IR 05000259/1993019
| ML18036B322 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 05/28/1993 |
| From: | Branch M, Wiseman G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18036B321 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-259-93-19, 50-260-93-19, 50-296-93-19, NUDOCS 9306160157 | |
| Download: ML18036B322 (9) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323 Report Nos.:
50-259/93-19, 50-260/93-19, and 50-296/93-19 Licensee:
Tennessee Valley Authority 3B Lookout Place 1101 Market Street Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801 Docket Nos.:
50-259, 50-260 and 50-296 License Nos.:
DPR-33, DPR-52, and DPR-68 Facility Name:
Browns Ferry 1, 2, and
Inspection Conducted:
Hay 3 - 7, 1993 Inspector:
G.
R.
Wi seman Date igned H.
W. Branch, Acting Chief Test Programs Section Engineering Branch Division of Reactor Safety s a~/ez Date Signed SUMMARY Scope:
This routine, announced inspection was conducted in the areas of fire protection design changes and modifications, engineering support activities, implementation of the fire watch program and observance of Motor Operated Valve (HOV) differential pressure and flow testing.
Results:
Within the area examined no violations or deviations were identified.
Communication and coordination between the several groups involved in the on-going fire detection and suppression systems field modifications was good.
Knowledgeable engineering supervision was observed for the development and implementation of Design Change Notices (DCNs).
A weakness involving the control and timely update requirements of the licensee's Fire Protection Report and the Limited Conditions for Operations (LCO) determinations for fire protection features impacted by recent design changes was identified.
930blb0l57 930b04 PDR ADOCK 05000259
The licensee's fire watch program was adequately implemented and considered acceptable.
Fire watch personnel were sensitive to ongoing plant conditions in their assigned areas, attentive to their fire watch responsibilities, and knowledgeable of their duties and the locations of communication equipment to rapidly report a fire situation should it have occurred.
The licensee has developed specific HOV Technical Test Instructions which
'ncorporate Generic Letter (GL) 89-10 differential pressure (DP) testing guidelines.
Dedicated test crews are identified from the preventative maintenance organization for performance of the HOV tests and specialists are identified for interpretation and analysis of test data.
These personnel were knowledgeable and competent in their area of responsibility and in troubleshooting problems encountered during DP testin ~,
Persons Contacted REPORT DETAILS 2.
Licensee Employees R. Abbas, Fire Protection Engineer
- S. Austin, Licensing Engineer
- H. Bajestani, Technical Support Hanager
- R. Baron, Nuclear Assurance and Licensing Hanager H. Crisler, Lead Hechanical/Nuclear Site Engineer B. Endsley, Hotor Operated Valve Engineer, Preventative Haintenance
- R. Jones, Fire Protection, Operations
- R. Holi, Fire Protection, Operations
- J. Rupert, Engineering and Hodifications Hanager
- J. Sabados, Chemistry Hanager
- P. Salas, Site Licensing Hanager H. Schimmel, Valve Engineer, Nuclear Engineering C. Snoddy, Hotor Operated Valve Engineer, Preventative Haintenance
- R. Wells, Compliance Licensing Hanager
- 0. Zeringue, Site Vice President Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included engineers, operators, fire watches, craftsmen, and administrative personnel.
NRC Resident Inspectors
- C. Patterson, Senior Resident Inspector
- J. Honday, Resident Inspector
- R. Husser, Resident Inspector
- Attended exit meeting Fire Protection Design Changes and Plant Hodifications (37700)
TVA's Fire Protection Upgrade Program has committed to the NRC to upgrade the plant fire detection/alarm and certain fire suppression systems during the Unit 2 Cycle 6 outage.
The inspector reviewed selected fire protection Design Change Notice packages associated with these plant modifications.
The DCN design changes/modifications work packages and the work was observed to: I) determine the adequacy of the
CFR 50.59 evaluations performed and that appropriate Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) revisions were planned or completed; 2) verify that the DCNs were properly reviewed and approved by onsite and offsite review organizations in accordance with applicable administrative controls; 3) verify the modifications were installed (for those that could be physically inspected)
in accordance with the DCN package; 4)
verify that applicable plant operating and design documents (drawings, operating procedures, emergency operating procedures, Fire Protection Plan, etc.)
were identified and revised to reflect the modifications; 5)
verify that the modifications were reviewed and incorporated into the operations program as applicable; 6) verify that the modified plant
configuration was consistent with appropriate codes and standards, regulatory requirements, and licensee commitments:
and (7) verify that post modification test requirements were specified and that adequate testing was performed.
The following DCNs were reviewed:
DCN W17820, HPCI Room Fire Protection This modification replaced the existing water spray system for the Unit 2 HPCI Room with a new pre-action sprinkler system with floor area coverage to meet National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)
standards.
The safety evaluation stated that the size of the fire protection water supply header was increased to 4-inch diameter piping to allow adequate water flow for the new design with an increased number of sprinkler heads in the area.
The inspector conducted a walkdown inspection and verified the modifications were satisfactorily completed and met NFPA sprinkler spacing/coverage guidelines.
- DCN W18212A, High Pressure Fire Protection (HPFP) Air Supervision System at the Intake Pumping Station This modification added an air supervision system to use low pressure air to monitor the integrity of the sprinkler piping downstream of a check valve installed between the actuation valve and the sprinkler heads.
The air supervision system was added to alarm the control room of the opening of the sprinklers at the intake pump station or leakage in the downstream piping system.
This modification to connect the air supervision feature required the addition of a swing check valve in the sprinkler header, connection of the air supervision package into the service air header, and conduit and wiring between the air supervisory switch and the fire alarm panel.
The inspector conducted a walkdown inspection and verified that modification was properly installed.
Additionally, testing documentation was reviewed and the inspector verified that the NFPA post modification hydrostatic leak testing requirements were satisfied.
- DCN W17909A, Upgrades for Units 1/2 Diesel Generator Building Fire Detection and Alarm System This modification installed fire detection and alarm components in areas of the Unit 1/2 diesel generator building.
Components installed included thermal detectors, smoke detectors, local alarm panels and alarms.
Post modification functional testing, performed as part of system operability verification, identified a
problem with the thermal detectors alarm set points of 136'.
The set points were determined to be too low and caused spurious alarms of the fire detection system while the emergency diesels generators were running.
The licensee was in the process of
performing a design change to replace the type of thermal detectors used in the diesel generator rooms to resolve the spurious alarm problem.
- DCN W17904A, Upgrades for Fire Detection and Alarm System The modification installed a Unit 1/2 Central Fire Alarm Station and the interconnecting wiring of all Local Fire Alarm and Control Panels to a fire detection console in the Unit 3 Computer Room.
The equipment installed was a product of Fire Alarm & Systems Technology, Inc.
(FAST) and replaced obsolete components where replacement parts were no longer being manufactured.
Critical fire detection trouble status and alarm conditions monitored from local panels throughout the plant are channeled to a display panel mounted on the Unit 1/2 Hain Control Room Panel 1-9-22-1 allowing operators to request immediate fire detection status for any location in the plant.
This modification in parallel with the other fire detection system upgrade DCNs temporarily abandoned in-place and deactivated the existing fire detection systems which will be removed later under demolition DCN W18213A.
The inspector conducted a walkdown inspection and verified the modification was satisfactorily completed.
The inspector concluded that the design change packages reviewed were adequate.
Knowledgeable engineering supervision was observed for the development and implementation of the Design Change Notices (DCNs).
Communication and coordination between the onsite Hechanical/Nuclear System Engineering and operations personnel involved in the on-going field testing of the fire detection and suppression systems modifications was good.
It was noted however, that Change Requests to Licensing Documents (CRLDs) for the licensee's Fire Protection Report (FPR),
Volume 1 for the Fire Protection Program and the Limited Conditions for Operations (LCO) determinations for fire protection features contained in the Fire Protection Plan had not yet been implemented nor scheduled to incorporate fire protection administrative requirements impacted by the recent fire protection and alarm system upgrade design changes.
The Fire Protection Report, Volume 1, contains the Fire Protection Plan, Fire Hazards Analysis, Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis, and Safe Shutdown Program.
The Fire Protection Report as referenced by the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), Section 10.11, Fire Protection S stems, is the licensing basis for Browns Ferry's Fire Protection Program.
Based on the inspectors findings the licensee initiated actions to track these items by the TVA Nuclear Control Office (NCO) Nos.
930105001 and 93015002, scheduled to be resolved or completed prior to Unit 2 startup.
This was considered a weakness and will be reviewed in future routine NRC resident inspection Fire Watch Program (64704)
The inspector reviewed the fire watch program as described in the Fire Protection Report, Volume 1, Fire Protection Plan and implemented through instructions provided in Section I-L of the FPR-2, Attachment L.
Fire watches under the program are utilized as compensatory measures for coverage in plant areas when fire protection equipment, systems or components of systems are removed from service or otherwise cannot meet operability requirements (impairments).
Fire watches are designated as Roving/Hourly Watch, Continuous/Dedicated (C/D), and Continuous/Area (C/A).
The hourly fire watch ensures that a specified area is checked on an hourly basis.
The C/D fire watch monitors specific impairments on a continuous basis.
The C/A fire watch monitors multiple impairments by moving through the area within a required (15 Minute) time frame.
The inspector observed the performance of a number of Roving/Hourly and C/A fire watches provided to compensate for inoperable fire barrier's as a result of NRC Bulletin 92-01 addressing Thermo-Lag 330 material issues and other inoperable/impaired fire protection features associated with Unit 2 outage activities or fire protection system modifications.
Each of the C/A fire watches observed could monitor their assigned area within the specified 15 minute time frame.
The fire watches were sensitive to ongoing plant conditions in their assigned areas, attentive to their fire watch responsibilities, and knowledgeable of their duties and the locations of communication equipment to rapidly report a fire situation should it have occurred.
Based on the above review the inspector determined that the licensee fire watch program was adequately implemented and considered acceptable.
Design Basis Differential Pressure And Flow Testing (TI 2515/109)
The inspector observed the performance of design basis differential pressure (DP)
and flow testing for a selected GL 89-10 program motor operated valve (HOV) using the HOVATS 3000 Series Test System diagnostic equipment.
The test was a coordinated effort involving several plant groups and required close communications.
A Preventative Maintenance/Valve Engineer coordinated the test from the control room and other Preventative Maintenance/Valve Engineers supervised the test at the valve and data acquisition station to ensure that temporary instrumentation for pressure and/or flow was properly installed.
The technicians performed the sensor and computer hook up and a brief initial examination of the acquired data to determine that the intended data was captured.
Procedures involved for the baseline and differential pressure testing of the system no.
HOVs included:
ECI-O-OOO-HOV008, Testing of Motor Operated Valves Using 3000 MOVATS Signature Analysis Syste Technical Instruction 2-TI-284, Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water Differential Pressure (DP) Test.
Based on review of portions of the above procedures, the inspector concluded that adequate, step by step instructions were provided for preparation, calibration, data acquisition, and data analysis using the HOVATS diagnostic equipment.
The inspector observed the pre-test briefing in the control room for the DP flow tests of Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water (RBCCW) system (system no. 70),
HOV 2-FCV-070-47.
The Preventative Maintenance/Valve Engineer briefed operations on the system test conditions, provided the control room a copy of the valve test technical instruction and reviewed the system valve alignment necessary to achieve design differential pressure and flow during the HOV cycle.
The inspector considered the pre-test briefing adequate.
The inspector also observed HOV testing from the data acquisition station to verify that communications were established; temporary instrumentation was installed and monitored; appropriate calibrations were obtained; and appropriate procedures were present and followed.
A problem was encountered initially with cable connections of the data acquisition test equipment.
The engineers quickly diagnosed the problems and connected spare equipment that had been staged within the station area for such events.
Once the equipment was operating properly, operations was directed to align system valves in an attempt to achieve design basis pressure and flow and to cycle the HOV.
However it was observed that a differential pressure could not be achieved across the valve during the HOV stroke cycle.
The testing was terminated, recorded data was stored for future use, and the system engineers were consulted.
The system engineers determined that either restricted flow and/or back pressure to the downstream side of HOV 2-FCV-070-47 influenced the DP test.
A Test Action Plan was developed in an attempt to identify and isolate the potential of back pressure on the downstream side of MOV 2-FCV-70-47.
Additional testing of HOV 2-FCV-070-47 was not conducted during the inspection period.
Based on the above reviews the inspector concluded that the licensee's testing methodology appeared acceptable and the trouble-shooting of emerging problems was thorough and timely.
Results of additional HOV testing will be reviewed during future NRC inspections.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and results were summarized on Hay 7, 1993, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1.
The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results.
Proprietary information is not contained in this report.
Dissenting comments were not received from the license J