IR 05000266/1996018
| ML20217K267 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Point Beach  |
| Issue date: | 08/08/1997 |
| From: | Beach A NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | Grigg R WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER CO. |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20217K271 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-266-96-18, 50-266-97-05, 50-266-97-5, 50-301-96-18, 50-301-97-05, 50-301-97-5, EA-96-273, EA-97-075, EA-97-75, NUDOCS 9708150181 | |
| Download: ML20217K267 (5) | |
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UNITE 3 STATES A
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
SUBJECT:
EXERCISE OF ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION (NRC Inspection Reports 50 266(301)/96018(DRS) and 50 266(301)/97005(DRP))
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Dear Mr. Grigg:
The NRC conducted two inspections from December 2,1996, through March 14,1997, at your corporate office and at the Point Beach Nuclear Plant. An Operational Saftw Team Inspection (OSTI) was chartered in November 1990 because of several events that shared the same root causes as the issues discussed in Enforcement Action (EA) 96 273', The results of the OSTI were presented to your staff at a January 31,1997, public exit meeting and the inspection report was issued on March 3,1997. In addition, a special inspection was conducted at Point Beach from February 8 through March 14,1997, to review the use of manual operator action in piace of automatic operation of the motor-driven auxiliary feedwater system during an accident coincident with loss of offsite
. power. The results of this inspection were discussed with your staff on March 17,1997, and the inspection report was issued on April 3,1997. A predecisional enforcement conference was held in the Region 111 office on April 9,1997, to discuss several apparent violations that were identified during these inspections.
Based on the information developed during the inspections and the information that your staff provided during the predecisional enforcement conference, the NRC has determined that numerous violations of NRC requirements occurred. These violations are cited in the enclosed Notice of Violation (Notice) and the circumstances surroundhig them are descrit,ed in detail in the subject inspection reports.
Item A of the Notice contains 15 violations involving your failure to promptly identify and correct conditions adverse to quality, including failures associated with inconsistent 1;
EA 96-273 issued a $325,000 civil penalty on December 3,1996, for issues identified during inspections conducted from June through August 1996. The issues were examples of
- Inattentiveness to duty on the part of licensed personnel, breakdown in control of licensed actMties, failure to take prompt corrective action following the identification of a condition adverse to quality, and problems in the implementation of dry cask storage.
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MEIElllBlEllllR 9708150181-970000
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PDR ADOCK 05000266
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Mr. R. Technical Specification (TS) interpretations, incorrect containment penetration testing frequencies, breaker coordination problems, and thermal overload conditions that could affect component operability. Additionally, ymr corporate staff had implemented a comprehensive design basis reconstitution program that identified substantial conditions that were adverse to quality. However, program managers did not ensure that prompt operability determinations were performed and effective corrective actions ~were implemented. These violations indicated that the corrective action program suffered from a noticeable lack of senior management review and oversight. Individually and collectively, the vio!ations are significant. Therefore, these violations are classified in the aggregate in accordance with NUREG 1600, " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions" (Enforcement Policy), as a Severity Level lli problem, item B of the Notice contains two violations invo'ving your failure to perform adequate safety reviews in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59, " Changes, Tests and Experiments," such that unreviewed safety questions were created when your staff operated the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) and the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) systems in a manner that was not described in the Final Safety Analyses Report (FSAR). For the RHR system, your staff used the upper core injection portion of the low pressure injection system (part of the RHR system) as a flow path to the core during refueling activities. This system configuration was not discussed in the FSAR, bypassed the established forced flow cooling path to the core, and according to the associated safety analysis, could increase the probability of a dilution accident. For the AFW system, your staff required the use cf manual operator action to control auxiliary feedwater flow to the steam generators during loss of offsite power events to compensate for equipment deficiencies. The use of operator action was different from the system function discussed in the FSAR. Therefore, these violations are classified in the aggregate in accordance with the Enforcement Policy as a Severity Level lli problem, item C of the Notice contains four violations involving your failure to properly implement plant TS requirements by not correcting inappropriate TS interpretations or failing to either perform several tests required by the TS requiremems for portions of the emergency power supply system, or perform the tosts at the required frequency. Collectively, the violations represent a significant lack of attention toward licensed activities. Therefore, these violations are classified in the aggregate in accordance with the Enforcement Policy as a Severity Leval ill problem.
NRC conducted the OSTI because Wisconsin Electric Power Company's response to previous self revealing and NRC-identified issues was ineffective. However, the NRC recognizes that during and subsequent to the inspections that identified these violations, you and your management staff implemented significant and comprehensive actions to address these and other issues. The corrective actions implemented included (1) bench marking processes (such as control room decorum, control room staffing levels, work control and danger tag processes, and conduct of operations) with other nuclear power plants to assure that your standards were commensurate with industry standards; (2) the overhaul of the corrective action program by lowering the identification threshold, improving the effectiveness of assessments. and implementing effective long term
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Mr. R. corrective actions; (3) obtainlag employee input and involvement to ensure successful implementation of the performance improvement prograrn; (4) removing the operating unit from service and not restarting the unit that was in an extended outage in order to focus resources on resolving these significant performance problems; and (5) performing a backwards look at work activities and engineering evaluations to assess the adequacy of the work performed and address deficiencies that had not been resolved, in accordance with the Enforcement Policy, civil penalties would normally be considered for those Severity Level til problems. A significant penalty was considered in this case because these violations demonstrated that the management control systems in place at the time of the inspection were not adequate to assure that unreviewed safety questions were identified and resolved, equipment testing was properly conducted, and the corrective action prograrn was effective in the early detection and timely resolution of conditions adverse to safe plant operation. However, I have been authorized after consultation with the Director, Office of Enforcement to exercise enforcement discr'etion in accordance with section Vll.B(6) of the Enforcement Policy and not propose a civil penalty in th!s case.
Discretien was warranted because (1) the NRC has already issed a $325,000 civil penalty (EA 96 273 dated December 3,1996) to emphasize performance problems, (2)
the licensee entered into a Confinnatory Action Letter which provided that the licensee would not operate its facility until it andressed the enclosed violations as well as other performance problems and met with the NRC to justify restart, (3) the licensee has implemented comprehensive corrective actions, and (4) although the NRC identified a number of these issues as a result of its inspections, the NRC has determined, based on our continuing inspection effort, that Wisconsin Electric Power Company dedicated significant resources to successfully address the performance issues and substantially improve Point Beach's conduct of operations.
Nonetheless, the NRC must emphasize that failure to sustain this performance could lead to more significant regulatory sanctions.
'/ou are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions specified in the enclosed Notice when preparing ycur response. The NRC will use your response, in part, to determine whether further enforcement action is necessary to ensure compliance with regulatory requirements.
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Mr. R. R, Grigg-4. -
in accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice,"- a copy of this letter, its enclosure (s), and your response will be placed'in the NRC Public Document Room.
(PDR).
Sincere,
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&si
/. Bill Beach
- Regional Administrator Docket Numbers 50 266,50-301 License Numbers DPR 24, DPR 27 Enclosure: -
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cc w/encis:
S. A. Patulski, Site Vice President l
A. J. Cayla, Plant Manager Virgil Kanable, Chief, Boiler Section Cheryl L. Parrino, Chairman, Wisconsin Public Service Commission
State Liaison Officer
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