IR 05000275/1988006
| ML16341E646 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 04/21/1988 |
| From: | Burdoin J, Cicotte G, Mendonca M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML16341E645 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-275-88-06, 50-275-88-6, 50-323-88-06, 50-323-88-6, GL-83-28, NUDOCS 8805180283 | |
| Download: ML16341E646 (18) | |
Text
U.
S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION V
Report Nos.
50-275/88-06, 50-323/88-06 Docket Nos.
50-275, 50-323 License Nos.
Pacific Gas and Electric Company 77 Beale Street Room 1451 San Francisco, California 94106 Facility Name:
Diablo Canyon Units 1 and
Inspection at:
Diablo Canyon Site, San Luis Obispo County, California Inspection Conduc ed:
Mar h 2
- Apri 1, 1988 b
Inspectors:
J
. Bud r
spector G,
R Cicot
,
adiation Specialist i /
/!I'pproved by:
~/4
~/.g IJ.
M.
M. Mendonca, Chief Reactor Project Section
~Summer Date Signed
~z-PT Date Signed g-u-8x" Date Signed Ins ection Durin Period of March 28 -
A ril 1 1988 Re ort Nos.
50-275/88-06 and 50-323/88-06 Areas Ins ected:
An announced inspection by two regional inspectors of various vital areas and equipment in the plant, and followup of enforcement and open items.
Inspection Procedures Nos.
30703, 41701, 71707, 92701, 92702 and 92703 were used as guidance for the inspection.
Results:
No violations or deviations were identified.
8805180283 880429 PDR ADOCK 05000275 DCD
DETAILS Individuals Contacted Pacific Gas and Electric Com an PGEE
"J.
M. Gisclon, Assistant Plant Manager J.
A. Sexton, Plant Superintendent
"W.
M. McLane, Acting Assistant Plant Manager, Technical Support C.
L. Eldridge, QC Manager
- T. A. Bennett, Assistant Maintenance Manager
- M. J.
Angus, Work Planning Manager
- S.
R;- Fridley, Senior Operating Supervisor M.
L. Smith, Power Production Engineer
"T.
L. Grebel, Regulatory Compliance Supervisor D.
R.
Geske, Verification Planning Group Supervisor S.
W. Hamilton, Power Production Engineer S.
D. Wilson, Regulatory Compliance Engineer J.
M. Neill, Document Control, Supervisor P.
W. Provence, Records Analyst D.
D. Malone, Regulatory Compliance Engineer T.
A. Nelson, Regulatory Compliance Engineer C. J.
Leach, Senior Training Instructor
- C.
E.
Weber, Power Production Engineer R.
C. Washington, Senior Power Production Engineer J. I. Hjalmarson, Power Production Engineer J.
R. Bratton, Rate Case Coordinator
"J.
H. Arhar, Regulatory Compliance Engineer Various other engineering and QC personnel.
"Denotes attendees at exit meeting on April 1, 1988.
In addition, NRC Resident Inspectors attended the exit meeting.
Area Ins ection An independent inspection was conducted in Units 1 and 2 Turbine and Auxiliary Buildings.
The inspection examined areas and equipment for debris, potential hazards, oil and water leakage, and equipment condition, e. g., oil level, valve position, and electrical connection configuration and cleanliness.
The equipment and areas inspected included:
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.
Five Emergency Diesel Generator Rooms.
Six 4160 Volt Switchgear Rooms.
Combined Two-unit Control Room.
Two Containment Spray Pumps (Unit 2).
Three Charging Pumps (Unit 2).
Two Safety Injection Pumps (Unit 2).
Two RHR Pumps (Unit 2).
H.I.
J.
K.
L.
M.
N.
0.
p.
Three Component Cooling Mater Pumps (Unit 2).
Three Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps (Unit 2).
Six Emergency Battery Rooms.
Three 480 Volt Vital Bus Rooms (Uni.t 2).
Two Cable Spreading Rooms.
One Hot Shutdown Panel Area (Unit 2).
One 480 Volt Load Center Area (Unit 2).
Turbine Building at Elevation 140'.
GW/GE Penetration Areas Unit 2 at Elevations 100'nd 115'.
Housekeeping and equipment status appeared to be acceptable.
No violations or deviations were identified.
3.
Followu of Enforcement Items A.
Closed 50-275/86-33-01 and 50-323/86-31-01 Incom 1 ete Functi onal Performance Re uirements for Conax RTDs The licensee did not establish complete functional performance requirements for safety-related Conax RTDs in that the required accuracy for the RTDs was specified in the file as "al.75 F," but there were no criteria or standard values established with which to evaluate the data against this specification.
Examination of the raw data showed that several of the samples during the design basis event simulation deviated from the others by more than 1.75 F.
Subsequent to the inspection, the licensee provided the inspection team leader with the final results of an analysis which confirmed that the RTDs had met the accuracy specifications for their various applications stating that the analysis was being incorporated in the Eg file.
The team leader reviewed the information and found it acceptable.
The inspector examined reference 18 of Eg File IH-36, and verified that the analysis for the accuracy specifications for Conax RTDs had been incorporated into the file.
The licensee reviewed other RTD Eg files to assure that acceptance criteria were satisfied, including shunting cable effects from harsh DBE environments, and that all RTD files met the Eg acceptance criteria.
The licensee has corrected the deficiencies identified in this enforcement item.
The licensee's corrective actions are satisfactory to achieve compliance.
This item is closed.
B.
Closed 50-275/86-33-03 and 50-323/86-31-03 Incom lete ualification Documentation for Limitor ue Motorized Valve Actuators The licensee's qualification documentation for Limitorque motorized valve actuators did not establish similarity between the installed actuator and that tested in that, unlike that tested, there was no gear case grease relief on the installed actuator.
The files
contained no analyses to demonstrate that grease reliefs were not required for the OCPP applications.
However, the licensee provided an evaluation of operability as described in the Eg inspection report (50-275/86-33 and 50-323/86-31).
The licensee in their January 20, 1988 letter (OCL-88-012) committed.,
to evaluate the effect of not having a grease relief installed on the gear case.
The licensee indicated that reliefs would be installed on those MOVs potentially subject to elevated temperatures (necessary for safe plant shutdown);
and that Eg MOVs in containment not so equipped would have reliefs installed.
The inspectors reviewed representative Work Orders (WO), work schedules, guality Control (gC) addenda to WOs, and the licensee's evaluation as above noted.
The following was determined:
Grease reliefs in Unit 2 containment had been installed and inspected as stated in the licensee's response.
Grease reliefs in Unit 1 containment were scheduled for installation during the outage in progress at the time of the Eg inspection.
Grease reliefs in both units were being installed primarily by incorporation in routine preventive maintenance, as committed in the licensee's response.
Approximately 60X of all affected valves appeared to have been so modified, and the remaining 40K of the effect valves are scheduled for completion by January 1989.
This schedule is considered to be acceptable.
IH-7A, "Engineering Evaluation of Operability," had been revised appropriately to reflect the commitment as noted.
The licensee's actions to date, and the schedule for completion, appeared adequate to achieve compliance in a timely manner.
This matter is considered closed.
C.
Closed 50-275/86-33-04 and 50-323/86-31-04 Un uglified Scotchco Putt Cable S lices The licensee had not upgraded to 10 CFR 50.49 requirements the level of qualification of their Scotch 33+/Scotchco putty cable splice insulation system used on qualified equipment purchased after the effective date of 10 CFR 50.49 (February 22, 1983)
and the file contained no sound reasons to the contrary.
Eg inspection report (50-275/86-33 and 50-323/86-31) identified that the splice insulation system was qualified to NUREG-0588, category II.
Justification for continued operation was provided to the Eg Inspection Team.
The inspector conferred with the licensee and examined documentation that demonstrated walkdowns have identified a number of the splices required to be replaced.
The walkdown of the various systems will be completed for Unit 1 during the present outage.
The inspector examined the Maintenance Work Order program to replace approximately
forty-one splices in Limitorque valve operators located outside of Unit 1 containment with Raychem qualified splices; twenty-two during this refueling outage, and the balance during the third refueling outage scheduled for fall of 1989, when the splice replacement program is scheduled to be completed.
The splices inside containment are Eg qualified.
A similar program has been initiated
.
to replace the unqualified splices in Limitorque valve operators and to complete the walkdowns for Unit 2 during its upcoming refueling outage, scheduled for September/October 1988.
The inspector examined design change notices E-39470-Rl and E-39508-Rl to replace, during the present outage in Unit 1, unqualified splices in twenty-four solenoid valves with Raychem splices to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50. 49.
A similar program is being instituted to replace unqualified splices in Unit 2 during its upcoming refueling outage.
The licensee's actions to date and those scheduled for completion, appeared adequate to achieve compliance in a reasonable time period.
This item is closed.
No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Licensed 0 erator Trainin The inspector examined the licensee's program for training of licensed operators to determine whether it satisfies regulatory requirements and meets the licensee's commitments for training as described in section
of the FSAR.
The following documents were reviewed:
Licensee Event Reports (Units 1 and 2, June 1987 to February 1988)
NPAP B-101,
"NRC Licensed Operator Requalification Program" AP B-10151, "Administrative Procedure NRC Licensed Operator Requalification Program" AP B-10051,
"Suppl.
1 - Administrative Procedure B-100 Licensed Operator and Senior Operator Training Program" DCPP Reactor Operator Medical and License Summary Operations Training Schedule 1986 Requalification Year Tracking Individual RO/SRO Training Records and gualification Records Lesson/Session Attendance Records The inspectors held discussions with several RO/SRO qualified individuals involved in abnormal events identified by licensee event reports from
June 1987 to February 1988.
For those events potentially caused by a lack of training, all RO/SROs contacted indicated that post-event training had been conducted during shift briefings.
For more significant events, a portion of the requalification lecture series was devoted to event analysis.
Subject matter of lessons regarding surveillance testing appeared to address the more routine operations.
Most of the events reviewed were mitigated by operator/shift foreman recognition and corrective action.
None of the events reviewed involved a significant threat to safety.
Major system tests and some special procedures are incorporated in requalification training.
Use of the licensee's simulator to train for a new startup procedure designed to minimize steam generator level trips was observed.
A simulator session (discussed above)
and a lecture on rod control were observed.
Lesson objectives and material presented were consistent with the licensee's INPO accreditation, which was achieved in March 1986, for licensed operators, non-licensed operators, and shift technical advisors.
Documentation of RO/SRO attendance and alternate methods of training when sessions were missed was examined.
The licensee addresses missed sessions primarily by rescheduling attendance with another shift or by having the individual review routine lesson guides and student handouts.
No individuals having failed to meet the requalification requirements of
CFR 55, Appendix A were observed to have been allowed to operate either unit.
gualifications had been rescinded on some individuals failing to meet attendance requirements as these individuals held training department managerial positions not specifically requiring a
license.
These licenses were not reinstated.
Individual training records were reviewed for the presence of annual written examinations and examinee's responses thereto, attendance, and documentation of required reading.
However, control manipulations, performance evaluations, additional 'training in deficient areas, self-study and procedure review, and approvals to resume licensed activities for affected individuals were not reviewed.
Pass/fail rates for initial license and requalification examinations for the last three years were as follows:
Cycle:
1987 1986 1985 License RO Pass 100X 100X License Requal Requal SRO Pass Fail RO Pass SRO Pass Fail 100X lOOX lOOX lOOX 100X lOOX lOOX lOOX 78X 22X*
Three SROs failed.
Two training department personnel failed to requalify, one additional passed on re-examination.
The licensee's RO/SRO training program, for those areas reviewed, appeared adequate to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 55.
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Followu on Previous Identified Ins ection Items A.
Closed 50-275/86-33-05 and 50-323/86-31-05 Semiannual C clin of Limitor ue Valve 0 erators The EQ inspection team's concern was to be assured the Limitorque valve operators are being cycled at least semiannually.
The inspector examined the Inservice Test Submittal (Unit 1 dated 10/8/87).
The submittal for Unit 2 is identical, which identifies in table 4.2. 1 those Limitorques that are routinely cycled quarterly.
Table 4.2.2 identifies and provides justification for those Limitorques that cannot be tested quarterly for various reasons i.e. inaccessibility during power operation, interlocks, etc.; but are tested dur ing cold shutdown.
The recurring task schedular (RTS) computer program provides a list of valves required to be cycled before the plant can heatup once it has been placed in cold shutdown.
It appears that this concern has been properly addressed.
This item is closed.
B.
Closed 50-275/86-33-06 and 50-323/86-31-06 Internal Heaters and Mirin in Limitor ue Valve 0 erators The EQ inspection team's concern involved the licensee's commitments to:
a)
Complete inspection of Limitorques equipped with heaters for degradation and burned wire insulation.
b)
Disconnect heaters for those Limitorques located inside bui 1 dings.
c)
Revise procedure(s)
to avoid close wire-heater proximity.
d)
Trend condition of materials susceptible to thermal aging degradation in those Limitorques with heaters.
The inspector conferred with the licensee and examined work orders, procedure(s),
and other documentation which demonstrates that the above commitments are in process or have been accomplished.
This item is closed.
Closed 50-275/86-33-07 and 50-323/86-31-07 Dis ositionin of Internal E
Audit Findin s
The EQ inspection team's concern was the review of the disposition of findings from internal EQ audit, EQ 860 The inspector examined the audit plan, the audit, findings and disposition of the findings.
The disposition of the findings was found acceptable and accomplished in a timely manner.
This item is closed.
D.
Closed 50-275/86-33-08 and 50-323/86-31-08 ualification Basis for Life of Conax RTDs The Eg inspection team's concern was the basis for determining the qualified life of Conax RTDs, model numbers 7K45-10000-01 and 7K46-10000-01 (file IH-36).
The inspector examined reference 17 of Eg File IH-36 which evaluates thermal aging to define the thermal life of Conax RTDs.
The evaluation reviewed the qualified life of Kapton the insulating material in the RTD, considered the limiting material in the RTD.
The documentation demonstrates Kapton lead wire qualified life is well over forty years and the Conax RTD submergence qualification is justified.
This item is closed.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Status of Generic Letter s 0 en Item s and Part
Re ort s A.
0 en 50-275/323/86-21 Generic Letter 85-09 Technical S ecifications for Generic Letter 83-28 Item 4.3 A followup of this item last reported in Inspection Report 50-275/323/86-21 has found that the NRR staff has not completed its review of the licensee's submittal(s).
The inspector reviewed a
draft copy of a licensing amendment request to change the technical specifications to add operability and surveillance requirements for the undervoltage.and shunt trip attachments for the control rod trip br eakers.
This item remains open and will be followed up during a future inspection.
0 en 50-275/87-01-02 Control of U -To-Date Vendor Manuals A followup of this item has revealed that since the last inspection (December 1987)
an additional 300 manhours of onsite project engineering group effort has been assigned to expedite the completion of this task.
The completion of this task is presently scheduled for June 1, 1988.
Inspection in this area, control of up-to-date vendor manuals, shall be continued during a future inspection.
This item remains open.
C.
0 en 5Q-275/323/TI-00-2Q -
Com liance With Antici ated Transients Without Scram ATWS Rule
CFR 50.62
This item was reported in Inspection Report 50-275/323/87-25..
The inspector examined the licensee's March 2, 1988, letter (DCL-88-049)
in which the licensee transmitted additional information requested by the NRR staff during a conference call on December 15, 1987.
This information was requested to supplement the staff's review of the licensee's October 30.
1987 letter (DCL-87-258) on the plant-specific, anticipated transient without scram (ATWS)
mitigating system actuation circuitry (AMSAC) design to be implemented at the Diablo Canyon Power Plant.
\\
The staff's review of the licensee's specific design will not be completed early enough to allow the installation of AMSAC at Unit 1 during the second refueling outage (presently in progress).
The licensee plans to install AMSAC at DCPP Unit 2 during the second refueling outage scheduled for the fall of 1988; and for Unit 1 during the third refueling outage tentatively scheduled for the fall of 1989.
This item remains open pending completion of installation of AMSAC at Units 1 and 2.
D.
0 en) 50-275/323/87-05-P Part 21 -
RTD Accurac Re uirements for RVLIS In ut This item concerns a Part 21 report related to RTD accuracy for determination of Inadequate Core Cooling (ICC).
Discussions with the Compliance Group and the Instrument Maintenance Supervisor revealed that the Nuclear Operations Support Group (NOSG) had concluded that no major issues were raised by the report.
Any actions related to the evaluation are to be presented in a report from the NOSG.
This item will remain open pending evaluation of the NOSG report.
No violations or deviations were identified.
The inspector conducted an exit meeting on April 1, 1988, with the members of the plant staff as indicated in paragraph one.
During this meeting, the inspector summarized the scope of the inspection activities and reviewed the inspection findings as described in this report.
The licensee acknowledged the concerns identified in the report.