive air activity and gamma activity.
Further, each radiation monitor would alarm with a visual and audible alarm upon exceeding a preset level.
10.
Control Room The control room had extra operations personnel to participate in the exercise, since the reactor was operating.
The control room personnel consulted their procedures, however, there were times when they would rely on memory and go back to the procedures to catch up on filling in forms etc. Due to the early arrival of the Station Superintendent and his assuming the position as the Emergency Director, there was not the opportunity for the inspectors to determine the capabilities of the Shift Supervisor for emergency response.
The Emergency Director spent too much time on the telephone making calls and this effort could be handled by a person assigned to make local and outside calls.
The inspectors noted that a person was stationed in the computer center, across from the control room, to relay meteorological data to the control room.
The computer room is not habitable and therefore, could preclude the control room from obtaining meteorological data during severe radiological conditions at the station.
Further, it was not determined who would be (dedicated) available for this interim position in the event of a radiological emergency during the backshifts.
The information flow from the control room to the Technical Support Center was very good.
The engineering personnel coordinated their problem solving with the control room operations personnel throughout the exercise.
11.
Technical Support Center (s) (TSC)
There are two Technical Support Centers located in the immediate vicinity of the control room.
The Engineering TSC is, in reality, the lunch area for operations personnel during normal working shifts and the other TSC was an area where corrective actions were initiated.
Both TSC's appeared to function and interface with the control room without any apparent difficulty.
The inspectors noted that the area provided for the NRC representatives also had a microfiche reader and the microfiche file located in their area.
The NRC area provided is inadequate in size and does not have the emergency telephones as recommended in NUREG-0696.
The general work area for the TSC response personnel (outside the control room) was congested (had as many as 14 people in one room), however, the personnel were orderly and communicated very well.
The inspectors noted that the TSC (outside the control room) has radiological monitoring instrumentation to indicate radiological conditions inside the TSC for both radioactive air and gamma radiation.
Further, each monitor had a local readout and would give a visual and audible alarm upon exceeding a preset level.
This item is considered open (82-08-01) pending:
Provisions are made to provide adequate space for NRC and Technical
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Support Center response personnel in the TSC (outside the control room).
12.
Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
The nearsite Emergency Operations Facility is located outside the licensee's protected area and is located adjacent to the security access control point for entrance to the station protected area.
The licensee's alternate EOF location, according to the January 15, 1982, Emergency Plan, exists, in Auburn, Nebraska, at the National Guard Armory.
The inspectors noted the introduction to Chapter 7, of the CNS Emergency Plan, that certain equipment was on order and that the emergency facilities may not " exist" as stated in the plan, however, most of the facilities were to be in place by March 1982.
The inspectors toured the National Guard Armory on March 9, 1982, and noted that area which the licensee may have for the E0F.
The alternate EOF had one black board, one telephone receptacle, one public address system receptacle, and some office furniture stacked in one corner of the room.
Presently, the alternate EOF is not adequate to provide sufficient coverage for emergency response; e.g., communications, and equipment.
The nearsite E0F does not meet the habitability requirements as set forth
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in Generic Letter 81-10; e.g., protection factor of 5 or have High Efficiency Particulate Filters (HEPA).
The nearsite EOF does not have sufficient space for Federal, State, and local representatives.
The licensee placed a trailer outside the nearsite E0F for the NRC which is not acceptable.
The inspectors had a difficult time in understanding what was transpiring during the exercise.
The Emergency Director stayed on the telephone and conducted his exercise via the telephone.
During an emergency there is concern about the exchange of information between the NRC and the licensee if there is no upper management to coordinate the response and corrective actions taken during the incident.
The State of Missouri representative was located around the corner from the main emergency response area and upon leaving the area to be briefed, his telephone was left unattended, therefore, losing contact with his State office.
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The reactor status board was updated frequently and gave a general overview of the reactor's simulated condition.
The inspectors noted that there was security control for access to the EOF and all exercise personnel had preassigned identification badges.
Further, the inspectors noted the presence of radiological monitoring equipment for detecting radioactive air and gamma radiation in the EOF.
Both radiological monitors had local readouts and would indicate with a visual and audible alarm upon exceeding a preset level.
This item is considered open (82-08-02) pending:
-- Provisions are made to provide adequate space for the NRC, State, local, and the emergency operations facility personnel in the EOF.
-- Personnel are assigned to make telephone calls, thus allowing the Emergency Director to direct the emergency excercise and minimize time spent on the telephone.
13.
Dose Assessment The inspectors observed dose assessment activities in the Control Room, Technical Support Center, and the Emergency Operations Facility. The inspectors noted that adequate personnel, procedures, facilities, equipment, and communications were available to provide timely dose assessment information.
The dose assessment team consisted of the following members:
Meteorological Monitor (computer room)
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Effluent Instrument Monitor (control room)
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Computer Input Operator (TSC)
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Data Analyst (TSC/E0F)
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The dose assessment personnel appeared well trained and very familiar with their assigned responsibilities.
Throughout the exercise, dose assessment personnel performed their functions in an efficient and effective manner.
The licensee's program included a computer for real-time assessment data which was supplemented with a manual system for projected dose information.
Meteorological and effluent readout instruments were located in the computer room and control room, respectively.
Noted was the absence of provisions to enable the backshift personnel to establish timely initial dose assessment.
Primary concern is the ability to assemble a functioning assessment team during the backshift which would preclude making timely dose projections and assessment.
The inspectors noted the absence of a procedure for collecting and analyzing charcoal cartridges associated with monitoring effluent release
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e pathways.
The inspectors determined that this information is needed to determine actual iodine releases via the effluent release pathways.
Further, the information displayed on the TSC and E0F Radiological Status Boards did not reflect maximum centerline plume doses.
The licensees's computer program evaluated the dose values along the centerline of each affected sector.
During this exercise, the plume covered two sectors (A&R) with the two edges of the plume near the centerline for sectors A and R.
The integrated thyroid dose from analyses of sector's A and R centerline doses was approximately 180 mrem where as the actual centerline plume dose was about 6.7 Rem.
The centerline plume dose was
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available from the computer printout.
However, this information was not i
displayed on the status boards, which personnel in the TSC and E0F would normally reference for radiological conditions.
The inspectors determined that the dose assessment computer program could only provide real-time data for the actual location of the plume.
The program did not estimate projected doses for selected locations downwind of the plume.
A manual calculation method was used to predict doses in advance of the leading edge of the plume.
The licensee was aware of the limitations regarding their present computer program.
The licensee stated that plans call for the installation of an enlarged computer system that would provide comprehensive dose assessment capability.
This item is considered open (82-08-04) pending:
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-- Provisions are made for enabling backshift personnel to establish timely initial dose assessment values.
-- Development of procedures which address requirements for collecting and analyzing charcoal cartridges and determining iodine releases associated with effluent release pathways.
-- Development of a method for displaying the maximum. centerline plume doses on the TSC and EOF radiological status boards.
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Development of a computer program which contains a calculational program
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for projecting dose in the downwind direction of the plume.
14.
Postaccident Primary Coolant Sampling The inspectors noted that the technician could obtain a primary coolant
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sample using the primary coolant sampling procedure in approximately 45 minutes.
Due to the technician not conducting a radio check upon arriving at the sampling station, the technician was not aware of the inability of the OSC to contact him.
It was established later that there was a problem with establishing communications from the sampling area and L
the OSC.
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Further, it was discussed with the licensee as to the ability to obtain a primary coolant sample during a power failure.
There was concern expressed by the inspectors that loss of onsite and offsite power might prevent the licensee from obtaining a representative sample of the primary coolant, since the sample system is electrically operated.
This item is considered open (82-08-05) pending:
-- The review of the postaccident sampling system design and the correct system operation such that a representative primary coolant sample can be obtained during a loss of onsite and/or offsite power.
15.
ACCOUNTABILITY Personnel accountability was initiated at the TSC when an Alert was declared at 08:18.
Supervisors at the control room, each OSC, and in the security building auditorium had an assembly area roster sheet listing persons in their areas.
The operations shift crews on duty were identified with an NPPD 1982 work schedule card.
Accountability reports were hand carried and phoned into the security and administrat in logistics coordinator (SAL) at the TSC and checked against several successive computer personnel onsite (POS) printouts.
Although a few persons were not in the area designated by the roster sheets, they were quickly located.
Accountability of all personnel and visitors was accomplished in 22 minutes.
Record keeping at the security building was efficient.
Personnel leaving the EOF gave their ID badge to the guard stationed at the door.
Persons entering the building had to sign in with the guard at the door with the approval of the emergency director.
The turnstiles in the security building were deactivated.
Any person entering or leaving the protected area would insert their ID card into the reader for purposes of the computer accountability, and a guard would manually activate the turnstile.
Each OSC supervisor maintained accountability with an emergency action log sheet.
The maintenance OSC supervisor dispatched the initial two man team and recorded their departure after an inquiry by this observer.
Each subsequent OSC had a complete log of arrivals and departures of their personnel.
The SAL requested a computer printout (POS) approximately every 30 minutes during an event and confirmed accountability with the TSC via SAL.
It was noted that EPIP 5.7.10 does not indicate how the OSC supervisor maintains accountability or how a continuos accountability is accomplished.
16.
Media Release Center (MRC)
The inspectors noted that the Civic Center facilities were ample and well arranged, however, the work area arrangements were inadequate for this exercise.
The designated work area for the NPPD and the State Public Information Officer was too small for efficient operation.
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l The NPPD MRC manager should be available to manage the MRC activities, however, he cannot do so effectively if he must answer the media telephone inquiries.
Additional public information officer personnel should be available to answer incoming telephone calls and handle media communications.
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Security at the media relations center was adequate, however, the physical arrangements would create a problem for handling a large number of news personnel during an actual incident.
The inspectors noted that the facsimile equipment was located too close to the telephone communications area and created a distraction for the media representative.
The Public Information Officers for the States of Iowa, Missouri and Kansas were not present at the MRC.
The inspectors noted that the media relations function could have been performed in the General Office of NPPD rather than having the media center located in the Omaha Office.
17.
Onsite and Offsite Monitoring The inspectors observed the onsite radiological monitoring activities originating from the Health Physics Operations Support Center (HPOSC).
The inspectors noted that accountability of personnel was conducted in an efficient manner.
The inspectors noted that there were dedicated radiation detection instruments, self contained breathing apparatus, radios, and procedures available in the HPOSC.
The inspectors noted that the loss of power to the station could result in the HP technicians not having an immediate method to collect air samples.
Further, it wat,ioted that personnel exposures were being kept for personnel accumulated dose, however, the most current exposure list was not being used.
The inspectors did not attend the predeparture briefing for the offsite monitoring team, however, the team indicated that there was a briefing conducted.
After departure from the site, it was discovered by one of the team members that the analyzer had been left onsite and the team returned to the site for the analyzer.
The inspector noted confusion concerning sample locations and noted that their maps were not adequate for sample locations close to the plant and those located ten miles from the plant.
The inspectors determined that the offsite monitoring capabilities would have been better coordinated if a dedicated person in the E0F had been directing the offsite monitoring effort and coordinating the offsite monitoring effort with the State.
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The inspectors determined that the offsite monitoring procedures did not provide adequate directioris to ensure monitoring of the radiological plume.
This lack of direction could lead to inaccurate characterization of the plume.
This item is considered open (82-08-05) pending:
Development and implementation of offsite radiological plume
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characteristic monitoring procedures, e.g., procedures to lead the offsite monitoring teams to direct and characterize the radiological plume.
18.
Summary During this exercise, the NRC inspectors concluded that the CNS emergency response organization demonstrated the capability to protect the health and safety of the public.
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