IR 05000255/1992010
| ML18058A248 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palisades  |
| Issue date: | 03/03/1992 |
| From: | Holmes J, Jablonski F NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18058A246 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-255-92-10, NUDOCS 9203060109 | |
| Download: ML18058A248 (6) | |
Text
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Report No. 50-255/92010(DRS)
Docket No. 50-255 License No. DPR-20 Licensee:
Consumers Power Company 1945 West Parnall Road Jackson, MI 49201 Facility Name:
Palisades Nuclear Generating Plant Inspection At:
Palisades Site, Covert, MI Inspection Conducted:
February 10-14, 1992 Inspector:
Approved By:
F. (,J.. r Jablonski, Chief Malnt~nance and Outages Section Inspection Summar /3 I 9 Date
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Date Inspection on February 10-14, 1992 (Report No. 50-255/91010(DRS))
Areas Inspected:
Routine, announced inspection to assess the implementation of the fire protection program, which included a review and evaluation of administrative procedures, completed surveillances, audits, and a fire dril In addition, a walkdown was performed to assure that isolation of safe shutdown power cables and control circuits was prope The inspector utilized NRC inspection procedure modules 30703, 64704, and 9270 Results: Based on the items inspected, overall performance in fire protection was considered adequate. Two open items were closed; no violations of NRC requirements were ~dentifie The following strengths were identified:
Self contained breathing apparatus were wall mounted to allow fire brigade members to quickly don the equipmen Also, the fire brigade members were equipped with a personal alert safety syste In the event a fire brigade member becomes.
incapacitated, an alarm will.sound to notify other brigade members for assistanc In addition, the surveillance procedure for fire barrier penetration seals and fire rated assemblies was significantly improved by showing the exact location of fire barrier penetration seals and fire rated assemblie This will ensure that all the fire barrier penetration seals and fire rated assemblies in a given area have been identified during the surveillanc Fire watch training was upgraded to a formalized class from general employee trainin r;c;i 9'")'.")'"'
PDR ADOCK
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05000255 PDR
- DETAILS 1.0 Principal Persons Contacted Consumers Power company (CPCo)
- R. Rice, Operations Manager
- S. Cote, Property Plant Superintendent
- E. Dorbeck; Staff Engineer, Fire Protection
- J. Kuemin, Licensing Administrator
- K. Osborne, System Engineer Manager
- R. Phillips Jr., Nuclear Analyst
- P. Quinns, Fire Protection Coordinator
. U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
- D. Nelson, Reactor Inspector
- T. Markley, Reactor Inspector
- Denotes those attending the exit on February 14, 199.0 Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Open Item 255/89014-0l(DRS):
The licensee was requested to review surveillance procedure R0-51 to ensure that
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obstructions to sprinkler systems do not occur as a result of a modificatio The licensee revised the procedure to address obstructions that may result from new modificatio This item is close (Closed) Open Item 255/89014-05(DRS):
Administrative Procedure No. 9.03, "Facility Change-Minor," Revision 6, did not reference the correct design criteria in that nine of the criteria listed did not specifically apply to the Palisades plan Procedure N.03 was revised and the changes were acceptabl In addition, the licensee developed Administrative Procedure 9.04, "Design Change Engineering Training," which ensured that engineers are acquainted with the fire protection requirement This item is close.0 Fire Protection Program Review This inspection consisted of a review of administrative pr6cedures, completed fire protection surveillances, and fire protection audits, observation of a fire drill, and inspection of safety related equipment to assure proper isolation of safe shutdown power equipment and control circuits.
- 3.1 Administrative Procedures Fire Protection Organization Procedure FPIP-1, "Organization and Responsibilities," Revision 3, was developed to establish the organization and personnel responsibilities for the fire protection program at this sit The inspector reviewed the responsibilities and qualifications for the fire protection supervisor, fire protection coordinator, fire training instructor, and the CPCo fire protection enginee In all cases, the individuals' training and experience was commensurate with their positio No unacceptable items were observe Control of Flammable and Combustible Materials, Welding and Cutting Permits Procedure FPIP-7, "Fire Prevention Activities," Revision 6, was developed to provide controls for the storage, use and handling of transient combustibles, including flammable/combustible liquids and gasse The procedure also included instructions for cutting and welding operation The inspector reviewed the procedure for unacceptable storage and welding practices that would pose a significant threat to redundant safe shutdown
~quipment as required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix No unacceptable items were observe.2 Fire Protection Surveillance The fire protection program required equipment to be maintained and operabl The inspector reviewed and evaluated a sample of completed surveillance procedures as listed belo A0-6, "Fire Suppression Water System Fire Hydrant Flush and Valve Operation," dated April 1989, (Revision 13), April 1990, (Revision 14), and May 1991 (Revision 14).
D/WP-14, "Verification of Operability of Safety Related Fire Door Electrical Supervision System and Status of Safety Related Fire Doors," dated December 1991 (Revision 2).
R0-52, "Fire Suppression Water System Functional Test and Pump Capacity Test," dated September 1989 (Revision 10) and April 1991 (Revision 11).
RT-53, "Fire Barrier Penetration, Fire Rated Assembly and Fire Protection Assembly Surveillance," dated November 1989 (Revision 5), September 1990 (Revision 5), and February 1991 (Revision 5).
SI-7, "Functional_ Test of the Fire Detection System Outside_
Containment," dated May 1991 (Revision 8), and November 1991 (Revision 8).
RT-53 was u~graded to clearly define the location of the fire barrier penetrations and fire rated assemblie Surveillance procedures RT-53A and RT53B include drawings of walls,.floors and ceilings of the fire areas that indicate the identification number and location of each fire penetration and fire rated assembl This procedure is an improvement over the previous procedure in that it allows the operator to easily identify and record the results of the surveillanc Deficiencies identified during the surveillance tests were corrected or scheduled to be correcte No unacceptable items were observe.3 Fire Protection Audits Technical Specification 6.5.2.4.2.h. required an independent fire protection and loss prevention inspection and audit to be performed annually utilizing either qualified off-site licensee personnel or an outside fire protection fir The audits dated October 13, 1989, October 24, 1990, and October 16, 1991, identified findings and observations that were brought to management's attention, and were resolved or scheduled to be resolved by the license No unacceptable resolutions were note Technical Specification 6.5.2.4.2.i. required an inspection and audit of the fire protection and loss prevention program to be performed by a qualified outside independent fire protection consultant at intervals no greater than three year The triennial audit dated October 13, 1989, identified findings and observations that were brought to management's attention, and were resolved or scheduled to be resolved by the license No unacceptable resolutions were note.4 Redundant Safety Related Cable The inspector observed the power cables for the motor driven high pressure safety injection pump (P-66B) and the motor driven charging pump on the 590 foot level of the reactor building, and verified that these cables were separated as required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix No unacceptable items were observe.5 Fire Drill On February 14, 1992, a fire drill was initiated, which simulated a fire at the generator side (south end) of the turbin The drill postulated a turbine blade ejection that resulted in a pressurized oil and hydrogen lea.*
The fire brigade responded within ten minutes with protective equipment including self contained breathing apparatus and personnel alert system and established a command pos Self contained breathing apparatus were wall mounted to allow fire brigade members to quickly don the equipmen Also, the fire brigade members were equipped with a personal alert safety syste In the event a fire brigade member becomes incapacitated, an alarm will sound to notify other brigade members for assistanc The hydrogen fire was stopped by shutting off the hydrogen supply to the turbine electrical generato The ground oil fire was controlled by use of foa The nearby exposed hydrogen oil/seal unit was cooled down by fire brigade personne Strong and weak points of the fire drill were discussed in detail during the critiqu For ex-ample, it was discussed that large amounts of smoke could make visibility almost impossible. In addition, heat buildup may severely weaken structural steel resulting in the collapse of the turbine hall roo The performance of the fire brigade and the critique was goo.6 Fire Reports The inspector reviewed the fire reports for the last three year In 1989, there were several small fires such as an overheated light fixture, and an oil leak that was ignited by the hot air compressor casin In 1990, there were small fires resulting from cutting and welding activities due to the steam generator replacement progra In 19911 there was one small trash can fir The fires were quickly detected and extinguishe No
.unacc~ptable items were identifie.7 Fire Watch Training Program A new fire watch training program was developed for all contractors performing fire watch dut Fire watch training was previously covered under general employee trainin The inspector observed a portion of the new fire watch training, which included a discussion on the different types of fires and the appropriate choice of fire extinguishe Hands on fire extinguisher training was also given to the fire watche Based on the observations and assessment, the training program was well developed and implemente.8 Plant Observations The inspector observed several hose stations, extinguishers, sprinkler valves, emergency lights, fire doors, fire penetration seals, and housekeeping in several areas of the reactor, and turbine building The inspector concluded that the equipment was well maintaine Housekeeping in the~e areas was goo *
-- ------ Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on February 14, 1992, and summarized the scope and findings of the inspectio The*likely informational content of the inspection report was discussed with regard to.documents reviewed during the inspectio The licensee did not identify any of the documents as proprietary.
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