IR 05000295/1983004
| ML20023D985 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Zion File:ZionSolutions icon.png |
| Issue date: | 05/18/1983 |
| From: | Boyd D, Dunaway F, Hartmann P, Waters J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20023D982 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-295-83-04, 50-295-83-4, 50-304-83-04, 50-304-83-4, NUDOCS 8306060221 | |
| Download: ML20023D985 (12) | |
Text
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION III
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Reports No. 50-295/83-04(DPRP); 50-304/83-04(DPRP)
t Docket Nos. 50-295; 50-304 Licenses No. DPR-39; DPR-48 Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company P. O. Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690
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Facility Name: Zior Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2 I
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Inspection At: Zion, IL Inspection conducted: March 5 through April 29, 1983 e n/
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5[/8/#_3 Inspectors:
J. R. Wa ers Date
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away S10)03 Date H
/ 83 Date Approved By I O 63 Projects Section 2A Date Inspection Summary Inspection on March 5 through April 29, 1983 (Reports No. 50-295/83-04(DPRP);
50-304/83-04(DPRP))
Areas Inspected: Routine Unannounced Inspection by Resident Inspectors of Inadvertant Depressurization, Gaseous Releases, Results of Eddy Current Testing, High Radiation Doors Unlocked, Operational Safety, ESF System, Maintenance, Surveillance, Licensee Event Reports, Preparation for Refueling, Refueling Activities Spent Fuel Activities, Auxiliary Building Negative Pressure, Containment Pressure Sensing Lines. These inspections involved a total of 475 inspection-hours onsite by three NRC inspectors, including 133 hours0.00154 days <br />0.0369 hours <br />2.199074e-4 weeks <br />5.06065e-5 months <br /> onsite during off-shifts.
Results: Two (2) items of noncompliance and no deviations were identified.
8306060221 830519 PDR ADOCK 05000295 g
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
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- K. Graesser, Station Superintendent
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- E. Fuerst, Assistant Station Superintendent, Operations
- C. P11ml, Assistant Station Superintendent, Administrative and Support Services K. Kofron, Assistant Station Superintendent, Maintenance R. Budowle, Unit 1 Operating Engineer
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J. Gilmore, Unit 2 Operating Engineer K. Schultz, Assistant Technical Staff Supervisor A. Miosi,. Technical Staff Supervisor
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B. Schramer, Station Chemist P. Ost, Health Physics Engineer C. Silich, Technical Staff Engineer, ISI
- B. Harl, Quality Assurance Engineer
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- B.
Kurth, Master Instrument Mechanic
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F. Lentine, Nuclear Licensing Administration
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Broccolo, Quality Control Supervisor J. Johnson, Westinghouse Site Representative A. Amoroso, Technical Staff P. Cantwell, Technical Staff
- T. Rieck, Rad / Chem Supervisor
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A. Bless, Technical Staff R. Chin, Technical Staff J. Hallard, Technical Staff A. Nykiel, Assistant Fire Marshall W. Stone. Quality Assurance Engineer F. Woodin, Personnel Administrator A. Ockert, Technical Staff
- Denotes those present at the exit meeting on April 29, 1983.
2.
Summary of Operations Unit 1 Unit 1 operated at power levels up to 80% power during the inspection period. (ht March 25, 1983 the licensee limited Unit 1 power to 55% due to fuel burn up considerations.
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Two reactor trips occurred during the inspection period, the first April 14, 1983, was caused by a turbine trip. Four of the six incoming 4 KV lines were lost, due to severe weather. The Unit 1 transformers experienced a surge resulting in an insulator for one phase of the 1 east main transformer insulators exploding. The "86" turbine trip relay
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actuated a turbine trip, followed by a reactor trip. All safety systems functioned normally. Unit I was made critical at 9:57 p.m. April 15, and tied to the grid at 1:37 p.m. April 16, 1983 using one of the two i
main transformers, limiting power output to 650 MW.
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The second trip, on April 22, 1983, was caused by loss of the 111 in-strument bus inverter which disrupted control power to the feedwater control system.
The feedpump speed dropped to minimum. The reactor tripped on low level in 1C steam generator, coincident with steam flow-feed flow mismatch.
The Unit 1 operator wrote a work request on rod control, due to observa-tion of a delay of inward rod motion and less thar. maximum rate of
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insertion after loss of the 111 instrument bus inverter.
Technical staff personnel checked out rod control and no abnormalities were found. Technical staff personnel theorize that during the inverter failure, instrument bus voltage may have spiked high prior to going to zero, causing the delay in rod motion.
I The 111 instrument inverter was repaired and the reactor was made critical at 5:19 p.m.,
and tied to the grid at 8:23 p.m. April 23, 1983.
Unit 2 Unit 2 remained shutdown for refueling during the entire inspection period. The outage is scheduled to be complete May 11, 1983.
3.
Inadvertant Depressurization of Unit 2 During Cold Shutdown
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On March 3, 1983, Unit 2 was in cold shutdown with primary plant temperature 102*F, plant pressure approximately 370 psi, the pressurizer filled solid, both primary Power Operated Relief Valves (PORV) in the automatic low temperature mode set at 435 psi, and one reactor coolant pump running. At approximately 8:15 a.m. instrument mechanics shut the
isolation valve for pressure transmitter 2PT-403 in preparation for a calibration check.
In addition to providing wide range RCS pressure indication, the output of this transmitter also controls one of the primary PORV's while in the automatic low temperature (auto low temp)
mode. When the isolation valve was shut the pressure in the isolated piping and transmitter increased to approximately 450 psi. This caused one of the primary PORVs to open and the plant pressure was relieved to the pressurizer relief tank. Between 30 seconds and one minute later the instrument mechanics realized that something was wrong and re-opened the pressure transmitter isolation valve. Since the transmitter then saw actual RCS pressure (approximately zero) the PORV re-closed. Mean-while control room operators had secured the operating reactor coolant pump. With the PORV reclosed the operators were able to repressurize the RCS by throttling letdown. The reactor coolant pump was left secured since it was about to be tagged out of service when the plant was depres-surized for refueling.
Inspection Report 50-295/82-02; 50-304/82-02 documented the events described above and an unresolved item was opened pending investigation and review of the occurence.
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The calibration of 2PT-403 had been authorized by the shift supervision on February 25, 1983. At that time the plant was neither on RHR nor in the automatic low temperature mode on the primary PORV's.
The instrument mechanics proceeded to perform calibrations on electronic portions of the instrument channels.
On March 3, 1983 the instrument mechanics isolated 2PT-403 for calibration of the detector, causing the depressurization event described above.
The channel calibration procedure contains precautions to be taken if the plant is on RHR cooling or the Primary PORV's are in the auto low temp mode. These precautions are directed to the operating personnel but were not applicable at the time the 2PT-403 calibration was author-ized. Once a calibration was authorized that authorization was considered to be in effect until the calibration was completed. There were no provisions for changes in plant conditions in the interim.
Technical Specification Section 6.2.A states that " Detailed written procedures including applicable check off lists covering items listed below shall be prepared, approved and adhered to:"
".. 5. Instrumentation operation which could have an effect on the safety of the facility."
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Surveillance and testing requirements."
Contrary to the above Instrument Maintenance Department procedures did not contain adequate provisions to account for plant condition changes after an instrument calibration has been authorized.
In response to the above occurance the licensee has taken the following actions:
a.
The event was reviewed with all instrument maintenance department personnel, including the causes and correccive actions.
b.
The precautions section of the PT-403 calibration procedure will be revised to add information as to why precautions must be taken when the plant is on RHR or auto low temp.
c.
Instrument maintenance personnel were instructed that the entire procedure should be at the work site, not just the calibration sheets.
d.
A system was instituted whereby authorization to perform an instru-ment calibration is updated daily after initial authorization is granted. This will provide an opportunity for operations personnel to reconsider the authorization with regards to plant conditions changes.
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Item 50-304/82-02-01 opened in the previous report will remain open pending receipt and review of the licensee's response to the notice of violation.
One item of noncompliance and no deviations were identified.
4.
Inadvertant Gaseous Release March 5, 1983 An inadvertant gaseous radioactive release occurred on March 5, 1983 when mechanics attempted to remove the Unit 2 gas volume control tank relief valve for set point testing.
In specifying isolation for the work operations personnel overlooked the fact that waste gas header connected to ths discharge of the relief valve was pressurized to about 3 to 4 psi.
When the mechanics loosened the joint on the dis-charge side of the relief valve they heard gas escaping and retightened the joint. The gas that escaped resulted in a 19.9 curie release with a maximum release rate of 7.5% of the Technical Specification limit.
The waste gas header was later depressurized and the valve removal completed. The event was discussed with the operations personnel who were involved and a notice went to all operations personnel to remind them to consider the discharge side when specifying isolation for relief valve work.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
5.
Radioactive Release of April 21, 1983 On April 21, 1983, an unplanned gaseous release of radioactivity occurred.
From 11:45 a.m. to 1:45 p.m. increasing readings were observed on OPR-10A (Gas Decay Tank (GDT) Vent Stack Monitor) from 60 counts per minutes (cpm) to 230 cpm.
At 1:40 p.m. the manual vent valve (OWG 9298E) was found partially open, and immediately closed. The OPR-10A reading dropped to 90 cpm.
At 2:20 p.m. the headquarters duty officer was notified of the release via the Emergency Notification System (ENS).
Additional investigation disclosed that the manual vent for 1B GDT had been partially open for some time, but no release occurred because the main isolation valve for IB GDT (0W6 9297E) was closed.
This release was initiated by placement of the IB GDT in the " cover gas" mode, which included opening the main isolation valve for IB GDT, thus providing a release path out the IL GDT manual vent to the vent stack.
Initial release calculations were based on an 875 cuoic foot goseous release of 2300 uci at a rate of.21 uci/second.
Final calculations, based on sampling of the vent stack indicated an actual release of 37 uci at a rate of.003 uci/second. Both initial and final release rates are less than 1% of the Technical Specification limit.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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6.
Eddy Current Testing of Unit 2 Steam Generators During the Unit 2 outage all tubes in the steam generators were eddy current tested.
In the 2B steam generator one eddy current indication showed a defect that was apparently thru-wall at an anti-vibration bar.
Other tubes had indications that may also have been thru-wall but the signals were so distorted that a quantitative depth analysis was not possible. The following number of tubes were plugged in each steam generator:
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2A S/G 2 tubes plugged
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2B S/G 7 tubes plugged
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2C S/G 1 tube plugged 2D S/G S tubes plugged
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No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
7.
High Radiation Doors Unlocked During the inspection period, the Resident Inspector, on two separate occasions, found two high radiation doors unlocked during routine inspection tours of the auxiliary building.
On March 21, 1983 the auxiliary building sump "B" high radiation area door (EL. 542') was found unlocked, and slightly ajar. This high radiation area is routinely entered by operations personnel during auxiliary building tours. April 8, 1983 the Unit I valve aisle high radiation and potentially airborne radioactivity area door (EL. 579')
was found unlocked and ajar. This high radiation and potentially airborne radioactivity area is not routinely entered.
Both doors have automatic closing devices that apparently did not close the door completely, 1 caving these high radiation doors / unlocked.
The licensee's Radiation Protection Procedure 1190-1 states in part
"each entrance to a high radiation area must have access controls which comply with the requirements of 10 CFR 20."
10 CFR 20.203.2(111) states "Each entrance or access point to a high radiation area shall be maintained locked except during periods when access to the area is required, with positive control over each individual entry." Contrary to the above, on March 21, 1983 the auxiliary building sump "B" high radiation door was unlocked and unattended. On April 8, 1983 the Unit I valve isle high radiation door was unlocked and unattended.
One item of noncompliance and no deviations were identified.
This item remains open pending identification and resolution of required corrective action (50-295/83-04-01; 50-304/83-04-01).
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8.
Auxiliary Building Negative Pressure During the inspection period, the Resident Inspector observed on several occasions less than 1/4" negative pressure from the auxiliary building to atmosphere.
The Final Safety Analysis Report, Section 9.10.1.2.2 Auxiliary Building Ventilation System states in part "The [ Auxiliary Building] exhaust fans are controlled to maintain the auxiliary building at a nominal 1/4" negative pressure with respect to the outdoors."
Subsequent to discussions of this problem with the operating engineer, an information notice was issued, one cc,py posted on the center panel of the control room, addressing the requirement and method of controlling 1/4" negative pressure and one other copy posted in the standing orders book.
Subsequent to the issuance of the above mentioned notice, the Resident Inspector observed less than 1/4" negative pressure on several occasions.
The auxiliary building pressure automatic control was essentially inoperable. The licensee was manually controlling auxiliary building pressure.
In the manual mode of pressure control, any change in the ventilation path of the auxiliary building affects differental pressure, requiring constant manipulation of manual in plant controls to maintain a constant differential pressure.
The auxiliary building ventilation system was placed in automatic pressure control on April 19, 1983. Five of the six auxiliary building exhaust fan sub systems are pending repair.
(Auxiliary Building Exhaust Fan Subsystems OA, OB, OC, OD, OF) Work orders were issued on April 20, 1983. The Resident Inspector is monitoring corrective action.
This is designated as Open Item 295/83-04-02; 304/83-04-02 pending repair of the above mentioned exhaust fan subsystems.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
9.
Containment Pressure Sensing Lines Recent events at Kewaunee, Prairie Island and Arkansas Nuclear One, have identified capped containment pressure sensing lines.
In response, the Resident 'nspector investigated the licensee's type
"A" test method
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of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J (III), Leak Testing Requirements.
The licensee's Containment Integrated Leak Rate Test (CILRT) procedure (T.S.S. 15.6.10A) does not include:
isolation of containment pressure detectors, capping of detector ports or capping of containment pressure sensing lines. The centainment pressure detectors CS 19-22 narrow range pressure indication (0-60 psi), and CS 50 and 51 wide range pressure indication (0-200 psi) are operable throughout the CILRT providing indication to control room operators.
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The sensing lines have two isolation valves outside containment. This section of the sensing line in the penetration area to the containment pressure detector has been exempted from type "C" testing, since these sensing lines remain open after an accident.
The eight isolation valves for containment pressure detector sensing lines are locked open and are not closed for any testing.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
10.
Preparation for Refueling The Resident Inspector verified that technically adequate procedures were approved for fuel handling, fuel tool inspection, fuel shuffle and inspection of fuel to be reused.
The inspector verified that the licensee's 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation of the reload core showed that prior NRR review is not required. The inspector also reviewed the licensee's program for overall outage control.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
11.
Spent Fuel Pool Activities The Resident Inspector verified that approved procedures relating to fuel handling operations provided provisions for verifying the following:
that the fuel building ventilation system is operating as required, that the efficiency of HEPA and charcoal filters has been determined as required, that on high radiation signal fuel building exhaust is direct through charcoal filters, that minimum water level requirements are monitored, that fuel building area and airborne radioactivity monitors are operable, and that the spent fuel pool cooling system is operable.
The inspector by direct observation verified that the spent fuel pool water was above the minimum level required by Technical Specifications and that the ventilation system maintained the fuel handling building pressure more negative than the specified negative pressure.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
12.
Refueling Activities The inspector verified that prior to the handling of fuel in the core, all surveillance testing required by the Technical Specifications and licensee's procedures had been completed; verified that during the outage the periodic testing of refueling related equipment was performed as required by Technical Specifications; observed eight shifts of the fuel handling operations (removal, inspection and insertion) and verified the activities were performed in accordance with the Technical Specifications and approved procedures; verified that containment integrity was maintained as required by Technical Specifications;
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verified that good housekeeping was maintained on the refueling area; and, verified that staffing during refueling was in accordance with Technical Specifications and approved procedures.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
13.
Maintenance - Refueling The inspector verified maintenance procedures include administrative approvals for removing and return of systems to service; hold points for inspection / audit and signoff by QA or other licensee personnel; provisions for operational testing following maintenance; provisions for operational testing following maintenance; provisions for special authorization and fire watch responsibilities for activities involving welding, open flame, and other ignition sources; reviews of material certifications; provisions for assuring LCO requirements were met during repair; provisions for housekeeping during and following maintenance; and responsibilities for reporting defects to management.
The inspector observed the maintenance activities listed below and verified work was accomplished in accordance with approved procedures and by qualified personnel:
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Reactor Head Electrical Checkout No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
14.
Operational Safety Verification and ESF System Walkdown The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during the months of March and April 1983. The inspector verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to service of affected components. Tours of the auxiliary building and turbine building were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance. The inspector by observation and direct interview verified that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the station security plan.
The inspector observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions and verified implementation of radiation protection controls. During the months of March and April 1983, the inspector walked down the accessible portions of the Auxiliary Feedwater System to verify operability. The inspector also witnessed portions of the radioactive waste system control; associated with radwaste shipments and barreling.
No items af noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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15. Monthly Maintenance Observation Station maintenance activities on safety related systems and components listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards and in conformance with Technical Specifications. The following items were considered during this review: The limiting condi-tions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applic-able; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; and fire prevention controls were implemented. Work requests were reviewed to determine status of oustanding jobs and to assure that priority is assigned to safety related equipment maintenance which may affect system performance.
The following maintenance activities were observed / reviewed:
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2B and 2D Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Replacement.
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2A Charging Pump Replacement 2A RHR Pump Repair
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2B Diesel Generator Repair 2A S/G Eddy Current Testing
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Following completion of maintenance on the O Diesel Generator, the inspector verified that this system had been returned to service properly.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
16. Monthly Surveillance Observation The inspector observed Technical Specifications required surveillance testing on the Reactor Protection System and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that removal and restoration of the affected components were accomplished, that test results conformed with Technical Specifications and procedure require-ments and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel.
The inspector also witnessed portions of the following test activities:
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Containment Spray Test No items or noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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Licensee Event Reports Followup Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following Licensee Event Reports were reviewed to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with Technical Specifications.
Unit 1 LER NO.
DESCRIPTION 83-02 Turbo Charger Failure "0" Diesel Generator 83-02 (update)
Turbo Charger Failure
"0" Diesel Generator 83-06 1A S/G dp Bistable Out of Tolerance 83-07 1A S/G Pressure Indication Out of Talerance 83-08 1C S/G Feedwater Flow Failed Unit 2 LER NO.
DESCRIPTION 83-04 Electric Penetration Zone Rupture Disk Ruptured 83-05 Electric Penetration Zone Rupture Disk Ruptured 83-06 Heat Trace Circuit Inadvertantly De-energized 83-07 2B Diesel Generator Inoperable Due to Oil Leak.
83-08 2C S/G Steam Flow Channel Drifted Low In regard to LER's 295/83-02, 295/83-02 (update) and 304/83-07. The eve.it was initially reported under LER 295/83-02 (Unit 1).
At the request of the inspector, the licensee initiated an internal review which resulted in the reclassification of the event as a Unit 2 occurrance, and issuance of LER's 295/83-02 (update) and 304/83-07.
Additionally, the event covered by these reports was reclassified by the licensee as a 14 day reportable occurrance after the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> prompt notification period had expired. Required notification was made upon reclassification. This failure to comply with the reporting requirements of Technical Specification 6.6.1.a(5) is classified as a licensee identified item of noncompliance for which no citation will be issued.
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Meetings, Offsite Functions _
During the inspection period the Senior Resident Inspector attended the following offsite function:
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J. R. Waters April 11-15, 1983 Supervising Human Resources, Naperville, IL April 20-22, 1983 Course Resident Inspector Seminar, Glen Ellyn, IL.
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Open Items Open items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee, which will be reviewed further by the inspector, and which involve some action on the part of the NRC or licensee or both. Two open item (Paragraph 7 and 8) were disclosed during this inspection.
20.
Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)
throughout the month and at the conclusion of the inspection on April 29, 1983 and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities.
The licensee acknowledged the inspector's comments.
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