IR 05000285/1982006

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IE Insp Rept 50-285/82-06 on 820401-30.Noncompliance Noted:Failure to Follow Procedures Re Insertion of Fuel Rod Into Fuel Bundle
ML20054G158
Person / Time
Site: Fort Calhoun Omaha Public Power District icon.png
Issue date: 05/24/1982
From: Randy Hall, Yandell L
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20054G154 List:
References
50-285-82-06, 50-285-82-6, IEB-78-01, IEB-78-05, IEB-78-08, IEB-78-1, IEB-78-12, IEB-78-5, IEB-78-8, NUDOCS 8206210189
Download: ML20054G158 (6)


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APPENDIX B U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

Report: 50-285/82-06 License: DPR-40 Docket: 50-285 Licensee: Omaha Public Power District 1623 Harney Street Omaha, Nebraska 68102 Facility Name: Fort Calhoun Station, Unit 1 Inspection At: Fort Calhoun Station, Blair, Nebraska inspection Conducted: April 1-30,1982 Inspector: M 21. s u

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L. A. Yandell, Senior Resident Reactor Inspector Datel Other Accompanying Personnel: W. C. Seidle, Chief, Reactor Project Branch 2 (April 5-6,1982 only)

Approved By:

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R. E. Hall, Chief, Reactor Project Section C Dat/e Inspection Summary Inspection conducted during period of April 1-30, 1982 (Report 50-285/82-06)

Areas Inspected: Routine, announced inspection including (1) Operation Safety Verification; (2) Sarveillance Testing; (3) Maintenance; (4) Plant Operations; and (5) IE Bulletin Followup. The inspection involved 87 inspector-hours by one NRC inspecto Results: Within the five areas inspected, one violation was found in the area of plant operations (violation - failure to follow procedures - paragraph 5).

8206210189 820527 PDR ADOCK 05000285 0 PDR

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-2-DETAILS Persons Contacted

  1. W. C. Jones, Division Manager, Production Operations
  1. S. C. Stevens, Manager, Fort Calhoun Station
  • W. G. Gates, Acting Manager, Fort Calhoun Station
    • R. L. Andrews, Section Manager, Operations
  • R. L. Jawerski, Section Manager, Technical Services
  • J. K. Gasper, Manager, Reactor and Computer Technical Services -
  • T. L. Patterson, Licensing Administrator
  • F. A. Thurtell, Division Manager, Environmental and Regulatory Affairs
  • Denotes those attending the exit intervie # Denotes those attending meeting with W. C. Seidle on April 5,198 The NRC inspector also talked with, and interviewed, other licensee employees during the inspection. These employees included licensed and unlicensed operators, craftsmen, engineers, and office. personne . Operational Safety Verification The NRC inspector performed-activities as described below to ascertain that the facility is being maintained safely and in conformance with regulatory requirements, and that the licensee's management control systems are effectiv The NRC inspector made several control room observations to veri fy: (1) licensee adherence to selected Technical Specifications; (2) operator adherence to approved procedures; and (3). proper con-trol room and shift manning. The NRC inspector reviewed selected logs and records to verify compliance with regulatory requirement The licensee's equipment control was reviewed for proper implementa-tion by: (1) reviewing the maintenance order and tag-out logs; and (2) verification of " return to operable ' status of selected safety-related components and systems." The NRC inspector observed several shift turnovers and reviewed several shift turnover sheet The NRC inspector toured th'e plant at various ' times during the inspec-tion period to determine and/or verify equipment conditions, plant conditions, security, safety,'and general housekeeping. These obser-vations included the following:

(1) general plant and equipment condition (2) fire hazards and control of combustible material (3) presence of fire watches when required (4) physical security

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-3- The NRC inspector verified operability of the following safety-related systems by performing a walk-down or switch verification of the accessible portions of the system:

. Engineered Safeguards Controls per Checklist ES-1-CL-A. Minor administrative discrepancies were identified due to design changes during the recent plant outage. A procedure change is being submitted to correct these item . High Pressure Safety Injection System per Checklist SI-1-CL- . Safety Injection Tanks and Leakage System per Checklist SI-1-CL- No violations or deviations were identifie . Surveillance Testing The NRC inspector witnessed portions of the following Surveillance Test activities:

. Fire Protection (Monthly) ST-FP-1, F.~., which calls for performance of the Fire Protection System Inspection and Test Procedure OI-FP- . Secondary CEA Position Indicating System PDIL: Deviation, Out of Sequence and Overlap Monitoring System Test (Monthly) ST-CEA-1, Procedure Change 8171 was written to correct minor typographical error . Power Range Safety Channels (Monthly) ST-RPS-1, . Safety Injection / Containment Spray Pumps and Valves (Monthly)

ST-SI/CS-1, F.1, for Pumps SI-3C and SI-1B onl . Axial Power Distribution Channels (Monthly) ST-RPS-12, F.2, for Channels C and D only. This test was performed by a trainee under the direct supervision of a qualified technicia . Pcwer Operated Relief Valve / Safety Valve Tailpipe Temperature Circuit Check (Monthly) ST-SVTEMP-1, In the above Surveillance Tests,the NRC inspector veri /ied, where appli-cable, that:

. testing was scheduled in accordance with Technical Specification requirements

. procedures were being followed

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. qualified personnel were performing the tests

. Limiting Conditions for Operation were being met

. test data were being accurately recorded i

No violations or deviations were identifie . Mair.tenance Maintenance Order (MO) 14207, " Component Cooling Water Pump (AC-3B)

Bearing Leak." Over a period of 3 days,the NRC inspector had the opportunity to observe work being done to refurbish the pump seals and witness reassembly of the pump. It was noted that qualified personnel were performing the work, approved procedures were being used, and QC hold points were being observe MO 14581, " Charging Pump CH-1A, Demineralized Water Leak." The pump was placed out-of-service and properly tagged, although a procedure change was submitted to make the tag-out lineup correct in the mainte-nance procedure. The NRC inspector noted that a Flame Cutting and Welding Permit (FC-18) was filled out and approved, and that qualified personnel were assigned to perform the wor MO 14575, " Volume Control Tank Level Instrument - Sigma Alarm Would Not Clear." The NRC inspector reviewed the approved M0 and observed part of the trouble shooting being performe M0's 14578 and 14580, " Component Cooling Water Valves Failed to Operate."

Valves HCV 491B, HCV 490A, and HCV 492 failed to operate, and an investi-gation was initiated to identify the cause as either a failed solenoid or mechanical problems. The NRC inspector observed the testing which seemed to indicate a mechanical binding. The piston operator on Valve HCV 491B was disassembled and checked. The licensee intends to submit a 30-day LER on this ite Annual PM Maintenance Check of the 4160V Breaker for LPSI Pump SI-1 The NRC inspector verified that: (1) the pump was tagged-out properly under Tag-Out 82-314,(2) qualified personnel were assigned to the work, and (3) Procedure PM-EE-1.2 was followed during cleaning and testing of the breaker, maintenance of the cubicle, and reinstallation of the breake MO 14665, " Spurious RPS Trip, Channel A Reactor Coolant Low Flow." It was verified by the NRC inspector that: (1) the maintenance order was properly filled out and approved, (2) QC requirements were identified, (3) qualified technicians were assigned to the work, (4) the channel was bypassed in accordance with Technical Specification requirements, allowing

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-5-the system to operate in a -2/3 logic, (5) calibrated test equipment was used, and (6) Technical Manual E-115-131 was available and being used by the technician. The problem was traced to loose connections in the control board, and the channel was restored to operation after repairs were com-plete Installation of the Post Accident Sampling System (NUREG 0737, Item II.B.3)

has progressed to the checkout stage, and the NRC inspector observed the valve lineup and part of the preoperational testing performed under Field Change 79-19 MO 14662, " Valve HCV-490A Will Not Open." The valve was placed in the OPEN position to meet emergency requirements,and it was determined that the hand i operator was the problem. The operator was removed and disassembled, and the NRC inspector had the opportunity to observe the disassembled operator .

and parts of the rebuilding / reassembly proces No violations or deviations were identifie . Plant Operations The plant experienced a shutdown about 3:56 p.m., on April 2,1982, when a generator differential relay tripped due to a surge on the line, causing a turbine / reactor trip. All systems performed normally,and the NRC emergency duty officer was informed within the hour. The licensee had personnel from the System Protection Department come to the site to check out the trans-former before returning plant busses to offsite power. It was concluded that the surge was caused by a lightning strike on the line near the plant, and the plant conducted a startup early the next day and was back on line by 8 a.m. that mornin During the af ternoon shif t on April 8,1982, a fuel rod was found lying on the Combustion Engineering Fuel Inspection Stand as it was being raised from the Spent Fuel Pool in preparation to ship the stand offsite. As the stand was being raised, radiation levels momentarily peaked at 20 R/hr general area, prompting the attending health physicist to order the evolu-tion stopped. The stand was lowered back into the pool until radiation levels returned to background, at which time an inspection of the stand revealed the fuel rod lying at the base. TLD's from the participating technicians were processed immediately and the highest dose detected was 85 mr. Special Procedure SP-SS-5, " Retrieval of Fuel Pin or Pin Standard

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From Superstand Lower Frame Assembly (LFA)," was prepared, reviewed, and approved by the PRC, and the fuel rod was retrieved and placed in the spent fuel shipping basket the next day.

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An investigation by the licensee determined that the fuel rod had probably

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been mishandled the previous week when it had been withdrawn from Bundle D013 by mistake and incorrectly reinserted. As part of a Department of Energy program, OPPD had allowed fuel rods from selected fuel bundles to be withdrawn and shipped offsite for analysis. On March 30, 1982, a

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-6-number of fuel rods were being removed from Bundle D013 for this progra It was discovered by serial number comparison that Peripheral Rod KJN024 was pulled by mistake,and the technicians reinserted the rod back into the bundle. The rod insertion was to be done in accordance with Section of Special Procedure SP-SS-2, " Comprehensive Fuel Inspection Stand Opera-tion," but the technicians failed to observe the precaution of Step 5. which required that a visual check be made to ensure that any peripheral rod being inserted "is passing through all spacer grids." Rod KJN024 was inserted through the proper template hole at the top of the bundle but apparently passed by the spacer grid hole and skewed to the outside of the bundle as it was pushed down. The technicians failed to adhere to the pre-caution of Step 5.3.7, and when the handling tool was removed, the rod dropped to the base of the inspection stand. This failure to follow pro-cedures is an apparent violation against Technical Specification 5.8.1'

which requires that, " written procedures . . . be established, implemented, and maintained that meet or exceed the minimum requirements of Section and 5.3 of ANSI N18.7-1972, and Appendix A of USNRC Regulatory Guide 1.33 -

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No other violations or deviations were identifie . IE Bulletin Followup The NRC inspector reviewed the licensee's responses and activities to verify that: (1) the written response addressed the information required, (2) adequate corrective action, when required, was specified, and (3) cor-rective action was accomplished as specifie IE Bulletins reviewed were:

. IEB 78-01, GE CR120A Relays

. IEB 78-05, Malfunctioning of Circuit Breaker Auxiliary Contact Mechanism - GE Model CR105X

. IEB 78-08, Radiation From Fuel Element Transfer Tubes

. IEB 78-12, Atypical Weld Material in Reactor Vessel Welds These items are considered close . Exit Interview On April 5,1982, Mr. W. C. Seidle, Chief, Reactor Project Branch 2, met with management representatives of OPPD to outline the Region IV reorgani-zation and discuss several generic issues of concern to the NRC. The two day visit also included a short meeting with staff members of the Fort Calhoun Station and a tour of the plant on April 6,1982. The NRC inspec-tor met with licensee representatives on May 14, 1982, to summarize the scope and findings of the inspection.

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