IR 05000275/1988016
| ML16341E744 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 07/13/1988 |
| From: | Mendonca M, Pereira D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV), NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML16341E743 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-275-88-16, 50-323-88-15, NUDOCS 8808030194 | |
| Download: ML16341E744 (18) | |
Text
U.
S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION V
Report Nos.
50-275/88-16 and 50-323/88-15.
License Nos.
Pacific Gas and Electric Company 77 Beale Street, Room 1451, San Franci sco, Cal iforni a 94106 Facility: Diablo Canyon Units 1 and
Inspection at: Diablo Canyon Site, San Luis Obispo County, California Inspection Conducted:
May 31-June 3, 1988 and June 13-17, 1988.
Inspector:
D.
B. Per a, Project Insp tor Date Si ned Approved By:
M.
M.
Men ca, Chief, Reactor Project Section
Date S gned
~Summar Ins ection Durin the Period of Ma 31-June
and June 13-17 1988 Re ort 50-275/88-16 and 50-323/88-15 Areas Ins ected:
This routine, unannounced inspection by the Project Inspector involved the evaluation of the Licensee's Quality Assurance (QA)
program for the control of measuring and test equipment (M&TE), evaluation of the Surveillance Testing and Calibration Control program, evaluation of the Design, Design Change, and Modification program, and onsite followup on previous inspection findings.
During this inspection, inspection procedures 30703, 35750, 61725, 37700, and 92701 were used.
Results:
No violations or deviations were identified.
The Measuring and Test Equipment Program was acceptably implemented under the General Construction's calibration shop; however the I&C calibration shop remains limited in its scope and responsibilities following weaknesses identified during an internal Quality Assurance audit.
The Surveillance Testing and calibration Control Program was extensive and indicated a thorough and knowledgeable staff in support of the program.
The Design, Design Change, and Modification program was acceptable and indicated that proper documentation and review processes were in place.
8808030194 880713 PDR ADQCK 05000275
pNU
DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted a.
Licensee Personnel
"J.
D. Townsend, Plant Manager
¹"J.
B. Gisclon, Assistant Plant Manager
- W. B.
McLane, Acting Assistant Plant Manager, Technical
¹"L. F.
Womack, Operations Manager
"C.
L. Eldridge, Quality Control Manager
"T. A. Bennett, Maintenance Manager
¹"W.
G. Crockett, I&C Maintenance Manager
"S.
G. Banton, Engineering Manager
"B.
D. Guilbeault, Material Services Manager
¹"M. J.
Augus, Work Planning Manager
¹"D.
A-. Taggert, Director, Quality Support
¹"D. Miklush, Acting Plant Superintendent
¹"T.
L. Grebel, Regulatory Compliance Supervisor
¹"K. C.
Doss, Senior Engineer, Onsite Review Group
¹T. Black, Compliance Engineering Manager
¹E.
Conway, Human Resource Manager
¹R. Weinberg, News Services Representative
¹D.
R. Clifton, Technician and Maintenance Training Supe
¹J.
Gardner, Senior Chemical Engineer
¹R. Todaro, Security Manager
¹T. Allen, General Construction Project Superintendent
¹R. McInerney, Material'ervices Supervisor
¹P. Sarafian, Technical Services Engineer Services rvisor Various other maintenance and engineering personnel.
b.
U.
S.
Nuclear Re ulator Commission
¹"K. Johnston, Resident Inspector
"R. Huey, San Onofre Senior Resident Inspector Attended the Exit Meeting on June 3, 1988.
¹ Attended the Exit Meeting on June 17, 1988.
2.
ualit Assurance Pro ram Measurin And Test E ui ment 35750 The purpose of this inspection was to determine whether the licensee has developed and implemented a Quality Assurance (QA) program relating to the control of measuring and test equipment (M&TE) which is in conformance with regulatory requirements, licensee commitments, and industry standards.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's program for the control of M&TE which was implemented via Administrative Procedure (AP) 0-450, entitled
"Calibration and Control of M&TE (Instrument and Controls Department)".
AP 0-450 required that M&TE and measurement standards be
properly controlled and calibrated at specific periods to maintain accuracy within prescribed limits.
The procedure detailed the responsibilities, definitions, identification requirements, calibration program both on-site and off-site, calibration master schedule and interval, use of calibration labels and stickers, and use of M&TE check out slips.
The program ensured that each M&TE was traceable to its calibration source, the as-found and as-calibrated data were identified, the standards used were identified, the date of calibration and of next calibration was recorded, and the name of the person performing calibration was recorded.
The Test Equipment Master List provided the inventory of all M&TE calibrated, controlled, and maintained by the Instrument and Controls ( I&C) department.
The M&TE Usage Database
'ontained information relat'ed to usage of I&C Department M&TE, which included the Work Order/Activity performed, the M&TE ID number, the M&TE usage date, and other pertinent remarks.
The inspector reviewed the implementation of the M&TE program by witnessing the calibration of several Heise gages, and determined that the personnel understood the calibration process well, and performed the calibrations correctly.
The I&C calibration shop was only capable of calibrating chemistry and radiation protection department M&TE due to guality Assur ance Audit Report 88804P, which issued a Stop Work Order on February 26, 1988.
The audit report addressed the use of calibration procedures previously identified as being deficient (e.g., accuracy, completeness, current availability of referenced equipment, inclusion of required accuracy ratio of 4:I, and a two year annual review).
As a result of the Stop Work Order, the M&TE calibrations were being performed by GC's calibration shop until the procedures were revised and approved.
The 64 deficient I&C calibration procedures were rescinded by the I&C department, and the stop work order was lifted on April 1, 1988.
The I&C calibration procedures were being rewritten at the time of this inspection, and only a few procedures were reviewed and approved.
The inspector noted that a
similar event happened two to three years ago when the I&C calibration shop was being moved up to the main turbine deck.
The inspector's review of GC's calibration shop indicated that the M&TE was properly stored prior to use; identified by a unique number; calibration status was formally maintained; GC's calibration procedures were available and properly controlled; and the M&TE were recalled for calibration in. accordance with an established shedule.
Based upon the inspector's review of the two calibration shops and the M&TE program, it appeared that the licensee has an acceptable program for the calibration, control, and maintenance of M&TE.
No violations or deviations were identifie Surveillance Testin And Calibration Control Pro ram 61725 The purpose of this inspection was to determine whether the licensee has developed programs for control and evaluation of surveillance testing, calibration, inspections required by the Technical Specifications (TS)
(including inservice inspection)
and calibration of safety-related instrumentation not specifically controlled by TS.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's program for surveillance testing and inspections.
Administrative Procedure (AP) C-3Sl describes the surveillance testing and inspection program conducted at Diablo Canyon Power Plant, including responsibilities, scheduling, performance, determination of equipment operability, review, and reporting of results.
The inspector verified that a master schedule for surveillance testing/calibration/inservice inspection and testing has been established.
Attachment 4 to AP C-3S1 provided the master surveillance schedule which provided test title, the TS license requirements, the frequency, and the responsible/reviewing department.
The inspector interviewed the Surveillance Test Supervisor (STS)
who has the responsibility to assure that all required surveillance activities are covered by the appropriate test procedures and are scheduled.
The STS has overall authority to approve changes to the master surveillance schedule and is responsible for assigning the surveillance coordinator.
The surveillance coordinator reports to the STS and is responsible for maintaining the master surveillance schedule, conducts evaluation of all program changes, monitors the performance and training of the test coordinator and periodic verification of the master surveillance schedule.
The inspector's review of the master surveillance schedule indicated a
comprehensive and thorough listing of all surveillance tests required by the TS as well as by NUREGs.
Attachment 3 of AP C-3S1 provided a cross reference of the TS requirement and the applicable surveillance test procedure.
The
"MASTER COPY" of attachments 3 and 4 of AP C-3S1 are maintained by the surveillance coordinator.
Copies are updated either when the procedure is revised or at the two year review cycle.
The
"MASTER COPY" will be the only up to date listing at a given point in time due to the potential for frequent changes to the program.
A computer scheduling program was used to track accomplishments of the Surveillance Test Procedures (STPs)
in the master surveillance schedule.'he program is called the PINS Recurring Task Schedu'ler (RTS)
and is used for tracking STPs with a test frequency of seven days or greater.
Completion of a STP is documented in the update section of the RTS and committed to the data base.
The STP is then rescheduled based on the frequency of the surveillance and the last accomplished date.
The inspector reviewed the implementation of the surveillance testing and inspection program by records review.
The inspector reviewed several STPs in different systems to assure that tests were conducted within the prescribed time interval, that an evaluation and a review of results were performed, and that PIMS updating of surveillance performance were conducted.
The inspector reviewed the completed STPs according to AP C-3Sl's checklist for performing the secondary review which included
verifying required signoffs have proper signatures, dates and times, positive verification of system alignment, prerequisites, precautions, and limitations.
The inspector's review indicated no discrepancies or deviations among the completed test procedures.
For the data sheets reviewed by the inspector, the RTS system had been updated with the proper accomplished date and unit number, and all recorded data was reverified to be within the acceptance criteria.
The inspector verified that all pages were included in the data sheets and that proper revisions to the STPs were being used.
Based upon the inspector's review of the licensee's surveillance testing and inspection program, it appears that the licensee has developed adequate programs for the control and evaluation af surveillance testing, calibration, and inspections required by Technical Specifications.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
4.
Desi n Desi n Chan es and Modifications 37700 The purpose of this inspection was to determine whether design changes and modifications that are determined by the licensee to not require approval by the NRC are in conformance with*the requirements of the Technical Specifications (TS)
and
CFR 50.59.
The inspector reviewed the following design changes and modifications to ensure that they had been reviewed and approved in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59:
a.
Design Change Package (DCP)-M-29158-Install new seismic brackets for reactor trip breakers b.
DCP-J-39875-Add instrumentation to pressurizer surge line - to evaluate temperature strafication in pressurizer surge line c.
DCP-J-37786-Replace main steam isolation valves position switches (MSIV) with NAMCO model EA-740 on MSIV-FCV-41 thru FCV-44 d.
e.
Temporary Modification (TMJ-OC1-SM-39166-Temporarily modi fy containment penetration No.63 in order to support steam generator sludge. lancing;and eddy current testing DCP-M-,39666-Remove control rod drive mechanism head adapter plug by cutti'ng,.above the stainless steel to inconel dissimilar metal weld DCP-J-39724-Replace pressure transmitter PT-8 and PT-9 g.
DCP-J-39751-Provide instrument test connections and instrument installations for the plant class 1C and class 11 test instruments on the feed water and turbine steam supply systems.
The inspector's review of the above design changes and modifications indicated a comprehensive
CFR 50.59 review conducted by the licensee Plant Staff Review Committee (PSRC).
The PSRC is required to review all proposed changes or modifications to unit. systems or equipment as required
by the PSRC charter.
The design changes were controlled by approved procedures, namely Nuclear Power Administrative Procedure (NPAP)
C-I/NPG-4.2, entitled "Nuclear Power Plant Modification Program" and Procedure No.3.6 ON, entitled "Operating Nuclear Power Plant Design Changes".
The inspector conducted a review of completed tests, when applicable, on the above design changes and modifications which indicated that the licensee reviewed and evaluated the test results prior to the modification or design change being declared operable.
The inspector's review indicated that the test results were within the acceptance criteria, and that a formal approval process is established.
For example, test Procedure 4. 1, which retested the MSIV's valve control scheme and indication lights after replacement of the position switches pet DCP-J-37786, specified the initial conditions, performed testing on Control Circuit Trains A and 8, and provided the acceptance criteria as prescribed in the applicable tables.
The procedure had a
simulation/independent verification log that was used for verifying removal and installation of control fuses and jumpers, and verifying open contacts in the circuits.
This log specified the step in the procedure being verified, a description of the action being verified, signature block of the tester/date, and signature block of the witness/date.
The test procedures detailed the scope and objective, prerequisites, precautions, limitations and actions, checkoff lists, acceptance criteria, and restoration to normal lineups.
The inspector verified that the as-built documents for design changes were reviewed, approved and safeguarded until all marked-up changes have been incorporated onto the revised documents.
The inspector determined that the revision of documents incorporating all the marked-up changes were issued and distributed in a timely manner.
The preventive maintenance and inservice inspection and test (ISI and IST) requirements for newly installed equipment or systems were found to have been added to the respective programs maintained and implemented by the licensee.
The inspector reviewed the licensee s program for temporary modifications, including lifted leads and jumpers.
The review indicated that controls are in place for the review and approval of temporary modifications, and that detailed approved procedures are in use when performing temporary modifications.
The inspector reviewed temporary modification DC1-SM-39166 which was to temporarily modify containment penetration No.63 in order to support steam gener'ator sludge lancing and eddy current testing.
The review indicated satisfactory review and approval processes, and installati.on and removal status of temporary equipment.
The inspector verified that functional testing of equipment following installation or removal of temporary modifications was conducted.
The inspector's review of the implementation of the design change program was accomplished by the witnessing of the torquing of bolts associated with change to the containment purge and exhaust valves FCV-660 and RCV-ll implemented in accordance with Design Change EP-35429.
The appropriate documents were present and personnel were knowledgeable in their job requirements.
The torque wrench was calibrated and was assigned to that wor Based upon the inspector's review and observations of the licensee's design change and modification program, it appears that the licensee has developed an adequate program that is in conformance with the requirements of the Technical Specifications and
CFR 50.59.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
5.
Onsite Followu of Written Re orts of Non-Routine Events 92700 Licensee Event Re orts 1-87-024-L08L1 Closed Reactor Tri in Mode
When Source Ran e Channel N-32 Detector Volta e Su
Failed Hi h Due to a Ca acitor Failure Licensee Event Reports (LERs) 1-87-024-LO&Ll detailed the results of a reactor trip signal generated at Unit 1 on December 13, 1987 and a
subsequent turbine trip signal occurring due to the failure of the detector voltage supply for source range channel N-32.
All automatic safety functions responded as required.
The unit was already stable in Mode 3.
The root cause of this event was the failure of the high-voltage power supply for source range channel N-32.
This failure caused a high source range flux signal which damaged the detector signal pre-amp.
Subsequent failure analysis indicated that the power supply failure was due to the failure of an input voltage filter capacitor.
The corrective actions initiated by the licensee were the monitoring of all similar power supplies for early capacitor failure, and the initiating of a preventive maintenance recurring task schedule to replace capacitors in these power supplies prior to typical capacitor in-service 10-year lifespan.
Based upon the licensee's failure analysis and proposed corrective actions the inspector considers LERs-1-87-024-L08L1 closed.
b.
Licensee Event Re ort 2-87-024-L1 Closed Manual Reactor Tri After Discover of Arcin in Iso hase Bus Motor 0 crated Disconnect Switch Due to Hi h Resistance at the Contacts LER 2-87-024"Ll detailed a manual reactor trip on November 7, 1987 of Unit 2 when arcing was discovered in non-safety related isophase bus phase C motor operated disconnect (MOD) switch.
The unit was stabilized in Mode 3 (Hot Shutdown).
The root cause of this event was a combination of high ambient temperature and high resistance at the contacts.
The high resistance was caused by dust and hardened lubricant on the contacts and a slight misalignment of some contacts.
The licensee's corrective actions included the development and implementation of a comprehensive preventive maintenance procedure, MP E-61.9A entitled "Isolated Phase Bus, and Motor Operated Disconnect Preventive Maintenance" which provides for inspection, cleaning, and alignment of the isophase bus MODs on. both units.
A replacement MOD
switch and the switches from the unaffected phases were inspected, cleaned, lubricated, and aligned under the supervision of a vendor representative.
Based on the above licensee's corrective actions, and the inspector's review of MP E-61.9A, the inspector considers LER 2-87-024-Ll closed.
Licensee Event Re ort 2-87-23-LO Closed Accumulator Nozzle Crackin Due to Inter ranular Stress Corrosion LER 2-87-23-LO detailed for information purposes only that since October 1985, Unit 2 had exper ienced several very small leaks.on the emergency core cooling system accumulator tank sample and fill line nozzles.
The leaks have all been minor resulting in only small deposits of boric acid precipitate.
The leaks resulted from intergranular stress corrosion (IGSCC) with the exception of one leak which resulted from a weld defect introduced. during manufacturing.
All leaking nozzles were identified and successfully repaired or replaced, and surveillance inspection frequency has been increased.
The leaking nozzles on Unit 2 have been redesigned and replaced.
The new design utilizes a butt welded connection and type 304L base material.
Increased surveillance inspections have been initiated for all Unit 2 accumulators.
Based upon the licensee's information, the inspector considers LER 2-87-23-LO closed.
Licensee Event Re ort 2-86-025-LO Closed Automatic Start of Diesel Generator 2-2 Due to Personnel Error LER 2-86-025-LO describes the event of October 2, 1986, when an electrician inadvertently grounded a terminal in a component cooling water (CCW) pump breaker cubicle while performing preventive maintenance, causing a bus potential transformer fuse to burn out.
This open circuit caused the transfer of vital 4 kV bus H to an alternate power supply and the automatic start of diesel generator (DG) 2-2.
DG 2-2 functioned properly and, per design, did not load onto the bus.
The fuse was replaced, DG 2-2 was shut down, and the bus was returned to its normal power supply.
The root cau'se'-of this event was personnel error.
The electrician failed to take proper precautions while performing preventive maintenance in the CCW breaker cubicle.
The licensee's corrective actions were to conduct a tailboar d meeting reviewing the incident and to emphasize the possibility of encountering energized circuits in this type of maintenance.
Maintenance Department Bulletin No.
007 was reviewed at the Training Department's quarterly seminar for electricians.
The seminar emphasized precautions required when work is being done on or near energized circuit Based upon the above corrective actions conducted by the licensee, the inspector considers LER 2-86-025-LO closed.
Exit Interview The inspector met with the licensee representatives denoted in paragraph
on June 3 and June 17, 1988, and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activitie r