IR 05000259/1995053
| ML18038B461 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 10/05/1995 |
| From: | Shymlock M, Whitener H NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18038B460 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-259-95-53, 50-260-95-53, 50-296-95-53, GL-89-10, NUDOCS 9510180152 | |
| Download: ML18038B461 (26) | |
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'NITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET,,N.W., SUITE 2900 ATLANTA,GEORGIA'303234199
.Report Nos.: 50-259/95-53, 50-260/95-53 and 50-296/95-53 Licensee:
Tennessee Valley Authority 6N 38A Lookout Place 1101 Market Street Chattanooga,TN 37402-2801 Docket Nos.: 50-259, 50-260, and 50-296 Facility Name:
Browns Ferry Units 2 and
Inspection Conducted:.
September ll - 15, 1995 License Nos.:
DRP-33,DPR-52 and DPR-68 Lead Inspector:
,H. Whitener, Reactor Inspector Other Inspection Personnel'.
M. Miller., RII T. Scarbrough, NRR Date Signed Approved by:
M. Shymlock, Acting Chief Test Program.Section Engineering Branch Division of Reactor Safety
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'Date Signed SUMMARY Scope:
This special, announced inspection was performed at the Browns Ferry Nucl'ear Plant to examine the 1-icensee's implementation of the motor-operated valve (MOV) program to meet commitments made for Unit 3 in,response to Generic Letter (GL) 89-10,
"Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valve Testing and'urveillance."
The inspectors utilized the guidance provided in Temporary Instruction (TI-) 2515/109 (Part 2), "Inspection Requirements for Generic Letter 89-10, Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valve Testing and Surveillance."
As delineated in Part 2.of TI 2515/109, this inspection was the initial review of the licensee's MOV program implementation in response to GL 89-10 for Unit 3.
In addition, the "system operational enhancement" (S.O.E.) motor-operated Enclosure W5<0<80<5a 95<0<a
'PDR ADCICK 05000259
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z valves were examined for Units 2 and 3 to determine if these HOVs met the GL 89-10 initial recommendations.
The S.O.E.
MOYs were valves removed from the GL 89-10 MOV program as not having an active safety function.
Results:
The inspectors concluded that the licensee's implementation of GL 89-10 for Unit 3 was in the process of being completed in a satisfactory manner.
However, one inspector followup item (IFI) concerning the program scope reduction will remain open.
The scoping concern. involved the reduction of the number of HOVs from 56 to 36 that are in the GL 89-10 program.
Several work items and testing remain to be completed for Unit 3 prior to plant startup.
Not all HOVs had been tested at the time of this inspection.
However, the Unit 3 GL 89-10 HOV program reviewed was nearly identical to the Unit 2 GL &9-10 program which was satisfactorily closed out in July 1995.
Several remaining items have not been completed.
These items are:
1)
Motor brakes for 3-FCV-73-34, 40, and 44 have not been removed.
[Section 2.1]
2)
Testing has not been completed.
[Section 2.3]
3)
Engineering has not reviewed and completed the reconciliation of test data for the "Calculation Packages".
[Section 2. 1 and 2.3]
4)
Problem Evaluation Reports, BFPER 940016, 940038, 940697, 950263, 950485, 950920, 951057, and 951080 have not had all work completed.
[Section 2.6]
5)
During the inspectors walkdown inspection, several cover bolts were loose or missing.
[Section 2.9]
~Stren ths (1)
The GL 89-10 Part 2 Implementation Hook was thorough and identified the complete status of each HOV including open deficiencies.
[Section 2. 1]
(2)
The "calculations pack'age" for each HOV was detailed and contained complete information that included actuator data, valve data, motor data, testing data, the design-basis differential pressure calculation, and the thrust/torque calculations.
[Section 2. 1]
(3)
Licensee personnel, including both engineering and maintenance, were very knowledgeable of the issues related to GL 89-10.
Enclosure
0 0>
REPORT DETAILS
1'. 0 2.0 Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- T. Abney, Unit 3 Nuclear Assurance and Licensing Manager
- I. Beltz, GL 89-10 Program Manager
- T. Chan, Corporate Engineering Specialist
- J. Davenport, Licensing Engineer
- B. Endsley, HOV Maintenance Engineer
- C. Galuska, HOV Engineer
- R. Golub, GL 89-10 Project Manager D. Gruber, Maintenance Manager
- J. Johnson, Site guality Manager
- R. Hachon, Vice President
- J. McCarthy, Mechanical Engineering Manager
- W: Pratt, Corporate Maintenance Valve Engineer
- G. Preston, Plant Manager
- P. Salas, Licensing Manager
- T. Shriver, Nuclear Assurance and Licensing H. Williams, Engineering Manager
- S. Wetzel, Compliance Manager NRC Resident Inspectors
- L. Wert, Senior Resident Inspector Other NRC Personnel
- T. Scarbrough, Mechanical Engineering Branch, NRR Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the last paragraph.
GENERIC LETTER (GL) 89-10
"SAFETY-RELATED MOTOR-OPERATED VALVE (MOV)
TESTING AND SURVEILLANCE" (TI 2515/109)
On June 28, 1989, the NRC issued GL 89-10, which requested licensees and construction permit holders to establish a program to ensure that switch settings for safety-related HOVs were selected, set, and maintained properly.
Subsequently, six supplements to the GL.have been issued'.
NRC inspections of licensee actions implementing commitments to GL 89-10 and its supplements have been conducted based on guidance provided in Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/109,
"Inspection Requirements for Generic Letter 89-10, Safety-'Related Motor-Operated Valve Testing and Surveillance."
TI 2515/109 is divided into Part 1,
"Program Review,"
and Part 2, "Verification of Program Implementation."
The current inspection assessed the licensee's implementation of GL 89-10 using Part 2 of TI 2515/109 for Unit 3.
In addition, the licensee's
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scoping revision that removed
MOVs from the GL 89-10 program was also reviewed for Units 2 and 3.
The licensee's implementation of the GL 89-10 for Units 2 and 3 were previously examined and documented in NRC Inspection Reports 50-259, 260, 296/92-04, and 94-03.
A closeout inspection of Unit 2 was conducted July 10 -14 and July 24 - 28, 1995 and documented in Inspection Report 95-19.
Details of this inspection and findjngs are described below.
Desi n-Basis Reviews During. the Unit 2 closeout inspection, the inspectors reviewed the licensee's design-basis documentation for the "GL-89-10 Motor Operated Valve Plant Program" for diagnostic testing of HOVs.
That inspection included a review of mechanical flow diagrams; design-basis calculation results of the expected differential pressures; the sizing and switch setting calculations; and diagnostic test data.
During this inspection, the inspector verified that the Unit 3 HOV program was essentially the same as the Unit 2 HOV program.
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's
"Calculation Packages" for all 36 HOVs in the GL 89-10 Program.
These packages were reviewed to determine and verify their adequacy and completeness.
The licensee had one HOV Calculation Package for each valve which included 1) design data for the valve, operator, and motor; 2) design-basis calculation; 3) pressure locking/thermal binding evaluation; 4) electrical data; 5) thrust/torque calculations; and 6) weak link analysis.
Testing results including diagnostic traces are to be added for reconcilation.
Testing results were not included since testing had not been completed and the data was not available.
The HOV packages included the calculations for differential pressure, electrical degraded grid voltage, flow, temperature, design thrust, and torque.
The documents and calculations were reviewed to determine if the design-basis differential pressure and flow conditions, design temperature, and other design parameters for each HOV selected met the recommendations of GL 89-10.
The inspectors verified that degraded grid'alculations were incl'uded to ensure that the lowest motor terminal voltage commensurate with design-bases conditions was factored into the determination of minimum thrust ratings.
The inspectors also. verified that the licensee satisfactorily addressed, the Limitorque Part 21 high temperature motor concern.
The inspectors reviewed and compared eleven Unit 2 and Unit 3 MOV
"Calculation Packages" in detail.
These comparisons were done to determine and verify that the results for both units were the same since the systems in both units were the same.
The Unit 2 and Unit 3 HOVs compared are listed as follows:
Unit 2
3 Valve No.
Valve Function FCV-23-34 FCV-23-40 RHR Service Water Heat Exchanger A
Discharge Valve -,12 inch globe RHR Service Water Heat Exchanger C
Discharge Valve -
12 inch globe
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FCV-23-46 FCV-23-52 FCV-73-16 FCV-74-57 FCV-74-59 FCV-74-71 FCY-74-73 FCV-75-09 2-FCV-75-37 RHR Service Water Heat Exchanger
Discharge Valve - 14 inch globe RHR Service Water Heat Exchanger D
Discharge Valve -
14 inch globe HPCI Turbine Steam Supply Valve -
10 inch gate Valve - 10 inch gate RHR Suppression Pool Spray/RHR Test Return Valve - 18 inch gate RHR Suppression Pool Cooling/RHR Test
,Return Valve -
12 inch globe RHR Suppression Pool Spray/RHR Test Return Valve - 18 inch gate RHR Suppression Pool Cooling/RHR Test Return
-
12 inch globe Core Spray Hinimum Flow for Pumps 2A and 2C Valve - 3 inch gate Core Spray Hinimum Flow for. Pumps 2B and 2D Valve - 3 inch gate The system documentation review for the above ll HOVs included the
"System Design Criteria" for the Residual Heat Removal System (RHR), the High Pressure Coolant Injection System and the Core Spray Coolant System.
The "System Design Criteria" included the system description, operation, and design-basis documentation.
The system flow (P&ID)
drawings were used to verify the location of the HOVs in the piping systems and the design safety function.
These documents were examined to verify that the HOV design-basis calculations included all necessary parameters.
The HOV design-basis documentation (DBD) included calculations, drawings, engineering reports, and engineering standards.
The HOV documentation.
package for each valve included both the "design-basis" calculations and the "engineering thrust" calculations.
The DBD documents reviewed are listed as follows:
2.
System Design Criteria BFN-50-7073, Revision 6, High Pressure Coolant Injection System (HPCI) - Unit 2
& 3 HPCI Pump Curves
- General Electric Co.
-
P.O.
No. 205-H-0457 Flow Diagram 2(3)-47E812-1
& 2, High Pressure Coolant Injection System System Design Criteria BFN-50-7074, Revision 7, Residual Heat Removal System (RHR) - Unit 2
& 3
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RHR Pump Curves - Bingham Pump Co.
X 24 X 28 CVIC, p'er General Electric Co.
P.O.
No. 205-H0627 Flow Diagram 2(3)-47E811-1, Residual Heat Removal System Flow Diagram 2(3)-47E858-1, Service Water -
RHR System 3.
System Design Criteria BFN-50-7075, Revision 5, Core Spray System
- Unit 2
& 3 Core Spray Pump Manual for Curves - Bingham-Wi11amette
X 16 X
14 1/2 CVDS, per General Electric Co.
P.O.
No. 205-H0592 Flow Diagram 2(3)-47E814-1,.Core Spray System In the areas inspected the inspectors concluded that the licensee had adequately addressed the design-basis as recommended in GL 89-10 in that the MOV packages were very thorough and contained all the necessary data, calculations, and reviews to ensure each HOV has been adequately evaluated by engineering.
The HOV packages were considered a strength in the GL 89-10 program.
With respect to the Unit 3 GL 89-10 MOVs, the licensee has not completed its evaluation of test data.
Motor Brakes Design change notice DCN W29831 was initiated to have the motor brakes removed for 3-FCV-73-34, 3-FCV-73-40, and 3-FCV-73-44.
The licensee was in the process of completing the work.
The removal of the brakes from the HOVs is scheduled to be completed prior to startup of Unit 3.
Sco e
Chan e
Initially, the licensee had identified 56 MOVs in their GL 89-10 program during the Part
GL 89-10 inspection conducted February 1992.
Since that time, the scope of MOVs had been reduced to 36 HOVs.
The licensee had revised the scope of HOVs after the GL 89-10 Part 2 inspection conducted February 1994.
GL 89-10 Scope Calculation MD-Q0999-910034 had been revised reducing the HOVs to 36 HOVs.
Since then one HOV, 2(3)-
FCV-78-68 had been removed as a
GL 89-10 or system operation enhancement (S.O.E.) valve.
The HOVs had been re-evaluated and the results are documented in report,
"Assessment Of Browns Ferry Units 2 And 3 Motor Operated Valves," dated November ll, 1994, by the contractor S.
LEVY Incorporated.
Thirty-six of the HOVs had been classified as having an
"active" safety function and remain in the GL 89-10 program.
The remaining
HOVs had been re-classified as S.O.E.
valves and have been removed from the GL 89-10 program.
All 19 S.O.E.
HOVs had their thrust limits calculated and were statically tested and met the recommendations in GL 89-10.
However, the licensee's GL 89-10 program requirements would no longer be applicable to these valves.
The MOVs removed from the scope of the GL 89-10 program for Units 2 and 3 were:
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FCV-70-47 Reactor Building Close Cooling Water Containment Outlet Isolation Valve FCV-71-08 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC)- Turbine Steam Supply Valve FCV-71-19 RCIC Condensate Storage Tank Suction Valve FCV-71-25 RCIC Lube Oil Cooling Water Valve FCV-71-34 RCIC Pump Minimum Flow Valve FCV-71-39 RCIC Injection Valve FCV-73-35 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI)
Pump Test Return Valve FCV-73-36 HPCI/RCIC Pump Test Return Valve FCV-73-81 HPCI Isolation Valve Bypass Valve FCV-74-07 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Minimum Flow Valve FCV-74-30 RHR Minimum Flow Valve FCV-74-47 RHR Shutdown Cooling Outboard Isolation Valve FCV-74-48 RHR Shutdown Cooling Inboard Isolation Valve FCV-74-52 RHR Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) Injection Throttling Valve FCV-74-66 RHR LPCI Injection Throttling Valve FCV-75-22 Core Spray Test Return Valve FCV-75-23 Core Spray Injection Valve FCV-75-50 Core Spray Test Return Valve FCV-75-51 Core Spray Injection Valve The inspectors reviewed the "Calculation Packages" for all the Unit 2 and Unit 3 S.O.E.
valves to determine if the packages were complete and to verify that the S.O.E.
valves have sufficient thrust and margin to ensure there are no operability concerns.
The inspectors did not identify any immediate concerns regarding the S.O.E. valves.
The reduction of MOVs from the GL 89-IO scope was previously identified as Inspector Followup Item IFI 50-260, 296/95-19-01,
"Reduced Scope of Valves in GL 89-10 Program",
during the Unit 2 closeout inspection conducted In July 1995.
Further review of this issue will be required by the NRC staff for both Units 2 and i i
MOV Settin s
2.3 The inspectors verified that the licensee was implementing the same requirements for MOV switch settings in Unit 3 that were used for Unit 2.
During the Unit 2 closeout inspection conducted July 1995, the inspectors concl'uded the licensee
'had satisfactorily implemented the GL 89-10 recommendations for switch settings.
Desi n-Basis Ca abilities 2.4 The 1icensee was in the process of testing the MOVs.
No data was available for review at the time of this inspection.
However, the licensee stated all testing would be completed and reviewed by engineering prior to startup of Unit 3.
However, two HPCI MOVs that need steam for testing are to be tested during startup.
Periodic Verification of MOV Ca abilit Recommended action "d" of Generic Letter (GL) 89-10 requested the
'preparation or revision of procedures to ensure that adequate MOV switch settings are determined and maintained throughout the life of the plant.
Section "j" of GL 89-10 recommends surveillance to confirm the adequacy of the settings.
The interval of the surveillance is to be based on the safety importance of the MOV as well as its maintenance and performance history, but was recommended not to exceed five years or three refueling outages.
Further, Gl 89-10 recommended that the capability of the MOV be verified if the MOV was replaced, modified, or overhauled to an extent that the existing test results are not representative of the MOV.
Periodic Testin
, Re-verification The, licensee revised SSP-6.51, Program Plan For Generic Letter 89-10, Section 3. 14, Periodic Monitoring of MOVs, Step B.
Step B has been revised to state,
"The frequency for periodic monitoring shall be set not to exceed three refueling outages or five years....
All MOVs identified as 89-l0 shall be retested as a minimum under static conditions and where possible under differential pressure (DP)
conditions....
Currently, for BFN Unit 3,
MOVs are in the 89-10 program with 24 static and
Dp testable MOVs...."
Conclusion
The inspector concluded that the licensee has agreed to meet the recommended actions
"d" and "j" in GL 89-10 for periodic monitoring of MOVs to ensure the MOVs capabilities and switch settings for Unit 3.
However, the NRC Staff is preparing a generic letter on the periodic verification of MOV design-basis capability.
Consequently, the inspectors cannot determine the acceptability of the licensee's long-term periodic verification plans.
The Staff will review the licensee's MOV periodic verification program following issuance of the new generic letter.
The licensee should review its periodic verification program in l.ight of the new generic letter and consider any appropriate adjustments.
For example, the licensee should consider the benefits (such as identification of decreased thrust and increased requirements)
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and potential adverse effects (such as accelerated aging or valve damage)
when determining appropriate periodic verification testing for each GL 89-10 HOV.
2.5 Post Maintenance and Post Modification Testin The inspectors verified that the post maintenance and post modification testing requirements were the same for Unit 3 as required for Unit 2.
During the Unit 2 closeout inspection conducted July 1995, the inspectors concluded the licensee had satisfactorily addressed the requirements for post maintenance and post modification testing..
The post maintenance and modification test (PHT) requirements for GL 89-10 HOVs were specified in Appendix B of the Site Standard Practice Procedure SSP-6.51,"
Program Plan For Generic Letter 89-10,," Revision 2.
Table I of, Appendix B to SSP-6.51 listed the test requirements and guidelines for 21 maintenance and modification activities.
These activities were placed in three categories, Minor, Intermediate, and Major.
The "Intermediate" category included stem packing replacement/adjustment and actuator removal/installation.
The testing requirement was to re-verify the running load by thrust measurement (HOVATS Testing)..
The "Major" category included actuator/gearbox rebuild, torque switch adjustment, valve disassembly, stem/nut replacement, spring pack adjustment, motor replacement, and upper housing cover bolt tightening or gasket replacement.
New baseline testing (HOVATS Testing)
was required for all Major items.
Conclusion The inspectors concluded that the licensee has satisfactori.ly addressed
'ost maintenance testing and post modification testing requirements for Unit 3.
2.6 MOV Failures Corrective Actions and Trendin Recommended action "h" of the generic letter requested that licensees analyze and justify each HOV failure and corrective action.
The documentation should include the results and history of each as-found deteriorated condition, malfunction, test, inspection, analysis, repair, or alteration.
All documentation should be retained and reported in accordance with plant requirements.
It was also suggested that the material be periodically examined (every two years or after each refueling outage after program implementation)
as part of the monitoring and feedback effort to establish trends of HOV operability.
Documentation Anal sis and Corrective Actions for HOV De radation and Failures The inspectors assessed the adequacy of the licensee's documentation, analyses, and corrective actions for HOV degradation and failures through a review of listed MOV discrepancies.
The discrepancies were identified through Problem Evaluation Reports (PER)
and corrective actions were completed through Maintenance Work Orders (HWOs) when field work was required.
The inspectors verified that work was completed for nine PERs and work remained open for eight PERs.
The licensee stated
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that all the remaining Unit 3 HOV work addressed in the following PERs would be completed prior to startup of Unit 3.
The PERs with work remaining are:
1)
BFPER940016, 2)
BFPER940038, 3) BFPER940697, 4)
BFPER950263, 5)
BFPER950485, 6) BFPER950920, 7) BFPER951057, and 8)
BFPER951080.
Conclusions The inspectors concluded from the PERs reviewed that the licensee's staff was proficient in identifying all potential problems.
Engineering provided appropriate timely evaluations for these potential, problems.
~Trendin The inspectors verified that the HOV trending program was setup to include both Unit 2 and Unit 3.
Ouring the Unit 2 closeout inspection conducted July 1995, the inspectors concluded the trending program was adequate for both, Unit 2 and Unit 3.
Conclusions The inspector s concluded that the tr ending program for HOVs was able to trend the parameters necessary for analysis of test results and to capture the data on component degradation or failure.
The licensee had implemented the recommendations of GL 89-10 for trending HOVs in Unit 2 and Unit 3.
2.7 Pressure Lockin and Thermal Bindin In GL 89-10, the staff requested licensees to review the design-basis of their safety-related HOVs to identify potential pressure locking or thermal binding concerns.
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's actions taken to evaluate thermal binding and pressure locking.
In accordance with the recommendation of GE SIL 368, Revision 1 and Supplement, the licensee performed a design review of safety related valves that were susceptible to pressure locking or thermal binding.
These valves were required t'o operate in the event of an accident.
The evaluations considered flow, temperature, operational conditions, sequence of events, physical orientation, and disc configuration.
Four HOVs in the Emergency Core Cooling Systems for Unit 3 were identified as being susceptible to pressure locking.
The valves were:
3-FCV-74-53 3-FCV-74-67 Inboard RHR Loop I Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) Injection Valve Inboard RHR Loop II Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) Injection Valve 3-FCV-?5-25 Inboard Loop I Core Spray Injection Valve 3-FCV-75-53 Inboard 'Loop II Core Spray Injection Valve The licensee's engineering evaluation concluded that these four valves were susceptible to pressure locking and should be vented to the high pressure side.
Accordingly, OCN M21711,.Rev.
A (design change
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modifications for Unit 3) was issued for drilling a 1/4 inch hole in each valve to provide a vent path for the body cavity.
The inspectors verified that DCN W21711, Rev.
A was closed out for Unit 3.
For thermal binding, the licensee has or i,s the process of including a
step in each operating procedure warning the operators that the potential for thermal binding exists.
For example, Operating Instruction 2-0I-73, High Pressure Coolant Injection System states for 2-FCV-73-16 that, "this MOV is susceptible to thermal binding.
The condition could occur after the valve has been heated...."
The inspectors verified that the "Closure Package" for each MOV had addressed pressure locking and thermal binding as recommended in GL &9-10.
Conclusions The inspectors concluded that the licensee had or was in the process of adequately addressing pressure locking and thermal binding to meet the intent of the recommendation in GL &9-10.
However, the licensee was aware that further re-evaluation of pressure locking and thermal binding is discussed in Generic Letter GL 95-07.
ualit Assurance Pro ram Im lementation The inspectors reviewed the licensee's implementation of quality assurance (gA) function for the GL 89-10 HOV Program.
A Self Assessment of the MOV program was performed and documented in Report W60 950905 912 dated September 1,
1995.
The purpose of the assessment was to evaluate the effectiveness of HOV program development and implementation, in accordance with the recommendations and guidelines of GL 89-10, at Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant.
In the assessment report, the licensee concluded that the major elements of the HOV program were in place and implementation was in progress.
The assessment team identified nine items which required follow-up actions.
Revision to calculation HD-f3073-920408 to remove unverified assumptioms is scheduled for completion prior to Unit 3 startup.
The remaining items related to document updates and will be evaluated and closed with Unit 3 GL 89-10 program closure which is scheduled for 30 days after completion of power ascension.
The inspectors veri.fied that all of the items were being adequately addressed and considered the licensee's corrective action acceptable.
Conclusions
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The inspectors concluded that the licensee had adequately implemented the gA functions recommended in GL 89-10 for Unit 3.
Walkdown The inspectors conducted a walkdown of HOVs in Unit 3.
The inspection of HOVs was conducted to observe the general condition of the HOVs and the lubrication of the valve stems.
During the walkdown, the inspectors noted that the licensee had not completed all work and testing.
Several loose cover bolts were identifie )
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The inspectors concluded that the licensee has not completed all the work and inspection necessary to ensure all the cover bolts have been properly installed on Unit 3 GL 89-10 HOVs.
Followup (92701)
(Closed):
Inspector Fol1owup Item (IFI) 50-259, 296/95-19-02 was opened to track an old IFI 259/85-09-02, which applied to all three units and had been previously closed for Unit 2 but remained open for Unit 1 and Unit 3.
The inspector closed out IFI 259/85-09-02 and opened IFI 259, 296/95-19-02 in inspection report No. 259, 260, 296/95-19 for clarity of tracking Unit
and Unit 3 close out.
The item related to the inspection and repair of valve motor stator through bolts for 10 RHR system valves.
The low strength bolts had become loose and failed due to RHR system vibrations.
Subsequent to the inspection of Unit 3 HOVs, September 11-15, 1995, report No. 259, 260, 296/95-53, the licensee submited documentation that IFI 296/95-19-02 was complete and closed out.
The inspector verified that site licensing tracking item SLT850929004 was completed, verified and closed.
The inspector confirmed that work orders were issued and that the bolts on all
RHR system valves were verified as grade 5 or better and secured with locktite.
The inspector considered IFI 296/95-19-02 closed for Unit 3.
IFI 259/95-19-02 remains open for Unit l.
4.0 Exit Interview The inspection scope and results were summarized on September 15, 1995, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1.
No proprietary information was reviewed or contained in this report.
Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.
5.0 Closed:
IFI 50-296/95-19-02, Inspect and/or repair valve motor stator through bolts on
RHR system valves.
Acron ms and Intialisms DBD DCN DP EHS EPRI FCV GE GL HPCI IFI LPCI LSB MOV HWO NPRDS Design Basis Document Design Change Notice Differential Pressure Equipment Management System Electric Power Research Institute Flow Control Valve (MOV General Electric Company Generic Letter High Pressure Coolant Injection Inspector Followup Item Low Pressure Coolant Injection Load Sensitive Behavior Motor Operated Valve Maintenance Work Order Nuclear Plant Reliability Data System
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SOER SSR TI TROI TVA Nuclear Regulatory Commission NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Problem Evaluation Report Post Maintenance/Post Modification Test equality Assurance Residual Heat Removal System Operation Enhancement Significant Operating Event Report Stem Strain Ring Temporary Instruction Tracking/Reporting of Open Items Tennessee Val.ley Authority
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