IR 05000259/1995050
| ML18038B415 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 09/06/1995 |
| From: | Shymlock M, Wiseman G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18038B414 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-259-95-50, 50-260-95-50, 50-296-95-50, NUDOCS 9509180240 | |
| Download: ML18038B415 (14) | |
Text
gp$l REgy Og UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
'101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W., SUITE 2900
, ATLANTA,GEORGIA 303234199 Report Nos.:
50-259/95-50, 50-260/95-50, and 50-296/95-50 Licensee:
Tennessee Valley Authority 6N 38A Lookout Place 1101 Market Street Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801 Docket Nos.:
50-259, 50-260 and'0-296 License Nos.:
DPR-33, DPR-52, and DPR-68 Facility Name:
Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station Units 1, 2, and
Inspection Conducted:
August 15-18, 1995 Inspector:
G.
Wiseman Approved by:
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Milton B. Shy oc Chief Plant Systems Section Engineering Branch Division of Reactor Safety SUMMARY
-~-qs Date Signed Date Signed Scope:
This routine, announced inspection was conducted in the areas of design engineering and plant modification issues associated with the restart of Browns Ferry Unit 3 (IP 37550).
The inspector reviewed the licensee's actions to resolve design engineering related issues (i.e. design errors, design controls, and Design Basis Verification Program implementation concerns)
that were identified by Corrective Action Tracking Documents (CATDs).
The inspection primarily focussed on Unit 3 related corrective actions for these issues.
Results:
In the areas inspected, violations or deviations were not identified.
The inspector determined that the, Design Basis Verification Program for Unit 3 had been implemented consistent with the methodology established for Unit 3 restart.
9509480240 95091K PDR ADOCK 05000259
PDR Enclosure
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Overall, the completed corrective actions appropriately addressed the identified,issues for Unit 3.
Incomplete actions were scheduled and. appropriately tracked.
The carbon dioxide (C02) fire protection system modifications reviewed were technically adequate and sufficiently documented to verify that design flow calculation updates were made to assure that C02 gas flow concentrations remained within National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) code requirements.
C02 fire protection system performance issues similar to those identified at Tennessee Valley Authority'TVA) Watts Bar, Plant were not identified at Browns Ferry Plan ll 4I
REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted
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- D. Burrell, Lead, Electrical Engineer
- J. Cory, Radchem Manager
- T. Dexter, Training Manager
- J. Johnson, Site guality Manager
- W. Jones, Site Licensing
- G. Nuy, Operations
- G. Pierce, Technical Support Manager
- R. Rodgers, Maintenance and Modifications
- P. Salas, Licensing Manager
- S. Wetzel, Compliance Licensing
- J. White, Outage Manager Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included craftsmen, engineers, technicians, and administrative personnel.
NRC Employees 2.0
- L. Wert, Senior, Resident Inspector
- Denotes those individuals-that attended the exit meeting.
Acronyms and abbreviations used within this report are identified in the last paragraph.
Corrective Action Tracking Documents (CATDs)
The inspector reviewed the licensee's corrective actions for Unit 3 design engineering related issues (i.e. design errors, design controls, and design basis Verification Program implementation concerns)
that were identified as CATDs.
These CATDs were developed from the licensee's employee concerns program and encompassed several design issues.
The inspection assessed the adequacy of TVA corrective actions in resolving the issues as applied to Unit 3.
The applicable regulatory requirement was
CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action.
2.1 Review of CATDs Associated with Design Errors The inspector reviewed CATDs associated with design errors to ensure that corrective actions adequately addressed the concern identified in, the CATO and their application to Unit 3.
CATD 22902-BFN-01 (NRC¹ 73) identified a concern that potentially radioactive sample panel drains could be routed to open floor drains and did,not meet the criteria described in Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) section. 10. 16, Equipment and Floor Drainage Systems.
The inspector reviewed the packages detailing the corrective actions for these concerns.
The concern for Unit 3 was addressed by Drawing
0
Discrepancy (DD) 3-88-1017 that extended the Non-Regenerative heat exchanger sample station drain to a closed equipment drain that resulted in corrective action for this concern.
The closure of the commitment action item will be tracked prior to restart of Unit 3 to ensure closure under tracking item NCO 930185031.
The inspector performed a.walk down of the Unit 2 and Unit 3 sample stations based on the location and piping drawings (47W448-13, Rev.000 and 47W600-42, Rev. 001).
The inspector identified no significant findings.
The inspector concluded that these actions and the completion of the implementation of the remaining actions of the NCO would adequately address this concern.
CATO 22910-BFN-Ol (NRC8 74) identified a concern that a TVA Mechanical Design Standard DS-H18. 1.2 that restricted the use of devices that contain mercury was not met.
The inspector reviewed the package detailing the corrective action for this concern as it related to Unit 3.
Based on a TVA engineering review of systems drawings and instrument tabulations the licensee determined that no mercury-containing switches were found at Browns Ferry.
However, switches using mercury contacts were identified in the diesel generator (DG) fuel oil day tank and C02 fire protection storage tank level indication systems.
Review of the fire protection system indicated that the C02 storage tank level switches do not input into the C02 system initiation logic, therefore, inadvertent actuation of those switches would not cause a release of C02 into the protected plant areas.
The inspector reviewed portions of the CATO package compiled to address the concern of mercury contact level switches installed on the DG fuel oil day tanks.
CARR BFP87074003 was initiated to address the concern.
The inspector reviewed documentation that verified that the mercury contact level switches (Hagnetrol Model A-103X and A-153-X-TDH)
installed in the DG fuel oil day tanks were purchased and qualified as part of the original diesel generator vendor skid package.
The diesel generators were purchased and installed prior to the issuance of DS-H18. 1.2.
An engineering analysis dated December 24, 1987, analyzed the location and function of the DG switches and concluded that the condition did not violate the TVA DS-18. 1.2 which appropriately restricts the use of switches containing free mercury and therefore did not affect DG operability.
The inspector examined the fuel oil day tank switches on the Unit 3 DGs and verified that the make and models were consistent with those identified in the analysis.
The design standard suggests replacement of these components when justified. This replacement had been incorporated into the computer equipment database Equipment Management System (EHS).
These switches are flagged for replacement with models that contain no mercury contacts.
The inspector found this resolution satisfactory.
The CARR was closed by rollover to an
"OPEN" nuclear licensing commitment NC0930185023.
This commitment is scheduled for close out by September 13, 1995.
The inspector determined
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that the licensee analysis and corrective actions associated with the implementation of the NC0930185023 would adequately address this concern.
2.2 Review of CATDs Associated with Plant Design Baseline Verification Program (DBVP)
The inspector reviewed CATDs packages detailing the corrective action associated with the plant design basis to ensure that corrective actions adequately addressed the concern identified in the CATO and their application to Unit 3.
The inspector reviewed the following CATD packages related to Unit 3:
CATD 20103-BFN-01 (NRC8 37),
DESIGN CRITERIA DOCUMENTS 50-722,725,726 IN INDEX NOT ISSUED CATD 20106-BFN-Ol (NRC8 39),
IMPLEMENTATION OF DESIGN BASELINE VERIFICATION PROGRAM (DBVP),
AND DESIGN BASIS DOCUMENT (DBD)
PROGRAMS These concerns identified design criteria documents which were intended to be issued for Unit 2 restart but were either superseded or enveloped in other DBDs.
The establishment of the DBVP provided for a procedural process for controlling, reviewing, and changing, drawings to ensure that the functional plant configuration for required safe shutdown systems was reflected in design criteria documentation and drawings.
The DBD program was an integral part of this plan.
By letter dated November ll, 1991 the NRC accepted the DBVP program for Unit 3.
The program basically required that the licensee reestablish the design basis of the plant, systems and components and verify that design documents, including design criteria and drawings, were consistent with the design basis documents.
As stated in the DBVP, the design basis criteria documentation for Unit 2 would be revised to include Unit 3.
An NRC inspection was conducted on November 28-December 2,
1994 and December 12-16, 1994 in the area of the Design Baseline and Verification Program (IR 94-31).
During this inspection no findings were identified.
The inspections determined that the Design Basis Verification Program for Unit 3 including, design basis documents, had been implemented consistent with the methodology established for restart.
The inspector concluded that the licensee's actions and the implementation of the DBVP adequately addressed the implementation of the DBVP and design basis criteria documentation concerns.
2.3 Review of CATDs Associated with Design Control The inspector reviewed CATD packages detailing the corrective action associated with plant design control to ensure that corrective actions adequately addressed the concern identified in the CATO and their application to Unit il il~
The inspector reviewed the following CATD packages related to Unit 3:
CATD 20901-BFN-01, (NRC¹ 44),
BF1. 11 Q-LIST ACCURACY CATD 20901-BFN-02 (NRC¹ 45),
QA Review of g-LIST CATO 20901-BFN-03 (NRC¹ 46),
0-LIST DIFFERENCES ON WORK ORDERS The inspector reviewed portions of the CATD packages compiled to address the above concerns.
These CATDs identified concerns related to the use of several differing quality lists previously utilized by the engineering and operations organizations.
guality lists are used to satisfy commitments to identify structures, systems, and components as safety related.
TVA has committed to complete the development of, and issue, a new si,te wide 9-List program for Browns Ferry through the review and. resolution of differences with existing plant lists.
Previous lists will then be discontinued.
The licensee closed the CATDs by rollover to nuclear licensing commitment NCO890113024 detailing the Unit 3 9-List Program to be tracked prior to restart.
NRC detailed review of the Unit 3 g-List program will be addressed in the Browns Ferry Resident Inspector inspection report (IR 95-43).
The inspector concluded that the issues regarding the g-List identified by these CATDs have been adequately addressed.
Conclusion 3.
Overall, the inspector concluded that the licensee was adequately addressing the Unit 3 applications of the issues identified by the above CATDs.
Incompl'ete acti'ons were scheduled and appropriately tracked.
The Design Basis Verification Program for Unit 3 had been implemented consistent with the methodology established for Unit 3 restart.
Review of Design Modifications for C02 Fire Protection System As a resul.t of NRC identified carbon dioxide (C02) fire protection design and operational issues identified at TVA Watts Bar Plant, the inspector reviewed the scope of those design modifications to the C02 fire protection (system ¹39)
implemented from 1978 to 1995 to determine the extent of physical plant configuration changes which might have affected system design flow C02 gas concentrations or operational performance.
Two modification packages were reviewed in detail,:
W06453
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Small. bore piping and pipe support changes associated with the Small Bore Piping Analysis EOL9075-Replace Unit 3 louvered Auxiliary Instrument Room and Computer Room doors with fire rated doors and add over pressure vent protection to the rooms The inspector determined that the modifications reviewed were technically adequate and sufficiently documented to verify that design flow calculation updates were made to assure that C02 gas flow
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concentrations remained with'in NFPA code requirements.
The inspector concluded that C02 fire protection system performance issues similar to those identified at Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) Watts Bar Plant did not exist at Browns Ferry.
4.0 Exit Heeting The inspection scope and results were, summarized on August 18, 1995, with those individuals indicated in paragraph 1.
The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detai'1 the inspection, findings.
There were no dissenting comments received from the licensee.
Proprietary information is not contained in this report.
5.0 Acronyms and Abbreviations BFN Browns Ferry Nuclear (station)
CARR Condition Adverse,to guality Report CATO Corrective Action Tracking Documents CFR Code of Federal Regulations C02 Carbon Dioxide DBD Design Basis Document DBVP Design Baseline Verification Program DD Drawing Discrepancy DG Diesel Generator DS Design Standard FSAR Final Safety Analysis Report EHS Equipment Hanagement System IP Inspection Procedure IR Inspection Report NFPA National Fire Protection Association NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission TVA Tennessee Valley Authority gA guality Assurance
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