IR 05000295/1994009
| ML20029D980 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Zion File:ZionSolutions icon.png |
| Issue date: | 05/04/1994 |
| From: | Jorgensen B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20029D979 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-295-94-09, 50-295-94-9, 50-304-94-09, 50-304-94-9, NUDOCS 9405130214 | |
| Download: ML20029D980 (14) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
l Report Nos. 50-295/94009(DRP); 50-304/94009(DRP)
Docket Nos. 50-295; 50-304 License Nos. OPR-39; DPR-48 Licensee:
Commonwealth Edison Company Executive Towers West III 1400 Opus Place - Suite 300 Downers Grove, IL 60515 l
Facility Name:
Zion Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2 i
Inspection At:
Zion, IL Inspection Conducted: March 23 through April 26, 1994 Inspectors:
J. D. Smith M. J. Miller V. F. Lougheed F. J. Ehrhardt Approved By:
L. J rg n
f S'H -M Reacto rojects Section lA Date
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Inspection Summary
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Inspection from March 23 through April 26, 1994, (Report No. 50-295/304-l 94009(DRP))
Areas Inspected: This was a routine, resident inspection of licensee action on previous inspection findings, operations, plant support, maintenance and surveillance, engineering, and licensee event reports (LERs).
Results:
No violations or deviations were identified.
One non-cited violation was identified during this inspection period as discussed in section I
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DETAILS
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l 1.
Management Summary The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in section 10)
throughout the inspection period and at the conclusion of the inspection on April 26, 1994, to summarize the scope and findings of the inspection activities.
The licensee acknowledged the inspectors' comments.
The
inspectors also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspectors during the inspection.
The licensee did not identify any such documents or processes as proprietary.
Safety Assessment of Operations Operations performance was observed as excellent during this inspection period.
This performance was demonstrated by effective responses to the dropped rod and the reactor trip, and the conservatism shown to revalidate the 2A auxiliary feed water (AFW) pump head flow curve'.
The residents also observed a conservative and very professional demeanor during the startup of both units.
Safety Assessment of Plant Support Housekeeping improved this period as scaffolding and other outage material was removed.
However, housekeeping and the recovery of contaminated areas were impacted by the dilution of resources during the steam generator tube repairs and the Unit 2 main electrical generator repairs.
The emergency plan initial notifications for the main generator fire went smoothly as did subsequent termination notifications.
Safety Assessment of Maintenance and Surveillance Good troubleshooting and root cause evaluations were demonstrated for the turbine-driven AFW pump overspeed problem, the shaft-driven oil pump
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failure, and the two AFW valve problems.
Safety Assessment of Engineerina j
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The lack of scales on the Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) sight glasses was considered an engineering weakness in modification planning and resulted in additional constraints being placed on the unit.
Nuclear engineering's conduct of the low power physics testing and their briefings of the Operations crews were considered a strength.
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2.
Licensee Actions on Previous Inspection Findings (92701)
a.
(Closed) Unresolved Item 50-295/90018-01(DRS) "Safet_y Evaluation Reauired for Operating with the Service Water Crosstie Valves Open":
One of the two 1990 diagnostic evaluation team (DET)
commitments affecting this unresolved item was satisfactorily addressed during the dual unit outage. The commitment remaining
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open (DET 2.3.04-01) addressed analyzing the service water (SW)
system for a two-pump accident scenario.
The inspector determined
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that DET 2.3.04-01 was also addressed in unresolved item 50-
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295/90019-02.
Although much of the analysis was completed, i
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portions would not be complete until mid-1995. This remaining DET commitment is being joined with other outstanding DET SW l
commitments (see section 2.c), and will be tracked as inspection l
followup item (IFI) 295/304-94009-01(DRP).
This item is closed.
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b.
(Closed) Unresolved Item 50-295/90018-02(DRS) " Confirming Calculations for SW Pump Combinations":
Similar to item 90018-01, one of the two DET commitments was satisfactorily addressed during
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the dual unit outage.
The remaining commitment is DET 2.3.04-01, l
and, as discussed in item 2.a, completion of this commitment will i
l be tracked under IFI 295/94009-01(DRP).
This item is closed.
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c.
(Closed) Inspection Followup Item 50-295/90030-09(DRP) " Seismic Support Issues": This item originally covered nine DET commitments.
Six were satisfactorily completed prior to or during the dual unit outage.
Of the remaining three items, one (DET 2.2.08-03) deals with implementation of Generic Letter 89-13
" Service Water System Problems Affecting Safety-Related l
Equipment."
This item requires on-going testing, cleaning, or replacement of safety-related heat exchangers over the next two i
outages, with an estimated completion in mid-1996. The remaining
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two items (DET 2.3.06-01 & 2.3.06-03) address SW throttle valve positioning and control. While these items were worked on during the dual unit outage, verification and control of the final throttle valve positions was not complete by the end of the inspection period. These three items will be combined with DET item 2.3.04-01 and tracked as IFI 295/94009-01(DRP).
This item is closed.
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d.
(Closed) Violation 50-295/304-92009-Olb "Inadeauate Corrective Actions Regarding the 0 Diesel Generator":
The licensee made extensive modifications to the emergency diesel generator (EDG)
during the last two years, including modifications to the air start system and diesel control system.
Additionally, during the l
dual unit outage, an extensive overhaul of the EDG was performed.
l EDG reliability has improved considerably, and is currently 93
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percent (successful starts per hundred).
This item is closed.
e.
(Closed) Violation 295/304-94002-Ol(DRP) " Ineffective Corrective Actions to Exclude Foreign Material from Critical Areas": The licensee believed the violation occurred due to a failure by
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station management to adequately communicate and enforce expectations for the station _ foreign material exclusion (FME)
program.
Detailed corrective actions were specified in Zion management action plan 1224. An evaluation of the key corrective actions is described below.
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The inspector reviewed the licensee's revised FME procedure, ZAP 400-018 " Foreign Material Exclusion (FME) Program." The work practice requir_ements contained in the procedure were adequate to prevent or minimize intrusion of foreign material into plant systems.
The procedure contained general expectations for
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adherence to the procedure, but was not clear regarding the degree to which work analysts should include the FME requirements contained in ZAP 400-01B in work packages.
The only requirement appeared to be inclusion of specific FME requirements as specified in a technical or maintenance manual for a specific component.
The expectation among maintenance personnel interviewed was that the FME requirements in the ZAP should be included in work packages.
Responsibility for adherence to FME requirements was explicitly delegated to the work supervisor or designee.
The Maintenance staff supervisor's justification for this approach was that it provided for flexibility during maintenance and did not dilute responsibility between planners and supervisors.
The licensee developed a comprehensive training program to address issues relating to FME, with two types of training being provided.
Detailed training sessions were provided to groups who routinely implement FME procedures and requirements at the work site.
The detailed training consisted of a four hour classroom phase that
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included an introduction by a senior manager emphasizing expectations regarding FME, a lecture presenting the effects of improper FME practices, a lecture presenting proper methods to implement FME controls per the station procedure, and a question and answer session during which the audience could ask specific questions of the trainer or broad questions of the senior manager.
The classroom phase was followed by a two hour. coached evaluation on a mockup fluid system where a team of two or three students was required to demonstrate proper FME technique during establishment of FME controls and performance of maintenance.
The training adequately addressed FME procedures and practices.
Discussions with personnel attending the training revealed that the ' majority recognize the need for improved FME practices.
Their questions primarily concerned details regarding implementation of the
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station's revised FME procedure and management's recognition of the additional maintenance commitment of time and resources needed to implement.the program.
These questions-were adequately addressed by the staff present at the training session.
General training sessions were provided to groups who work in the plant but do not typically open or close systems or work around open systems.
The general training consisted of a one hour classroom phase with the same format as-the detailed training,
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only provided in a overview fashion. The content of the training was adequate to heighten awareness of FME issues.
The inspector surveyed a number of job sites involving maintenance in various stages of completion.
While some inconsistencies between sites regarding implementation of FME practices were noted, FME practices in place were adequate to prevent intrusion of foreign material into plant systems.
In an effort to improve self-assessment in the area of FME, the licensee has modified their mechanism for collecting and disseminating performance data to include the reporting of instances of poor FME practices.
A separate performance category was created to monitor FME performance across departments.
The threshold criteria for data reporting from problem identification forms and senior manager plant tours was modified to include lower-level events.
Although long-term corrective actions have not been completed, the corrective actions which were completed or were in progress were adequate to minimize the frequency of foreign material intrusion in systems important to safety.
This item is closed.
f.
(Closed) Inspection Followup Item 50-304/94006-03 " Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Trips on Overspeed":
As described in section 5, the apparent reason for the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump tripping on overspeed was identified and corrected.
This item is closed.
No violations or deviations were identified. One new inspection followup item was identified.
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Operations (717071 A.
Operational Status Unit 1 During this report period, Unit 1 entered Mode 7, low power physics testing, on March 31, 1994. After the testing was completed, the unit entered Mode 1 on April 3 and the unit synchronized to the grid.
Power had been increased to approximately 25% when a turbine trip and reactor trip occurred.
The unit remained out of service the rest of the inspection period.
Unit 2 Unit 2 entered Mode 4, then Mode 3 on March 31 and remained in this Mode until April 8 when the unit was placed in Mode 5 to
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I perform work on an auxiliary feedwater pump and AFW valves.
Unit 2 was taken critical on April 17, 1994 and placed on line April
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Power was held at approximately 29 percent for Xenon stabilization and flux mapping.
Power was increased at a rate of 3 percent per hour, up to 90 percent for flux mapping. After flux mapping was completed, the power was increased to 100 percent on April 25, 1994.
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Activities
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Unit 1 Startup l
The residents observed Unit 1 criticality, low-power physics testing and the unit synchronization to the grid. The estimated
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critical condition calculation was very close to actual boron
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concentration and rod position.
The reactor engineering group gave Operations an excellent briefing for each step of the low l
l power physics testing. The reactor engineer and shift engineer
stressed the operators were in charge of the testing and to stop j
the tests at any time they had a question or needed more l
information.
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l Unit 2 Startup l
The residents reviewed the pre-startup data and observed the rod f
withdrawals. When control bank "B" reached approximately 160 steps, rod F-14 dropped into the core.
The operators immediately l
entered the Abnormal Operating Procedure and manually drove all l
rods full in. An investigation of the cause revealed a blown
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i stationary gripper coil fuse.
The fuse was replaced and the operators conservatively exercised all rod banks, which operated normally.
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The reactor was taken critical without further incidents. During the performance test to verify 115 gpm auxiliary feedwater flow to each steam generator (SG), only 105 gpm flow was indicated to the
"C" SG. The instrument mechanics found the problem to be a bad
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square root extractor which gave false low readings.
Although the performance test had been successfully performed earlier for the 2A turbine driven AFW pump, operators ran the test again to verify the pump head flow curve was being met and the flow to the generators were within tolerance.
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Generator Trip / Reactor Trip At 6:18 a.m. (CDT) on April 3, 1994, the Unit 1 generator tripped on a phase-to-phase fault, followed by a reactor trip.
Fire was discovered in the generator phase duct bushing. The plant fire
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l brigade responded to the hydrogen fire and the Zion City Fire Department was called to assist. The fire was extinguished, and the city fire department left the site at 9:05 a.m.
The licensee declared an Unusual Event under its emergency plan.
State and local officials were notified and the Unusual Event was
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terminated at 9:05 a.m.
The licensee formed a root cause team and repair team of CECO specialists.
The team's investigation of equipment damage revealed the generator phase "C" bushing was cracked, causing the escape of hydrogen and the fire. The "A" and
"B" phase bus ducts each blew out large holes where the vertical duct makes a 90 degree turn to run horizontal to the transformer.
The One West transformer was shorted, requiring its replacement.
The main generator rotor sustained smoke and soot damage which could not be cleaned without disassembly.
The Unit 2 spare rotor will be used as a replacement.
The stator windings were cleaned and successfully passed megger tests. The bus duct repairs were in progress.
The goal for completing the repairs and getting l
Unit 1 on line is June 12, 1994.
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As a result of the Unit 1 damage, the licensee inspected Unit 2
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electrical distribution components. The Unit 2 generator had a crawl-through inspection which revealed a loose keeper for a
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hydrogen fan blade.
This blade was repaired and the others inspected.
The generator connection box and bushings were inspected and no problems were found. The generator bus ducts were also inspected.
The main transformer gasses were checked and found to be in the normal trend range.
c.
Safet Assessment of Operations Operations performance was observed as excellent during this inspection period. This performance was demonstrated by effective responses to the dropped rod and the reactor trip, and the conservatism shown to revalidate the 2A auxiliary feed water pump head flow curve.
The residents also observed a conservative and very professional demeanor during the startup of both units.
No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Plant Support (71707)
a.
Radiation Protection The inspectors verified that workers were following health physics procedures and randomly examined radiation protection
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instrumentation for operability and calibration.
During a tour with NRC senior management, the inspectors independently monitored radiation levels in the auxiliary building.
No improperly posted areas were detected.
However, senior NRC management did express concerns regarding the extent of contaminated areas.
b.
Security During the inspection period, the inspectors monitored the licensee's security program to ensure that observed actions were
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being implemented according to their approved security plan.
No adverse trends were noted.
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c.
Fire Protection. Foreign Material Exclusion, and Housekeeping The inspectors monitored the' status of housekeeping and plant cleanliness for fire protection and protection of safety-related equipment from intrusion of. foreign matter. A large amount of scaffolding was erected in the auxiliary building to correct cable
. tray deficiencies identified by the safety systems outage modification inspection.
This scaffolding will.. remain erected after the work is completed due to no contractors being on site.
The scaffolding has been built to seismic requirements; however, it will affect housekeeping appearance for this long period.
d.
Emergency Preparedness The inspectors monitored the activation of the emergency plan-which occurred on April 3, 1994.
A reactor trip occurred at 6:18 a.m. (CDT) due to a phase to phase fault and shortly afterwards a hydrogen fire was discovered in the generator phase duct bushing area. The licensee declared an Unusual Event and-contacted the Zion Fire Department for support.
Several other local fire departments also responded.
The fire was extinguished and the Unusual Event was terminated at 9:05 a.m.
e.
Safety Assessment of Plant Support Housekeeping improved this period as scaffolding and other outage material was removed.
However, housekeeping and the recovery of contaminated areas have been impacted by the dilution of resources during the steam generator tube repairs and the Unit 2 generator-repairs.
The emergency plan initial notifications for the main generator fire went smoothly, as did subsequent terminations.
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Maintenance and Surveillance (62703, 61726)
Routinely, station maintenance and surveillance activities-were observed and reviewed to verify they were conducted in accordance with all regulations. Also considered during the observation and review were:
proper obtaining of approvals, meeting of operability requirements, appropriate performance of functional testing and-calibrations, resolution of identified discrepancies, maintenance of quality control records, and performance of all activities by qualified personnel.
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a.
Activities Unit 2 Turbine-Driven Auxiliar.y Feedwater Pump Testina:
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April 5, with Unit 2 in Mode 3, surveillance testing of turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pump 2A was performed.
During this testing, the pump tripped on overspeed and'the pump was declared inoperable.
Subsequent testing over the next few days resulted in additional trips.
Separately, a problem with the shaft-driven oil pump occurred. A motor-driven oil aump supplies oil while the turbine is coming up to speed. Once tie main pump is up to speed, the shaft-driven oil pump develops pressure and the motor driven pump stops..However, during-the runs on April 7, the shaft-driven oil pump was not developing normal pressure. The
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problem was eventually traced to be a worn phenolic gear.
The licensee did a thorough root cause analysis to identify the cause of the overspeed trips. 'Because water slugs did not appear to be the cause, the licensee began examining the governor valve controls.
Further testing revealed that the governor seemed to be oscillating considerably in an attempt to control the pump speed.
These oscillations would increase in amplitude until an overspeed trip occurred. With the assistance of the governor vendor representative, the governor springs were replaced.
Replacement of the springs appeared to resolve the oscillations. This observation was confirmed on April 15 when the turbine-driven pump was successfully started and run during its routine surveillance.
On the same day as the shaft-driven oil pump problem, two AFW valves were determined to be inoperable. During stroke time testing of containment isolation valve 2MOV-FW0050, the valve would not close from the main control room.
The valve was manually closed and deenergized. A-continuity check of the control circuit for 2MOV-FW0050 was performed with no problems
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found. A strip chart was hooked up and.2M0V-FW0050 was
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electrically stroked open and closed from the control room, several times. The following troubleshooting actions were also performed:
inspected and cleaned the motor control center
inspected the limit switch compartment
checked continuity of the control room hand switch
These troubleshooting activities were performed successfully; no anomalies were discovered. A surveillance test was then successfully performed and the valve declared operable.
Approximately 40 minutes later, valve 2MOV-FW0053 could not be set to achieve the required flow rate of 115 gallons per minute to steam generator 20. The valve was disassembled and checked for-foreign material but none was found.
The valve stem was found to-be scored and was replaced.
Further investigations revealed the flow problem was caused by a bad square rcot extractor which gave
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false ' low flow readings. A surveillance test was performed and 2MOV-FW0053 was declared operable.
Because of the three concurrent independent problems on the AFW system described above, the licensee returned the unit to Mode 4.
The shaft gear was replaced and both valves were repaired with the unit cooled down.
b.
Safety Assessment of Maintenance and Surveillance
'l Good troubleshooting and root cause evaluations were demonstrated for the turbine-driven AFW pump overspeed problem, the shaft-driven oil pump failure, and the two AFW valve problems.
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No violations-or deviations were identified.
6.
Engineering
The inspectors evaluated the extent to which engineering principles and
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evaluations were integrated into daily plant activities.
This was accomplished by assessing the technical staff involvement in non-routine events, outage-related activities, and assigned technical specification surveillances; observing on-going maintenance work and troubleshooting; and reviewing deviation investigations and root cause determinations.
a.
Activities Inoperability of Emergency Diesel Generator: On March 24, 1994, the 1A EDG was declared inoperable following a non-emergency trip i
during a technical staff surveillance.
The actual trip was caused by the high bearing temperature sensor for a main rod bearing.
The trip mechanism was comprised of a T-handle switch and a Eutectic sensor mounted on the main rod bearing.
Should the bearing reach a specific temperature, the Eutectic device extends from the bearing and trips the T-handle switch.
Since the EDG had just completed a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> run several days earlier, the probability of a overheated bearing was unlikely, i
The initial assumption was that the oil cooler had developed a
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service-water-to-oil leak causing the oil level'to increase.
Excess oil in the crankcase would allow the counterweights on the crankshaft to sling oil at the T-handle ~ and trip. the switch.
Both the data collection system and the oil sight glass indicated that oil level increased during the 36 minute run prior to the trip.
No water was identified in two separate oil samples and no-i evidence of water was found during an inspection of several points on the EDG.
The data collection system allowed rapid identification of the specific switch that caused the trip.
The inspection cover near the switch was remos ! to reset the switch and the Eutectic sensor l
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had not extended. However, the oil level in the crankcase was i
found to be abnormally high.
During the modification of the EDG to install the new data collection and control system, a new oil level sight glass was installed.
Prior to the trip,. the operators identified a low oil condition on the EDG and added two barrels of oil.
Subsequently, the data collection system indicated that the oil level was in the normal range. However, the data collection system was indicating 2.5 inches below the actual oil level and was the cause for excess oil.being added.
The operators used the indication on the data collection system to determine the need for adding oil.
Their actions were in
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accordance with the provided guidance.
No guidance was provided to suggest verification of oil level by the sight glass.
In addition, the new sight glasses installed on the 0, 1A, and 2A EDG were not positioned consistently for the three EDGs and therefore did not indicate the same range of oil level. The sight glasses had no scale available to determine actual leveT in the crankcase.
Therefore, the operators had no way of determining oil level except from the data collection system indication.
The station drained the excess oil from the EDG and performed the periodic test to return the EDG to service. Appropriate scales have been installed on the oil sight glasses and the operators have been instructed to reference the sight glass to determine
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correct oil level.
Control Rod Drive Ventilation Fans
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During this inspection period, the IB control rod drive (CRD)
ventilation fan threw a blade approximately 14 ' days after installation. The CRD vent fans are axial vane assemblies consisting of 10 blades. The investigation revealed the IB CRD vane assembly was one of two purchased from the normal supplier in 1992. The other vane assembly purchased in 1992.was installed on the 2B CRD fan. A dry powder magnetic particle test of the-2B CRD fan identified linear indications in all 10 blade welds to the central hub assembly.
Investigations are being performed which include vibration induced failures and laboratory analyses of the IB fan blade, which appears to have failed due to high cycle fatigue crack propagation.
b.
Safety Assessment of Engineering The lack of scales on the EDG sight glasses is considered an engineering weakness in modification planning.and resulted in additional constraints being placed on the unit.
Nuclear engineering's conduct of the low power physics testing and their briefings of the operations crews were considered a strength.
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No violations or deviations dere identified.
7.
Licensee Event Report (LER) Followup (92700)
Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, licensee event reports were reviewed to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective l
action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had l
been accomplished in accordance with technical specifications.
The LER listed below is considered closed:
304/93004: Violation of the In-service Testing (IST) Program Which Is l
Required Per Technical Specifications l
l During a December 1993 review of technical staff surveillance TSS-l 15.6.20V-P, "In Service Testing Valve Surveillance, Power Operated Valve l
Testing", the licensee noted that the stroke time for valve 2M0V-CS0002, Containment Spray Pump 2A Discharge Stop Valve, increased by 26.3
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percent in July, 1993, compared to the previous results. The IST l
program, as required by technical specification 4.0.5, was based on the l
1980 ASME Section XI code, Winter 1981 Addenda. The code required that l
test frequency be increased to monthly whenever the stroke time of a l
valve increased by 25 percent or more for valves with full stroke times greater than 10 seconds. The required increased testing was not i
performed in August or September.
After discovering the missed surveillances, the licensee increased the test frequency for 2MOV-CS0002 from quarterly to monthly.
These monthly l
measurements subsequently trended at approximately tne baseline value.
The licensee's evaluation concluded that the stroke time measured in July,1993, was an anomaly.
This was confirmed by monthly testing through March,1994, and the valve was returned to quarterly testing.
The licensee completed a review of 1993 IST program surveillances for both units.
Three additional valves which exceeded the trending acceptance criteria and were not previously identified were noted.
Two of these valves were placed on a monthly testing schedule.
For the l
third valve, 2M0V-RH8700B, the increased stroke time was not evaluated
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within a month of the increased stroke time, and the valve was not placed on a monthly testing schedule prior to the dual unit outage.
This appears to be a second example of failing to follow the TS action statement, which requires reporting under 10 CFR 50.73.
The licensee has committed to issuing a supplemental LER by May 16, 1994, to discuss the additional missed surveillance.
This commitment will be tracked as an inspection followup item (50-304/94009-02(DRP)).
l To prevent recurrence, the IST results engineer initiated a record of l
valve stroke times to allow for detection of trends as well as stroke times outside of allowable tolerances. Additionally, the results
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engineering group leader was reviewing procedures TSS 15.6.20V,-P, "In Service Testing Valve Surveillance, Power Operated Valve Testing" and TSS 15.6.20P, "IST Pump Surveillance" on a bi-weekly basis until
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procedure revisions were completed.
The revisions were to incorporate
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corrections to note deficiencies as well as to reflect the ASME Section XI code requirements for the third 10-year inspection interval.
The
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inspectors found these actions acceptable.
l The failure to perform required monthly testing is a violation of TS 4.0.5.
However, this violation is not being cited in accordance with l
Section VII.B.2 of the " General Statement of Policy and Procedures for
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the NRC Enforcement Actions" (Enforcement Policy, 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C), because this violation was identified by the licensee, was classified as a Severity Level V, corrective actions to previous
violations would not have prevented this violation, the corrective l
actions and actions to prevent recurrence for this violation were acceptable and the violation was not willful.
l One non-cited violation and one inspection followup item were i
identified.
8.
Management Meetings (30703)
On April 14 and 15, 1994 Mr. W. L. Axelson, Director, Division of l
Radiation Safety and Safeguards, and Mr. G. E. Grant, Director, Division of Reactor Safety, visited the station for a pre-SALP assessment.
The directors toured the plant and interviewed station personnel and management.
No violations or deviations were identified.
9.
Inspection Followup Items Inspection followup items are matters which have been discussed vith the licensee which will be reviewed further by the inspector and which involve some action on the part of the NRC or licensee or both.
Two inspection followup items disclosed during this inspection are discussed in sections 2 and 7.
10.
Persons Contacted R. Tuetken, Vice President, Zion Station A. Broccolo, Station Manager M. Lohmann, Site Engineer & Construction Manager
- P. LeBlond, Executive Assistant
- S. Kaplan, Regulatory Assurance Supervisor i
D. Wozniak, Operations Manager
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R. Link, Technical Superintendent L. Simon, Maintenance Supervisor J. LaFontaine, Outage Management Manger
- T. Printz, Assistant Superintendent of Operations
- R. Cascarano, Services Director
- W. Stone, Performance Improvement Director l
- K. Hansing, Site Quality Verification Director l
- M. Rauckhorst, Site Engineering Supervisor i
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- G. Ponce, Quality Control Supervisor
- K. Moser, Unit 0 Operating Engineer
- Indicates persons present at the exit interview on April 26, 1994.
The inspectors also contacted other licensee personnel including members of the operating, maintenance, security, and engineering staff.
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