IR 05000295/1992026

Insp Repts 50-295/92-26 & 50-304/92-26 on 920929-1109. Violations Noted But Not Cited.Major Areas Inspected:Summary of Operations,Operational Safety Verification & ESF Sys Walkdown & Maint & Surveillance Observation

ML20128E239
Person / Time
Site:	Zion  File:ZionSolutions icon.png
Issue date:	11/27/1992
From:	Farber M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20128E224	List: IR 05000295/1992026 ML20128E221
References
50-295-92-26, 50-304-92-26, NUDOCS 9212080028
Download: ML20128E239 (14)

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U.S. liUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ,

REGI0t1 111

Report Nos. 50-295/92026(DRP); 50-304/92026(DkP)

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Docket Nos. 50-295; 50-304 License Nos. DPR-39; DPR-48 Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company Opus West til 1400 Opus Place - Suite 300 Downers Grove, il 60515

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Facility Name: Zicn Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At: Zion, IL Inspection Conducted: September 29 through November 9, 1992 e inspectors: J. D. Smith R. J. Leemon A. M. Bongiovanni R. B. Landsman D. F. Jones J, Wal Approved By: M. J. Farb , Chief // 7!fz-Reactor Pr jects Section lA '

[ fate Insec: tion Summary

.Lnsnection from September 29 throuch_ November 9.1992(Recort Nos. 50-295/92026(DRP): 50-304/92026fDRP)) .

Areas inspected: Summary of operations; operational . safet, ver ification 'and '

engineered safety feature (EST) system welkdown; maintenance and-surveillance

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observation; engineering and technical support observations; safety assessment >

and qutlity verification; and management meetings.-

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Resultst Of the six-areas inspected, no_ violations or deviations were-identified in five areas. One non-cited violation regarding an inadvertent engineered safety features (ESF) actuation was identifie .

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Plant Doerat191d Operations performance continued to slip during this period. Personnel errors resulted in an ESF actuation, an incorrectly positioned auxiliary feedwater (AfW) pump isolation valve, and a damaged AFW pipe support from water hammer caused by failure to warmup a steam line, liaintenance and. Surveillance Positive indicators in personnel accountability and team work of the maintenan e department; have been observed. A significant improvement in the planning and scheduling for the Unit 2 outage was demonstrated by numerous indicator Enaineerina and Technical Support Excellent engineering support continues to be provided by the recently expanded on-site engineering grou An engineering and technical support inspection identified only minor problems and significant strength Lafety Assessment and Quality Verification Extensive management efforts have been applied to increase personnel accountability and better planning and scheduling which has resulted in the best preparations to date for a major refueling outage starting on November 12, 1992. The m cution of the Unit 2 cutage schedule will measure the effectiveness of management efforts in these areas. -The implementation of u new shutdown (SD) risk procedure will further strengthen a good SD risk program._ The monthly Integrated Quality Effort (lQE) program is providing all departments with prompt performance indicators of their areas allowing for quick management action % N

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DETAILS Persons Contacted R. Tuetken, Vice President, Zion Station

• T. Joyce, Station Manager i D. Wozniak, Superintendent, Technical  ;

• Kurth, Superintendent, Production  ;

• R. Budowle, Onsite Nuclear Safety 1

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T. Broccolo, Director, Services

• W. Stone, Director, Performance Improvement '

D. Redden, Assistant to Production Superintendent

• P. LeBlond, Assistant. Superintendent, Operations R. Johnson, Assistant Superintendent, Maintenanc !

J. LaFontaine, Assistant Superintendent, Work Planning .

D. Bump, Nuclear Quality Program, Supervisor C. Schultz, Quality Control Supervisor S. Kaplan, Regulatory Assurance Supervisor-

• R. rN" anowski, Technical Staff Supervisor i K. Mour, Technical Staff R. Milne, Security Administrator

• K. Dickerson, Regulatory Assurance ,

R. Cascarano, Unit 2 Operating Engineer

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W. Demo, Unit 1 Operating Engineer T. Printz, Unit 0 Operating Engineer T. Boyce, Fire Marshall i

• Indicates persons present at the exit interview on November 16,- 199 ,.

The ' inspectors also contacted other licensee personne1' includi_ng members of the operating, maintenance, security, and engineering staf . Summary of 0.perations Unit 1 ,

f On October-2, 1992, Unit I was taken critical and synchronized to the grid on October 3 after a sixteen-day outage to repair the 1A auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pum The unit operated at power levels up_ to 96% power during the remainder of this perio '

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Unit 2 The unit operated routinely in coastdown during the entire report -

period.

l= No violations or deviations were identifie '

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. Op.gr3tionalltfdv Verifiution and Engineered Safety f eatures System Walkdown (71707 & 71710)

The inspectors verified that the facility was being operated in coaformance with the licenses and regulatory requirements and that the licensee's management control system was effectively carrying out its responsibilities for safe operation. During tours of access ole areas '

of the plant, the inspectors mt.de note of general plant and equipment

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conditions, including control of activities in progres On a sampling basis the inspectors observed control room staffing and coordination of plant activities; observed operator adherence with procedures and technical specifications; monitored control room indications f or abnormalities; verificd that electrical power was -

available and observed the frequency of plant and control room visits by station managers. The inspectors also monitored various administrative and operating records. The inspectors observed a reduction in out-of-service (005) equipment on the plant control board The specific areas observed were:

• Enaineered Safety Features (f.SF) Systems Accessible portions of ESF systems and their support systems components were inspected to verify operability through observation of instrumentation and proper valve and electrical power alignment. The inspectors a' iso visually inspected components for material condition * fiadiation Protection Contro The inspectors verified that workers were following health physic's procedures and_ randomly examined radiation protection instrumentation for operability and calibration.

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• Security During the inspection period, the inspectors monitored the licensee's security program to ensure that observed actions were being implemented according to their approved security pla A security inspection performed during this perid identified several strengths and no weaknesse The strengtas were firearms trainino, good communications with the region security, exceptional corporate support and good management oversigh * Housekeppina and Plant CleanlinesJ The inspectors monitored the status of housekeeping and plan cleanliness for fire protection and protection of safety-related u

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equipment From intrusion of foreign matter. Extensive management efforts have been expended to correct the foreign material exclusion problems that have recently occurred.

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a. Operational Events (dogral Station Emeraency Prenaredness Exercise (GSEPl The Emergency Preparedness annual exercise was conducted on September 30, 1992. The resident staff observed the exercises from the simulator control room. The control room team did very well witn one exception, a delay of approximately 10 minutes in sounding the plant evacuation alarm. Two exercisc weaknesses were the simitated assembly and the tracking of contamination into the Operation's Support Center. There were no new trackable findingt or open items. The overall exercise was good. The exercise is specifically discussed in Instection Reports 50-295 /92013; 50-304/9201 [DR.i.neeriva Safety Feature (ESF) Actuation - Unit 1 On October 30, with Unit I at 96% power, while performing PT 58, Reactor Protection Logic Test for ESF equipment, staam generator blowdown automatically isolated and 10 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump started as designed. The pump was stopped a*1d blowdown was restored. The cause of the event was personnel error by the i operator who incorrectly followed a technically corrett procedur The licensee has generated a procedure change request to change fron multiple actions contained in one step to individual steps for action. The operator has been counselled on his actions and the importance of following procedures. This ESF actuation had minimal safety significance. This was a l'icensee identified violation, was reported as required to the NRC, and corrective actions were taken as discussed in the Licensee' Event Repor This licensee identified violation is' not being cited because the criteria specified in _10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C, (Enforcement Policy)-Section V.G. were satisfied. Your corrective actions, as described in the Licensee Event Report, appear adequat Consequently, no reply to this violation is require Auxiliary Buildino Conditions ,

The material condition and cleanliness of the-auxiliary building are the best it has been since the resident staff reported to Zioni in June 1989. Most' areas are painted and some contaminated pump rooms have been decontaninated for street clothes entric ,

inomirable Aniliary Feedwater (AFW) Pumo On October 21 with Unit I at 97% power, it was discovered that the

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IB AFW pump discharge isolation valve (lFWOO38) being discovered -

incorrectly positioned, (not fully opened). An equipment operator

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discovered the mispositioned valve while performing the valve lineup verification check 'tist after testing thn IA AFW pump. The valve was fully opened within five minutes of discovery. Other corrective actions performed were the verific. Lion of the AFW system valve lineup on both units and the installation of new locks on all accessible locked valves. The keys for these new locks are in the locked key cabinet and controlled by the shift engineer. An extensive level 11 root cause investigation-is being conducted by Senior Corporate and Station Management. NRC review of this event will be documented in Special Report 304-50/9203 Smokina transformer in 480 VAC Motor Control Center (MCC)'

On October 22 the fire brigade responded to a fire alarm and found a smoking sola transformer in a breaker on MCC 1381. The power to the breaker was de-energized and the smoking ceased. The' breaker for PR-09, containment purge exhaust effluent monitor, was removed from the cubicle and replaced with a spare breaker. The i trensformer failure aopeared to have resulted from long service and the end of life, Assessment of Plant Operations Operations performance continued to slip during this per o Personnel errors resulted in an ESF actuation, an inco;rectly positioned AFW pump valve and a damaged AFW pipe sup; ort from water hammer caused by failure to warmup a steam lin .

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One licensee identified violation was discusse . honthly Maintenance and Surveillance (62703 and 61726)

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Routinely, station maintenance and surveillance activities were observed and/or reviewed to ascertain _that they.were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards,.

L and in conformance with technical specification ;

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ine following ittas were also considered _during this review: approvals were obtained prior to' initiating the work and testing and that operability requirar.a.ns were met during such activities; functional-terting and calibrations were performed prior to declaring the component I

operable; discrepancies identified during the activities were resolvadL l prior to-returning the _ compont rit to service; quality control records ,

L were maintained; and activities Nere accomplished by qualified  !

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h I Maintenance / Surveillance Related Activities t

Auxiliary feedwater Pump Tri On September 26, 1992, during a routine surveillance of th9 18 AFW I pump, the IB AFW pump trip)ed on low lube oil pressure, lhe '

licensee determined that tie low lube oil pressure pump trip was caused by the auxiliary AC lube oil pur.'p breaker beina inadvertently left open on the clearance of the out-of-service for that pum The auxiliary AC lube oil pump supplies oil pressere ;

until the shaft driven pump is up to speed. The licensee determined by tests that the AFW pumps would trip without the:

auxiliary oil pump being operable. _ By engineering ana'lysi:, and ,

vendor confirmation, it was determined that the auxiliary AC lule_

nil pumps were not required to pre-lube the pump. In order to ensura that the AFW p"mps will not trip when required, due to an inoperable non-safety auxiliary oil pump, the licensee temporarily lifted the low lube oil pressure trip leads on all the AC AFW pumps for both units. This temporary alteration will be replaced -

by a permanent modificatio ,

1A Safety Iniection Pumo low Recirculation Flow The lA safety injection aump (SIP) was declared-inoperable on-October 11 due to less'tian the required recirculation flow. .Due to the low flow, the orifice was replaced and the pump was tested; however, the new orifice also had-low flow. The orifice was again '

removed and the old, new and spare orifice were bench tested and the original orifice was then reinstalled. The path and valves were radiographed and no obstructions were found. - The equipment operator gitated the 10 Si pump recirculation check valve-1-S189108 causing it to seat resulting in acceptable recirculation ,

flow since the bypass-path was now closed. A work request was written to replace this check valve and to analyze the cause of . '

why it was sticking. An inspection determined there was debris in the orifice. The orifice was replaced and adequate-recirculation flow was establishe '

l Safety In.iection Motor 00etated Valve Mistakenly Closed On October 7, a safety injection motor operated v7've (1-MOV-SI-8808A) was manually closed by a mechanical maintenance technician instead of placing the valve on the open- backseat as desired. A control room operator observed the valve in the wrong -

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position while walking down the control boards. A containment-entry was made and the valve was re-positioned within five minutes-of its mis-positioning. Unit I was at full power at the time.-

Root cause investigation determined that the valve is located i l the piping upside down; this resulted in the maintenance personnel mistakenly turning the valve in the wrong directio '

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[ngjneered Safety feat.gre (ESf) Actuation  !

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On October 8 at 11:53 a.m. while performing PT-10-3 (safeguards actuation test) Step 52, an inadvertent ESF actuation occurred resulting in the following equipment to tutomatically start: IB Charging Pump, lA Service Water Pump, OE Compontnt Cooling Pump, ,

IA Safety injection (SI) Pump, and 10 Reactor Containment Fan Cooler. The cause of the event was a faulty test switch. A work '

request was written to inspect and evaluate this switc The

. witch was subsequently replace Zion Stridon Preparations for Unit 2 Refuelina Outaae 22R12 Due to extensive planning and prepatation of outage related maintenance work requests, out-of-services (005), radiation work requests, modification packages, scheduling of tests, ordering o J parts, formation of an outage management team and nut-of-service team, the licensee is better prepared for this refueling outage than for any previous outage Pre-outage preparation includes: completion of 1330 of 1646 total nucic'r work requests (NWR'>) submitted prior to shutdown; '

complet ton of approximately 50% of the modification packagcs; preparation of approximately 300 00S's related to-the integrated ,

leak rate test (ILRT), shutdown genere.1 operating procedures, plant. testing and secondary system work;' preparation of appronimately 90% of the radiation ~ work requests to support the first three days of tht outage; and ordering and receiving the parts on site prior to the outage to support the required work activit lia19L olanned Outaae Activities for 72R12 The following are the major planned activities for outage Z2R12:

refuel with 84 Vantage 5 fuel assemblies; clean and replace in-core thimbles; replace the number three seal in 2B reactor coolant pump (RCP), and inspect the 2C RC Steam generator work includes: primary eddy current ~ testing,- sludge lancing and the replacement of 103 steam generator plugs; internal inspection of two main steam check valves;, erosion and corrosion inspection of 43 components at 36 locations; motor operated valve inspection,-

overhaul, VOTES testing, and two to four rotor mdification Diesel generatoa work includes: rebuilding of f ear cylinders on 0 EDG, 18 month surveillance insptction or 2A EDG and the starting air modification; 2B EDG five-year overhaul, rod bearing replacement and starting air modification. Out of 214 total tests that will be performed, the containment integrated leak rate test

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will be the most importan Ma.ior plant modifications-scheduled for this outage include:

changing to 4% beric acid syster Eagle 21 reactor protection system installation; boric acid nnk removal; control board desig ;;

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changes; auxiliary feedwater pump H0V's and check valve work; and -

changing 129 snubbers from Grinnell to Lisega.- e

! Assessment of Haintenance and Surveillance  ;

Positive indicators in personnei accountability and team work of the mainterance departments have been observed. A significant improvement in the planning and scheduling for the Unit 2 outage was demonstrated by numerous indicator No violations of deviations were identifie , Enaineerina a_qcLJfenical Sypport (37828)  ;

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The inspectors evaluated the extent to which engineering principles and evaluationt were integrated into daily plant activitie This was accomplished by assessing the technical staff involvement in non-routine *

events, outage-related activities, and assigned TS surveillances; observing on-going mnintenance work and troncleshooting; and reviewing ,

deviation investigations and root cause determinations, Engineering and Technical Support Events Motor Operated Valve (MOV) VOTES Test Emlioment In June 1992, Liberty Technology Manufacturing Company announced a i 10 CFR Part 21. deficiency with the MOV V0TES test equipment inaccuracies. The test result inaccuracies resulted from different MOV stem material properti9s and valve stem geometry assumptions that were incorrect. Ceco corporate engineering is '

presently reviewing all VOTES tests aerformed at Zion. This review will oc completed in six monti Jnitial License Trainina l An inspection to assess the initial license training was conducted I during the week of October 26, 1992 by Mr. John R. Walker from Region II The following items were reviewed during the inspections:

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Initial licensing scenarios and trainirig materia '

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Initial licensing certification-examinations.

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Twenty day preparation program prior to licensing

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Previous three years NRC administered scenario !

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- Internal requalification results and retraining methods for the past three year ;

Seventeen interviews were also conducted including Operations and Training canagement, training instructors, senior reactor ,

operators, reactor operators and personnel involved in the 1992 initial licensing examinatio The inspection results were divided into strengths and arer. that showed weaknesses or needed improvemen The relationship between operations and training is positive with open lines of communicatio The annual meeting between traiteing and operations is also a positive attribute. Training staff professionalism was demonstrated by the following attributes: Positive professional attitud . Concern for the candi<iates and willingness to put in extra ime to accomplish the needed training.

' Wiilingness to say "I don't know, but I will find out," and then follow through on that commitmen The training department places emphasis on training individuals to accomplish their job rather than training to pass an examinatio Another strength was the station's establishment of a " Task force" to do an in-depth self evaluation of the issue surrounding the low pass rate for the previous NRC administered initial licensing examination Crew dynamics were weak in that candidates did not realize that though they were evaluated as individuals, part of-the evaluation is how well they work as a team.- Certification timing was weak-in that the time between the facility administered certification examination _and the NRC administered examination was excessive. A seven-month time frame existed with the 1992 examinatio Pre / Post initial examination reviews require 6dditional attentio A method needs to be established so that resolutions made between the chief examiner and the facilitu reviewers are understood. The station should also recognize that not all issues are resolved in the facility's favor. The self-study program a9pebrs to have been unstructured, the candidates interviewed felt- that they did not have an understanding of the areas they needed to be studying for their examinatio ,

Weaknesses were also seen in the use of requalificatior scenario for initial license certification examinations, If requalification scenarios are used for certification examinations, an effort needs to be made to ensure that they are updated and meet the general guidance given for initial examination scenarios. This is important for the number of events, complexity and duration of the

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examination. -The station needs to improve the scenario complexity used for both certification and training of initial classes. Items such as multiple failures, in-depth use of Emergency Operating Procedures, and component failures following the major transient are examples of areas that could be irproved. The facility failed to practice in-plant JPMs. Though this was not a problem with the 1992 examination, if this practice were to continue, it could develop into a problem in upcoming examination No classes on test taking technique were included in the licensing training.-

This type of class in not a requirement by the NRC, but it has been found to benefit personnel taking NRC administered examinations, following the facility administercd certification examination, tb9 candidates reported that crew strengths and weakness were covered, but that only people who failed those examinations were given individual strength and weakness evaluations. The self-study program appears to have been unstructured, the candidates interviewed felt that they did not have an understanding of the arens they needed to be studying for their examination. More emphasis needs O be given to systems which are currently in use When even possible the candidate should parforn the various task under appropriate supervisio Though a classroom discussion class does exist, there is little practical training in decision making and prioritizing in the simulator. The use of multiple events and ir, proving the complexity of the scenarios during training will aid in this are During the 1992 initial class, a large amount of training material was being changed. Whenever these changes are being made, an effort should be made to get quality training material to ile candidates when possibl Having-this material a/ailable during the lectures is important for the candidates to gain full advantage of the training they are receiving. During this class, it was reported, that for a large-number of lectures, lesson material was not available other than co?ies of the notes with hand written changes that the instructor was usin Re-examinations of personnel who failed certification examinations were performed only on the specific areas the candidate showed weakness i It is to the benefit of the candidate and the facility to do a full reexamination of the portion of the examination where weaknesses were exhibite During the inspection one other area was identified and aduressed. During the examination in 1992 during one scenario, a Reactor Operator candidate was placed in the Senior Reactor Operator-position. The candidate was not evaluated at the SR0 level, but his system and procedural knowledge were evaluated. All three persons involved in--

this scenario failed the operational portion of this examination, it is our view that while the acting SR0s actions contributed t the degradation of plant conditions, it did nct materially contribute to the individual weakness observed,

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The NRC does recognize that many of these issues aie currently being addressed by the facility as the result of the self-evaluation done by the utilities task force, Assessment of Engineering and Technical Support Excellent engineering support continues to be provided by the recently expanded on-site engineering group. An engineering and technical support inspection identified only minor problems and I significant strength No violations or deviations were identifie . Safety Assessment and_ Quality Verification (40500)

The effectiveness of managemert controls, verification and oversight activities in the conduct of jobs observed during this inspection were evaluated. Management and supervisory meetings involving plant status were attended to observe the cocrdination between departments. The resu!ts of licensee cor ective action programs were routinely monitored by attendance at meetings, discussion with the plant staff, review of deviation reports, and root cause evaluation report . SAQV Related Events fianpgement Chaagn .

On November )?,1992, Mr. R. Tuetken was promoted from Zion General Manager to Vice Presiden ImpInyements for Refuelino Outaae 22R12 Management made :;ignificant improvements for the Unit 2 refueling outage. These include an on-shift outage coordinator who will-work out of the shift engineer's office for better real time control of activities, Outage expectations will be the responsibility of each individual, with the help of outage expediters. Approximately 110 corrective action improvements have been incorporated into these outage activitit- from the last outage critique sheets and the outage critique meetin Management's outage philosophy is to complete the outage safety, with quality, on time, within budget, and within the exposure goal of lett than 600 person-im-

. Assessment of'SAQV Extensive management efforts have been applied to increase personnel accountability and batter planning and scheduling, which have resulted in the best preparations to date for a major-.

refueling outage: starting on November 12, 1992. The~ execution of the Unit 2 outage schedule will measure the effectiveness of

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management efforts in these areas. The 'mplementation of a new shutdown (SD) risk procedure will further strengthen a good SD risk program. The monthly Integrated Quality Effort (100) program is providing all departments with prompt performance indicators of their areas allowing for quick management action No violations or deviations were identified.

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6. lianagement Meeting t 00703)

Zion _ Initial Exam failures l On October 20, Mr. A. Bert Davis of Region 111 and members of his staff met with Mr. Mike Wallace and members of his staff to share views on their findings related to the July Zion operator licensing examination failures. An inspection of the initial operator licensing program was ,

conducted the week of October 26, 199 The inspection was performed to t assist in the evaluation of four of five candidates who appealed for a review of their examinatinn failures. The licensee and the NRC agreed to discuss the initial examination program at a later dat No violations or deviations were identifie . Licensee Identified Violations The NRC uses the Notice of Violation as a standard method for- 3 formalizing the existence of a violation of a legally binding requiremen However, because the NRC wants to encourage and support i licensee's initiatives for self-identification and correction of problems, the NRC will not generally issue a Notice of Violation for a violation that meets the tests of 10 CFR 2 Appendix C, Section These tests are: -

(1) the violation was identified by the licensee; (2) the violation fits in Severity Level IV or V; s (3) the event was reported, if required; (4) _

the violation was or will be corrected, includ_ing measures to prevent recurrence, 'within a reasonable time; and (5) it was not a violation that could reasonable be expected to have i been prevented by the licensee's corrective action for a previous violatio A vio~.ation of regulatory requirements identified during -this = inspection

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for which a Notice of Violation will not be issued is discussed in Paragraph 2 . ExiLinterview (301011 The inspectors met with licensee reoresentatives (denoted-in Paragraph-1) throughout the inspection perioa and at the conclusion of the inspection on November 16, 1992 to summarize the scope and findings of the inspection _ activities. The licensee acknowledged the inspectors'~

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comment The inspectors also discussed the likely informational  ;

content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes ]

revinwed by tb inspectors during the inspection. The licensee did not i identify ny su.h documents or processes as proprietar !

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