IR 05000259/1995046
| ML18038B402 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 08/22/1995 |
| From: | Barr K, Gooden A NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18038B400 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-259-95-46, 50-260-95-46, 50-296-95-46, NUDOCS 9508290081 | |
| Download: ML18038B402 (14) | |
Text
Psst RECO Iq so cs UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
,101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W., SUITE 2900 ATLANTA,,GEORGIA303234199 August 22, 1995 Report Nos.:
50-259/95-46, 50-260/95-46, and 50-296/95-46 Licensee:
Tennessee Valley Authority 6N 38A Lookout Place 1101 Market Street Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801 Docket Nos.:
50-259, 50-260, and 50-296 License Nos.:
DPR-33, DPR-52, and DPR-68 Facility,'ame:
Browns.Ferry, Nuclear Plant Inspection Conducted:
August 7-11, 1995 Inspector:
.
sro-6 A. Gooden Approved by:
l K. Barr, Chief
'Emergency Preparedness Section Radiological Protection and Emergency Preparedness Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards p8 zl Da e
S gned Date Signed Branch SUMMARY Scope:
This special, announced inspection was to assess the operational readiness of the emergency preparedness program for Unit 3 restart activities.
Areas, reviewed included the.adequacy of emergency response organization staffing, training for operations personnel assigned responsibilities as the interim Site Emergency Director, and followup on Unit 3 Control Room accident assessment systems, and communications equipment.
Results:
Within the areas reviewed, no violations, deviations, or open items were identified.
With the exception of the 'Unit 3 specific equipment yet to be installed and/or tested, the emergency preparedness program appeared to be opera'tionally ready for mul'ti-unit operations.
The licensee performance in the area of staff augmentation was considered a program.strength.
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REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees T. Chinn, Instructor, Operations Training
- R. Coleman, Manager, RADCON
- T. Cornelius, Manager, Emergency Preparedness T. Dexter, Manager, Training A. Feltman, Project Engineer, Emergency Preparedness T. Golden, Shift Technical Advisor D. Hi11, Manager, Operations Training
- J. Johnson, Manager, Site guality
- R. Hachon, Site Vice President
- B. Marks, Manager, Corporate Program Planning
- G. Preston, Plant Manager
- S. Rudge, Hanager, Site Support
- P. Salas, Manager, Licensing J. Wallace, Compliance Engineer
- S. Wetzel, Acting Manager, Compliance
- J. White, Outage Management Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included operators, engineers, technicians, security force members, and administrative personnel.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- R. Husser, Resident Inspector
- L. Wert, Senior Resident Inspector
- Attended exit interview An index of abbreviations used throughout this report will be found in the last paragraph.
Shift Staffing and Augmentation (82205)
This area was inspected to determine whether the licensee's program was adequate for U3 restart, and fully implemented consistent with commitments and NRC requirements for minimum staffing and timely augmentation of response capability.
Requirements applicable to this area are found in 10 CFR 50.47(b),
Appendix E to
CFR Part 50, and the Emergency Plan.
The licensee's ERO was described in the NP-REP Sections 3. 1 (site), 3.2 (offsite),
and Appendix A (site specific Plan).
Shift staffing levels and functional capabilities were reviewed and determined to be consistent with the guidance in Table B-1 of NUREG-0654.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's notification system for activating the ERO during off-hours.
The administrative and physical program for ensuring
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that sufficient staffing would be available during emergencies was described in BFNP SSP-1.52 entitled
"Emergency Preparedness Administration."
The licensee's administrative system included a three team (green, blue, and red) on-call duty roster system.
On a weekly basis, qualified personnel are assigned to the ERO for duty.
The inspector confirmed via documentation review that the duty roster phone numbers were checked and verified at least on a quarterly basis.
The off-hours notification system for mobilizing the ERO involves activating pagers/telephones utilizing a computer based automatic telephone dialing system.
The aforementioned system is referred to as the "APS."
A primary and backup system was available.
The primary system was located in the SOS Shift Clerk office and the backup system was located in the ODS office in Chattanooga.
Both units incorporate a self-checking mechanism which warns in the event the system is rendered inoperable.
At the ODS office, an audible alarm i,s received; and at the SOS Clerk office the APS screen. periodically blinks.
According to the licensee contact, in the unlikely event both systems failed, the procedure for manual call out would be initiated.
As verification that the system was operable, the inspector observed the weekly pagers test performed each Wednesday.
No problems were noted.
The system activated pagers in accordance with the design criteria.
The Shift Clerk with responsibility for APS activation appeared to be knowledgeable regarding the system operability, and the backup procedures (ODS APS or manual call out)..
The inspector reviewed both a copy of the weekly duty roster and the ERO notification roster and determined that the rosters were the most current versions.
The inspector discussed with a member of the licensee's staff the periodic testing of the APS to ensure system reliability.
Since the last inspection of this area (April 1993), the licensee had conducted five off-hours unannounced augmentation drills (one drill was associated with an exercise dress rehearsal, and one drill was an objective during the annual exercise).
One additional augmentation drill reviewed involved the CECC organization (December 4, 1994).
During each of the aforementioned drills, response personnel were required to travel to the site and activate the ERFs.
Two of the onsite drills produced unsatisfactory results for two members of the on-call duty roster.
In each case of a delay, the licensee was able to fill the positions with a backup responder to meet the staffing and augmentation times as illustrated in the Plan.
Based on documentation and a discussion with the emergency preparedness contact, management involvement to ensure an effective program was evidenced by the followup actions to determine why an individual did not respond and actions taken to prevent recurrence.
The results from the CECC augmentation drill disclosed that minimal staffing for activation was obtained approximately 40 minutes after the paging system was activated.
In addition to the beforementioned drill program, the licensee was conducting weekly tests to verify operability of pagers following weekly duty turnover; and on a monthly basis unannounced off-hour pagers/telephone drills were conducted to determine
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the availability of responders to staff the TSC and OSC.
The inspector noted that test results indicated a highly reliable paging system in that the availability of the APS for the period January 1995 to July 1995 was 100 percent.
Based on the above observations, the inspector concluded that the shift staffing for emergencies was adequate in numbers, and the administrative and physical mechanism including management controls provided an effective program for responding to emergencies involving single or multi-unit operations.
The licensee performance in this area (testing, system reliability', and redundancy)
was considered a program strength.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Training (82206)
This area was inspected to determine whether emergency response training was adequate for U3 restart, and fully implemented consistent with commitments and NRC requirements to ensure that employees are familiar with their specific emergency response duties.
Requirements applicable to this area are found in 10 CFR 50.47(b),
Appendix E to
CFR Part 50,,
and the licensee's Emergency Plan.
The inspector discussed the ERO training program with members of the licensee staff to determine if changes were made since the last inspection in preparation for U3 restart activities.
As during a
previous inspection (IR Nos.
50-259, 260, and 296/95-30),
the inspector was informed that ERO training was common to all units at BFNP and no changes were made.
Lesson plans and training material were not Unit specific.
The REP and training commitments were initially developed and implemented for multi-unit operations.
Consequently, the inspector reviewed the description of the training program (in Section 15 of the REP), training implementing procedure TRN-30 (Radiological Emergency Preparedness Training),
and interviewed members of the operations training staff.
In addition, the following lesson plans and selected exams were reviewed:
EPT 001
"CECC Director" EPT 020 "Emergency Duty Officer/State Communicator/TVA-State Liaison/EP Staff Position" EPT 022 "Operations Duty Specialist" EPT 110 "Direction and Control REP Overview" EPT 122 "Technical Assessment" OPL 171 "Hot License Certification Training (Classroom)
Course"
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Further, as verification that SROs were licensed on all three units rather than unit speci'fic licensed, the inspector reviewed randomly selected certification letters from NRC granting on shift personnel a
reactor operating license for all three units.
The SOS position was designated in the licensee's Plan and procedures as the interim SED.
Therefore, the inspector reviewed the lesson plan and training objectives for hot license certification training and requal training.
Based on the reviews and interviews with operations training personnel, the inspector determined that the training program was common to all three units in discussing the REP/EPIPs.
Included were practice exercises involving event classification.
The names of 17 individuals from six different crews (designated as SOS, ASOS, or U3 Outage Supervisors)
were selected by the inspector from the current BFNP rotating shift operator schedule to ascertain the status of training.
All training was considered current and up to date as evidenced by the most recent training provided during the period February
- March 1995.
Supplemental training evaluated'ncluded OPL 173.936 (Unit Differences)
which examined the major differences between Units I, 2, and 3 regarding systems, technical specifications, and procedures.
In response to questions regarding operations training for multi-unit operations, the licensee provided the inspector a copy of the training department action plan for Unit 3 restart.
The referenced document identified various classroom and simulator training activities to ensure operators are aware of procedural changes, plant modifications, and the resulting effect on plant operations.
Although an exercise/drill involving a U3 specific accident scenario had not been conducted, cycle 13 requal training included a dual unit scenario.
The NRC evaluated annual exercise (conducted July 1995, IR Nos. 50-259, 260, and 296/95-32)
was considered a fully successful exercise with no weaknesses or deficiencies in the licensee's response.
Based on interviews and records reviewed, the inspector determined that the emergency preparedness training program for operations and non-operations personnel was adequate and common to all units.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Emergency Facilities, Equipment, Instrumentation, and Supplies (82701)
This area was inspected to determine whether the licensee's program for U3 restart was fully implemented and consistent with commitments and NRC requirements for an operational ready response program.
Requirements applicable to this area are found in 10 CFR 50.47(b),
Appendix E to
CFR Part 50, and the licensee's Emergency Plan.
Section 8.0 and Appendix A of the TVA generic REP describes the facilities and equipment that the licensee maintains in readiness for an emergency.
With the exception of the U3 CR, the ERFs are common to all units and include the TSC, OSC, CECC, and the LRC.
The inspector
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reviewed the status of onsite ERFs during the previous inspection (see IR Nos. 50-259, 260, and 296/95-30).
Three observations were discussed in detail with the licensee:
The absence of a preventive maintenance program or a periodic surveillance test of the site evacuation warning system.
Inconsistencies between EPIP-20 pl'ant data sheets for U3, and the CR instruments as installed, regarding the instrument number and/or detectability range.
The absence of the ODS ringdown phone.
In response to the above observations, the inspector discussed with the licensee contact the current status of those items.
The inspector was informed that with the exception of the maintenance/surveillance program for the site evacuation warning system, other observations were responded to and corrective actions completed.
The inspector toured the U3 CR and determined that the ODS ringdown phone was installed and operational based on a communications test between the U3 CR and the ODS in Chattanooga.
In addition, the inspector compared the revised plant data sheets for Unit 3 (from EPIP-20) with the CR instruments as installed and no discrepancies were noted.
Regarding the periodic test program for the site warning system, the licensee indicated that this matter was still under review and was uncertain as to when a
surveillance program would be implemented.. The inspector had no further questions.
The inspector toured the U3 and U2 CRs along with the TSC.
During the tour, the inspector reviewed the meteorological capability to confirm operability status and determine if data used for dose assessment was an instantaneous reading or averaged data for periods of 15 or 60 minutes.
The inspector interviewed a member of the CR staff and examined data from the Radiological Release Rate Meteorological System for periods of one minute, 15, or 60 minutes averaged.
Net data was also available via the plant integrated computer system (CR and TSC)
and by contacting Chattanooga (CECC) to, obtain data.
Regarding U3 ERDS, the licensee contacts indicated that the target date for submittal of the ERDS data point library remains as previously discussed (November 6, 1995).
When questioned regarding the SPDS status for U3, the inspector was informed that an anticipated date was January 1996 pending power ascension status.
Based on the above observations, the inspector concluded that with the exception of U3 specific equipment and facilities yet to be installed and/or tested, this programmatic area appears to be operationally ready for multi unit operations.
Equipment installation, testing, and verification will be reviewed during a followup inspection.
No violations or deviations were identifie il~
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I Exit Interview The inspection scope and results were summarized on August ll, 1995, with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1.
The inspector described the areas inspected and stated that no open items were identified.
As a
program strength, the inspector discussed management involvement and commitment to the off-hours staffing and augmentation program.
There were no dissenting comments'o proprietary information was reviewed during the inspection.
Index of Abbreviations Used In This Report AMOS APS ASOS BFNP CECC CFR CR EP EPIP ERDS ERF ERO IR LRC NRC ODS OSC REP SED SOS SPDS SRO'SP TSC TVA U2 U3'ctivities Management and Oversight System Automatic Paging System Assistant Shift Operations Supervisor Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Central Emergency Control Center
'Code of Federal Regulation Control Room.
Emergency, Planning Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure Emergency Response Data System Emergency Response Facility Emergency Response Organization Inspection Report Local Recovery, Center Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Duty Specialist Operations Support Center Radiological Emergency Plan Site Emergency Director Shift Operations Supervisor Safety Parameter Display System Senior Reactor Operator Site, Standard Practice Technical Support Center Tennessee Valley Authority Unit 2 Unit 3
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