IR 05000272/2009002
| ML091190177 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 04/29/2009 |
| From: | Arthur Burritt Reactor Projects Branch 3 |
| To: | Joyce T Public Service Enterprise Group |
| References | |
| FOIA/PA-2010-0209 IR-09-002 | |
| Download: ML091190177 (30) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ril 29, 2009
SUBJECT:
SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2 -
NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000272/2009002 and 05000311/2009002
Dear Mr. Joyce:
On March 31, 2009, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an integrated inspection at the Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results discussed on April 3, 2009, with Mr. Braun and other members of your staff.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.
Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Arthur L. Burritt, Chief Projects Branch 3 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos: 50-272; 50-311 License Nos: DPR-70; DPR-75 Enclosure: Inspection Report 05000272/2009002 and 05000311/2009002 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information
cc w/encl:
W. Levis, President and Chief Operating Officer, PSEG Power R. Braun, Site Vice President P. Davison, Director of Nuclear Oversight E. Johnson, Director of Finance G. Gellrich, Salem Plant Manager J. Keenan, Manager Licensing, PSEG L. Peterson, Chief of Police and Emergency Management Coordinator P. Baldauf, Assistant Director, NJ Radiation Protection Programs P. Mulligan, Chief, NJ Bureau of Nuclear Engineering, DEP H. Otto, Ph.D., Administrator, DE Interagency Programs, DNREC Div of Water Resources Consumer Advocate, Office of Consumer Advocate, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania N. Cohen, Coordinator - Unplug Salem Campaign E. Zobian, Coordinator - Jersey Shore Anti Nuclear Alliance
SUBJECT:
SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2 -
NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000272/2009002 and 05000311/2009002
Dear M
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000272/2009002, 05000311/2009002; 01/01/2009 - 03/31/2009; Salem Nuclear
Generating Station Unit Nos. 1 and 2; Routine Integrated Report.
The report covered a three-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and announced inspections by regional specialist inspectors. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 4, dated December 2006.
No findings of significance were identified.
REPORT DETAILS
Summary of Plant Status
Salem Nuclear Generating Station Unit No. 1 (Unit 1) began the period at full power. On March 27, operators lowered Unit 1 to three percent power due to a condensate polishing system malfunction that required the turbine generator to be taken off line. Operators returned Unit 1 to full power on March 31.
Salem Nuclear Generating Station Unit No. 2 (Unit 2) began the period at full power. Unit 2 operated at full power for the duration of the inspection period.
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity and Emergency Preparedness
1R01 Adverse Weather Protection
.1 Evaluate Readiness for Impending Adverse Weather Conditions
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors completed one impending adverse weather inspection sample for the onset of high levels of river detritus. The inspectors reviewed PSEGs weather preparation activities related to the potential for river grass intrusion conditions.
Inspectors assessed implementation of PSEGs grassing readiness plan through plant walk downs, corrective action program review, and discussions with cognizant managers and engineers. Documents reviewed by inspectors are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R04 Equipment Alignment
.1 Partial Walk down
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors completed four partial system walk down inspection samples. The inspectors walked down the applicable systems to verify the operability of redundant or diverse trains and components when safety equipment was inoperable. The inspectors focused their review on potential discrepancies that could impact the function of the system and increase plant risk. The inspectors reviewed applicable operating procedures, walked down control systems components, and verified that selected breakers, valves, and support equipment were in the correct position to support system operation. The inspectors also verified that PSEG properly utilized its corrective action program to identify and resolve equipment alignment problems that could cause initiating events or impact the capability of mitigating systems or barriers. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. The inspectors walked down the systems listed below:
- Unit 1 1A and 1B Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs), 11 and 12 auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pumps when 13 AFW pump was unavailable on February 9;
- Unit 2 Service water screens, pumps, and strainers during grassing season on March 19;
- Unit 2 heating systems for the refueling water storage tank (RWST), auxiliary feedwater storage tank (AFWST) and pure water storage tank (PWST) during extreme cold weather on January 20.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R05 Fire Protection (71111.05Q - 4 samples,
==71111.05A - 1 sample)
.1 Fire Protection - Tours
a. Inspection Scope
==
The inspectors completed four fire protection quarterly walkdown inspection samples.
The inspectors performed walk downs to assess the material condition and operational status of fire protection features. The inspectors verified that combustibles and ignition sources were controlled in accordance with PSEGs administrative procedures; fire detection and suppression equipment was available for use; that passive fire barriers were maintained in good material condition; and that compensatory measures for out-of-service, degraded, or inoperable fire protection equipment were implemented in accordance with PSEGs fire plan. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
The inspectors evaluated the fire protection areas listed below:
- Unit 1 and 2 AFW pump areas; and
- Unit 1 and 2 spent fuel and component cooling areas.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Fire Protection - Drill Observation
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors completed one fire drill observation inspection sample. The inspectors observed an unannounced fire drill conducted in the 2B emergency diesel generator room. The inspectors observed the drill to evaluate the readiness of the plant fire brigade to fight fires. The inspectors verified that PSEG staff identified deficiencies; openly discussed them in a self-critical manner at the drill debrief, and took appropriate corrective actions. Specific attributes evaluated were: proper wearing of turnout gear and self-contained breathing apparatus; proper use and layout of fire hoses; employment of appropriate fire fighting techniques; sufficient fire fighting equipment brought to the scene; effectiveness of fire brigade leader communications, command, and control; search for victims and propagation of the fire into other plant areas; smoke removal operations; utilization of pre-planned strategies; adherence to the pre-planned drill scenario; and drill objectives.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R06 Flood Protection Measures
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors completed one flood protection measures inspection sample. The inspectors evaluated flood protection measures for the Unit 1 and Unit 2 auxiliary buildings. The inspectors walked down the areas to assess operational readiness of various features in place to protect redundant safety-related components and vital electric power systems from internal flooding. These features included plant drains, flood barrier curbs, and wall penetration seals. The inspectors also reviewed the results of flood barrier penetration seal inspections, flooding evaluations, preventive maintenance history, and corrective action notifications associated with flood protection measures. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program
.1 Requalification Activities Review by Resident Staff.
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors completed one quarterly licensed operator requalification program inspection sample. Specifically, the inspectors observed simulator training administered to a single crew on March 3, 2009. The scenario involved biofouling of the circulating water and turbine area cooling systems, loss of two circulating water pumps, a reactor coolant leak that transitioned into a loss of coolant accident requiring a reactor trip and safety injection. This training scenario was developed and administered as a corrective action to a reactor coolant draining incident that occurred in the fourth quarter of 2008.
The original issue is discussed in inspection reports 05000272/2008009 and 05000272/2008005. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors completed two quarterly maintenance effectiveness inspection samples.
The inspectors reviewed performance monitoring and maintenance effectiveness issues for two systems. The inspectors reviewed PSEGs process for monitoring equipment performance and assessing preventive maintenance effectiveness. The inspectors verified that systems and components were monitored in accordance with the maintenance rule program requirements. The inspectors compared documented functional failure determinations and unavailability hours to those being tracked by PSEG to evaluate the effectiveness of PSEGs condition monitoring activities and to determine whether performance goals were being met. The inspectors reviewed applicable work orders, corrective action notifications, and preventive maintenance tasks. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. The inspectors evaluated the systems listed below:
- Unit 1 and Unit 2 steam driven AFW pumps; and
- Unit 1 and Unit 2 vital instrument bus inverters.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors completed five maintenance risk assessment and emergent work control inspection samples. The inspectors reviewed the applicable maintenance activities to verify that the appropriate risk assessments were performed as specified by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) prior to removing equipment for work. The inspectors reviewed the applicable risk evaluations, work schedules and control room logs for these configurations. PSEGs risk management actions were reviewed during shift turnover meetings, control room tours, and plant walk downs. The inspectors also used PSEGs on-line risk monitor (Equipment Out-Of-Service workstation) to gain insights into the risk associated with these plant configurations. The inspectors reviewed notifications documenting problems associated with risk assessments and emergent work evaluations. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. For this inspection the inspectors assessed the plant configurations listed below:
- Unit 2 performance of pressurizer pressure functional test on February 3, 2009, which closed both Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV) block valves, 2PR6 and 2PR7;
- Unit 1 unplanned unavailability of the 13 AFW pump concurrent with maintenance on the 5023 offsite power line on February 9, 2009;
- Unit 2 planned unavailability of the 21 component cooling heat exchanger (CCHX) concurrent with unavailability of the 23 service water pump and automatic operation of pressurizer PORV 2PR1 on January 19;
- Unit 2 unplanned unavailability of the 26 service water pump concurrent with planned unavailability of the 23 service water pump and subsequent emergent unavailability of the 25 service water pump on February 20 and 21; and
- Unit 2 planned unavailability of the 21 CCHX and 26 SWP on February 25.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R15 Operability Evaluations
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors completed eight operability evaluation inspection samples. The inspectors reviewed the operability determinations for degraded or non-conforming conditions associated with:
- 13 charging pump speed control linkage found in the low pressure position during plant power operations;
- 23 chiller low discharge pressure due to the 23SW102 valve failure to close on demand;
- Unit 1 containment integrity given degradation of containment spray valve 12CS2;
- Unit 2 AFW system performance due to degradation of 22 AFW pump minimum recirculation flow control valve 22AF40;
- Unit 1 reactor coolant leak detection given degradation of containment fan coil unit condensate collection system;
- Unit 2 service water system during concurrent planned and unplanned unavailability of up to three service water pumps;
- Unit 1 overhead annunciator system during failure of the annunciator verification system (AVS); and
- Unit 2 solid state protection system (SSPS) given degradation of a time delay relay in the train A test circuitry.
The inspectors reviewed the technical adequacy of the operability determinations to ensure the conclusions were justified. The inspectors also walked down accessible equipment to corroborate the adequacy of PSEGs operability determinations.
Additionally, the inspectors reviewed other PSEG identified safety-related equipment deficiencies during this report period and assessed the adequacy of their operability screenings. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
a. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R18 Plant Modifications
.1 Temporary Modification
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors completed one plant modification inspection sample. The inspectors reviewed a temporary modification for Unit 1 SSPS train A test circuitry. Two leads were lifted to stop a relay in the circuit from chattering. The lifted leads were left in place to facilitate the replacement of a time delay relay in the SSPS train A cabinet. The inspectors reviewed the temporary modification documentation and verified that the modification did not affect system functionality. Following replacement of the time delay relay, inspectors verified that the temporary modification was removed and that the original system configuration was restored.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors completed seven post-maintenance testing inspection samples. The inspectors observed portions of and/or reviewed the results of the post-maintenance test activities. The inspectors verified that the effect of testing on the plant was adequately addressed by control room and engineering personnel; testing was adequate for the maintenance performed; acceptance criteria were clear, demonstrated operational readiness and were consistent with design and licensing basis documentation; test instrumentation was calibrated, and the appropriate range and accuracy for the application; tests were performed, as written with applicable prerequisites satisfied; and equipment was returned to an operational status and ready to perform its safety function.
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. The inspectors evaluated the post-maintenance tests for the following maintenance items listed below:
- WO 30175773, repair of the 23SW102 pressure control valve on the 23 chiller;
- WO 60081161, adjustment and repair of 21SW122 flow control valve;
- WO 30060411, replacement of 2A EDG starting air solenoid operated valves;
- WO 60079798, rotation of the pressurizer PORV 2PR2;
- WO 30095033, replacement of the 26 service water pump; and
- WO 60081911, oil change of the 23 AFW pump speed control governor.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R22 Surveillance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors completed seven surveillance testing inspection samples. The inspectors observed portions of and/or reviewed results for the surveillance tests to verify, as appropriate, whether the applicable system requirements for operability were adequately incorporated into the procedures and that test acceptance criteria were consistent with procedure requirements, the technical specification requirements, the UFSAR, and ASME Section XI for pump and valve testing. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. The inspectors evaluated the surveillance tests listed below:
- S2.IC-FT.RCP-0018, 2PT-456 Pressurizer Pressure Protection Channel II;
- S1.OP-ST.DG-0003, 1C Diesel Generator Surveillance Test;
- S2.OP-ST.SW-0006, Inservice Testing, 26 Service Water Pump;
- S2.IC-CC.RCP-0028, 2FT-512 #21 Steam Generator Steam Flow Protection Channel I;
- SC.OP-PT.CA-0001, SBO Diesel Control Air Compressor Test;
- S2.OP-ST.AF-0003, Inservice Testing - 23 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump; and
- S2.OP-ST.CVC-0006, Inservice Testing Chemical and Volume Control Valves Modes 1-6.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1EP2 Alert and Notification System (ANS) Evaluation
a. Inspection Scope
An onsite review was conducted to assess the maintenance and testing of the Salem and Hope Creek ANS. During this inspection, the inspectors interviewed Emergency Preparedness (EP) staff responsible for implementation of the ANS testing and maintenance and reviewed corrective action program notifications pertaining to the ANS for causes, trends, and PSEGs corrective actions. The inspector reviewed the ANS procedures and the ANS design report to ensure PSEGs compliance with system maintenance and testing commitments. The inspection was conducted in accordance with NRC Inspection Procedure 71114, Attachment
.02. Planning Standard, 10 CFR
50.47(b)
- (5) and the related requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, were used as reference criteria.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1EP3 Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Staffing and Augmentation System
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors conducted a review of Salem/Hope Creeks ERO augmentation staffing requirements and the process for notifying and augmenting the ERO. This was performed to ensure the readiness of key staff for responding to an event and to ensure timely facility activation. The inspectors reviewed the ERO roster, training records, applicable procedures, drill reports for augmentation, quarterly EP drills and corrective action program notifications related to the ERO staffing augmentation system. The inspectors also reviewed the implementation of the change in the ERO augmentation time from 60 to 90 minutes. The inspection was conducted in accordance with NRC Inspection Procedure 71114, Attachment
.03. Planning Standard, 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2)
and related requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, were used as reference criteria.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1EP4 Emergency Action Level (EAL) and Emergency Plan Changes
a. Inspection Scope
Prior to this inspection, the NRC had received and acknowledged changes made to the Salem/Hope Creek Emergency Plan and its implementing procedures. PSEG developed these changes in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(q), and determined that the changes did not result in a decrease in effectiveness of the Plan. PSEG also determined that the Plan continued to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b) and Appendix E to 10 CFR 50. During this inspection, the inspectors conducted a review of Salems and Hope Creeks 10 CFR 50.54(q) screenings for all changes made to the EALs, and for a sample of the changes made to the Plan, from May 2008 through March 2009, that could have potentially resulted in a decrease in effectiveness. This review of the EAL, Plan, and EPIP changes did not constitute NRC approval of the changes and, as such, the changes remain subject to future NRC inspection. In addition, the inspectors reviewed notifications written related to this area. The inspection was conducted in accordance with NRC Inspection Procedure 71114, Attachment
.04. The
requirements in 10 CFR 50.54(q) were used as reference criteria.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1EP5 Correction of Emergency Preparedness Weaknesses
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed a sampling of self-assessment procedures and reports to assess PSEG=s ability to evaluate their EP performance and programs. The inspectors reviewed a sampling of notifications written between January 2008 and March 2009 that were initiated by PSEG at Salem and Hope Creek for issues identified during drills, self-assessments and audits. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed: Nuclear Oversight audits; the event report for the August 2008 Unusual Event declaration at Hope Creek; and, the 2007 and 2008 50.54(t) audit reports. This inspection was conducted in accordance with NRC Inspection Procedure 71114, Attachment
.05. Planning Standard,
- (14) and the related requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix E were used as reference criteria.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1EP6 Drill Evaluation
a. Inspection Scope
(71114.06 - 1 sample)
The inspectors completed one drill evaluation inspection sample. On March 17, 2009, the inspectors observed the drill from the control room simulator, the technical support center (TSC) and the emergency offsite facility (EOF). The inspectors attended the drill debrief to ensure that PSEG captured drill deficiencies in their critique. The inspectors evaluated the drill performance relative to developing event classifications and notifications. The inspectors reviewed the Salem Event Classification Guides and Emergency Plans. The inspectors referenced Nuclear Energy Institute 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator (PI) Guideline, Revision 5, and verified that PSEG correctly counted the drills contribution to the NRC PI for drill and exercise performance.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
RADIATION SAFETY
Cornerstone: Occupational Radiation Safety
2OS1 Access Control to Radiologically Significant Areas (71121.01 - 6 samples)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors identified exposure significant work areas (about 2-3) within radiation areas, high radiation areas (<1 R/hr), or airborne radioactivity areas in the plant and reviewed associated PSEG controls and surveys of these areas to verify that controls (e.g., surveys, postings, barricades) were acceptable.
With a survey instrument, the inspectors walked down these areas or their perimeters to verify that prescribed radiation work permits, procedure, and engineering controls were in place, PSEG surveys and postings were complete and accurate, and air samplers were properly located.
The inspectors reviewed radiation work permits used to access these and other high radiation areas and identify what work control instructions or control barriers were specified. The inspectors used plant-specific technical specification high radiation area requirements as the standard for the necessary barriers. The inspectors reviewed electronic personal dosimeter alarm set points (both integrated dose and dose rate) for conformity with survey indications and plant policy. The inspectors verified that workers knew what actions were required when their electronic personal dosimeter malfunctioned or alarmed.
The inspectors verified adequate posting and locking of all entrances to high dose rate-high radiation areas and very high radiation areas.
The inspectors discussed with the Radiation Protection Manager high dose rate-high radiation area and very high radiation area controls and procedures. The inspectors reviewed procedural changes completed since the last inspection. The inspectors verified that changes to PSEG procedures did not substantially reduce the effectiveness and level of worker protection.
The inspectors discussed with health physics supervisors the controls in place for special areas that have the potential to become very high radiation areas during certain plant operations. The inspectors verified that communication with the health physics group was required prior to these plant operations to allow proper posting and control of radiation hazards.
The inspectors evaluated PSEG performance in this area against the requirements contained in 10 CFR 20, and Technical Specification 6.12.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
2OS2 ALARA Planning and Controls (71121.02 - 4 samples)
a. Inspection Scope
Utilizing PSEG records, the inspectors reviewed the historical trends and current status of tracked plant source terms. The inspectors verified that PSEG made allowances or developed contingency plans for expected changes in the source term due to changes in plant fuel performance issues or changes in plant primary chemistry.
The inspectors compared the person-hour estimates provided by maintenance planning and other groups to the radiation protection group with the actual work activity time requirements and evaluated the accuracy of these time estimates.
The inspectors verified that PSEG developed an understanding of the plant source term, including knowledge of input mechanisms to reduce the source term. The inspectors also verified that PSEG had a source-term control strategy in place.
The inspectors reviewed specific sources identified by PSEG for exposure reduction actions and the associated priorities PSEG established for implementation of these actions. The inspectors reviewed results achieved for these priorities since the last refueling cycle. During the previous 12 month assessment period, the inspectors verified that source reduction evaluations were completed and actions taken to reduce the overall source-term compared to the previous year.
The inspectors evaluated PSEG performance in this area against the requirements contained in 10 CFR 20.1101.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
2OS3 Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation and Protective Equipment (71121.03 - 1 sample)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the qualification documentation for onsite personnel designated to perform maintenance on the vendor-designated vital components and the vital component maintenance records for three self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA)units currently designated as ready for service. For the same three units, the inspectors ensured that the required periodic air cylinder hydrostatic testing was documented and up to date and the DOT required retest air cylinder markings were in place. The inspectors reviewed the onsite maintenance procedures governing vital component work and verified agreement between PSEG procedures and the SCBA manufacturers recommended practices.
The inspectors evaluated PSEG performance in this area against the requirements contained in 10 CFR 20.1501, 10 CFR 20.1703 and 10 CFR 20.1704.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed PSEG submittals for the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Mitigating Systems cornerstone PIs and the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Barrier Integrity cornerstone PIs discussed below. Data reviewed was for all four quarters of calendar year 2008. Emergency preparedness PI data was reviewed from the second through the fourth quarters of 2008. To verify the accuracy of the PI data reported during this period the data was compared to the PI definition and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI)99-02, Regulatory Assessment Indicator Guideline, Revision 5.
Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems
- Unit 1 and 2 Safety System Functional Failures
Cornerstone: Barrier Integrity
- Unit 1 and 2 Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Unidentified Leak Rate; and
- Unit 1 and 2 RCS Specific Activity The inspectors reviewed main control room logs and were familiar with leak rate data through plant status reviews required by NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status.
Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness
- Drill and Exercise Performance (DEP)
- ERO Drill Participation; and
- ANS Reliability.
For the PIs listed above to verify the accuracy of the reported data the inspectors reviewed the PI data, supporting documentation, and the information PSEG reported, from the second quarter through the fourth quarter of 2008.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems
.1 Review of Items Entered into the Corrective Action Program:
As required by Inspection Procedure 71152, Identification and Resolution of Problems, and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed a daily screening of all items entered into PSEG's corrective action program. This was accomplished by reviewing the description of each new notification and attending daily management review committee meetings.
4OA3 Event Followup
.1 (Closed) LER 05000272/2008002-00, Missed Containment Spray Valve Surveillance
per Technical Specification 4.0.5 On December 9, 2008, with Salem Unit 1 in Mode 1, it was identified that containment spray pressure relief (vacuum breaker) valve 1CS12 could not be located to perform a required post removal as-found surveillance test in accordance with the requirements of the technical specifications (TS) and the ASME OMa-1988, Part 1, Requirements for Inservice Performance Testing of Nuclear Power Plant pressure Relief Devices. The inability to perform the test because of the loss of the 1CS12 resulted in a conservative determination that the valve would not have passed the TS surveillance pressure test.
The valve misplacement was attributed to failure to follow work order instructions to properly retain the valve for testing. The valve testing scope was expanded to the second redundant valve on the tank. The test of the redundant valve concluded that the valve would have performed its function. All pressure relief valves on the containment spray additive tank were replaced with new valves. The failure to comply with TS 4.0.5, Surveillance Requirements for Inservice Inspection, constituted a violation of minor significance not subject to enforcement action in accordance with NRCs Enforcement Policy. The inspectors reviewed this LER and identified no additional findings of significance or violations of NRC requirements. PSEG documented the cause and corrective actions for this failure in notification 20394390. This LER is closed.
4OA5 Other Activities
.1 Quarterly Resident Inspector Observations of Security Personnel and Activities
a. Inspection Scope
During the inspection period, the inspectors conducted observations of security force personnel and activities to ensure that the activities were consistent with PSEG security procedures and regulatory requirements related to nuclear plant security. These observations took place during both normal and off-normal plant working hours. These quarterly resident inspector observations of security force personnel and activities did not constitute any additional inspection samples. Rather, they were considered an integral part of the inspectors normal plant status review and inspection activities.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2 TI 2515/173, Review of the Implementation of the Industry Ground Water Protection
Voluntary Initiative
a. Inspection Scope
On March 9-13, 2009, the inspectors assessed PSEGs ground water protection program to verify that PSEG implemented the voluntary industry Ground Water Protection Initiative (GPI). The GPI was unanimously approved by a formal vote of the Nuclear Energy Institute member utility chief nuclear officers. This established the industrys commitment to implement the initiative. The GPI identifies the actions the industry deemed necessary for implementation of a timely and effective ground water protection program.
The inspectors verified that the following objectives for the GPI were contained in PSEG's program:
1.1 Site Hydrology and Geology 1.2 Site Risk Management 1.3 On-Site Ground Water Monitoring 1.4 Remediation Process 1.5 Record Keeping 2.1 Stakeholder Briefing 2.2 Voluntary Communication 2.3 Thirty-Day Reports 2.4 Annual Reporting 3.1 Perform a Self-Assessment 3.2 Review the Program Under the Auspices of NEI Unit 1 Tritium Ground Water Monitoring The inspectors reviewed PSEG actions regarding the tritium in ground water from the Unit 1 fuel pool, first identified in 2002. The inspectors discussed with PSEG current activity levels of tritium, historical trends, remediation activities and future plans regarding this issue.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.3 World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO) Plant Assessment Report Review
The inspectors reviewed the final report for the WANO plant assessment of the Salem Generating Station, August 2008 evaluation, dated March 2009. No new safety issues were identified.
.4 Emergency Response Organization, Drill/Exercise PI, Program Review
The inspectors performed NRC Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/175, ensured the completeness of PSEGs completed Attachment 1 from the TI, and forwarded that data to NRC Headquarters.
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit
On April 3, 2009, the resident inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Braun.
PSEG acknowledged that none of the information reviewed by the inspectors during the inspection period was proprietary.
ATTACHMENT:
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee personnel
- H. Berrick, Senior Engineer Nuclear, Regulatory Assurance
- L. Cataldo, Nuclear Technical Supervisor, Chemistry
- R. Gary, Radiation Protection Manager
- G. Gellrich, Plant Manager
- M. Gwirtz, Director Operations
- E. Keating, Environmental Manager, Regulatory Affairs
- D. McCollum, Component Maintenance Organization
- E. Villar, Licensing Engineer
- H. Miller, Technical Support Specialist
- G. Rich, Chemist
- T. Davis, Environmental Specialist
- L. Rajkowski, Design Engineering Manager
- L. Oberembt, NSSS Systems Manager
- M. Rahmani, Electrical Systems Engineer
- A. Garcia, BoP Systems Engineer
- G. Pawha, Programs Engineer
- P. Williams, LOR Instructor
- J. Gebely, Fire Department Shift Supervisor
- D. Burgin, Manager Emergency Preparedness
- D. Kabachinski, D&E Coordinator
- C. Banner, Emergency Preparedness Coordinator
- B. Vondrasek, Emergency Preparedness Training Coordinator
- C. Simmermon, Emergency Preparedness Facility and Equipment Coordinator
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Opened
None
Opened/Closed
- 05000272/2008002-00 LER Missed Containment Spray Valve Surveillance per Technical Specification 4.0.5 (Section 4OA3.1)
Discussed
None