IR 05000259/1993041
| ML18037A633 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 12/17/1993 |
| From: | Barr K, Wright F NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18037A632 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-259-93-41, 50-260-93-41, 50-296-93-41, NUDOCS 9401040238 | |
| Download: ML18037A633 (47) | |
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W., SUITE 2900 ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323-0199 ggg j2 S Report Nos.:
50-259/93-41, 50-260/93-41, and 50-296/93-41 Licensee:
Tennessee Valley Authority 6N 38A Lookout Place 101 Market Street Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801 Docket Nos.:
50-259, 50-260, and 50-296 License Nos.:
DPR-33, DPR-52, and DPR-68 Facility Name:
Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Inspection Conducted:
November 15-19, 1993 Inspector:
F.
N.
right, Team Leader Team Members:
D. Draper E.
Fox J.
Kreh J.
M Dat Si ned Approved by:
r K. P. Barr,
'
Date Signed Emergency Preparedness Section Radiological Protection and Emergency Preparedness Branch Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards SUMMARY Scope:
This routine, announced inspection involved the observation and evaluation of the annual emergency preparedness exercise.
Emergency organization activation and response were selectively observed in the Simulator Control Room; Technical Support Center; Operational Support Center; Joint Information Center, and Central Emergency Control Center.
The inspection also included a
review of the exercise scenario and observation of the licensee's post exercise critique.
The exercise was a full-scale exercise with participation by the State of Alabama and local emergency response agencies.
This announced exercise was conducted on November 17, 1993, between the hours of 8:00 a.m.
and 3:00 p.m.
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940i040238 93i2i7 PDR ADQCK 05000259 Q
e Persons Contacted DETAILS The following individuals were contacted during the inspection:
+¹
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¹
+
+¹ R. Abbott, General Manager, Site Support S. Austin, EP Training Instructor N. Avrakotos, Emergency Preparedness Coordinator, NYPA D. Barcomb, Radiation Protection Manager J. Benson, DrillCoordinator J. Blasik, Chemistry Manager D. Bosnic, Operations Superintendent, Unit 2 G. Gresock, Planning/Scheduling Coordinator K. DaMberg, Plant Manager, Unit 1 P. Harnett, EP Program Director, Plans J. Jones, EP Program Director, Radiological J. Josh, Supervisor E. Kaish, Manager, EP Communications J. Kaminsky, Director, EP Drills and Exercises T. Kulczycky, Supervisor, Safety Analysis P. Mangano, Coordinator C. McClay, Maintenance Department M. McCormick, Plant Manager, Unit 2 P. McSparran, Operations Training Instructor J. Mueller, Manager, Operations R. Pasternak, Manager, Technical Services J. Pavel, Site Licensing V. Perry, Nuclear Trainer R. Sanaker, General Supervisor, Operations Training, Unit 1 R. Slade, General Supervisor, Operations Training, Unit 2 J. Spadafore, Safety Evaluation Group N. Spagnoletti, Executive Assistant P. Swafford, Radiation Protection Manager T. Verno, Supervisor, Security C. Ware, Director, Emergency Preparedness
~ Attended EP program review exit meeting on June 18, 1993.
+ Attended EP exercise exit meeting on July 14, 1993.
¹ Attended June 18 and July 15, 1993 exit meetings.
The inspector also contacted other licensee personne ~
~
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Results:
In the areas inspected, no violations, deviations, or exercise weaknesses were identified.
One Inspector Followup Item (IFI) was identified to review the emergency preparedness exercise radio communications for proper identification as drill messages in a future exercise (Paragraph 2).
Licensee corrective actions for an IFI identified in the 1992 emergency preparedness exercise concerning the content of news releases were inadequate and the problems with the content of news releases were repeated in the 1993 exercise (Paragraph 9.e).
Problems with an Abnormal Operating Procedure concerning emergency venting operations was identified (Paragraph 9.a).
The command and control of the Site Emergency Director in the Technical Support Center was excellent.
Overall the licensee's performance during the exercise was good, with the licensee meeting most exercise objectives and demonstrating a capability to implement the Emergency Plan and its implementing procedures in the event of a radiological emergenc REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- J. Allen, Control Room Evaluator
- T. Atkins, Corporate Emergency Preparedness Program Manager
- B. Baggett, Control Room Controller
- C. Beasly, Public Relations
- C. Benton, Corporate Emergency Preparedness Exercise Manager T. Chinn, Simulator Operator
- R. Coleman, Radiation Protection Supervisor
- J. Corey, RADCON Manager
- T. Cornelius, Site Emergency Preparedness Manager J.
Dodson, Public Information Controller J.
Duke, Shift Operations Supervisor, Scenario Development Staff
- C. Duncan, Control Room Controller
- T. Feltman, Exercise Lead Controller
- E. Hollins, Operations Support Center Director
- K. Jackson, Radiological Emergency Planning Engineering Aide D. Keuter, Corporate Emergency Control Center Director
- K. King, Corporate Radiological Emergency Preparedness, Technical Support Center Lead Controller
- R. Kitts, Corporate Emergency Preparedness Hanager
- J. Lewis, Technical Support
- R. Machon, Plant Manager
- B. Marks, Corporate Emergency Preparedness Program Planning Manager
- J. Parshall, Operations Instructor, Control Room Lead Controller
- D. Pond, Corporate Emergency Preparedness G. Preston, Plant Operations Manager
- S. Rudge, Site Support Manager
- J. Sabados, Chemistry Manager
- P. Salas, Site Licensing Manager
- W. Simpkins, RADCON
"A. Sorrell, Radiation/Chemistry Manager, Site Emergency Director
- J. Wallace, Site Licensing Engineer
- R. Wells, Compliance Licensing Manager K. Wittenburg, Public Information Officer
- 0. Zeringue, Site Vice President Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included engineers, operators, mechanics, security force members, technicians, and administrative personnel.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- K. Barr, Region II
- R. Musser, Resident Inspector
- C. Patterson, Senior Resident Inspector
- Attended exit interview
Abbreviations used throughout this report are defined in the last paragraph.
Review of Exercise Objectives and Scenarios For Power Reactors (82302)
The scenario for the emergency exercise was reviewed to determine that provisions had been made to test the integrated capability and a major portion of the basic elements existing within the licensee's Emergency Plan and organization as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14),
CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.F, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.N.
The scenario was reviewed in advance of the scheduled exercise date and was discussed with licensee representatives.
The scenario was adequate to exercise the onsite and offsite emergency organizations of the licensee.
The inspector noted that players worked hard throughout the exercise to implement the Emergency Plan and it's implementing procedures.
Throughout the conduct of the exercise, an environmental monitoring team failed to report emergency exercise radio communications as "drill messages."
The players had been instructed to utilize the "drill message" qualifier on each drill communication transmission prior to the start of the exercise.
The environmental monitoring team's failure to use the drill message qualifier was identified by the inspector and licensee evaluators.
The reporting of exercise offsite radiological measurements, by radio transmissions, could have unnecessarily alarmed members of the public that may not have been aware of the licensee's participation in a emergency preparedness exercise.
The inspector stated that a review of emergency exercise radio communications would be made in a future inspection to observe proper exercise communication procedures.
IFI 50-259, 260, 296/93-41-01:
Review of emergency exercise radio communications in a future inspection for proper exercise communications procedures.
The inspector noted that a message was repeated several times on the radio channel the environmental monitoring teams were utilizing during the drill.
The message basically stated that the radio channel, the listeners were tuned to, was transmitting drill information as part of the Browns Ferry annual EP exercise.
The procedure appeared to be an excellent drill control measure to clarify drill activities to any listening public.
No violations or deviations were identifie Assignment of Responsibility, Evaluation of Exercises For Power Reactors (82301)
The area of assignment of responsibility was observed to determine whether primary responsibilities for emergency response by the licensee had been specifically established and that adequate staff was available to respond to an emergency as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(l),
CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.A, and specified criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.A.
During pre-exercise reviews of the licensee's Emergency Plan and implementing procedures, the inspector concluded that the onsite and offsite emergency organizations were adequately described, the emergency responsibilities of the various supporting organizations had been specifically established, and key emergency response organization positions were clearly defined in approved plans and implementing procedures.
The inspector observed that adequate personnel were available to respond to the simulated emergency.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Onsite Emergency Organization (82301)
Implementation of the licensee's onsite emergency organization was observed to determine whether the responsibilities for emergency response were unambiguously defined, that adequate.staffing was provided to insure initial facility accident response in key functional areas at all times, and that the interfaces were specified as required by
CFR 50.47(b)(2),
CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.A, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.B.
The inspector observed that the initial onsite emergency organization was adequately defined; the responsibility and authority for directing actions necessary to respond to the emergency were clear; that staff were available to fill key functional positions within the organization; and that onsite and offsite interactions and responsibilities were clearly defined.
The licensee adequately demonstrated the ability to alert, notify, and mobilize TVA emergency response personnel.
Following the Alert declaration, the on-shift emergency organization was augmented through mobilization of the ERO and activations of the TSC, OSC, JIC, and CECC.
With the exception of the JIC, inspectors observed those activations and determined that the required staffing and assignment of responsibility were consistent with the licensee's approved procedures and the licensee was able to staff and activate the facilities in a timely manner.
The SOS assigned to the exercise assumed the duties of SED promptly upon initiation of the simulated emergency, and directed the emergency response in the SCR until formally relieved by the designated SED in the
TSC.
Following the turnover the designated SED assumed the responsibilities of the SED and directed all emergency operations until relieved of some duties, including PARs, by the CECC Director.
Because of the scenario scope and conditions, long term or continuous staffing of the emergency response organization was not required.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Emergency Response Support and Resources (82301)
This area was observed to determine that arrangements for requesting and effectively using assistance resources have been made, that arrangements to accommodate State and local staff at the licensee's onsite Emergency Operations Facility have been made, and that other organizations capable of augmenting the planned response have been identified as required by
CFR 50.47(b)(3),
CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.A and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.C.
The inspector determined that State and local staff =ould be accommodated at the CECC and the JIC and arrangements for requesting offsite assistance resources were in place, but not utilized during the exercise.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Emergency Classification System (82301)
The emergency classification system was observed to determine that a
standard emergency classification and action level scheme was in use by the nuclear facility licensee as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4),
CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.C, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.D.
Browns Ferry procedure EPIP-l,
"Emergency Plan Classification Logic",
Revision 13, dated July 9, 1992 provided for off-normal events to be classified into one of the four emergency classification categories.
The licensee's staff made the following emergency classifications during the exercise:
The conditions for declaring an Alert were met at about 9:00 a.m.
due to:
Hain Steam HSIV's auto close, at 9:01 a.m.,
due to high steam line radiation.
"Hain Steam Line Radiation Exceeding
X Normal Full Power Background (Alarm and Group
Isolation)" (FA-2),
A report of possible explosion in the Offgas Building at 9:02 a.m.
"Explosion Within Protected Area Causing Damage to the Facility Affecting Plant Operation" (HA-12), and
C
At 9:05 a.m. stack effluent radiation monitors indicating release rates greater than
X TS limits.
"Gas Release Rate Exceeding 10 times Technical Specifications..." (RA-3).
The SOS in the SCR declared an Alert at 9: 12 a.m.,
based on EALs RA-3 and HA-12.
The conditions for declaring a
SAE began at about 9:45 a.m.
due to stack release rate of 3,000 Ci/sec.
The SED in the TSC declared the SAE approximately 25 minutes later at 10: 10 a.m.,
based on EAL
"Verified Total Plant Noble Gas Release for the Stack of 1,000 Ci/sec for 30 minutes or 10,000 Ci/sec
>
2 minutes" (RSI).
The conditions for declaring a General Emergency were met at about 12:01 p.m.
when RCIC isolation valves fail to isolate the RCIC system following RCIC steam leak.
The steam leak occurred at about 12:00 p.m. causing a breech of the primary system and containment.
The SED in the TSC declared the General Emergency about six minutes later at 12:07 p.m.,
based on EAL "Loss of 2 of
FPBs With A Potential Loss of 3rd Barrier..." (FG-3).
In general, the SOS in the SCR and the SED in the TSC effectively evaluated existing conditions and declared appropriate emergency classifications in accordance with approved procedures in a timely manner.
However, the SOS/SED in the SCR failed to report the condition classified under FA-2, recognized by the staff for declaring an Alert, to the ODS and therefore the State and local agencies.
The SOS was
,
aware of the condition but failed to list it on the initial notification message with EALs HA-12 and RA-3.
The SOS/SED had recorded the EAL (FA-2) in the SCR logbook which was faxed to the SED in the TSC during the turnover briefing.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Notification Methods and Procedures (82301)
fl The Notification Methods'nd Procedures area was observed to assure that procedures were established for notification of State and local response organizations and emergency personnel by the licensee, and that the content of initial and follow-up messages to response organizations was established.
This area was further observed to assure that means to provide early notification to the population within the plume exposure pathway were established pursuant to
CFR 50.47(b)(5),
Paragraph IV.D of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.E of NUREG-0654.
A review of notification messages to Federal, State, and local agencies was made to determine that completed notification forms to Federal, State, and local offsite authorities c'ontained the following information; emergency conditions, emergency classifications,
radioactivity release status, potentially affected population, projected population doses, recommended protective actions, and any changes to these conditions.
During this exercise, licensee personnel issued timely initial and follow-up notifications that, for the most part, accurately described site emergency conditions.
The licensee also documented notifications made and simulated to the NRC Operations Center.
However, the initial report by the SOS/SED to the ODS contained no mention of nine control rods failing to insert or that the Hain Steam Isolation valves had automatically closed on a high radiation signal.
The STE's report to the NRC also failed to contain this information.
In addition, the STE incorrectly indicated that the reactor automatically scrammed and stated that all systems had functioned as required.
In reality, a manual reactor shutdown was initiated and the offgas system had failed to isolate, resulting in a continuing release.
The inspector determined that the ERO in the TSC and the CECC were aware of the conditions during the exercise.
The omissions and inaccuracies in the notification messages did not affect the licensee's proper classification and appropriate responses to the emergency conditions in the exercise.
However, the omissions could have affected classifications in another scenario and indicated the need to emphasize the importance of accurate event descriptions for emergency notifications in training.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Emergency Communications (82301)
The Emergency Communications area was observed to determine whether provisions existed for prompt communications among principal response organizations and emergency personnel as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(6),
CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.F.
The licensee demonstrated the adequacy, operability and effective use of emergency communications equipment.
The inspector noted that radio communications between the Field Honitoring Teams and TSC were adequate to dispatch and direct field team activities.
There was a scenario communications problem with a radiation monitoring team's failure to use
"This is a Drill Message" during some communications (See Paragraph 2).
In general, the inspector observed that adequate communications existed among the licensee's emergency organizations, and between the licensee's emergency response organization and offsite authorities.
The State of Alabama did send a representative to the CECC which is located in Chattanooga, TN.
The licensee also had a dedicated State Communicator in the CECC to report emergency conditions and emergency preparedness actions to the State by phone and fax.
The State Communicator in the CECC established communications with the State of Alabama at about 9:40 a.m.
and maintained communications with the State representatives and the licensee's liaison in the FEOC until the exercise was terminated.
The State representative and the State Communicator sat at the
management table with the CECC Director and key staff.
In addition to the Emergency Notification messages and the direct communications with State representatives by phone, the State Communicator periodically forward emergency actions and plant condition information to the State on an "Information Periodically Supplied To The State" form.
The licensee also sends a liaison to State FEOC to help the State obtain emergency information from the licensee and to provide technical assistance when needed.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Emergency Facilities and Equipment (82301)
The Emergency Facilities and Equipment area was observed to determine whether adequate emergency facilities and equipment to support an emergency response were provided and maintained as required by
CFR 50.47(b)(8),
CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.H.
Licensee procedures required activation of the TSC and OSC emergency facilities upon declaration of an Alert emergency classification.
An Alert classification was made at 9: 12 a.m.
and the Emergency Coordinator requested activation of the ERO.
The ERO pagers were activated at about 9: 12 a.m.
and an announcement was made over the plant PA system at 9:17 a.m.
The message reported the declaration of an Alert emergency classification and directed personnel to report to emergency facilities to activate the TSC and OSC.
The CECC ERO staff was notified by the ODS in Chattanooga, TN.
The inspector observed the activation, staffing and operation of key ERFs, including the TSC, OSC, and CECC.
The inspector also observed some operations in the JIC following it's activation.
'a ~
Simulator Control Room The Shift Supervisor demonstrated good command and control throughout the exercise.
Classifications and notifications were accomplished efficiently and in a timely manner.
The SOS correctly classified the emergency and notified appropriate personnel within 13 minutes.
The SOS and the reactor operators demonstrated good use of the Emergency Plan implementing procedures throughout the exercise.
The SOS referred to the classification procedure often, when conditions changed, to determine the possibility of reclassification.
The SOS demonstrated a thorough understanding of both the emergency classification procedure and the Alert notification procedure.
The STE and reactor operators were proactive in diagnosis of abnormal conditions and employed the use of all available reference material.
They routinely used plant drawings and available technical information, as well as, appropriate control room procedures to accurately analyze and respond to plant conditions.
Control Room operators used alternate indication to analyze and confirm plant conditions and correctly responded to
system failures.
The crew demonstrated a solid understanding of system design.
Overall, operations personnel adequately assessed the problems faced during the exercise.
The transfer of Site Emergency Director responsibility to the Technical Support Center was accomplished efficiently.
An adequate complete and accurate turnover of information was performed at the time of the transfer and the time used to perform the transfer was kept to a minimum.
Operations personnel maintained good communications with the ERFs and kept management well informed of changing plant conditions.
Communication between the SCR and the TSC was quickly established and constantly maintained.
In general, the exchange of information was performed accurately, concisely and in a most professional manner.
During the exercise an explosion in the Offgas system at about 9:00 a.m. which resulted in a fire in the charcoal beds and a
gaseous effluent release through the stack.
The reactor was manually shutdown.
At about the same time the crew observed HSIV closure due to high steam line radiation and immediately identified this as an indication of some failed fuel.
At about 9: 10 a.m.,
the crew also identified a release rate of 2.3E8 Ci/sec on stack radiation monitor RE90-3068 and recognized that this was in excess of the TS limit of 1.4E7 Ci/sec.
The drywell pressure began increasing slowly at about 9:05 a.m.
from 1.3 psig.
As Drywell pressure slowly increased to 1.5 psig at 9: 15 a.m.,
the crew became concerned that Drywell pressure could increase to 2.4 psig.
That would have resulted in the initiation of an additional scram signal, an additional HSIV isolation signal, and isolation of other less important systems.
A decision was made to vent the Suppression Chamber using procedure AOI 2-64-1,
"Drywell Pressure and/or Temperature High,"
Revision 15, to avoid these actuation.
After venting for two minutes, high radiation caused a Group 6 isolation signal, automatically isolating the Suppression Chamber vent path and terminating that portion of the release.
The non-isolated Offgas release continued.
The inspector determined that Procedure AOI-2-64-1 contained a
caution statement that allowed venting only when radiological release levels were below the TS limit.
The inspector determined that the operators's actions did nothing to place the facility in a safer condition and did not appear appropriate considering the existing radiological conditions when the venting occur red.
The venting would have slightly increased the contribution to the uncontrolled radiological release occurring during the exercise.
The issue was discussed with licensee personnel following the exercise.
Licensee representatives reported that the caution
statement referred to by the inspector followed the steps the operator took in the procedure during the venting process and that they believed the location of the caution statement might be inappropriate.
Licensee representatives reported that it was their opinion that had the caution statement been in the front of the procedure utilized by the operator, the venting may not have been initiated.
Licensee representatives agreed to examine the procedure and relocate the caution statement to an appropriate location.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Technical Support Center The inspector observed the initial activation and personnel response in the staffing of the TSC.
The TSC was fully staffed and functional in a timely manner and promptly activated at 9:39 a.m. following the Alert declaration at 9: 12 a.m.
The designated SED entered the TSC and began a turnover with the SOS/SED in the SCR.
Once turnover was completed, the designated SED assumed the role of SED.
The SED appeared knowledgeable of his duties and responsibilities and assumed the responsibility in a professional and organized manner.
Excellent command and control was displayed by the SED in the TSC.
The SED used the periodic briefings of his TSC managers and his subsequent updates to keep the TSC and OSC personnel apprised of plant status and his priorities for accident mitigation.
Technical assessment and mitigation activities were aggressively and properly pursued by the TSC staff.
The licensee's TSC facilities and equipment were adequate to deal with the conditions described by the scenario.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Operational Support Center The inspector observed the initial activation and personnel response in. the staffing of the OSC.
Upon the direction by the
'OS/SED in the SCR, the OSC was activated, fully staffed, and functional in a timely manner.
The OSC was activated at 9:39 a.m.
The OSC Director appeared to be cognizant of his duties and responsibilities and was effective in coordinating OSC activities.
The OSC Director periodically briefed the OSC staff and the updates were timely and accurate.
The inspector observed the formation and dispatch of teams, assigned various plant mitigation tasks, from the OSC.
The teams were adequately briefed on their task prior to leaving the OSC.
The teams were provided dosimetry and RP personnel either
accompanied the teams or discussed with them the potential radiological conditions and protective measures for the access route and work areas.
The teams were dispatched promptly and controlled effectively.
Communications between members in the OSC and between emergency workers in the plant were clear and concise.
OSC participants appeared to be aggressive and pro-active in their efforts to solve problems.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Central Emergency Control Center The inspector observed and evaluated the activation, staffing, and operation of the CECC, which was located in the licensee's Nuclear Power Office Complex in Chattanooga, Tennessee.
At 9: 13 a.m., the ODS (located in a dedicated office adjacent to the CECC) received a telephonic notification from the Simulator Control Room that an Alert had been declared for Browns Ferry Unit 2 at 9: 12 a.m.
based on satisfying the classification criteria of EALs RA3 and HA12.
At 9: 16 a.m.,
the ODS telephonically notified the State of Alabama of the Alert declaration.
At 9:20 a.m.,
the ODS activated the Emergency Paging System to initiate the call-out of the CECC staff.
Shortly thereafter, designated staff members began arriving at the CECC.
The activation of the facility proceeded in an expeditious and orderly fashion.
CECC personnel referred to their activation procedures and checklists.
Security was established at the facility entrances in a timely manner.
At 9:39 a.m.,
the CECC Director provided an initial briefing to facility staff regarding plant conditions, and at 9:56 a.m. declared the CECC to be fully operational.
Under the licensee's concept of operation, the TSC was responsible for classifying the emergency while the CECC was responsible for developing the PAR 'and communicating it, as well as all emergency declarations and update notifications, to the State.
The CECC Director demonstrated effective command and control characteristics, and consulted frequently with his key staff (the RAM, the PAM, and the Assistant CECC Director).
The Director, along with his key staff, periodically briefed the facility staff by means of the PA system.
The frequency and content of these announcements appeared to keep the CECC organization adequately informed of plant status.
Two separate ancillary areas of the CECC accommodated the plant assessme'nt and radiological assessment staffs.
These groups were knowledgeable and diligent in the conduct of their assigned tasks.
The combination of SPDS data and status board displays in the CECC appeared to satisfy the information needs of the CECC staff.
However, the status boards were difficult to read from across the room and did not display useful tending information.
In addition, there were frequent delays in entering status board data, and
incorrect information regarding the emergency classification ("Emergency" instead of "Site Area Emergency" ) and the affected reactor unit (1 instead of 2) was posted for a period of several hours.
With the minor exceptions listed above, the CECC was a
fully adequate facility which allowed the staff to pursue and accomplish assigned tasks in an efficient manner.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Joint Information Center The JIC for Browns Ferry is located in the Fine Arts Building at the Calhoun State Community College in Decatur, Alabama.
Activation of the JIC was discretionary at the Alert, and was required following a Site Area Emergency declaration.
The JIC was declared operational at 10:52 a.m.
Activities at the JIC included the issuance of simulated news releases and the conduct of joint State and licensee news conferences.
Technical Briefings were provided to real and mock news persons who attended the exercise.
Space and equipment available at the JIC for use by response personnel and members of the media was adequate to support operations.
Overall, the coordination between the licensee and the State at the JIC was good.
,In the 1992 annual emergency preparedness exercise the inspector determined that the press releases had not adequately attempted to quantify the significance of the radiological releases they reported.
The inspector identified the issue as an IFI.
The licensee entered the issue in a corrective action program.
The inspector reviewed the corrective action documentation which indicated a licensee review of the problem had been made.
The review concluded that the problem was an exercise specific problem, in that, the JIC was not activated for that exercise and the cause of the inadequate press releases was attributed to the absence of the checks and balances that normally occur between the interaction of the CECC public information staff and the staff of the JIC.
The inspector noted that the licensee's review and evaluation did not identify any additional corrective actions.
The licensee issued four news releases from the JIC during the 1993 EP exercise and was preparing a fifth when the exercise was terminated.
The inspector determined that the licensee failed to quantify or put in perspective the nature or safety significance of radiological releases mentioned in news releases 2, 3, and 4.
In a draft press release, which was not issued prior to the exercise termination, the inspector observed licensee staff remove all references to offsite doses in it.
The inspector determined that there were two reasons the licensee personnel removed the references to offsite doses.
The first was the idea that it would
not be appropriate for the licensee's press releases to discuss
"offsite activities."
The inspector noted that the issue was briefly debated by some members of the licensee's staff in the JIC.
Another reason given for removing the information was the State was in the process of reversing an order for evacuation of areas within the plume path and the dose information could make a
confusing situation even more confusing.
The inspector reported to licensee personnel that it was appropriate to discuss offsite dose projections or measurements when the reported information was believed to be valid measurement or calculation of radiological conditions.
The inspector also reported to licensee management that the policies for reporting information in press releases apparently needed some review and clarification and the IFI would remain open pending effective corrective action implementation and review.
I The inspector determined from interviews with licensee mock media players that there had been two Technical Briefings conducted, by the licensee's technical advisors in the JIC, during the exercise to explain the significance of the simulated radiological releases to the mock media personnel.
The briefings were made prior to the inspectors arrival at the JIC and were not observed by the inspector.
No violations or deviations were identified.
10.
Accident Assessment (82301)
The Accident Assessment area was observed to determine whether adequate methods, systems, and equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency condition were in use as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9),
CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.B, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.I.
The accident assessment program included both an engineering assessment of plant status and an assessment of radiological hazards to both onsite and offsite personnel resulting from the simulated accident.
During the exercise, the ERO functioned effectively in analyzing the plant status so as to make recommendations to the Emergency Director concerning mitigating actions to reduce damage to plant equipment; to prevent release of radioactive materials; and to terminate the emergency condition.
The accident assessment personnel in the TSC and CECC facilities analyzed plant conditions and developed appropriate strategies for combating equipment failures.
Accident assessment activities of the Simulator Control Room operations staff was good as evidenced by:
The staffs prompt recognition that the Hydrogen Honitor may not have been operating properly and their request for a hydrogen sampl.e to determine Hydrogen concentrations and monitor operabilit Hethod of determining rod position by electronically measuring rod position following loss of Rod Position Indication System.
Onsite and offsite radiological monitoring teams were dispatched to determine the level of radioactivity in those areas within the influence of the simulated plume.
The teams effectively demonstrated their capability to collect those data points and relay those data to the emergency response facilities.
The inspector accompanied one radiological monitoring team for a portion of the exercise.
The inspector noticed that the teams had assembled and reported to the dedicated emergency monitoring vehicles and were ready to dispatch within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> of the Alert declaration.
In that hour the teams made operational and source checked radiological counting and survey equipment, checked the response of communication equipment and verified that other equipment was available for use.
The inspector also determined that the monitoring team personnel had received approval to simulate the taking of KI prior to their departure and in accordance with approved procedures.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Protective Responses (82301)
The Protective Responses area was observed to determine that guidelines for protective actions during the emergency, consistent with Federal guidance, were developed and in place, and protective actions for emergency workers, including evacuation of nonessential personnel, were implemented promptly as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10),
and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.J.
The inspector verified that the licensee had and used emergency procedures for formulating PARs for offsite populations within the 10 mile EPZ.
The declaration of a GE occurred at 12:07 p.m.
As previously noted, the primary mission of the CECC at that point was to develop an appropriate PAR.
Using the "Offsite Protective Action Recommendation Guide Chart" from CECC-EPIP-6, the CECC Director and his key staff determined that Recommendation 6 was the most appropriate PAR.
Consequently, at 12: 11 p.m., the CECC Director called the State to recommend the following protective actions for the public:
Immediately shelter all sectors to 10 miles, and prepare to evacuate all sectors to a 5-mile radius and actual and projected downwind sectors to 10 miles when conditions allow.
The sectors recommended for evacuation were A2, B2, F2, G2, A5, B5, ES, FS, G5, 810, C10.
The inspector observed that the CECC Director and his staff recognized that the PAR procedural guidance, of CECC-EPIP-6, straightforwardly produced PAR 4 rather than 6.
The former recommendation was essentially a smaller-scale version of the latter, involving distances of 2 and 5 miles instead of 5 and 10 miles.
Because of the direct release path to the atmosphere that existed with the RCIC system leak, CECC decision-
makers decided to conservatively answer
"yes" to the flowchart question,
"Large fission product inventory in containment?"
Although they knew that the situation would have been more accurately addressed by a "no" answer, their discussion concluded that the more conservative PAR was the right choice under the given circumstance of a large radiological release in progress.
Subsequent events did not serve to validate this judgment, as the release was terminated within an hour and the State had to issue an order to cancel the evacuation that was already in progress.
The inspectors also noted that the language of the PARs could be clearer or more exact.
For example, the inspectors determined that the Recommended PAR 6, "Shelter all sectors to 10 miles.
Prepare to evacuate to 5 mile radius and actual projected downwind sectors to 10 miles when conditions allow,"
was meant to be a recommendation to evacuate to a
5 mile radius as opposed to preparation to evacuate.
The inspector discussed the issue with licensee representatives and reported that the language was not as clear or explicit to prevent incorrect interpretations.
Licensee representatives noted the inspectors concern and reported the PAR procedure was undergoing significant modifications and efforts to clarify the content of specific PARs would be considered in its 1994 revision.
Protective actions were initiated for onsite personnel following the Alert declaration by conducting a personnel accountability of those personnel inside the protected area.
The Shift Supervisor in the SCR requested the assembly and accountability of site personnel with a PA announcement at about 9:20 a.m. followed by the siren for site assembly, in accordance with licensee procedure EPIP-8,
"Personnel Accountability and-Evacuation,"
Revision 7, dated August 20, 1993.
The accountability was reported to the ED at about 9:48 a.m. with seven identified personnel missing.
The licensee committed to upgrade the public address and evacuation alarm system during the Unit 2 Cycle 6 refueling outage in order to meet the intent of IE Bulletin 79-18, Audibility Problems Encountered On Evacuation Of Personnel For High-Noise Areas.
This item was tracked by the BFNP NPP, Volume III, Section II-77, as item 40.
In 1986, the licensee employed an engineering contractor to evaluate the operation of BFNs alarm and evacuation systems.
The results indicated many inadequacies in the existing system.
As a result of these findings, DCNs W15757, W15723, W15724, and 15756, were written to upgrade the system for Units 1, 2, and 3, and plant common areas, respectively.
The upgrades included among other things, the addition of strobe lights, electronic sirens, speakers, and uniterruptible power supplies.
Previously an inspector witnessed portions of PNT-233, that tested the evacuation system for Unit 2.
One discrepancy was noted due to a
typographical error which wrongly identified the location of a junction box.
This was corrected by implementing a nonintent change.
Test
deficiencies were being tracked and corrected as found.
All testing was expected to be completed by Unit 2 startup.
The inspector determined that the licensee had completed corrective actions for the system prior to the Unit 2 startup.
During the exercise, the inspector did not identify any problems with public address and evacuation alarm system.
No violations or deviations were identified.
12.
Exercise Critique (82301)
The licensee's critique of the emergency exercise was observed to determine whether shortcomings in the performance of the exercise were brought to the attention of management and documented for corrective action pursuant to
CFR 50.47(b)(14),
CFR 50, Appendix E,
Paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.N.
The licensee conducted critiques with exercise players following the exercise termination.
Licensee controllers and observers conducted additional critiques prior to the formal critique to management on November 19, 1993.
Issues identified by the licensee's staff during the exercise were discussed by licensee representatives during the formal exercise critique to licensee management.
The licensee's critique addressed both substantive deficiencies and improvement areas.
The conduct of the critique was adequate.
Licensee action on identified findings will be reviewed during subsequent NRC inspections.
No violations or deviations were identified.
13.
Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701)
a ~
(Open) IFI 50-259, 260, 296/92-39-01:
Press releases did not adequately quantify the offsite radiological release.
In the 1992 EP exercise, the inspector determined that the licensee's press releases were not sufficiently complete to quantify the radiological releases reported.
The licensee indicated the decision to not activate the JIC for the exercise was a contributing factor to the misleading news releases.
The issue was identified and reviewed by the licensee for corrective actions.
The inspector noted that the licensee's review and evaluation attributed the failure to adequately quantify the release to failure to activate the JIC and did not identify any additional corrective actions.
The licensee issued four News Releases from the JIC during the 1993 EP exercise and was preparing a fifth when the exercise was terminated.
The inspector determined that the licensee failed to quantify or put in perspective the nature or safety significance of radiological releases mentioned in news releases 2, 3, and 4.
The inspector stated that the item would remain ope b.
(Closed)
IFI 50-259, 260, 296/92-39-02:
Review offsite monitoring team utilization for effective release determination and personnel need for KI.
The inspector determined that the environmental monitoring team was taking appropriate measures to determine release direction and magnitude.
The inspector determined that the licensee had proceduralized the use of KI for environmental monitoring teams in CECC EPIP-9,
"Emergency Environmental Radiological Monitoring Procedures" and that the KI was administered in accordance with those procedures at team deployment.
The inspector stated that the item would be closed.
14.
Federal Emergency Management Agency Report A report on FEMA's evaluation of offsite preparedness will be issued at a later date and will be provided by a separate transmittal.
15.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and results were summarized on November 19, 1993, with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1.
The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results listed below.
Propriety information was not reviewed during the inspection.
Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.
Licensee management was informed that an open item (listed in Paragraph 14)
was reviewed and considered closed and another would remain open pending completion of revised corrective actions.
The need to quantify or appropriately describe the significance of radiological releases reported in licensee news releases was identified as a problem and as an IFI during the 1992 emergency preparedness exercises.
The problem was not corrected and repeated during the 1993 exercise.
The inspector reported that the problem warrants additional management attention for correction actions (Paragraphs 9.e and 13.a).
A problem with an AOI, concerning the location of caution statement in a procedure for venting the suppression chamber, was identified as an issue needing review for corrective actions (Paragraph 9.a).
Item Number 50-259)
260) 296/93-41-01 Status Open Descri tion and Reference IFI - Review of emergency exercise radio communications in a future inspection for proper use of identifying exercise communications (Paragraph 2).
50-259, 260, 296/92-39-01 50-259, 260) 296/92-39-02 Open Closed IFI - Press releases did not adequately quantify the offsite radiological release (Paragraphs 9.e and 13.a).
IFI - Review offsite monitoring team utilization for effective release determination and personnel need for KI (Paragraph 13.b).
Index of Abbreviations Used in this Report AOI Abnormal Operating Instruction CECC Corporate Emergency Control Center CFR Code of Federal Regulations Ci Curie EAL Emergency Action Level ED Emergency Director EP Emergency Preparedness EPIP Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure EPZ Emergency Planning Zone ERO Emergency Response Organization FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency FEOC Forward Emergency Operations Center FPB Fission Product Barrier GE General Emergency IFI Inspector Follow-up Item JIC Joint Information System KI Potassium Iodide MSIV Main Steam Isolation Valve NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission ODS Operations Duty Specialist OSC Operations Support Center PA Public Address PAM Plant Assessment Manager RAM Radiological Assessment Engineer RCIC Reactor Core Isolation Cooling RP Radiation Protection SAE Site Area Emergency SCR Simulator Control Room SED Site Emergency Director SPDS Safety Parameter Display System STE Shift Technical Engineer TS Technical Specification TSC Technical Support Center Attachments:
Exercise Objectives, Scenario Abstract and Scenario Timeline
V
BROWNS FERRY NUCLEARPLANT(BFN)
1993 EMERGENCYPLAN EXERCISE The 1993 BFN Radiological Emergency Plan Exercise willbe a full scale exercise consisting of full participation by TVAand full participation by the State and Local Government emergency agencies.
EXERCISE GOALS TVA's goals for the 1993 BFN exercise are as follows:
1.
Allowplant and offsite personnel to demonstrate and test the capabilities of the emergency response organization to protect the health and safety of plant personnel and the general public in accordance with the Nuclear Power-Radiological Emergency Plan (NP-REP), BFN Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs), and the Centrai Emergency Control Center (CECC) EPIPs.
2.
Provide an interactive exercise to ensure proficiency of onsite and offsite emergency response capabilities.
Provide training for emergency response personnel.
4.
Identify emergency response capabilities that are in need of improvement or revision.
5.
Provide an interative exercise to allow the State responders to demonstrate their proficiency in emergency response capabilities.
EXERCISE OBJECTIVES A. Control Room/Simulator 1. Demonstrate abilityofthe Shik Operations Supervisor to recognize conditions, classify emergencies, make required notiQcations in a timely manner, and assume the initial responsibilities ofthe Site Emergency director.
2. Demonstrate abilityofthe ShiQ.Operations Supervisor to maintain effective command and control ofcontrol room activities, prevent interference with classiQcation analysis, and periodically inform the control room staff ofthe status ofthe emergency situation.
3. Demonstrate abilityofthe control room staffto make timely determination ofthe cause ofthe incident, perform mitigating actions, keep onsite personnel informed ofthe emergency situation prior to Technical Support Center activation, and a precise and clear transfer ofresponsibilities from the Control Room Staffto the Technical Support Center Staff 4. Demonstrate abilityofthe control room staff to use proper procedures, maintain an accurate chronological account ofevents, and defer problems that cannot be quickly resolved to the Technical Support Center for resolution.
5. Demonstrate abilityofthe control room staff to continuously evaluate information, redeQne/conQrm conditions and event classifications, establish an effective Qow of information
between the Control Room, Technical Support Center, Operations Support Center, Central Emergency Control Center, and NRC.
B. Technical Support Center (TSC)
Demonstrate ability to perform a precise and clear transfer ofresponsibilities from the control room staQ'o the TSC staff, and assume the primary responsibilities ofthe Central Emergency Control Center (CECC) prior to CECC activation.
Demonstrate the Site Emergency Director's (SED) abilityto provide effective direction, command and control, to manage activities in a manner to prevent interference with classification, analysis, or mitigation ofan event and to perform periodic briefings for TSC/OSC staff and personnel.
Demonstrate ability ofthe TSC staff to use proper procedures, solve problems related to incident identification and mitigation, and maintain an accurate account ofevents through detailed chronological log keeping.
4. Demonstrate the TSC's ability to determine the appropriate sampling and monitoring required to support accident mitigation, perform timely assessments ofonsite radiological conditions, and formulate, coordinate, implement, and track on site protective actions.
Demonstrate the TSC's ability to maintain eQ'ective communication between the Operations Support Center (OSC), Control Room, CECC, and behveen various groups within the TSC.
Demonstrate abilityofthe TSC to continuously evaluate available information, redefine/confirm plant conditions and event classifications, ifrequired assemble onsite personnel within the site area, and provide an accountability rcport to the SED within thirty minutes ofsounding the emergency siren.
Demonstrate Site Security's ability to maintain effective site access control.
Demonstrate abilityofthe TSC to timely and eQ'ectively activate and establish communication withenvironmental monitoring vans.
C. Operations Support Center (OSC)
Demonstrate ability ofthe OSC Manager, through effective command and control, to coordinate and initiate activities in a timely manner, maintain effective communications between various groups within the OSC, and use ofproper procedures in the coordination and initiation of activities.
2. Demonstrate abilityofthe OSC staff to properly plan required tasks, promptly dispatch response teams, track response teams, and maintain communication with the response teams.
3. Demonstrate abilityofthe OSC response teams to quickly and effectively enter the plant, make necessary repairs or inspections, and perform an adequate de-brief upon returning to the OSC.
4. Demonstrate abilityofthe OSC staff'to maintain accurate status board information, maintain an accurate account of equipment, plant, and response team status through detailed chronological logs, and efiective transfer ofinformation between the OSC, TSC, RADCON laboratory, and Chemistry laborator. Demonstrate abilityofthe RADCON personnel to use proper procedures and followgood RADCON and ALARApractices to eQectively support accident mitigation efforts, ensure adequate worker protection, and perform effective inplant and site boundary surveys during radiological emergencies.
S 6. Demonstrate ability ofthe OSC to track changing radiological conditions through survey results and/or inplant monitors, control internal and external exposures and personnel contamination of onsite emergency workers, and incorporate the information into personnel protective actions and exposure tracking.
D. Central Emergency Control Center 1. Demonstrate ability ofthe Operations Duty Specialist to make initial notifications to State agencies in a timely manner.
2. Demonstrate ability to perform precise and clear transfer ofresponsibilities from the TSC staff to the CECC staff.
3. Demonstrate abilityofthe CECC Director to maintain eQective command and control within the CECC and establish and maintain effective communication between various groups within the CECC 4. Demonstrate abilityofthe CECC to perform, update, coordinate oQsite activities with the STATE and provide protective action recommendations in a timely manner.
5. Demonstrate ability to effectively transfer radiological survey information from the field, keep the field teams informed ofemergency conditions, and adequately monitor and control the exposure levels ofoQsite personnel.
6. Demonstrate abilityofthe CECC staff to maintain detailed chronological logs ofplant status, ongoing activities, external TVAcorrespondence, corrective actions taken, protective action recommendations and to continuously evaluate available information and redefine/confirm the conditions and event classifications.
7. Demonstrate abilityofthe CECC staQ'to eQ'ectively call upon and obtain TVAcorporate, vendor, or other outside support resources as appropriate or needed.
(technical, logistics, financial, federal, industrial, ect. )
8. Demonstrate abilityofthe CECC staff to eQ'cctively dispatch and control Radiological/Environmental Monitoring Teams, coordinate with the State when applicable, and obtain, analyze, and utilize meteorological, onsite and oQsite radiological conditions, and source term information to develop dose assessments in a timely manner.
9. Demonstrate abilityofthe CECC staff to establish and maintain effective communication between the various emergency centers ( Control Room, TSC, RMCC, State/Local EOC ) and NRC including NRC responders.
10. Demonstrate abilityofthe CECC staff to analyze current plant conditions, identify projected trends, determine the potential consequences, and maintain CECC status board information accurate.
11. Demonstrate ability to establish and maintain adequate security access control for the CEC. Demonstrate proficiency ofthe CECC staQ'with emergency procedures, equipment, and methods.
E. EXERCISE SPECIFIC 1. Demonstrate ability ofthe exercise controllers to perform their function without prompting, coaching, or othenvise interfering with the performance ofexercise players.
2. The scope ofthe scenario should demonstrate technical accuracy, anticipation ofsignificant player actions, and sufficiently diQicult to exercise capabilities of the emergency plan.
3. Demonstrate adequacy ofcontrol room and emergency centers facilities, resources, equipment, and communication systems to support emergency operations.
4. Demonstrate ability to alert and mobilize personnel for emergency response centers and activate the emergency centers in a timely manner.
5. Demonstrate ability to conduct habitability surveys for the TSC, OSC, control room / simulator and all assembly areas.
6. Demonstrate ability to maintain effective communication between the Technical Support Center, Operations Support Center, Central Emergency Control Center, Control Room / Simulator, NRC F. FIRE EMERGENCY 1. An incident Commander is promptly dispatched to the scene ofthe emergency where he/she demonstrates ability to establish a command post, setup communication with the main control'room and effectively interacts with the Fire Brigade Team Leader.
2. Demonstrate abilityofthe Fire Brigade Team to amve on the scene in a timely manner, establish response sectors, staging areas, and assess the physical situation.
3. The Fire Brigade Team demonstrates adequate fire fightingskills and appropriate use offire fighting equipment.
4. The Fire Brigade Leader demonstrates abilityto conduct briefings, control the situation, and displays appropriate fire fighting tattics.
5. Radcon personnel demonstrates their ability to monitor Fire Brigade Team exposures and provided suQicient radiological information to the Incident Commander and / or Fire Brigade Team Leader.
6. The Incident Commander and Fire Brigade Team Leader demonstrates ability to communicate and interact eQ'ectively.
7. Security personnel demonstrate their ability to provide suQicient and effective control at the scene ofthe fir G. ENVIRONMENTALMONITORING 1. Demonstrate the ability ofthe Environmental Monitoring Teams to effectively utilize their procedures to perform dose rate surveys, collect and analyze radiological samples, and conduct other prescribed radiological activities.
2. Demonstrate the Enviormental Monitoring Team's abilities to adhear to appropriate contamination control procedures in field conditions.
3. Demonstrate the adequacy ofthe Enviornmental Monitoring Vans to support emergency operations.
(monitoring equipment, supplies, communication equipment, etc.)
4. Demonstrate abilityofthe TSC to timely and effectively activate and establish communication with environmental monitoring vans.
5. Demonstrate abilityofthe Site to timely and effectively transfer control ofthe environmental monitoring vans.
6. Demonstrate ability to effectively dispatch and control Radiological/Environmental Monitoring Teams, coordinate with the State when applicablc, and obtain, analyze, and utilize meteorological, onsite and offsite radiological conditions,and source term information to develop dose assessments in a timely manner.
7. Demonstrate abilityofthe Environmental Monitoring Team personnel to monitor their accumulated dose, report their accumulated doses to the Environs Assessor/Field Coordinator, and recieve proper authorization for emergency exposures.
H. PUBLIC INFORMATION/ JOINT INFORMATIONCENTER 1. Demonstrate the abilityofthe CECC Communications staff to coordinate information with non-TVAagencies.
2. Demonstrate the abilityofthe CECC Communications Staff to develop timely accurate news releases.
3. Demonstrate the abilityofthe CECC Information Manager to exercise effective command and control ofthe overall communications response.
4. Demonstrate the ability ofthe JIC to coordinate public news briefings with State and Federal agencies and provide timely information to the public during periodic JIC briefings.
5. Demonstrate the abilityofmedia relations personnel in the JIC to answer telephone calls from the media professionally and accurately.
6. Demonstrate the ability ofTVA's public information staff in the JIC to provide timely and accurate information to anyone calling the public information telephone number.
7. Demonstrate the ability to provide reasonable media access with minimal impact on emergency response activitie. Demonstrate the ability to provide information to the public that is accurate, presented at a meaningful technical level, and take corrective actions for inaccuracies.
9. Demonstrate the adequacy ofthe CECC communication staQ's facilities, resources, equipment, and communications system to support emergency operations.
I. NRC FOLLOW UP ITEMS l. 92-3941 The press did not adequately quantify the offsite release.
2. 92-3942 Review ofthe offsite monitoring teams utilization for effective determination and personnel need for KI.
j. The following drills will be conducted during the exercise:
1. CECC/State Communication Drill 2. TSC/CECC Communication Drill 3. Plant RADCON Drill 4. Plant Radiological Monitoring Drill( Environs Monitoring )
5. Radiological Dose Assessment Drill
CONFIDENTIAL BFN 1993 GRADED EXERCISE REVISED: 9-24-93 page
Initial Conditions:
Unit 2 has been operating for the past 40 days with a dose equivalent Iodine 131 concentration of 2.39E-1 pC/ml.
Last shift the hydrogen analyzer"alarmed and indicated 1.5:.
Power was reduced to 60%. Electricians and IMs checked the recombiners'reheaters and reported that everything is working correctly.
The hydrogen problem has cleared up.
U-2 began to increase power at 8 megawatts per minute.
The "B" hydrogen analyzer was taken O.O.S.
due to erratic behavior.
Events:
Note times are in scenario elapsed time(hr:min).
At the start of the exercise (T=OO:00)
U-2 is at 100~ power.
Ten minutes into the exercise (T=OO:10)
steam extraction valve 2-FCV-5-1 fails which allows the internals of the valve to break free and lodge in the line blocking steam flow to the g1 high pressure feedwater heaters.
The feedwater temperature begins to decrease and reactor power increases.
Operations will begin to control power output using the recirculation flow rate.
Fifteen minutes into the exercise (T=OO:15) hydrogen concentration begins to increase in the offgas system due to the hydrogen recombiners losing efficiency.
Twenty two minutes into. the exercise (T=OO:22) Hydrogen Analyzer "A" alarms at 14 concentration.
Forty five minutes into the exercise (T=OO:45)
some fuel damage occurs due to clad failure from the colder feedwater'water.
One hour into the exercise (T=01:00)
an explosion occurs in the offgas system and results in a breech of the offgas piping in the offgas building, the offgas piping is cracked just upstream and downstream of the charcoal beds, and a fire has started in the charcoal beds.
When attempted FCV-66-28 will not close.
Also when attempted valve 66-517 will not close due to debris from the explosion on the valve seat.
Also when attempted valve 66-515 will not close due to the reach rod becoming disconnected from the stem.
Hydrogen analyzer says 2> concentration while actual concentration is
> 4%. Unit 2 is scrammed but several control rods are stuck out. Additional fuel damage occurs due to the control rods jamming on warped fuel assemblies.
Rod position indication is lost.
The offgas post treatment monitor High alarm comes in.
A crack in the condenser piping increases the air inleakage to the condenser.
One hour and five minutes into the exercise (T=01:05)
a release to the environment begins via the stack from the offgas system and the offgas building ventilation.
The offgas post treatment monitor High-High and High-High-H'igh alarms come in.
One hour and seven minutes into the exercise (T=01:07) offgas adsorber 2D's thermocouple has reached its maximum of 150 degrees Fahrenhei CONFIDENTIAL BFN 1993 GRADED EXERCISE REVISED: 9-24-93 page
tOne hour and twelve minutes into the exercise (T=01:12) the offgas adsorber Vault's thermocouple has reached its maximum of 100 degrees Fahrenheit.
One hour and fifteen minutes into the exercise (T=01:15) offgas adsorber 2F's thermocouple has reached its maximum of 150 degrees Fahrenheit.
One hour and twenty minutes into the exercise (T=01:20) offgas adsorber 2A's, 2B's, and 2C's thermocouples have reached their maximum of 150 degrees Fahrenheit.
The release to the environment via the stack from the offgas system increases as the fire consumes more of the charcoal.
An ALERT should be declared based on FA2, HA12, or RA3.
One hour and forty minutes into the exercise (T=01:40) the TSC should be staffed.
One hour and forty five minutes into the exercise (T=01:45) venting of the drywell via the Torus through the Stand By Gas Treatment System(SBGTS)
is required and results in an increase in the stack release rate. If RPIS has been repaired it may be returned to service.
Two hours into the exercise (T=02:00)
a SAE should be declared based on RS1.~
~
~
hree hours into the exercise (T=03:00) the release to the environment via the stack is slowly decreasing.
Four hours into the exercise (T=04:00)
a leak develops on the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling(RCIC) turbine steam supply line in the Northwest Quad on elevation 519 and when the RCIC isolation valves 2-FCV-71-2 and 2-FCV-71-3 fail to close a breech of the primary system and containment occurs.
Four hours and fifteen minutes into the exercise (T=04:15)
a GE should be declared based on FG3.
Four hours and thirty minutes into the exercise (T=04:30) the Offgas charcoal adsorber fire may be extinguished if a valid attempt has been made to do so.
The iodine release rate reduces rapidly.
A low level noble gas release rate continues due to the RCIC leak and any Drywell venting.
Six hours into the exercise (T=06:00) the Exercise terminate :00 01:30 MC'Z~4PPd'PFZZ~VZ REV. DATE 9-24-93 08:00 CST 00:00 00:30 BFIN EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS 1993 GRADED EXERCISE 02:00 02:30 03:00 03:30 04:00 04:30 05:00 05:30 06:00 ALERT(FA2; IIA]2; RA3)
SAE(RS1)
GE(FG3)
T=lC U-2"
T=OO:00 Rx at 100%
-
T=OO:15 H
" Hydrogen Analyzer is
)ncreases T=01:00 H2 expl T=01:00 Rx several co 0:22 H2 at 1%
.O.S.
is Scramed Lrol rods ar I2 at >4%
des.
but sLuck.
2:30 stuck control s are freed ADhIINISTRATEVLYCONI"IDENTIAL T=06:00 EXERCISE TERhIINATES CV-5-1 cks high heaters~-
T=OO:45 Some fuel damage oc T=OO:10 2-fails and bk steam to tie pressure Ft am from L
T=01:00 s cause add urs.
uck control tional fuel T=01:01 St is isolate
.
e Rx rods amage.
T=04:00 A in Lhe RCI(I which doed eak occurs steam supp not isolate.
T=01:00 H ignites ch in the offg explosion coal adsorb s system.
ers TT=04:30 cha fire in the qf be extingui I
coal adsor er fgas sysl.e may ed.
explosion as system nd radioa T=01:00 H in the ofg condenser a
g and valv ir leakage into Lhe o damages pip n esulting in a LiviLy leakafie S
nto Lhe ffgas buildin T=01 radioL stack system begins.
b0 A releas of ctivity via he from Lhe ot'fgas T=01 radio stack torus 15 the relea e of ctivity via (he increases ifen venting starts.
T=03:00 th radioactivi y stack is sl(j decreasing.
release of via the Iy T=04:30 a release of via the sta ow level adioactivit k continuek
-T p'0 I