IR 05000280/1991029
| ML18153C833 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 11/25/1991 |
| From: | Branch M, Fredrickson P, Tingen S, York J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18153C832 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-280-91-29, 50-281-91-29, NUDOCS 9112090147 | |
| Download: ML18153C833 (11) | |
Text
Report Nos.:
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULAlORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323 50-280/91-29 and 50-281/91-29 Li~ensee:
Virginia Electric and Power Company Glen Allen, VA 23060 Docket Nos.:
50-280 and 50-281 License Nos.:* DPR-32 and DPR-37 Faci 1 i ty Name:
Surry 1 and 2.
Inspection Conducted:
September 29 - November 2, 1991 Inspector:
// g*_g ~
- *
M. w':Br'fi.i\\'W'Seni'br Resident Inspector J. n~.R1fs;;ector S. G~~i"d'fntTupector *
Approved by:=-~...;,_-
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P. E. Fre ric son, Chief Projects Se~tion 2A Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY Scope:
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teSgned 1162&'/
Date S'i gned t<<1r4~:a
,,/µ.-ft; D'ate Signed This routine resident inspection was conducted* on site in the areas of plant operations, plant maintenance, plant surveillance, meeting with local officials, licensee ev~nt review closeout, and action on previous inspectiori finding During the performance.of this.inspection, the resident inspectors conducted review of the l icensee 1 s backshift or weekend operations on Septemb~r 29, 30, and October 8, 9, 15~ and 31, 1991. *
Results:
In.the operations functional area, a we~kness was identified in controlling boundary doors in areas that contain gas *fire suppression systems {paragraph 3.a).
I-n the operations functional area,* housekeeping.in the spent fuel pool area was considered a stren*gth (paragraph 3.a).
9112090147 9f1J22 PDR ADOCK 05000280 Q
- ~ersons Contacted Licensee Employees REPORT DETAILS
- R. Allen, Supervisor, Shift Operations W. Benthall, Supervisor, Licensing
- R. Bilyeu, Licensing Engineer
- D~ Christian, As~istant Station Manager
- C. Core, Senior Fire Protection Specialist
- J. Downs, Superintendent of Outag~ and Planning*
D. Erickson, Superintendent of Health Physics
- R. Gwaltneyi Superintendent of Maintenanc*
- D. Hart, Supervisor, Quality Assurance M. * Kansler, Stat.ion Manager
- T. Kendzia, Supervisor, Safety Engineering J. McCarthy, Superintendent of Operations A~ Price, Assistant Station Manager
- E. Smith, Site Quality Assurance Manager T. Sowers, Superintendent of Engi~eering
.
- G. Thompson, Supervisor, Maintenance Engineering NRC Personnel *
- M. Branch, Senior Resident Inspector
- P. Fredrickson, Section Chief, Division of Reactor Projects
- S. Tingen, Resident Inspector
- J. York, Resident*Inspector
- Attended ~xit intervie Other licensee employees contacted included control room operators, shift technical advisors, shift supervisors and other plant personne Acronyms and initialisms used throughout.this report are listed in the last paragraph~.
. Plant Status Unit 1 began the reporting period in power *operatio The unit was power at the end of the inspection period, day 318 of continu,ous operatio On October 2 and 3, the unit operated at reduced. power, approximately 80 percent, in order to make secondary plant repair On October 4 through 14, the unit operated at reduced power, approximately 60 percent,* in order to repair the B main feedwater pu~p motor lead '
Unit 2 began the reporting period in power operatio On October 21, the unit op~rated at reduced power, appr-oximately 60 percent, in order to repair the A main feedwater pum On October 26, the unit was shutdown
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for a. planned maintenance outage in order to replace a leaking expansion bellows located upstream of the B-high pressure secondary drain pum Op October 31,- the unit was restarted and operated at reduced power, approximately 55 percent, for* the remainder of the inspection period due *
to condenser tube leaks in the A waterbo.
Operational Sa.fety Verification (71707,42700,64704}
The inspectors conducted frequent visits to the control room to verify proper staffing, operator attentiveness and adherence to approved procedure The inspectors* attended plant status meetings and reviewed operator logs on a daily basis to verify operations safety and compliance with TS and to.maintain awareness of the overall operation of the faci.lit Instrumentation and* ECCS lineups were periodically reviewed from control room indication to assess operability. Frequent plant tours were conducted to observe equipment status, implementation of.the fire protection program and plant security program, radiological work practices, and housekeepin Deviation reports wefe reviewed to assur~
that potential safety concerns were properly addressed and reporte Fire Protection On July 23, 1991, the licensee found the Unit 1 cable vault upper level MCC room exit door blocked ope This_ area contains a carbon dioxide fire suppression system that requires the exit door to be
.shut in order for the fire suppression system to be fully effective. *
The licensee identified this as a violation of TS 3.21.B.4 which required that a continuous fire watch be stationed within one hour when the carbon dioxide suppression system is inoperabl As a result of this event, the licensee issued LER 280/91-13 which is further discussed in paragraph On October 28, operators found the No. 1 EDG room exit door blocked ope This area also contained a carbon dioxide fire suppression syste The door was held open by a rope in lieu of the blowout plu Since the door was held open, it would not have. closed during a carbon dioxide.release and a fire watch was not poste When this condition was discovered, the rope was removed and the door was placed on its blowout plug. At the end*
of the inspection period, the licensee was evaluating the operability the No. 1 EDG room fire suppression system when the exit door was blocked ope The inspectors questioned the design basis operability of the Carbon Dioxide sys tern. with boundary doors open, * and asked the l i censee if their fire protection program addressed this issue invo_lving open.
boundary door The licensee indicated that their fire protection
_program did not provide any specific requirements for this conditio The inspectors consider this a weakness in that the station's policy does n_ot clearly specify requirements for controlling operation of Carbon Dioxide system boundary doors, and that pe*rsonnel are not properly trained to take specific actton when boundary doors for this system are opene In addition, a potential hazard exists for
personnel,in adjacent rooms or areas when boundary doors are open for a Carbon Dioxide system that is arme Storage Of Material In The Spent Fuel Pool the inspectors reviewed the licensee's procedures for* controlling materials.stored in the spent fuel poo New and spent fuel is controlled by administrative procedure VPAP-1406, Control of Nuclear Material, dated May 1, 199 This procedure controls movement of fuel into and out.of the spent fuel pool, and also controls any thimble plugs* or burnable poison rods that are in the poo Procedure O-OSP-NM-002, Physical Inventory of Nuclear Fuel, dated May 7, 1991, is utilized to inventory the new fuel storage and spent fuel pool areas at intervals not to exceed 12 months and after each refueling of the reactor.. The licensee uses an underwater closed*
circuit television with monitor to perform the fuel inventory in the spent fuel poo The licensee conducts safety evaluations for placing any fuel related material in the pool and also for placing any object on top of the fuel rack The licensee also periodically store items in the spent fuel pool other than reactor core related component Examples included a six foot piece of sma 11 bore pipe, a pump and several sma 11 boxes containing parts from a previous fuel assembly modificatio Although the licensee had not proceduralized the storage of non-core related material in the spent fuel pool, the fuel handling group appeared to be maintaining proper control of these item The residents routinely monitor the spent fuel pool area and consider the housekeeping to be excellen All the items in the spent fuel pool were stored in an orderly manne The inspectors concluded that the spent fuel pool storage procedures were ad_equate for fuel assemblie The licensee had good control over the small amount of other material stored in an area 6f the spent fuel pool but did not have a formal procedural process to control these item Review of interim corrective actions to reduce the potential effects of internal flooding (IPE followup)
Generic Letter 88-20 required licensee to perform PRA based Individual Plant Evaluation of their facilities. The IPE program was implemented to look at nuclear plant safety from a probabilistic perspective that includes items or event that go beyond current licensing basi The stated purpose of the IPE was to identify events or areas of plant vulnerabilities and to rank them in order of safety significanc *
The Surry !PE was submitted to the NRC for review in September, 199 The Surry !PE identified an* internal flooding accident sequence that*
warranted further action* and consideratio The flooding i postulated to occur due to a break in the plant cooling water intake piping system and is postulated to incapacitate safety equipment, leading to loss of electric *power and core damag *
The licensee already has taken some actions and is planning addi_tional actions on an expedited basis with the intent of further reducing the risk associated with the potential floodin These
- actions include changes to p'l ant opera ti on procedures, maintenance and survei 11 ance improvements, and hardware modi ficati an The licensee also is addressing the uncertainties in -the analysis. in order to verify that the estimated frequency is* conservative and represents an upper bound value. The licensee colllllitted to provi d_e a reanalysis of this event and to meet with the NRC on November 22, 199.
Do to the concerns raised by the licensee original analysis the licensee proposed interim and short-term corrective that were being taken until the reanalysis could be complete The NRC conducted a special team inspection of the licensee interim and short term corrective actions on November 4-6, 199 The results of tha inspection along with finding by the resident inspectors prior to the
- teams arrival on site are documented in IR 50-280,281/91-31..
Within the areas inspected, no violations were identifie.
Maintenance Inspections (62703 & 42700)
During the reporting period, the inspectors reviewed maintenance*
activities to assure compliance with the appropriate procedures *
. Specifically, the repair of~ Unit 2 charging pump B ventilation damper was reviewe *
Ventilation damper 2-VSP-MOD-201B is designed to automatically open when charging pump 2-CH-P-lB is started and to shut when the pump is secure The open damper during pump operation is required to allow the circulation of air around the charging pump's motor to maintain proper temperature. -*
On October 8, charging pump 2-CH-P-lB was started and ventilation damper 2-VSP-MOD-201B failed to ope The inspectors reviewed the work package
- .assoc.iated with the troubleshooting performed to repair the dampe.
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Work Order 117473 was utilized to accomplish this maintenance and included troubleshooting instructions-that were processed and developed in accordance with administrative procedure The troubleshooting instructions required that the charging pump breaker be cycled to verify that the damper *opened and closed as required. During the troubleshooting process a loose screw was discovered in the damper power supply circuit *
The loose screw was tightened and the damper limit switch was adjuste The damper was tested by starting and stopping_2-CH-P-1B pum The damper opened and closed as require The PMT sheet involved a control circuit
- check only, in that it required the MOD be cycled and checked for binding, air leaks, and proper operation of indication lights, since the above repairs were restricted to the control circuits onl The standard retest for MODs and AODs did not apply for this maintenanc This finding is similar to previous *PMT findings in that the PMT sheets did not specify al 1 _of the necessary retest However, the components were properly tested because the craft went beyond the scope of the PMT when they performed the necessary test Inspection Report 50-280,281/91-21 discussed PMT program weaknesses and the need for more management attention in this are No other deficiencies were note Within the areas inspected, no viol~tions were identifie.
Surveillance Inspections (61726, 42700)
During the. reporting period, the inspectors reviewed surveillance activities to issure compliance with the appropriate proc~dufe Specifically, a Unit 2 turbine trip setpoint test was reviewed~
On October 30, the inspectors witnessed the performance of periodic test 2-PT-29.3,_Turbine Trip Setpoint, dated June_ 4, 199 The stated purposes of this procedure was the following:
1) to verify correct settings of the auto-stop oil pressure sensors as required by TS 4.1.1, 2) to verify that all turbine stop valves close when the auto-stop oil pressure sensors *
actuate, and 3) to verify that the reactor protection stop valve relays properly actuat TSs require that this testing be performed prior to each unit startup. The inspectors witnessed this testing from the turbine pedestal and Unit 2 relay roo Initially the test failed because the reactor protection relay associated with No. 1 stop valve would not deenergize when the stop valve closed. A limit switch associated with the stop valve was adjusted and the test was satisfactorily accomplishe The inspectors reviewed the circuit logic and redundancies to ensure that the failure of the single limit switch did not result in a failure of the functio No deficiencies were* noted by the inspectors during the performance of the tes Within the areas inspected, no violations were identifie.
Information Meetings with Local Officials (94600)
On October 2 and 3, the Senior Resident Inspector, accompanied by the
_Section Chief from the Regiori II office responsible for the Virginia Power plants, conducted meetings with local officials to include several.local government coordinators, county *administrators, and other government official The meetings were held to update the officials on the current*
NRC organization, provide* appropriate business.telephone numbers and points of contact, and to discuss the status of.Surry Power Station and
- related community concerns, both Surry County and the city of Newport News were visite The inspector and section chief also attended* a Virginia Departme_nt of Emergency Services meeting of the local government
- coordinators from most of the areas surrounding the Surry and_North Anna
- Power Station The meetings were constructive with no major concerns
- id~ntified. A standing invitation was extended for additional meetings to discuss matters of mutual interes * Licensee Event Review (92700)
The inspectors reviewed the LER's listed below and evaluated the adequacy of corrective action The inspector's review also included followup on the licensee's implementation of corrective actio (Closed) LER 281/91-'02, Main Steam Safety Valves Out-Of-Tolerance Due To Minor Setpoint Drift. This issue involved licensee identificati6n during MSSV setpoint testing that one of the fifteen Unit 2 MSSV's as*-found
.setpoint exceeded the TS allowed rang Immediate *corrective action involved adjustinf the setpoint to within the required TS rang The licensee concluded that the out-of-tolerance setpoint was due to setpoint drift and did not adversely effect pl ant safet The licensee's
corrective actions appeared to be ad~quat (Closed) LER 281/91-05, Reactor Coolant System Leakage Exceeded TS Limits Due To The Mechanical Failure Of Isolation Valv This issue involved excessive leakage from the packing of the Unit 2 RTD bypass line isolation valve, RC-9 The leakage rate exceeded the rate allowed by TSs and resulted in a plant shutdow This event and correttive actions were discussed in IR 280,281/91-1 All corrective actions discussed in the LER have been completed with the exception of r~moval of the RTD bypass lin The inspectors verified that removal of the RTD bypass line was in the licensee's commitment tracking system and is tentatively scheduled during the next Unit 2 refueling outag In addition to the corrective actions listed in the LER, the licensee is perfonning a failure analysis on the applicable RC-95 paits. The licensee's corrective actions appeared to be adequat (Closed) LER 281/91-06, Safety Interlock Rendered Inoperable and Unit Not Placed In Hot Shutdown Within Six Hours Due to Personnel Erro This issue was discussed in IR 280,281/91-21 and identified as a violation of TS Corrective action for this LERwill be reviewed during the close-out*
of the violatio *
(Closed) LER 280,281/91~07, Both Trains Of Auxiliary Ventilation Exhaust Inoperabl This issue involved licensee identification that both trains of emergency exhaust ventilation were isolated due to operator erro This issue was discussed in IR 280,281/91-10 and identified as NCV 280,281/91-10-0 The licensee's cotrective actions for this event were to review the event with operating shifts, labeling emergency exhaust fan control switches to indicate power supply, and changirig procedures to require verification of. emergency exhaust fan power supply prior to removing the train from servic The inspectors verified that labeling had been added i denti fyi ng power source The inspectors al s_o reviewed procedures MOP 21.1, Removing Auxiliary Ventilation Exhaust Train A From Service, dated May 10, 1991, and MOP 21.2, Removing Auxiliary Ventilation
- Exhaust Train B From Service, dated May 10, 1991, and verified that instructions were added to verify power available to the other train prior to removing a train from servic The licensee's corrective actions appeared to be adequat (Closed) LER 280,281/91-11, SW Radiation Monitoring Pumps Inoperable Due To Air Binding As A Result Of Inadequate Design.* During a functional test of the Unit 2 RSHX SW outlet radiation monitors, it was discovered that the pumps that provide SW flow through the radiation monitors could not develop* adequate* flow or pressure when a vacuum existed in the* CW discharge tunne Immediate corrective action involved stationing an operator at the*CW discharge vacuum breaker with instructions to open the valve to break discharge tunnel vacuum:when *notified of a high-high CLS signa Longer term corrective action involved modification of the SW radiation pump circuitry such that *the pumps were started in manual in lieu of automatic on a high-high CLS signa Emergency procedure E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, was revised to require manual opening.of*
the CW disc~arge tunnel vacuum breaker and.manually starting the radiation pump The inspectors reviewed E-0, dated May 29, 1991, TM 91-10 which modified the. pumps' circuitry, and JCO,.91-004, RSHX Radiation Monitor Sample Pump Operation, and concluded that these corrective actions appeared to be adequat The licensee is planning to conduct an engineering evaluation to improve the desi.gn of the RSHX SW radiation monitors and make changes if deemed appropriat The desigh review and subsequent changes was *being tracked by the licensee's CTS items 1306 and 130 The inspector~ noted that the licensee's corrective actions for this LER involved the replacement of automatic functions with manual action In a future inspection, the inspectors will review the licensee's criteria for determining when automatic functions can be replaced by manual action and how the number of these extra operator actions are controlled such that they can be readily carried out when the minimum number of operators are available on shif This item is 1dentifi ed as inspector foll owup item 50-280/91-29-01, Acceptability.of Manual Operator Action to Compensate for Automatic Functio (Open) LER. 280/91-13, MCC Room Fire Suppression System Inoperable Due to Personnel Error In Administratively Controlling the MCC Room Exit Doo This issue involved personnel blocking open the Unit 1 cable vault upper level MCC room exit door without establishing provisions to shut the door if a fire in the area would have occurre Immediate corrective action involved entering TS 3.21.B.4 action statement which required that a continuous fire watch be stationed with one hou The failure to properly control the door was attributed to an inadequate JC The door was opened to maintain temperature in the Unit 1 cable _vault upper level at or below 40 degrees C to prevent over heating the pressurizer heater cables and breakers that were located in the area. Over heating of these components could result in the degradation of the containment electrical penetrations for* the pressurizer heater cable Engineering prepared a JCO to recognize *this condition and one of the requirements of the JCO was to open the door to aid in controlling room temperature; however, the JCO failed to specify the necessary controls to station a fire watch or to
close the door in this type or similar event *. Corrective action for the inadequate JCO was to provide additional training on preparing JCOs to the responsible engineering personne The inspectors reviewed the training *
lesson for this subject and considered it acceptable. Corrective actions included issuing a memorandum to personnel responsible for monitoring temperature in the' room to verify that the door is properly maintained,.
and placing signs on the Units 1 and 2 cable vault upper level exit doors that listed special controls when the doors are* op.e The inspectors*
reviewed the memorandum and verified that the signs were placed on the door *The licensee has initiated an engineering study to evaluate the need to enhance door markings to make it easier for personnel to recognize what doors require special control This engineering study is being tracked by licensee CTS item 1396 but was not completed in time to prevent a similar event that occurred on October 28.. This issue is discussed in paragraph This item wtll remain open until the licen.see completes corrective actions to ensure that boundary doors for rooms that contain gas suppression* fire systems are properly controlle (Closed) LER 280/90-08, RCS Leakage Exceeds 10 gpm Due to Sensing Line Brea This issue involved the failure of stainless steel tubing located upstream of a pressure gage in the letdown system which resulted in an RCS leak rate greater than allowed by TS The licensee concluded that the tubing failed during a pressure surge in the letdown system when the operators imprbperly placed the deborator in servic The licensee's analysis of the failed. tubing indicated. that a crack existed on the tubing's internal surface. The crack in the tube, in combination with the pressure surge, resulted in the failure. _ The licensee's immediate corrective actions involved isolating the leak and exiting the TS.action statemen The licensee I s corrective actions to prevent reoccurrence involved revising operating procedures that place the deborator inservice to prevent a pressure surge in the letdown system, provide an administra-tive procedure to specify which operating evolutions are considered skill of the craft, discussion of this issue with all operating shifts, and performance of a failure analysis of the failed tubin The inspectors reviewed procedures 1,2-0P-8.2.5, Placing eves Deborating Demineralizer In Service, dated May 17, 1988, OPAP-0002, Operations Administrative Procedure, dated December 17, 1991, and the failure analysis for the failed *tubing; and consider that the corrective actions are adequat.
Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701, 92702)
(Closed) P21 280,281/89-12, Failure of Cam-Type Torque Switch With Fiber Spacer This issued involved SMB-00 and SMB-000 torque switch failure as a result of the stationary contact screws loosening on the side of the torque switches with fiber spacer In the notice, Limi torque recorrmended that the affected torque switches be replaced during the next available maintenance perio The licensee issued EWR 89-673, Evaluate Valve Torque Switch Spacers, dated December 27, 1989. This EWR identified which valves were affected by the notice and provided instructions for inspecting the
. torque switch spacers for excessive pla All inspections have been
completed with the exception of torque switches on valve l-CH-LCV-1115 No loose torque switch sp~cers were identified during the inspection CH-LCV~lll5C. is scheduled to be inspected during the next Unit 1 refueling outag The licensee's corrective actions appeared to be adequat Within the areas inspected, no violations were identifie ld. Exit Interview
. The inspection s_cope and results were summarized on November 8, 1991, with those individuals identified by an asterisk in paragraph 1. The following summary of inspectio_n activity was discussed by the inspectors during this exi Item Number Status IFI 280/91-29-01 Ope LER 280/90-08 Closed LER 280,281/91-07 Closed LER 280,281/91-11 Closed
. LER 280/91-13 Open LER 281/91-02 Closed LER 281/91-05 Closed LER 281/91-06 Closed Description and Reference Acceptability of Manual Operator Ation to Compensate for Automatic Function, paragraph RCS Leakage Exceeds 10 gpm Due to Sensing Line-Break, paragraph Both Trains of Auxiliary Ventilation Exhauit Inoperable, paragraph SW Radiation Monitoring Pumps Inoperable Due to Air Binding As a Result of Inadequate Design, paragraph 7 *
MCC. Room Fire Suppression System Inoperable Due to Personnel Error in Administratively Controlling the MCC Room Exit Door, paragraph Mai ri Steam Safety Va 1 ves Out of Tolerance Due to Minor Setpoint Drift, paragraph Reactor Coolant System Leakage Exceeded TS Limits Due to the Mechanical Failure of Isolation Valve, paragraph Safety Interlock Rendered Inoperable and Unit Not Placed in Hot Shutdown Within Six Hours Due to Personne 1 Error, paragraph ff
Item Number Status P21 280,281/89-12. Closed Description and Reference*
Failure of Cam-Type Torque Switch With Fiber Spacers, paragraph The licensee acknowl~dged the inspection conclusions with no dissenti~g comment The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials that was provided to or reviewed by the inspectors duri.ng this inspectio.
Index of Acronyms and Initialisms *
AOD AIR OPERATED DAMPER C
CELSIUS CLS CONSEQUENCE LIMITING SAFEGUARDS CTS COMMITMENT TRACKING SYSTEM eves CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM CW CIRCULATING *wATER ECCS EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM EDG EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERAiOR EWR ENGINEERING WORK REQUEST IPE INDEPENDENT PLANT EVALUATION IR INSPECTION REPOR JCO
- JUST! FICATION FOR CONTINUED OPERATION LER LICENSEE EVENT REPORT MCC MOTOR CONTROL CENTER MOD MOTOR OPERATED DAMPER MOP MAINTENANCE OPERATING PROCEDURE MSSV MAIN STEAM SAFETY. VALVE NCV NON-CITED VIOLATION NRC NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
- OPAP OPERATING ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES PMT POST MAINTENANCE TEST PRA PROBABILISTIC RISK ASSESSMEN PSI
. POUNDS PER SQUARE INCH RCS REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM RSHX RECIRCULATION SPRAY HEAT EXCHANGER RTD RESISTANCE TEMPERATURE DEVICE SW SERVICE WATER TM TEMPORARY MODIFICATION TS
. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS VPAP VIRGINIA POWER ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES