IR 05000272/1996004
| ML18101B242 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem, Hope Creek |
| Issue date: | 02/23/1996 |
| From: | Keimig R, Galen Smith NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18101B241 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-272-96-04, 50-272-96-4, 50-311-96-04, 50-311-96-4, 50-354-96-02, 50-354-96-2, NUDOCS 9603010146 | |
| Download: ML18101B242 (6) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
DOCKET/RE~ORT NOS.:
50-272/96-04 50-311/96-04 50-354/96-02 LICENSEE:
FACILITIES:
Public Service Electric and Gas Company Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2 Hope Creek Nuclear Generating Station INSPECTION DATES:
January 29 - February 2, 1996 INSPECTORS:
APPROVED BY:
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... -2 ~L:afeguards. lnsp.ectol'
G. C. Smith, Senior Safeguards Inspector Emergency Preparedness and Safeguards Branch Division of Reactor Safety d. j'J. _ Jol,o
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-2-~C Date Areas Inspected: Access Authorization Program Administration and Organization; Background Investigation Elements; Psychological Evaluations and Behavioral Observation; "Grandfathering," Reinstatement, and Transfer of Access Authorization; Temporary Access Authorization; Denial/Revocation of Unescorted Access; Audits and Records Retentio Results:
The licensee's Access Authorization Program was assessed as being capable of providing high assurance that individuals granted unescorted access are trustworthy, reliable and do not constitute an unreasonable risk to the health and safety of the public, including a potential to commit radiological sabotag Program strengths were noted in the consolidation of all pre-access functions under the direction of the Nuclear Security Manage No weaknesses or matters of non-compliance were identified during the inspectio ~960223
~DR ADOCK 05000272 PDR
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DETAILS BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE On April 25, 1991, the Commission published the Personnel Access Authorization Requirements for Nuclear Power Plants, 10 CFR 73.56 (the rule), requiring power reactor licensees to implement an Access Authorization Program (AAP) by April 27, 1992, and to incorporate the AAP into the licensee's Physical Security Pla The objective of the rule is to provide high assurance that individuals granted unescorted access are trustworthy and reliable, and do not constitute an unreasonable risk to the health and safety of the public, including a potential to commit radiological sabotag An April 8, 1992, letter from the licensee to the NRC forwarded Revision 2 to its Physical Security Plan, which stated, in part, all elements of Regulatory Guide 5.66, Access Authorization Program for Nuclear Power Plants, have been implemented to satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR Part 7 An NRC Region I
- -- - -letter--of-May--19,- -1992, to *the*-1i*censee-stated that*th*e changes subinTtted-*tiad been reviewed and were determined to be consistent with the provisions of 10 CFR 50.54(p) and acceptable for inclusion in the Security Pla This inspection, conducted in accordance with NRC Inspection Manual, Temporary Instruction 2515/127, Access Authorization, dated January 17, 1995, assessed the implementation of the licensee's AAP to determine if the program was commensurate with regulatory requirements and the licensee's Physical Security Plan (the Plan), and to identify AAP strengths and weaknesses in the areas inspecte, ACCESS AUTHORIZATION PROGRAM ADMINISTRATION AND ORGANIZATION The Public Service Electric and Gas Company (PSE&G) Access Authorization Program requirements are contained in two documents. Artificial Island Security Plan Procedure SP4, Personnel Access Program, Revision 3, dated November 1, 1994, defines the overall requirements for the Access Authorization Progra The Fitness-for-Duty and Behavioral Observation portions of the.Access Authorization Program are contained in PSE&G's Nuclear Administrative Procedure NC.NA-AP.ZZ-0042Q Fitness-for-Duty program, Revision 3, dated March 3, 199 The responsibility for implementation of the Access Authorization Program is vested in the Nuclear Security Manage The Access Screening and Medical Departments both report to the Nuclear Security Manage All access authorization functions are performed in the Site Access Processing Cente The consolidation of these functions in one location under the direction of the Nuclear Security Manager has resulted in an effective process that allows PSE&G to properly process a large number of personnel through the Access program in a timely manne Through interviews and inspection of documentation, the inspectors determined that the personnel responsible for the administration and implementation of the program were familiar with their duties and responsibilitie. '-...... *1
- BACKGROUND INVESTIGATION ELEMENTS The inspectors reviewed records and conducted interviews to c2termine the program's adequacy to verify the true identity of an applica111.. and to develop information concerning employment history, educational history, credit history, criminal history., military service, character and reputation of the applicant prior to granting unescorted access to protected and vital area The inspectors reviewed the background investigations (Bis) results of 65 licensee employees and contractor personne The inspectors noted that these records had various types of documentation depending on the type of Access Authorization being performed (temporary, reinstatement, transfer, etc.), however, all records were found to have the necessary documentation to support the Access Authorizations grante Most files had check lists that indicated what documents were in the files, however, even those files that did not have the check lists were determined to
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In accordance with 10 CFR 73.57, the licensee is responsible for initiating criminal history checks on individuals applying for unescorted Access Authorization, and for considering all information received from the Attorney Genera Among the records reviewed by the inspectors were the records of 10 persons whose fingerprint records had been returned with derogatory informatio The inspectors determined that the information had been properly evaluated and appropriate action had been implemented as a result of the derogatory informatio The action included revocation of access for some persons on site and "holds" placed on the Access Authorizations of those persons who had left the site prior to the receipt of the criminal history records by the license The "holds" on the Access Authorizations remain until the derogatory information is satisfactorily di spos it i one *****
Overall, the inspectors concluded that the records contained the required background investigation information on which an appropriate decision regarding granting Access Authorization could be based.. PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS AND BEHAVIORAL OBSERVATION Psychological Evaluations The inspectors interviewed members of the licensee's medical staff who administered the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) evaluation and determined.that the persons had been trained and qualified in its administratio The inspectors determined through observations that appropriate controls were in place to proctor the administration of the MMPI evaluation adequately and provide appropriate protection for personal psychological information
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gathered. Through review of records, the inspectors also determined that MMPI results were being reviewed by qualified psychologists, as require The psychological screening program was found to be well managed and to provide timely support to the AA _:1
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- .i 3 Behav;oral Observat;on The licPr.see's Behavioral Observation Program (BOP) was inspected to determine
~:hether tut: 1 icensee had a training and retraining program to ensure that supervisors have and maintain an awareness and sensitivity to detect behavior that could reflect adverse changes affecting trustworthiness and reliability, and to report such to appropriate licensee management for evaluation and actio The program had been instituted as part of, and is an element in common with, the licensee's FFD Progra The inspectors reviewed the licensee's BOP training program and related lesson plans and concluded that they were adequate to support the progra Interviews conducted throughout the inspection with various persons representative of a cross-section of licensee and contractor personnel, both supervisory and non-supervisory, indicated a satisfactory knowledge of program requirements and the awareness of a person's responsibility to report arrests to the licensee. The inspectors concluded that BOP training satisfied regulatory requirement ~--
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.1 uGRANDFATHERING,u REINSTATEMENT AND TRANSFER OF ACCESS AUTHORIZATION uGrandfatheringu Included in the cross-section of records selected at random by the inspectors were records of personnel who did not meet the criteria for "grandfathering,"
i.e., those who did not have uninterrupted, unescorted Access Authorization for at least 180 days on April 25, 1991, the date of publication of the NRC's Access Authorization Rul The inspectors noted that in all cases, none of the records reviewed revealed anyone who had been granted unescorted Access Authorization without having satisfied the requisite elements of the progra.2 Reinstatement The licensee's criteria for reinstatement of Access Authorization was re-viewe The criteria provided for reinstatement of unescorted Access Authorization if a security clearance had been granted, the individual's unescorted Access Authorization was terminated within 365 days of the reinstatement request, termination was under favorable conditions, and FFD Program requirements were me The inspectors determined that the reinstatement portion of the Access Authorization Program was being implemented satisfactoril.3 Transfer of Access Authorization The licensee has incorporated the provision for the transfer of Access Authorization, both receipts in and transfers out, into its progra The records selected at random for review by the inspectors included several examples of bot No discrepancies were note The inspectors concluded that the transfer of Access Authorization aspects of the program were properly implemente.,.
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4 TEMPORARY ACCESS AUTHORIZATION Aa1ong the records selectE'd at random for review by the. inspectors were those that included the results of an abbreviated scope investigation, which is used as the basis for granting temporary unescorted Access Authorization, as permitted by the Rul The records of these investigation results contained adequate information (character and reputation from one developed reference, past year's employment history, and a credit check) on which to base temporary Access Authorizatio The inspectors noted that, in these records; there were no instances in which rescission of Access Authorization, based on the abbreviated investigation, was necessitated following receipt of the full five-year investigation (except in several cases following receipt of information furnished by the FBI pursuant to 10 CFR 73.57). DENIAL/REVOCATION OF UNESCORTED ACCESS
The inspectors-reviewed the licensee's-provisfons for-the--revfe\\*r<>f' a*ppears*or--
denial or termination of Access Authorization, and determined that a person is informed of the basis for denial or revocation of Access Authorization, has the opportunity to provide additional information for consideration of Access Authorization and, if requested by the affected individual, and can have the decision, and any additional information, reviewed by the Access Appeals Officer in the Human Resources Department whose decision is final.* The inspectors concluded that this aspect of the program was being adequately implemente.0 AUDITS AND RECORD RETENTION Audits The inspectors reviewed the two most recenf:annual audits conducted by the PSE&G Nuclear Department Quality Assurance group, of the licensee's security program (Audit No.94-031, conducted February 16-25, 1994 and Audit No.95-031, conducted May 8-26, 1995), which also included audits of the Access Authorization Progra No adverse findings were reported in the audits in the area of Access Authorizatio The audits were determined to be comprehensive and indepth, and the findings were reported to the appropriate levels of managemen.2 Record Retention The inspectors reviewed the licensee's record retention activities and determined that required records were being retained for the required time perio The inspectors further determined that the storage facilities provided adequate security, and that access to those records was adequately controlled to protect personal information from unauthorized personne Records are stored in locked file cabinets, in a locked room, to which is only accessible to authorized personnel. Overall, the inspectors concluded, based on observations of ongoing operations, that record retention practices were adequate to provide the requisite security of sensitive personal informatio..,
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5 EXIT INTERVIEW Ar exit interview was conducted on February 2, 1996, at the Salem and Hope Creek Nuclear Generating Stations with the below listed person At that time, the purpose and scope of the inspection were reviewed, and the preliminary findings were presente The licensee acknowledged the preliminary inspection finding The principal licensee employees contacted during the inspection follow:
D. Beckwith, Licensing and Regulation Engineer R. Binettis, PhD, Psychological Services Director E. Cummings, Screening and Badging Administrative Clerk R. Fisher, Screening Supervisor L. Krajewski, Site Access Administer R. Mack, M.D., Medical Director
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C-. -Munzenmaier-,-- General-Manager,- Nuclear Ope-rations_ ServJces__ _ ____ _
D. Renwick, Manager, Nuclear Security M. Samuels, Medical Administrator In addition to the above persons, other licensee and contractor personnel were contacted/interviewed by the inspectors during the period of the inspection.