IR 05000260/1995099
| ML18038B256 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 04/25/1995 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18038B255 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-260-95-99, NUDOCS 9505020190 | |
| Download: ML18038B256 (12) | |
Text
SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT OF LICENSEE PERFORMANCE REPORT BROWNS FERRY, UNIT 2 50-260/95-99 BACKGROUND The SALP Board convened on March 30, 1995, to assess the nuclear safety performance of Browns Ferry, Unit 2 for the period September 19, 1993, through March 18, 1995.
The Board was conducted in accordance with Management Directive 8.6,
"Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance."
Board members were J.
R. Johnson, (Board Chairperson),
Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Projects; A. F. Gibson, Director, Division of Reactor Safety; J.
P. Stohr, Director, Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards; and F. J.
Hebdon, Director, Project Directorate II-3, NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
This assessment was reviewed and approved by the Regional Administrator.
PLANT OPERATIONS This functional area addresses the control and execution of activities directly related to operating the plant.
It includes activities such as plant startup, power operation, plant shutdown, and response to transients.
It also includes initial and requalification training programs for licensed operators.
Station management was very involved in the daily planning of station activities and major emerging problems.
The agenda for the morning meetings was comprehensive and provided an excellent plant status and schedule of major upcoming maintenance and testing evolutions.
Management supported six shifts, assigning additional Senior Reactor Operators to assist in field operations, control room monitoring, and rotational assignments in other departments.
The Nuclear Safety Review Board provided good safety oversight of the plant and remained knowledgeable of industry safety issues.
The Plant Operations Review Committee was effective in their station safety oversight role.
Operator response to plant transients, including use of Emergency Operating Procedures, was very good.
Operators were challenged by diverse equipment failures and personnel errors, and safely brought the unit to a stable condition in all cases.
Operations procedures were technically adequate to accomplish plant startup and shutdown.
Implementation of surveillance procedures under the cognizance of the operations staff was not as effective.
Operating shift supervisors'505020190 950425 PDR ADQCK 05000260
PDR Enclosure
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command and control was generally good, although at times potentially distracting levels of control room activity were not rigidly supervised.
Configuration and alignment of safety systems was well controlled.
Routine tagging and clearance activities indicated good adherence to programs and setting plant conditions for maintenance.
Use of an abnormal configuration log to track components out of their normal lineup was effective.
Operations management supported certain modifications which provided operators enhanced system status information.
Performance issues involving attention to detail and questioning attitude similar to those raised during the last SALP period existed during this period in the areas of surveillance implementation and procedural compliance.
Sensitivity to reactor decay heat removal functions and special system configurations and evolutions during plant shutdown conditions was not fully effective.
This indicated that controls and communications interfaces need to be strengthened during shutdown operations.
Communications within the operations department and with other departments were sometimes not fully effective.
This resulted in some instances with lack of awareness by operators of expectations in compensating for abnormal or unusual plant conditions.
Self-Assessment techniques were moderately effective.
The plant status
"windows" techniques were initiated this period by station management to provide both a status report and visual indication of overall performance.
The operations staff was not fully effective in using the Problem Evaluation Report (PER) system to initiate formal corrective actions (i.e., review and evaluation).
This revised PER process was instituted at the station during the assessment period and received limited use by operators.
Training of licensed and non-licensed operators was generally effective regarding response to simulated emergencies and other plant transients.
Initial examination and requalification programs were effective.
Training was not as effective in maintaining shutdown safety sensitivity or routine administrative and reporting functions.
The Plant Operations area was rated Category 2.
NINTENNCE This functional area addresses activities associated with diagnostic, predictive, preventive and corrective maintenance of plant structures, systems, and components.
It also includes all surveillance testing, inservice inspection, and other tests associated with equipment and system operability.
Performance in the Haintenance functional area was generally effective during this SALP period.
Haintenance personnel displayed a questioning
i
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attitude which resulted in the identification of several potentially significant problems.
Preventive and corrective maintenance backlogs remained relatively low.
The "Fix-It-Now" program and the new 12-week rolling schedule were recent licensee initiatives.
Excellent material condition and low fluid system leakage rates have been maintained.
The Inservice Inspection program has been very effective.
The erosion/corrosion program was adequate with no problems identified during plant operation or during inspection of Unit 2.
The overall surveillance program was generally adequate.
Tracking of required tests was effective.
Deficiencies involving surveillance were largely attributable to personnel problems during the performance of the testing.
The post maintenance testing program was generally effective.
The planning phase of post maintenance testing needs to be strengthened, since it did not identify specific tests to be done.
Weaknesses with the maintenance history records program limited the ability to trend equipment problems effectively and to identify repetitive failures.
In addition, weaknesses in work control processes resulted in skipped procedural steps and documentation errors.
The previous SALP identified a number of significant problems involving personnel errors and inadequate procedures.
Personnel errors continued during this SALP period, some of which could have been avoided by stronger self-checking and more effective controls to verify that work was being performed on the proper component.
Scram reduction efforts have not been entirely effective.
The plant continued to be vulnerable to scrams caused by equipment failures in the Balance-of-Plant.
Maintenance and surveillance activities were not always effectively evaluated to ensure that the most appropriate plant condition was chosen for performance of the activity.
The previous SALP report noted a weakness in management oversight of measuring and test equipment.
Significant improvement was achieved in control of this equipment indicating effective corrective actions and attention by craft and management.
The Haintenance area was rated Category 2.
ENGINEERING This functional area addresses activities associated with the design of plant modifications, engineering support for operations, maintenance, surveillance, and licensing activities.
Strong management attention and involvement resulted in effective design control and good engineering support to operations and maintenance.
Goals were established, performance was monitored, and corrective actions were initiated to address weaknesse ji i
e V.
The design of the plant was effectively controlled.
The quality of design documents, including drawings and calculations, was maintained high.
The backlog of engineering work was monitored by management and was maintained low throughout the SALP period.
The quality of licensing submittals to the NRC improved and was satisfactory.
In general, engineering support to operations remained strong.
Modifications were designed and installed to improve the reliability of the plant.
The effectiveness of engineering support to operations was reduced in a few instances by interface or communications problems between the two organizations.
Engineering support to maintenance was good.
Management expectations for identification and correction of longstanding problems were clear.
Good, questioning attitudes effectively identified several such problems.
Some examples of repetitive equipment problems occurred indicating deficiencies in the effectiveness of root cause evaluations.
Insufficient engineering involvement in determining root causes and extent of condition contributed to inadequate or untimely resolution of problems.
The need to address longstanding and repetitive problems was stressed by plant management and progress was made late in the period.
The performance of engineering organizations was effectively monitored by management.
Performance indicators and goals were established and results were tracked and trended in monthly reports.
Performance was also monitored using the "windows" assessment program that was established early in the SALP period, and by a comprehensive performance evaluation conducted by the Nuclear Assurance and Licensing organization later in the period.
The "windows" program provided feedback from the customers of engineering.
The Engineering area was rated Category 2.
PLANT SUPPORT This functional area addresses all activities related to the plant support function including radiological controls, radioactive effluents, chemistry, emergency preparedness, security, fire protection and housekeeping controls.
The radiological controls program continued to control external and internal exposures effectively.
Individual exposures were well below regulatory limits.
Contributing substantially to the control of exposures was the as-low-as-reasonably-achievable (ALARA) program, which was considered a strength.
There were numerous effective dose reduction activities initiated during the period.
The doses received were considered to be generally consistent with the actual work activities.
Surface contamination was effectively controlled at the source by excellent contamination control practices resulting in reduced
contaminated areas and a reasonably low number of personnel contamination events.
During the period the program for reducing radwaste generation was effectively implemented resulting in a low volume of waste ultimately disposed of at the burial site.
Radiological releases were effectively monitored and controlled with releases significantly below regulatory limits.
Laboratory analytical equipment and procedures were reliable.
A well implemented environmental monitoring program confirmed the low level of radiological effluent and impact on the environment.
The water chemistry program was also effectively implemented with the technical specification parameters maintained well below their limits.
The overall emergency preparedness program continued to be well-maintained.
The commitment to testing staff and organizational readiness in drills and exercises was considered a strength.
The training program was comprehensive and conducted in accordance with requirements, and exercises were successfully performed.
The emergency response facilities, supplies, and equipment were well-maintained.
Coordination with offsite supporting emergency organizations was good.
Drill critiques were well-documented with good tracking of corrective actions for critique findings.
The Physical Security program was maintained at a good level.
Security training was considered a strength; it was well administered and effective as demonstrated during routine duties and proficiency requalification.
Strong management support for the program was evidenced by the program upgrade underway during the period.
Access controls, equipment and procedures were adequate to ensure effective control.
Compensatory measures for inoperable or degraded equipment were effectively implemented.
The control of safeguards information improved during this period compared to last period.
Both the access authorization and fitness-for-duty programs were effectively implemented during the period.
Earlier in the SALP period, there were problems in the fire protection program associated with adherence to procedures and communication between organizations.
These and other issues were identified during a
comprehensive audit of the program approximately midway through the period.
Largely as a result of these issues, corrective actions were initiated including a Fire Protection Upgrade Program.
Subsequently, licensee efforts in this area were strong.
The quality of the fire protection suppression system design flow calculations was good, and the completed modifications were adequately implemented.
Housekeeping was generally good, although less attention was directed towards the infrequently accessed areas of the plant.
Control of foreign material in the torus was weak.
Housekeeping in the Emergency Core Cooling System equipment rooms was goo e Self assessments in the plant support areas of radiological controls, emergency preparedness, physical security, and fire protection were generally effective in identifying problems, and resulted in timely corrective actions.
The Plant Support area was rated Category I ld 8