IR 05000280/1991025
| ML18153C790 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 10/01/1991 |
| From: | Rankin W, Wright F NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18153C789 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-280-91-25, 50-281-91-25, NUDOCS 9110290069 | |
| Download: ML18153C790 (33) | |
Text
Report Nos. :
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION-
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323 001 O 1199\\ *
50-280/91-25 and 50-281/91-25 Licensee: Virginia Electric and Power Company Glen Allen, VA 23060
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Docket Nos.:
50-280 and 50-281
. License Nos.:
DPR-32 and DPR-37 Facility Name:
Surry 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted:
August 26 -
30, 1991 Inspi,Ctor:.* ~f(/ 4)~:J-:
F. N. Wright,:Te~eader Team Members:
T. Guilfold w. Rankin A. Rupp J. York Approved by:L-0) ~~
~~
W. H. Rankin, Chie Emergency Preparedness Section Radiological Protection and Emergency Preparedness Branch
Date/Signed Date Signed Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards SUMMARY Scope:.
. This routine, announced inspection involved the observation and evaluation of the annual emergency preparedness exercise. Emergency organization activation _and response were selectively observ~d in the Simulator Control Room (SCR), Technical Support Center (TSC),
Operational Support Center (OSC), and Local Emergency Operations Facility (LEOF). The inspection also included a review of the exercise scenario and observation of the licensee's post exercise critiqu This exercise was held in conjunction with an ingestion pathway exercise which included emergency response demonstrations by the Commonwealth of Virginia and several local government In the areas inspect~d, violations or deviations were not identifie Licensee performance as observed was timely and sufficient to mitigate offsite consequences of the simulated accident. Demonstrated program trengths included: good emergency response command and control; rompt activation of emergency facilities; timely event 9110290069 911001 PDR ADOCK 05000280 Q
. PDR
- lassificat{on, declarations, and initial notifications; high levels of staff proficiency, evidence of strong training; good response to assess and mitigate plant damage; good transition from the primary operational support center to it's backup facility; a lead controller communications network that provided efficient exercise control; and effective management of damage control teams. An*area needing
.additional management attention concerned Radiological Control Area (RCA) access process timeliness during emergency conditions.
- REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees,,
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R. Allen, Emergency Operations Director
- W. Benthall, Nuqlear Safety and Licensing
- M *. Biron, Alternate Radiological Assessment Director R. Blount II, Emergency Procedures Coordinator
- M. Bowling, Licensing Manager
- D. Christian, Site Emergency Manager*
- J. Collins, Drill Manager
- J. Costello, Emergency Preparedness
- J. Curling, Security Lead Controller
- J. Downs, Outage and Planning Superintendent
- D. Erickson, Radiological Assessment Director
- A. Fletcher, Design Supervisor
- A. Friedman, Nuclear Training Superintendent
- R. Gwalthney, Maintenance Superintendent M. Haduck, Emergency Maintenance Director
- ~. Lee, Corporate Nuclear Engineering
- W. Madison, Lead Controller
- G. Marshall, Operations
- A. Meekings, Administrative Services Supervisor
- W. Neidermeyer, Simulator Lead Controller
- J. Ogren, osc Lead Controller
- J. Price, Assistant Statton Manager
- R. Saunders, Alternate Recovery Manager I. Seybold, Health Physics Lead Observer K. Sloane, Alternate Emergency Operations Director
- D. Snoody, osc Director
- T. Sowers, Emergency Technical Director A. Wheeler, Simulator Control Room Shift Supervisor
- S. Wood, Training *
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R. Yizzi, Simulator Control Room Senior Reactor Operator Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included engineers, operators, mechanics, security force members, technicians, and administrative personne Exerc.ise Scenario (82302)
The scenario for the emergency exercise was reviewed to determine that provisions had been made to test the integrated capability*
and a major portion of the basic elements existing within the licensee's Emergency Plan and organization as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b) (14), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.F, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.N~
The-scenario_was reviewed in advance of the scheduled exercise date and was discussed with licensee representatives. The scenario was adequate to exercise fully the onsite and offsite emergency organizations of the licensee and provide sufficient emergency information.to the State and local government agencies for their participation in the exer~is *
The licensee's controller communication network was-effective and enabled all lead controllers to be aware of current activities in*
each of the other emergency facilities. The communication system was an effective scenario tool that was utilized to keep the scenario moving as planne No violations or deviations were identifie.
Assignment of Responsibility (82301)
This* area was observed to determine that primary respbnsibilities for emergency response by the licensee have beeri specifically
established and that adequate staff was available to respond to an emergency as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b) (1), 10.CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.A, and specified criteria in NUREG-0654,Section I The inspector observed that specific emergency assignments and responsibilities were made for the licensee's onsite emergency response organization, and that adequate staff was available to respond to the simulated emergency. It should be noted that a transportation accident involving radioactive material in route from the licensee's facility to a vendor occurred during the exercise. Licensee response to that accident _created additional demands on key emergency personnel including the various emergency directors. However, the alternates performed well throughout the organization, indicating good organizational planning and trainin No violations or deviations were identifie.
Onsite Emergency Organization (82301_)
The licensee's on-shift emergency_organization was observed to determine that the responsibilities for emergency response were unambiguously defined, that adequate staffing was provided to insure initial facility accident response in key functional areas at all t:i.mes, and that the interfaces were specified as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b) (2), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.A, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section I The inspector observed that the initial on-shift emergency organization was well defined; the responsibility and authority for directing actions necessary to respond to the emergency were clear; and that staff were available t~ fill key functional positions within the organizatio The inspector observed the activation, staffing, and operation of the emergency organizations in the SCR, TSC, osc, and LEOF. The licensee was able to staff and activate the above Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs) within approximately 30 minute The initial response o_rganizatiori was augmented by designated licensee representatives on-shift. Because of the scenario scope and conditions, long term or cqntinuous staffing of the emergency
. response organization was not require *
No violations or deviations were identifie.
Emergency Classification System J82301)
This area was observed to determine that a standard emergency classification and action level scheme was in use by the nuclear facility licensee as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b) (4), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.C, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section I *
Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIP)-1.01, Emergency Action Level Table, provided for off-normal events to be classified into one of the four emergency classification categories: The-designated Station Emer_gency Manager (SEM) in the SCR _-promptly and correctly used the procedure to identify and classify the Notification of Unusual Event and the Alert as*did-the SEM in the TSC to classify the site Area Emergency and General Emergenc No. violations or deviations were identifie.
Notification Methods and Piocedures (82301)
This area was observed to assure that procedures were established for notification of State and local response organizations and emergency personnel by the-licensee, and that the_ content of initial and followup messages to response organizations was establishe This area was further observed to assure that means to provide early notification to the population within the plume exposure pathway were established pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b) (5),
Paragraph IV.D of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.E of NUREG-065 Notifications to offsite authorities were established-in EPIP-2.01, Notification of State and Local Governments, and EPIP-2.02, Notification of NRC. The inspector observed that notification methods and procedures were used promptly to provide -
information concerning the simulated emergency conditions to Federal, state, and local response organizations and to alert the licensee's augmented emergency response organizatio *
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Notifications of the Commonwealth of Virginia and local offsite organizations were completed within the 15 minutes following the classification and declaration of the emergency even The Early Warning System, consisting of sirens located throughout the 10 mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) that can be used to alert the public within the EPZ, was not activated during.the exercise due to a concern that the public may be confused over appropriate response given the ongoing transportation acciden No violations.or deviations were identifie.
Emergency Communications (82301)
This area was observed to determine that provisions existed for prompt communications among principal response organizations and emergency personne 1 as. required by 1 O CFR 5 O. 4 7 ( b) ( 6), 1 O CFR 5 O, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section I The inspector observed that adequate communications existed among the licensee's emergency organizations, and between the licensee's emergency response organi~ation and offsite authoritie No violations or deviations were identifie.
Emergency Facilities and Equipment (82301)
This area was observed to determine that adequate emergency facilities and equipment to support an emergency response were provided and maintained as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b) (8),
10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in N~EG-0654,Section I The inspector observed the activation, staffing, and operation of key Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs), including the SCR, TSC, OSC, _and LEOF. In addition, the inspector observed the emergency medical dril Emergency Medical Drill This area was observed to determine whether first aid to a potentially contaminated injured individual is effectively provided and to assure appropriate actions are taken to transport the worker to the offsite hospita An inspector observed the response of the first aid and HP team to the simulated contaminated injured worker. Efforts were properly directed to the life-threatening injury.
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Contamination monitoring and control were provided, but in a manner not to impede the first aid treatment. The simulated contaminated injured worker was transported to an offsite hospital in*the licensee's emergency vehicle. The licensee observer noted several areas for improved coordination between the first aid and Health Physics (HP) response staf *
The licensee's handling of the simulated contaminated injured worker was effectiv No violations or deviations were identifie Simulator Control Room The Shift Supervisor (SS) demonstrated excellent command and contr61 throughout the exercise and classifications and notific~tions were accomplished efficiently and in'a timely manner. Both reactor operators and supervisors demonstrated good use of the normal, abnormal, emergency operating procedures, and the EPIPs throughout the exercise. The operations. staff worked extremely well as a tea The turnover briefing from the ss to the SEM was.effectiv There were ~ome minor communication problems. in the SCR that were identified by the licensee. However these problems did
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not impede the exercise time line. They included:
0 o*
The GaiTronics announcing system in the SCR was difficult to hear and required the operators on several occasions to request information/report repeat backs on other communication source The ss did not inform Security that the injured man was contaminated even though he spoke to Security three times after he was aware of the contamination proble The three calls included requesting outside assistance and an ambulance and requests for status reports on the ambulanc At time 0952, the SS received data confirming an Operation Basis Earthquake had occurre The ss then spent nine minutes discussing the data with the Senior Reactor Operator before he declared an Alert at time 100 When he did-declare the Alert he declared it as of 095 There were some access problems for operations personnel attempting to enter the RCA during the emergency exercis These included:
0 At 1218 the Loss Of Coolant Accident occurred requiring the operators to enter Emergency Procedure 1-E-Immediate action Step 12 of 1-E-O requires valve 1-CW-117 to be opened locally. According to a plant safety analysis conducted by the Nuclear Analysis and Fuel Group, valve CW-117 was required to be opened within 29 minutes from Safety Injection (SI)
initiation. The operator directed to open CW-117 was delayed 33 minutes at HP checkpoint prior to entering the RC..
During the controller critique, it was also identified*
that an operator directed to investigate the "Boric*
Acid Flats" was delayed 42 minutes at HP checkpoint prior to entering the RC Discussion with the.*
facility controller indicated th~ operator left the annex at 0~11 and reaphed the "Boric Acid Flats" one
.hour later at 101 Several factors contributed to the delay including:
HP discussion on dress out requirements, Waiting for the results of air samples, The operator became contaminated (simulated) when he entered a contaminated area that had not been identified, and The operator waited for AP-37 inspection form Licensee representatives reported that operations personnel were processed into the RCA as normal damage control personnel and did not receive any emergency prioritizatio Inability to dispatch operations personnel in a timely manner and process them through radiation protection program access requirements for entry into the RCA during emergency conditions in a timely manner is an NRC concern when delayed operator actions may affect the safety of the reacto Therefore, corrective action for this problem area will be carefully examined during the next exercise. The inspector indicated to the licensee that this area will be tracked as an Inspector Followup Item (IFI) (50-280/91-25-0l: RCA Access Timeliness For Operators and Damage Control Teams During Emergency Conditions).
No violations or deviations were identifie Technical Support Center The TSC was activated and staffed promptly upon notification by the SEM of the Alert qlassification. The facility layout provided for a good interface between the SEM and his Emergency Directors. Command and control in the *rsc was go9d specifically considering a majority of the TSC directors
were alternates. TSC status boards were kept current and the informatiop provided was used to facilitate decision makin Technical assessment and mitigation activities were aggressively and properly pursued by the technical, maintenance and operations staffs. *
The following communication problems were~observed by the inspecto During the first 15 minutes after TSC activation it was difficult to carry on voice conversation in the TSC because of elevated noise levels partly due to extensive GaiTronics system administrative announcement The SEM directed an announcement be made restricting use of GaiTronics for drill comments and emergency announcemen~s only.
. The SEM thought the Alert had been declared at 093 He had 0930.written in this turnover information and this is the time of declaration he announced when he conducted his initial TSC st~ff briefin Although the Emergency Operations Director (EOD) and the EPChad recorded the correct Alert declaration time as 0952 they did not correct the SE Beginning approximately one hour after TSC activation one or two of the TSC directors were not attentive to the SEM's periodic staff update briefing At time 1225, the SEM initially recommended Protective Action Recommendation (PAR) 3 to the Recovery Manager (RM) based on misinterpretation a block on the PAR matri Upon further discussion with the Radiological Assessment Director (RAD) and the Emergency Preparedness Coordinator (EPC) the error was noted and at time 1236 the correct PAR recommendation or PAR 2 was made to the RM.
. The TSC facilities were well equipped and organized to support simulated plant emergency condition No violations or deviations were identifie Operational Support Center
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Activation of the osc, which was located in the licensee's maintenance building, was initiated by the declaration of an Alert in accordance with EPIP 3.03, Activation of Operational Support Center. The inspector observed that, upon Alert declaration, personnel responded promptly to staff the faci~ity. The OSC was declared -activated with minimum staffing, within 10 minutes of the Alert
-classification. The osc Director promptly organized the staff and opened and maintained good communication with the TS In accordance with the exercise scenario a earthquake caused damage to the maintenance building such that the OSC had to be evaduated and reestablished at it's alternate locatiori~
The alternate OSC was activated about 15 minutes after the primary osc was damaged. The evacuation and relocation was made in an orderly fashion. The alternate osc was located in the Unit 1 emerg~ncy switchgear roo Several problems concerning the alternate osc were noted by the inspector including the following:
0 The majority of tools used by the craft were available at the primary osc, however, following the move to the alternate osc the osc Director recognized that tools were no longer readily available~ The OSC Director dispatched a team to the primary osc to obtain some basic tools that may be needed. The inspector determined that EPIP 3.03 needed to address the availability tools at the alternative os The osc Director set up command in the area near the telephona. That area was not well lighted and did not have a work table or chair. There were also no tables*
or chairs for any of the staff needing to complete paperwork or read a procedur Prior to moving to the alternate osc facility, voice communication environment for all players and participants was good. The OSC Director's orders and instructions that were spoken in a normal voice could be heard by all participants in the immediate are After moving to the alternate osc the communication environment was significantly degraded due to the noise of operating equipment in the area. The Director's voice communication was reduced to a one on one basi Hand held phone communications between the osc Director and other participants was considered good. However, GaiTronic$ messages could not be heard at the alternate osc phone location, where_ the Director was statione Routine verbal staff briefings were not possible because of the noise levels in the area and emergency status information was not posted in an area where most of the staff could see it.
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The OSC Director and his staff maintained effective control of damage control teams dispatched*out of.the OSC. In addition to logs and various paperwork, a* ;status board was used by the OSC Director to keep track of the location and status of damage control teams after they were dispatched from the alternate osc for various work activitie,*
Observation, operation, and repair teams coordinated with the TSC and HP.before dispatch to the RCA entr At the RCA entry, teams were briefed on potential.r&diological conditions and protective measure Radiological conditions were monitored.by HP technicians:who accompanied OSC team The coordination betwee~ damage control teams arid HP was considered good, in that, no holdups were reported in.'~his area for teams working out of the os The osc was effective in providing support in response to simulated-events. However, the alternative osc facilities were poo No violations or deviations were identifie Local Emergency Operations Facility The LEOF was promptly staffed and activated with qualified personnel. The Interim Recovery Manager and RM provided timely and accurate status updates to the LEOF staff. Dose assessment personnel performed timely offsite dose calculations using compµter models. The inspector also *noted good command and control of the field monitoring teams. The teams were dispatched early from the site and were positioned at logical projected plume path monitoring point No violations or deviations were identifie.
Accident Assessment (82301)
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This area was observed to determine whe~her adequate 'methods, systems, and equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency condition were in use as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b) (9),
10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.B, and specific criteria in NUREG~0654,Section I.
The accident assessment program included both an engineering assessment of plant status and an assessment of radiological hazards to both onsite and offsite personnel resulting from the
- simulated accident. During.the exercise, the engineering accident assessment team.functioned effectively in analyzing the plant status so as to make recommendations to the SEM concerning mitigating actions to reduce damage to plant equipment; to
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'l lo prevent release of radioactive materials; and to ~erminate the emergency conditio Onsite and offsite radiological monitoring teams were dispatched to determine the level of radioactivity in those areas within the influence of the simulated plume. The teams effectively demonstrated their capability to collect those data points and relay those data to the emergency response facilitie No violations or deviations were identifie.
Protective Responses (82301)
This area was observed to determine that_guidelines for protective actions during the emergency, consistent with Federal guidance, were developed and.in place, and protective actions for emergency workers, including evacuation of nonessential personnel, were implemented promptly as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b) (10), and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section I The inspector verified that the licensee had and used emergency procedures for formulating PARs for offsite populations within the 10 mile EPZ. The RM in the LEOF provided timely and accurate PARs to Commonwealth of Virginia personnel. PARs were routinely *
.reevaluated for accuracy and status updates.were provided to th offsite authorities. Protective actions were initiated for onsite personnel following the Alert declaration by conducting a personn~l accountability of *those personnel inside the protecte area. The_ site accountability* process was achieved and reported within 30 ~inute *
No violations or deviations were identifie :J-Exercise critiq~_e (82301)
The licensee's critique of the emergency exercise was observed to determine whether shortcomings in the performance of the exercise were brought to the attention of management and documented for corrective action pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b) (14), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section I The licensee conducted facility critiques with exercise. players immediately following the exercise termination. Licensee controllers and observers conducted additional critiques*prior to the formal critique to management on August 29, 1991. The critique process including the critique to management was well organized and thorough and included a review of the objectives
.. that had been established for demonstration during the exercis Issues identified during the exerdise were thoroughly discussed by licensee representatives during the critique. Licensee actio *
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on identified findings will be reviewed during subsequent NRC inspections. The licensee's critique addressed both substantive deficiencies and improvement areas. The conduct of the critique was consistent with the regulatory requirements and guidelines cited above and considered a program.strengt No violations or deviations were identifie. *Previous Inspection Findings (92701)
(Closed) IFI 50-338/90-31-0l: Failure to direct damage control teams in accordance with the procedures. The item is closed based on inspection team observations of, good management control of damage assessment teams and the performance demonstrated by the damage assessment team.
Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on August 29, 1991. The inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection incl.uding the IF Propriety information is not contained in this report. Dissenting.comments were not received from the license Item Number 50-280/91-25-01 Attachments.:
Exercise Objectives, Narrative summary, * and Time Line Description and Reference IFI - Access Timeliness For Operators and Damage Control Teams Entering RCA During Emergency Conditions (Paragraph 8).
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VIRGINIA POWER SURRY POWER STATION AUGUST 27, 28, AND 29, 1991 EMERGENCY EXERCISE-OBJECTIVES
VIRGINIA POWER SURRY POWER STATION AUGUST 27, 28, AND 29, 1991 EMERGENCY EXERCISE OBJECTIVES SUMMARY The purpose of this exercise is to demonstrate the adequacy of the Surry Power station Emergency Plan, the Corporate Emergency Response Plan, and associated implementing procedure The objectives of this Emergency Exercise are to demonstrate by actua"i performance a number of key emergency preparedness functions as they relate to the Surry Power Station Emergency Pla The simulated accident will involve:
emergency classification, notifications of company and off-site organizations, simulated actions to correct the emergency condition, and initiation of accident assessment and protective actions as necessary to cope with the even The event will include a simulated off-site radiological release -and ground deposition to support a combined plume and ingestion pathway exercis The attached objectives, as numbered in the Virginia Power Nuclear; Emergency Preparedness Six Year Plan, will be demonstrated as applicable to the schedule pr~visions of this pla As applicable to the events developed by the exercise scenario, the Surry Power Station and Corporate Emergency Response Facilities (ERF) will be activated. Each ERF staff will demonstrate functions described in the implementing procedure Emergency response functions which are impractical to demonstrate will be simulate A matrix is provided which indicates the objectives and the Virginia Power Emergency Response Facilities/Groups where they will be demonstrate The Control Room Simulator will be used in lieu of th~ actual Station Control Roo *
The following is a list of Corporate and Station Facilities and Groups with their names or acronyms:
(1)
Control Room Simulator (CRS)
(2)
Technical support Center (TSC)
(3)
Operational support Center (OSC)
(4)
Local ~ergency Operations Facility (LEOF)
(5)
Corporate Emergency Response Center (CERC)
(6)
Joint Public Information Center (JPIC)
(7)
Local Media Center (LMC)
(8)
Health Physics (HP)
(9)
Security (10) Chemistry
VIRGINIA POWER SURRY POWER STATION AUGUST 27, 28, AND 29, 1991 EMERGENCY EXERCISE OBJECTIVES The following objectives establish the scope of the August 27, 28,
- and 29, 1991 Emergency Exercis The objectives ensure that required events are included in the exercise scenario and establish appropriate exercise evaluation criteri.
Demonstrate the ability to analyze station conditions, assess Emergency Action Level (EAL)* parameters, and classify the emergenc The CRS and TSC ERO, will demonstrate this objective by initiation and use of EPIP-1.01 and appropriate operational procedure Status forms detailing radiological monitor and operational data may be issued at periodic-intervals to facilitate conduct of the scenario. The ability to acquire data using the Emergency Response Computer system (ERCS)
or by back-up methods will be demonstrated in appropriate facilitie.
Demonstrate the ability to notify, mobilize, and sustain the Surry Power Station and Corporate Emergency Response Organization T.he CRS staff, Station Security, and Corporate Security will notify and mobilize the Emergency Response Organizations.,
station ERO notification will be conducted in accordance with the appropriate Station EPIP' Corporate Security will initiate their Emergency Notification Procedure to call out the corporate ER sustain continuous response capability will be demonstrated by the TSC, LEOF, CERC, and JPIC by formulating shift relief rosters. In addition, the process for obtaining logistical and technical support for the Emergency Response personnel may be demonstrate.
Demonstrate the ability to notify the state and local governments and the NRC within established time constraint The CRS, TSC, and LEOF ERO w,ill demonstrate this objective by providing up-to-date information to federal, state, and local governments within required time limits *
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- State and Local Government Notification Information for these notifications will be identified-and recorded by an Emergency Communicator (EC) on EPIP-2. 01, Attachment 1 (Report of Emergency to State and Local Governments),
and Attachment
(Report of Radiological Conditions to the State).-
Upon approval by the station Emergency Manager ( SEM)
or the Recovery Manager (RM), the EC will transmit the information to the state and/or local government The start time for completing the 15-minute initial notification will commence when the SEM declares the emergency classification. Follow;;.*up communications will be maintained. using EPIP-2. 01, Attachment 1, and will occur at about 30 minute intervals or as conditions chang As conditions warrant, the ability to transmit Protective Action Recommendations (PARs)
to the State will be demonstrated in accordance with EPIP-1. OS and appropriate notification procedure The EC will transmit the initial Report of Radiological Conditions (EPIP-2.01, Attachment 2)
to *the state following data assimilation,. recording, and approva Follow-up notifications on radiological conditions will occur at about 30 minute intervals or as conditions chang The SEM retain~ responsibility for state and local government notifications until the LEOF is activate Following LEOF activation, responsibility for notification is transferred to the Recovery Manager (RM). NRC Notification Information for these notifications will be identified and recorded by the EC on EPIP-2.02, Attachment 1 (NRC Event Notification Worksheet), Attachment 2, (NRC Emergency Communicator Log),
and EPIP-4. 03, Attachment 1 (HPN Communications).
Upon approval by the SEM, the ECs will transmit the information,to the NR The start time for completing the 1-hour initial notification commences when the SEM declares the emergency classification. The initial notification will be performed from the CR Following initial notification and 'unless directed otherwise, the EC will maintain continuous communications-with NRC Operations to transmit pi ant condition changes. Communication dialogue highlights will be documented.
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- Responsibility for NRC Notifications in accordance with EPIP-2.02 will remain with the TSC ER Responsibility for Health Physics Network (HPN) communications will be transferred to the LEOF following activation of that facilit Demonstrate the ability to.conduct assembly and accountability of personnel within the Protected Are The Station Security Staff will demonstrate this objective in accordance with EPIP-5. 09 and EPIP-5. 03. Also, to support the
- overall accountability process, the Assembly Area Leaders will perform area accountability in accordance with EPIP-5.03, Attachment 1 (Personnel Accountability). Demonstrate the ability to assemble, dispatch, and control on-site emergency teams to perform response activitie.
As appropriate, the CRS, TSC, and osc staffs will demonstrate this objective by dispatching and* controlling teams in response 1;:.o scenario events within the Station Protected-Are Also, the ability to brief emergency teams and establish appropriate protective measures and communications will be demonstrate Prior to Emergency Response Facility activation, the CRS staff will demonstrate this objective by initiating applicable procedure Following facility activation, the TSC and osc staffs will demonstrate this objective by implementing EPIP-3.02, EPIP-3.03, and EPIP-5.0 Demonstrate the ability to assess conditions and implement appropriate protective measures for emergency response personnel, including site access control, contamination control, exposure control, use of protective devices and, as appropriate, the process for authorization of potassium iodide (KI) administratio This objective will be demonstrated through an interface among the CRS, TSC, and osc ERO in which.the TSC staff will monitor and authorize protective measures for site access, contamination control, and exposure contro The TSC organization, via the Radiation Protection Supervisor (RPS) located in the Health Physics area, will dispatch and direct monitoring teams within the bounds of the site property per EPIP-4. 01 and EPIP-4. 02 and associated procedures to assess radiological
- condition Protective measures appropriate
~or conditions will be developed and/or implemented for emergency response personne Security will implement access control measures in accordance with EPIP-5.09 and EPIP-5.04 *
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The OSC Staff and other site personnel will implement any necessary actions associated with protective equipment requirements and in-plant access contro If necessary, in response to scenario events, the CRS and/or TSC and osc staffs will demonstrate the process for requesting and authorizing exposure extensions, to include emergency exposure authorization in accordance with EPIP-4.01, EPIP-4.04, and EPIP-5.0 Also, if necessary, the TSC staff will demonstrate the KI authorization process per EPIP-4.01 and EPIP-5.0 If necessary, in response to scenario events, the TSC will demonstrate the planning and notification processes for protective measures and evacuating non-essential personnel in accordance with EPIP-4.07 and EPIP-s.os.*
- Demonstrate the ability to develop appropriate Off-site Protective Action Recommendations (PARs) based on assessment of plant conditions and off-site dose projections and/or measurement As appropriate, this objective will be demonstrated by the SEM from the TSC or by the RM in the LEO The TSC. and LEOF organizations will monitor plant conditions and perform off-site dose projections. to support formulation. of PAR Responsibility for PAR development is transferred to the LEOF following activation of that facilit Radiological parameter data generated during the development of this scenario may be artificially elevated and may not represent the degree of fuel failure and radiological release commensurate with the plant dynamic event.This may be necessary to demonstrate this exercise objectiv.
Demonstrate the ability to perform off-site dose assessmen As appropriate, this objective will be demonstrated by the TSC and LEOF staff The ability to perform initial dose assessment will be demonstrated through the implementation of EPIP-4.01 and associated dose assessment procedure Field monitoring teams will be dispatched per EPIP-4. 01, EPIP-4. 02, and associated procedures to support the dose assessment effor As appropriate, these teams will be directed by. the RPS and/or the TSC and LEOF staff.
As appropriate, demonstrate the ability of Health Physics and Chemistry to conduct radiological monitoring activities, including exposure rate surveys, sample collection, and sample analysis. *
As required, radiological monitoring, sampling, and analysis for in-plant and/or on-site activities will be initiated in accordance with EPIP-4.0 Post Accident Sampling activities may be performed in ac;cordance with EPIP-4.22 and EPIP-4.2 The field monitoring teams will perform radiological monitoring activities in accordance with EPIP-4.03, EPIP-4.15 and EPIP-4.16*.
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Reactor coolant and/ or containment samples may* be obtained utilizing the High Radiation Sampling System (HRSS).
Radiological data necessary to test response and monitoring capabilities will be provided by the controller during sample
. collection. Isotopic analysis data will be provided following demonstration of proper sample preparation and upon expiration of spectrum collection and analysis time.
Demonstrate the ability to effectively activate the emergency response facilities and associated emergency response pr-ocesse Activation of facilities and*emergency processes by the TSC, osc, LEOF, CERC, JPIC, and the LMC, will be demonstrated in accordance with the appropriate procedure OSC evacuation and relocation will be demonstrated.
As appropriate, activation of emergency processes will be demonstrated by Health Physics, Chemistry and Securit.
Demonstrate that facility layout and equipment support emergency response activities in each facilit This objective will be demonstrated in the CRS, TSC, OSC, LEOF, CERC, JPIC, and LM In addition, Security, Health Physics and Chemistry facilities will demonstrate-this objectiv.
Demonstrate the ability to establish and maintain effective communication The CRS, TSC, OSC, LEOF, CERC, JPIC, LMC staffs, and Field Teams will demonstrate this objectiv In addition, Security, Health Physics and Chemistry facilities will demonstrate this objectiv Use of backup communications systems will only be demonstrated if primary communications fai.
Demonstrate the ability to maintain command and control of the emergency response effor *--=-~.
The SEM will demonstrate on-site emergency response command and control from the CRS and TS The RM will demonstrate command and control of tpe emergency response effort associated with the LEOF upon activation of that facility *.
The SEM will ensure personnel within-the Protected Area are
. informed of emergency event status by *the use of emergency alarms and the plant paging system (Gai-tronics). Remaining site-personnel will be not;i.fied by other verbal communication methods. All announcements should, be preceded and terminated.
with the phrase:
"This is a drill. "
The CRS, TSC, and LEOF ERO will. demonstrate the ability to transfer appropriate command and control function The CRS functions that will transfer to the TSC include:
-
(1) * Notifications to the state, local governments, and NR (2)
Determining the emergency classificatio (3)
Authorizing emergency expo~ure The TSC functions that will transfer to the LEOF are:
(1)
Notifications to the state and local. governments and to the NRC via the HP (2)
Developing and transmittin9' PARs to the stat.
Demonstrate the ability to coordinate preparation, review and release of timely and accurate information to the publi The CERC, JPIC, LEOF, and LMC staffs will demonstrate this objectiv *
Press releases will be prepared and edited at the CERC and transmitted to the LEOF for technical revie Following*
approval by the RM and/or the corporate Response Manager, the process for issuing press releases will be demonstrate The JPIC Director will be cognizant of ail press releases and make them available to the media-in the JPIC and LM '.
1 Demonstrate the ability to establish and operate rumor control function *
Public Affairs will demonstrate this objective by establishing an emergency hotline in accordance with CPIP-Questions will be* called into the Public Information Room requiring respons *
1 Demonstrate the ability to provide basic life support and to package and transport a contaminated injured person to an off-site medical facilit *._\\.
This objective will be demonstrated by the First Aid Team implementing procedures appropriate for the victim's level of injury and by Radiological Protection employing the necessary radiological controls in accordance with EPIP-5.*01 and EPIP-4 * 2 o to remove the vict-im from the accident scen As necessary, Station Security will -implement applicable sections of EPIP-5.01 to summons off-site suppor An off-site rescue unit will demonstrate the ability to respond to the station. *
The contaminated injured person will be transported to an off-site facilit.
Demonstrate the ability to respond to, control and mitigate the consequences of a fir This objective will not be demonstrated during this exercis.
Demonstrate the ability to establish a Recovery Organization and to develop a Recovery Pla *
This objective will be demonstrated by the SEM and RM by implementing EPIP-6.01 to develop both a
Recovery Organization and Plan to return the Plant to a normal status.
1 Demonstrate the ability to conduct a self-critique and to identify areas for improvemen The CRS, TSC, osc, LEOF, CERC, JPIC, LMC, Security, Chemistry, and Health Physics will conduct a self-critique to identify weaknesses and improvement items *
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CRS osc TSC LEOF CERC JPIC LMC C
SECURITY BP CHEMISTRY
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SURRY PO-~R STATIPN AUGUST 27, 28, AND 29, 1991 EMERGENCY EXERCISE OBJECTIVES DEMONSTRATION MATRIX
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DENOTES NON-DEMONSTRATION
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VIRGINIA POWER SURRY POWER STATION AUGUST 27, 28, AND 29, 1991 EMERGENCY EXERCISE NARRATIVE
VIRGINIA POWER SURRY POWER STATION AUQUST 27, 28, AND 29, 1991 EMERGENCY EXERCISE SCENARIO NARRATIVE A full sea.le PLUME and INGESTION pathway exercise is scheduled to be conducted at the Surry Power Station on August 27, 28, and 29, 1991. For the purposes of the exercise, Unit 1 is designated as the affected unit..
Unit 1 is operating at 100 % full power equilibrium near end of life..
Unit 2 is operating at 100% full power equilibrium conditions with no equipment.out of servic The exercise initiates at 0830. At 0841 an individual is injured and contaminated in the Auxiliary Building. The necessity to transport the individual to an off-site facility requires the declaration of Notification Of Unusual Event (NOUE).
At 0931 an OBE earthquake.occurs. This earthquake is greater than OBE levels which requires the declaration of an Aler At 103*2 another earthquake occurs which is smaller in magnitude than an OBE.earthquak One minute later a loose parts alarm is receive Then a ten (10) gpm Reactor Coolant System leak begins and applicable radiation readings start to increas At 1117 a DBE earthquake occurs causing RCS leakage to increase to 400 gp * The reactor and turbine trip also safety injection commences with phase 11111 isolatio In addition the loss of the lJl 480v bus occur The RCS leak and/or the earthquake necessitates the declaration-of a Site Area Emergenc A major LOCA occurs at 1218, containment pressure increases and CLS is initiated. At initiation of CLS containment spray pump, 1-cs-P-lA, trip Then high containment pressure causes a penetration failure allowing an atmospheric release into the.Aux Building and to the environs through the Ventilation Vent syste A General Emergency is declared based on. the loss of three ( 3)
.fission product barriers, as indicated by the release and/or actual or projected site boundary doses exceeding 2 Rem whole body or 12 Rem thyroi *
The escalation through the applicable emergency classifications will provide activities designed to exercise both on-site and off-site response organizations. Sufficient time will be permitted to allow the response organizations to perform the required assessment and appropriate.response actions.
.-
The release will terminate-when the applicable repairs are made to the spray systems and the containment is sprayed down to sub-atmospheric condition on-site-Recovery meeting will commenc Day 1 activities will terminate and area critiques will * follow after which Day 1 is complete D*ay 2 activities will commence at 0830. Off-site recovery planning will commenc Sampling data will. be provided to support the process of establishing the environmental sample pla Other activities include: initiating the environmental sample plan and updating the sampling pla *
Day 3 activities will comme~ce at 0_800. Cohesive analysis results will be provided of the plan promulgated on Day 2. Other Day 3 activities include : revising the sample plan,as.necessary, updating protective *action *recommendations, *responses bein implemented by ingestion local governments, field sampling, analyzing samples, "Hot Spots" being discovered, recovery and re-entry commencing off-sit Area critiques are scheduled to commence. at 1700, and Day 3 activit~es are to be completed at 180 Virginia will provide services, as requested, by the Commonwealth of Virginia to support the activities* of the ingestion pathway scenari *
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_'._VIRGINIA POWER SURRY POWER STATION
. AUGUST 27, 28, AND 29, 1991 EMERGENCY EXERCISE TIME LINE
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VIRGINIA POWER SURRY POWER STATION AUGUST 27, 28, AND 29, 1991 EMERGENCY EXERCISE TIME LINE NOTE:
TIMES ARE APPROXIMATE TIME EVENT DAY
0800 -
0830 -
0841 -
0910 -
0931 -
0951 -
1032 -
1033 -
1034 -
1059 -
Lead Controllers and Lead Observers positione Operations Department participants positioned in the Control Room Simulato *
Selected controllers perform necessary participant briefing simulator run starte An individual is contaminated and injured performing maintenance in the Aux Building.
NOUE (Tab F-1), declared due to the transportation of a contaminated injured person to an off-site facilit OBE earthquake occurs (0.09g horizontal motion).
strong motion accelerograph alar ALERT (Tab L-2) declared due to earthquake greater than QBE level Minor earthquake occurs (0.06g horizontal motion).
Strong motion accelerograph alar Loose parts alarm is received for the lower vesse Letdown radiation levels start to increas RCS leak of approximately 10 gpm begin Hi - Hi Letdown Radiation Monitor Alarm is receive Letdown reading indicates off scale hig Unit starting to be ramped off the li_p **
- 1117 -
1120 -
1121 -
1134 -
1137 -
1218 -
1238 -
1445 -
1515 -
Earthquake greater than DBE level (0.2g horizontal motion).
Strong motion accelerograph alar Loss of lJ 480v bu RCS leak increases to 400 gp Instrument failure causing loss of steam dump Damage to the Maintenance Buildin Reactor and turbine trip Saf~ty Injection and Phase "1" isolation occu Source Range energize SITE AREA EMERGENCY declared based on (Tab L-1) earthquake greater than DBE level and/or (Tab B-2), RCS leak rate exceeding makeup capacity of operating charging/SI pumps as indicated by pressurizer leve LOCA occurs on "C" RC Loop Hot Le HI HI CLS is initiated *
1-CS-P-lA starts, however there is no flow due to impeller malfunctio The following pumps will trip upon auto or manual start:
l~RS-P-2A, 1-RS-P-l High containment pressure causes penetration failure, release commences into the Auxiliary Buildin Release commences to atmosphere through the Ventilation Vent syste GENERAL EMERGENCY declared due to (Tab B-10), the loss of 2 of 3 fission product barriers with potential loss of 3rd barrier and/or (Tab E-1), projected or actual site boundary dose exceeding 2 Rem whole body or 12 Rem thyroi,.
r, Repairs are such that.a portion of the containment spray or recirc spray systems are back in service to reduce containment pressure to sub-atmospheri *NOTE: INFORM THE LEAD CONTROLLER PRIOR TO EQUIPMENT BEING BROUGHT BACK INTO SERVICE, SO PROPER COORDINATION IS ACHIEVE Terminate emergency on-site, restore Emergency Response Facilitie DAY 2 0830 -
0900 -
1000 1400 -
DAY 3 0800 -
0830 -
0900 -
Start On-site Recovery Meetin Commence Ar~a Critiques for all participants except those in Recovery Complete On-site Recovery Meeting, start Area Critique for Recovery Staf Area critiques complete, participants break until Day Controllers and Observers are positione Ingestion pathway exercise participants are positione Participants brief, as necessar Commence off-site recovery plannin The following are anticipated actions for Day 2 Receive AMS scanning flyover data (Gross activity footprint).
Establish Environmental Sampling Plan to refine/characterize off-site plume deposition footprin Update and revise sampling plan, as nece_ssary, when receiving key sample results through out day 2 activitie Terminate Day 2 activitie Controllers and observers are positione Controllers brief participants on plant and off-site condition Controllers provide participants the comprehensive analysis results of the SAMPLE PLAN performed on DAY The following are anticipated actions for Day 3 Laboratory samples analyze Field sampling complete *cLS reports sample analyses results to Bureau of Radiologi-cal Healt Bureau of Radiological Health redefines Environmental Sampling Pla.\\
...
1700 -
1800 -
Protective Actions.recommended for Ingestion Pathwa Selective re-entry begins in risk area local gov~rnment Ingestion local* governments (Co.ordinator, PIO I s, Extension Agents, Communication Centers) respond in accordance with plan and scenario message *
Hot*spots* discovered in evacuated/sheltered area Environmental sampling Plan re.vise Relocation considered for "Hot Spots" areas: Recovery begins off-site~
Recovery terminates off-site, commence area critique Exercise terminates off-sit.
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