IR 05000255/1992015
| ML18058A439 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palisades  |
| Issue date: | 05/08/1992 |
| From: | Shafer W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | Slade G CONSUMERS ENERGY CO. (FORMERLY CONSUMERS POWER CO.) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18058A440 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9205150057 | |
| Download: ML18058A439 (20) | |
Text
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Docket No.
50~255 Consumers Power Company ATTN:
Gerald B.- Slade General Manager Palisades Nuclear Generating Plant 27780 Blue Star Memorial Highway Covert, Ml 4904j
Qear Mr.. Sl ade:.
This refers to the inspectfon conducted by Messrs. J. *K. Heller and J. R. Roton of this office on March 10 through April.20, 1992.. The inspection-intluded a review of *authorized activities for your Palisades Nuclear *
Generating Plant facility.
At t~e conclusidn of the* inspection, the findings were discussed with those members of your staff identified in the enclo~ed
. report.
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The enclosed copy of our inspection.report identifies. areas examined during*
the ins~ection. Within these areas~ the inspection consisted of a selective examination of procedures and representative records, observations,. and *
interviews with personnel.
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- During this ~nspection, certain of ytiu~ activities appeared to be in violation*
of NRC require~ents, as specified in the.enclosed Notice-of Violation. A
~ritten r~sponse is required.
- In*accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the Commis~ion's regulations, a ~opy of this~letter, the enclo~ures, and your respons~s to this letter will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.
The responses directed by this letter and the enclosed Notice are not subject to the clearance procedures of the Office of Management and Budget as required by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, PL 96-51 l.
We will gladly discuss any questions yo~ ha~~ concerning this inspection.
Enc*1 osures:
.. * __, 2. Inspection Report No~ 50-255/92015(DRP)
See Attached Distribution 9205150057 920508 PDR ADOCK 05000255 Si\\
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. pp_a
Sincerely, W;. D.
Shafe~. Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION Ill 799 ROOSEVELT ROAD GLEN ELLYN, ILLINOl_S 60137 Docket No. 50-255 Consumers Power Company ATTN: -*Gerald General* Manager Palisades Nuclear Generating Plant 27780 Blue Star Memorial Highway Covert, MI 49043
Dear Mr. Slade:
This refers to the inspection conducted by ME;!ssrs. J. K. *Heller and J. R. Roton of this office on March 10 through April 20, 1992. *The inspection included a review of authorized activities for your Palisades Nuclear Generating Pl~nt facility.
At the conclusion of the inspection, th~ findings were discussed.with those ~embers of your staff identified in the enclosed report.
The enclosed copy of our inspecti6n report identifies area~ examined dur~ng
- the in~pection.. Within these areas, the inspection consisted of a.selecti~e ex~mination of procedures-and representative fecords, observationi) and interviews.wi!h personnel.
- D~ring this inspection, certain of your *activities appeared to be in violation of NRC requirements, as-specified in the enclosed Notice of Violation.
A written response is requ1red.
. In *accordance with 10 CFR 2;190 o_f the Commission's *regulatiOns, a copy of this letter, the enclosLlres, and your response to this letter will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.
- .The responses directed by this letter and the_ enclosed Notice are not subject to the elearance procedures of the Office of Management and Budget as. required *
by the Paperwork Reductibn Act of 1980, Pl 96-511.
- We will.~ladly discuss any questions_you have concerning this inspection.
Enclosures_:
1. Notice of Violation 2. Inspection Report No. 50-255/92015{DRP)
See Attached Distribution
Sincerely, U) J)5/J,. ltiz,,*
- .
w~ D.*s~Chief Reattor Projects Branch 2
Consumers Power Company
- Distribution ct w/enclos~res: *
David P. Hoffman, Vice President Nuclear Operatio~s P. M. Donnelly, Safety and *
Litensing Director DCD/DCB(RIDS)
OC/LFCDB
~esident Inspector, Riil James R.
Padgett~ Michigan Public Service Commission*.
Michigan Department of*
Public Health Palisades, LPM~ NRR.
SRI, Big Rock Point MAY G 8 E?.2
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION II I Report No. 50-255/92015(0RP)
Docket No. 50-255 Licensee~ Consu~ers Power Company 212 West Michigan Avenue Jacksgn, MI 49201 Facility Name:
Palisades Nuclear Generating Plant Inspection At:
~alisade~ Site, Covert, MI
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Inspection* conducted:
March 10 through April 20, 1992
- . Inspectors:
J. K. Heller
...... ~;)R~R~oo~* nti k*
. Approved By: _'"f. r. :nfr"9e~ n, Ch e'.
. *..
Reactor ProJ cts S ti on 2A Inspection Summary
-
License No. OPR-20 *
Date Inspection from March 10 through April 20, 1992 CR~port No. 50-255/92015CDRPll *.
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Areas Inspected:
Routine unannounced inspection by the resident -inspectors of actions on previOusly identified items, plant safety verification, loss of shutdown cooling, ESF actuations, radiological controls, outages, reportable ev~nts, NRC Region III requests, and.meeting with the p~blic.. No Safety
- Issues Management System (SIMS) items were reviewed.
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Results: Of the nine areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified in six areas. One violation was identified (failure to implement procedures - Paragraphs 2, 4 and 5) with a total of five examples amon~ th~
remaining three areas.
- The strengths-, weaknesses and vi o 1 at i o*n are di s.clissed in paragraph.9,
"Manag~ment Intervie~."
9205150065 920508 PDR ADOCK 05000255
,Q PDR
Notice of Viol~tion
- This is a Severity Level IV violatio~ (Suppl~ment I}:*
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. Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Consumers Power Company is hereby required to s.ubmit a written statement or explanation to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555 with a copy to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region III, 799 Roosevelt Road, Glen Ellyn, Illinois, 60137, and a copy to the NRC -Resident Inspector at the Palisades Nuclear Generating flant*within 30 days of the date of the letter transmitting this* Notice of Violation (Notice). This reply.
- should be clearly: marked as a "Reply to a Notice of Violation" and.should.
include for each violation:
(1) the r~ason for the violation,. or, if contested; the basis for disputing the violation, (2) the *corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved, (3) the co~~ectiv~ steps that wi 11 be tak~n to avoid further vi o 1 at ions, and ( 4) the date when full. *
compliance will be achie~ed. If an adequate reply is not received within the tim~ specified in this Notice, an order or a demand for information may be issued as to why the license should not be modified, suspended, or revoked, ot.
why such other action as may be proper should hot be taken.
Where good cause *
is shown, consideration will be given to extending the response time.
,,:
Dated at Glen Ellyn, Illinois
. this 7(
day of 1'!.:'"-;f,
1992
'*
f;)Psfla~v W. D. Sh~~: Chief Reactor Proj~cts Branch 2
NOTICE OF VIOLATION Consumers Power Company Palisades Nuclear Generating Plant Docket No. 50-255 Litense No. DP~~20 Durin~ an NRC inspection conducted March IP throOgh April 20, I992, a violation of NRC requirements was identified.
In accordance with the
"General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions,
(10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C (I992, the vipl~tion is listed below: 10 CFR 50, Appendix ~' ~riieri~n V, ~equires that activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures; or drawings, of a type appropriate to the.circumstances and sha 11 be. accomplished_ in accordance * with those instructions, procedures,.or drawings. * contrary to the above: a.
On February 25, I992, while removing the reactor vessel head,. the licensee failep to adhere to the requirements of procedure RVG-M- . 2, "Removal of Reactor Vessel Head," by not using a calibrated load ce 11 (Step 3. 7. 2} and by exceeding the prescribed procedural maxi~um allowable lift weight (Step 5.I9~I5)~
- b.
On March 30, I992, while removing the Upper Guide Stiucture (UGS}, the. licensee failed to adhere to the requirem~nts of procedure . RVI-M-I, "Removal of Upper Guide Structute," by not using a
calibr~ted load cell (Step_ 3.2.2} and by exceeding the prescribed ~rocedural maximum all6wable.lift weighf. (Step 5~3.4).
c , On March 27, I 992, the l icerisee experienced a. loss of shutdown coolihg when testing the supply ~ower breaker to "IC" bus, due to failure to adhere to Administrative Procedure 4.02, "Control of . Equipment Status," Section I0.3.1., by cycling the bus supply breaker in the "Test" position.
-d.
Ori April 2, I992, the licensee experienced an inadvertent Safety Injection when technicians failed to install test equipment in acc6rdance with Technical Specifi~ation Test RT-I3A, "Normal Shutdown Sequencer Test - Left Channel," Section 5.
e.
On April 4, 1992, the licensee experienced an inadvertent actuation of a Shutdown Sequencer while performing Special Test T-325, "Timing of Emergency Diesel Generator I-I Start Sequence," wh~n an operator failed to parallel *an alternate power supply to safeguards bus "IC" in accordance with Standard Op~rating Procedure 22, "Diesel Generator Operability," Section 7.5.4 prior to opening the di ese.l generator output_ breaker.
9205150064 920508 PDR ADOCK 05000255 G . PDR
DETAILS, , 1. * Persons Contacted Consumers Power Company G. B. Slade, Plarit ~eneral Man~ger ~R. D. Orosz, Nuclear Engineering & Maintenance Manager R. M. Rice, Plant Operations Manager
D. J. VandeWalle, Engineering Programs Manager
- P. M. Donnelly, S~fety & Licensing Director K. M. Haas, Radiological Services Manager
. K. A. Toner, Electrical/I&C/Computer Engin~ering Manager
- J. L. Hanson, Operations Superintendent
- *R. B. Kasper, Maint~nance Superintendent
- K. E. Osborne, System Engineering Superintendent D. D. Hice, Chemistry Superintendent L. J. Kenaga, Health Physics Supetintendent
- C. S. Koz~p, Technical Engineer W. L.
Robert~, Senior Licensing Analyst R. W.
Smedley~ Staff Licensing Engineer T. A. Buczwinski, Reactor & Thermal Hydraulic Engin~ering Manager
- T. J; Palmisano, Administrative. & Planning Manager Nu~lear Regulatory C6mmission (NRC)
.. . . .
- J. K. Heller, Senior Resident Inspector *
- J. R. Roton, Resident Inspector S. Sander~, Intern (~RR)
-
- Denotes some of those present at the Management Interview.on April 27, 1992.
Other members of the plant staff, and several members of the contract security force, were a 1 so* contacted during the* inspection perfod.
2.
Actions on Previously Identified Items (92701, 92702) (Closed) Unr.esolved 'item 255/92006-02: Head removal and Upper Guide Structure (UGS) removal.
- This unresolved item addressed s~veral procedural compliance problems pertaining to the removal of the reactor vessel head and UGS.
The procedures controlling these activities were RVG-M-2,."Removal of Reactor Vessel He~d" and RVI-M-1,* "Removal of the Upper Guide Structure (UGS)."
Btith required documentation of load cell calibration (Steps 3.7.2 and 3.2.2 respettively).. This step was.annotated "N/A" by.the contractor performing the evolution.. * Both proce_dures specified a maximum lifting weight, (Steps 5.19.15 and 5.3;4 respectively) and both required* that the 1 ift be secur.ed and an evaluation be ~erformed for interference (Steps 5;19.15 and 5.3.4
.* ~es~ectively} if the specified weight was exceeded. In both casei, the
- * maximum weight was exceeded prior to unseating the components.
The contractor continued with the 1 i ft unt i1 the component was unseated,
- then performed ari "on-the-spot" evaluation prior to ptoceeding with the
- lifts. The "on-the~spnt" evaluation for the head lift did not consider or address the fact that the maximum specified weight was the crane design rating and that~he indicated load had exceeded this.rating. The decision to continue with both lifts was made by the contractor without approval by the licensee.
These failur,es to implement the procedures, as discussed above, a*re considered examples of a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V (examples a & b} in the Notice of Violation (255/92015-la and lb(DRP}}. T~o violation examples, _no deviations, unresolved it~ms, or open items were identified.
l. * Operational Safety Verification (71707; 71710, 42700} Routine facility operating act~vities 1 plant startup and power accession were obser~ed as.conducted in the plant (turbine building, auxiliary building and containment} and in th~ mairi control room.
- The performance of reactor operat~rs, senior reac~~r operators, shift....
engineers, and auxiliary equipment operators was observe4 and fiValuated.. Included in the review were procedural use ~nd adherencei records and logs, communications, ~hift/duty turnover, and the degree of ,profession~lism of crintrol room activities.
Observations of the control room monitors, indicators, and recorders were made to verify the operability of emergency systems, radiation monitorin~ systems, and n~clear r~actor protection systems.
Reviews of surveillance, equipment condition, and tagout logs were conducted.
Proper return to service of selected components was verified.
a. -. General The licensee began th~ reporting period in cold shutdown with fuel moves in progress.
The licensee-completed the fuel moves and the post-outage testing required to return the plant to service. At.
the conclusion of this reporting period, the plant was at powet.
b.
Criticality The unit went critical on April 14.
This completed the r~f~eling * outage and started the lo~ power physic~* testing portion of the .startµp program.
The estimated critical rod height and boron concentratirin were within the predicted target band.
.*.---
c.
Tours {l) Tours of the control room were routinely made.
During these visits the inspector observed that staffing requirements were al~ays met, operators were cognizant of changing plant conditions~ the equipment status board and the LCO board were maintained up-to-date, and the operators were performing assigned tasks in accordance.with plant procedures. Activities observed were: . {2) {a) Plant heatup {Cold Shutdown tp Hot Shutdown) per GOP 2.
{b) ~ot Shutdowri to critical in Hot Standby per GOP 3.
{c) .Power escalation after synchronization per GOP 5.
The inspector routinely toured the containment during the outage.
Some tours were performe.d with members of the pl ant'. staff. Most observations were minor and were resolved when
- identified.
{a) {b) {c) The inspector noted that a problem {identified during the previous refueling outage} pertaining to dirt/dust below a grating next to the primary coolant pump and .in other places throughout the cohtainm~nt had b~en * * resolved.
- The *inspector found an assortment of lighting configurations which consisted of some lights with a_
metal protective cage, some with protective explosive covers.and others with both configurations or neither.. The inspector di.scusse*d the variety of configurations with electrical maint~nance personnel and was informed .that the problem had been previously identified and a program was ongoing to make the.lighting -configuration _consistent.
- The inspector found that tape was still being used to patch a small crack in the head ventil~tion duct.
This item was documented i~ Inspection Report 255/91005{DRP).
The report stated the tape was.* . removed and that the duct would be replaced during the * next* refueling outage. This was discussed at the exit.
i nte*rvi ew.
(3) fours of the auxlliary and turbine building were routinel.Y performed.
Most were performed without the presence of the licensee staff. Minor observations ~ere identified and
- resolved.
4.
(4) In all are~s of the containment, turbine building and auxiliary building toured, the inspector noted that the degree of cleanliness continued to improve.
- d.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's program for refueling
- startup testing.
The licensee had prepared a startup test plan to assure that approp~iate plant groups and the Plant Review Committee (PRC) were in agreement that plant mode changes could be made.
The test plah identified the tests that required onshift management support. During the morning meetings, plant management stressed that quality was important and that delays in - the schedule were acceptable to ensure quality.
At several preshift briefings the plant manager stressed that licensed personnel had the obligation to slow br stop a test or activity if.
unsure of the test procedure or results. Additionally the.: operations group preplanned act1vities and established plant conditions on dayshift to support backshift *testing.
- No violations, deviations, unresolved items, or open items were
- *
identified.
Loss of Power tti the "C" Safeguards Bus The licensee lost *power to the "C" safeguards bus on March 27, at 10:26 p.m., during trouble shootfng activities of the supply power breaker. This ~ascaded to a five minute:loss of.shutdown cooling.
The plant was in cold shutdown with shutdown cooling supplied by equipment powe~ed from the "C" safeguards bus.
The reactor vessel head was installed with the stud/nuts torqued.' Activities wer*e underway to restore the openings in the head at the time of the event~ The primary coolant system (PCS) water level was at.the vessel flange.
The PCS water temperature started at 89 degrees F with the highest observed temperature increase of approximately 6 degrees F based on an average of* - the two operatihg core thermocouples.
The other train of shutdown. cooling was available.
. . . . Several shifts before the event, the "C" safeguards bus supply b~eaker charging motor had been found running continuously.
WOs 24101456 and 24103832 were written to resolve the problem.
The problem breaker was removed from service and a spare breaker was installed. Corrective maintenance was performed on the breaker that was remov~d.
During the 11 8" shift on March 27, an electrical lineup was established to permit testing of the problem breaker.
The lineup also realigned the .shut down cooling system to the train supplied by the "D" safeguards* bus... When the repaired breaker was racked in, the charging motor still-ran continuously.
The breaker was removed, the spar~ breaker reinstal1ed and shutdown cooling realigned to the train supplied by the riC" safeguards b~s to facilitate testing on the "D" safeguards bus scheduled for the next day:
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During the "C'.- shift on March 27, a second bre~ker repair was performed~ To determine if the repair was successful the shift superyisor authorized installation of the breaker to the "connect" position. This activity ~as not approved.by outage management nor was it scheduled to be performed or needed to be performed to support any planned activity.
Additionally, this electrical lineup was not described on the daily plant status sheet.
The shift supervi~or authorized alignment of the alternate power supply breaker, but did not realign the shutdown cooling syste~ back to the train supplied by the "D" safeguards bus.
The auxiliary operator
installed the charging motor fuses, but.not the control powef fuses.
The auxi 1 i ary operator then_ installed* the breaker to the "connect
position.and notified the control room that this actlon. had been
- performed.
The electrician and his supervisoi.realigned th~ breaker from the "connect" position to the "test" position and then closed the * breaker. This activity was performed without permissiori of the shift supervisor:. With the breaker in the "test" position all logic circuits were active.
Closure of the bus supply* breaker with the breaker in the "test" position resulted in deenergization of the bus because the. logic caused an* automatic transfer to the breaker in "test.
- Si nee the primary supply breaker was in the "test" position, power*was.lost to the bus~
,' ' Both diesel generator's started.. The "D safeguard bus remai.ned powered~ which meant the dedicated diesel generator idled until it was manually
- secured. Since power was iriterrupted to the 11C 11 safeguards bus the load sequencer was activated. However, with the contro 1 pow.er fuses not.
installed, the. breaker did not automatically open and permit automatic.
closure of the dedicated diesel generator output.breaker onto the bus.
The operators chose to resolve the problem by placing the synchronizing switch tb parallel which permitted the die~el generator output breake~ to close and power the "C" safeguards bus; The associated cooling* pump was ~anually started and shutdown cooling established.
The 5-minute 'duration did not seem unreasonable to diagnose the problem and implement correction action.
The licensee d~clared an emergency plan "Unusual Event~ when shutdown cooling was lost and exited the condition when shutdown cooling was reestablished~ Based on the information ava~lable, the e~e~gency plan declaration w.as conservative.
The inspector interviewed the shift supervisor.
He.knew the consequences of testing the incoming supply breaker while* in the test position! In fact, he referenced the lesson learned from a ~imiliar ~vent that occurred during the last outage.
There were at lea~t*two errors associated with this eve~t; The first pertained to a shift management error when the shift supervisor authorized the breaker test without establishing the proper conditions to ensure continued operation of the shutdown cooling system.
The
second occurred when the electrician, with the concurrence of his* supervisor, placed the breaker in the-"test" position and cycled the breaker. There was a laminated tag affixed to the outside of the. cubicle door and a second tag affixed to the inside of the cabinet that . specified, "BREAKER TESTING REQUIREMENTS.ARE SPECIFIED IN ADMIN PROC 4.02.". . Administrative Procedure 4.02, "Control of Equipment Status," paragraph 10.3.1, stated that Bus supplj breakers a~e not to be cycled in the
"test" position because operation in this configuration will result in deenergization of the respective bus. *Failure to test the breaker, as
- desc~ibed in Administrative Procedure 4.02, is a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix Bas discussed (example c) in the Notice *of Violation (255/92015-lc(DRP)).
-One violation example, no deviations, and no unresolved items; or open items were identified.
5.
Inadvertent Actuation of the Engineered Safeguards Systems {93702) Durin~ this reporting period, the-licensee experienced various inadvertent and spurious actuations of the Engineered Safeguards System (ESF).. The inspector performed a preliminary review and. will perform additirinal reviews when the Licensee Event Repo~ts are issued. A chronological listing*of those actuations follows: a.
March 15, at 6:18 p.m. (EST) ~ Sp~rious actuation of the left channel of containment isolatiori received fro~ RIA-2136.
Although the alarm/trip set point was 25 mR/hr, radiological protection workers in the area _reported dose rates of 8-10 mR/hr. * * This instrument had been placed in service to support removal of th~ Upper Guide St~ucture. The detector was immediately removed from service and recalibrated. Additionally, a replacement detector for RE-2136 was calibrated.
RIA-2136 and RE-2136 were installed and a loop c.alibration check was performed several times prior to returning the components to se~vice. The root cause of
- the spurious Left Channel Containment Jsolation actuation is unknown.
b.
April 2, at'l0:02 a.m. (EST) - Inadverterit actuation of Left Channel Safety Injecti~n.
- While l&C Technicians were installing equipment to facilitate performance of Technical Specification Test RT~l3A "Normal Shutdown Sequencer Test - Left Channel" th~ left channel Design Basis Accident (OBA) sequencer actuated. This actuation occ~rred while technicians were connecting the Amphenol plugs on the test cables to their matching plugs on the sequencer.. Plugs #1 and #2 were reversed by the l&C Technicians performing the connection.
Failure of the technicians to install the test plugs.per Section 5 of RT-13A, is considered a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B,- . Criterion V as discussed (example d) in the Notice of Violation (255/92015-ld(DRP)). . c.
April 3, at 10:55 p.m. (EST) - Iriadvertent actuation 6f both diesel-generators due to a premature bus undervoltage condition -0n
- bus "IC."
- While performing Special Test T-325, "Timing of Emergency Diesel Generator 1-1 Start Sequence," the potential transformer (PT)
drawer secondary contacts apparently opened momentarily,. . generating a second level undervolt~ge actuati~n and causing both.
~iesel generators to start. The root ~ause.of this event appeared
- to be the momentary opening of the PT drawer which was normally held shut by two latching devices.
The re.ason for this apparent contact opening.was still being evaluated by the licensee.
d.
April 4, at 8:15 p:m. (EST) - Inad~ertent actuation of Left Channel Normal Shutdown Sequencer..
- *
.While perforniing Special Test T~325, "Timing bf Emergency Diesel G.enerator 1-1 Start Sequence, *i an operator opened the output breaker of Diesel Generat6r 1-1 without. first.paralleling the alternate power supply to the "IC" bus as required by Standard Operating Procedure 22, Section 7.5.4. This resulted Jn
deenergization of bus "IC", the re-closing of the diesel gen~rator 1-1 output breaker,* and activation of the Left Channel Normal
- shutdown Sequencer.. :The root cause of this event was personnel.
error.
Fail~re of the oper~tor to first parallel an alternate.
power supply prior to opening the 1-1 diesel generator output breaker, in accordance with Standatd Operating Procedure 12, section 7.5.4, is considered a violation* of 10 CFR 50, Appendix a, . Criterion V as discussed (exaniple e) in the Notice of Violation (255/92015-le(DRP)). . . e~ On April 6,* at 2:10 aim. (EST) ~ Inadvertent actuation of Right Channel SIS-X relays.
Technical Spe~ification Test RT-80 ~Engin~ered Safeguards System -. Right Channel" specifies manual insertion of an undervoltage
- sigrial before insertion'of the SIS signal.
However, timirig of the* manual action was not clearly stated.
In thi.s case, the SIS * signal* was inserted before the bus voltage had decayed.
.
Therefore, offsite power was sensed to be available, which caused the activation of the SIS-X relays.
The actuation. of the SlS-X relays caused the.loss of bus ~1E" and bus 77, whi~h was not * planned.
After several seconds, the undervoltage condition was seen and load shed followed by OBA sequencer operation occurred as expected.
This event appear~ to be a technique problem which may warrant enhancement of the pr9cedure.
<* The inspector has reviewed this item and determined that. the .. reportablility determination required a detailed system knowledge and a strring knowledge of the reporting requirements. *The inspector has no additional questions at this time but will evaluate this when the Li~ensee Event Report is issued.
The last four actuations occurred over a relatively short time frame and.
were the subject of a licensee initiated call to Region III.
Two violation examples and no deviations, unresolved items; oi open items were identified.
6.
Radiological Controls (71707) .--:--- During routine tours of the radiologically controlled ireas and during interviews with plant personnel, th~ inspector observed occupation~l.. ~adiation safety practices by the radiatibn prote~tion staff and other
- .workers.. The items listed below were reviewed and discussed wfth Reg1o.n I lI personne 1.
a.** Duiin~ a containment tour, the licensee's radiation protectioh personnel found a high radiation door with a small portion of the ~ire me~h covering cut. A check of the area and ~ review of the* dosimetry records did not identify any unusual conditions.' It was* unclear if anyone entered the a~ea and, if they had,. what was their intention. *The i~spector observed the door orr the day of discovery and confirmed that the mesh had be~n cut and that compensatory measures were implemented.
Additionally, *during a
- subsequent tour, the inspector verifi~d that permanent repairs were made.
Th*is information was provided to Region III radiation protection and security specialists~
b.
The licensee found* a ten micro-curie hotspot above the eye of a. person working in* the refueling cavity;* The 1 i censee determined. that this.would not con~titute a whole body exposure in excess of the regulatory limits. This* information was provided to Region III radia~ion protection specialists. *
. c.. * The inspector briefly looked at the chemically induced source term reduction progra~ implemented*at the beginritng of the outage.
The inspector.was informed that a~pr~ximately 860 curies were removed . of which 750 c~ries wera Cobalt 58.
Approximately 2.3 pourids* of nickel was removed.
A communicati6n error occur~ed which result~d - in placement of the wrong demineralize~ in service and a reduction
- of the activity removed.
This information was provided to Region III r~diation protection specialists.
- No violations, deviations, unresolved items or open items were identified.
Outiges (37700, 42700, 60705, 60710, 61701, 61715, 86700) The licensee completed their 1992 refueling outage on April 19, 1992. . 9
..
Prior to *1eaving cold shutdown, the licensee resolved twci issues which precluded them from changing modes.
a.
Dropped fuel pin At 08:10 a.m. on March 10, a contractor performing fuel assembly reconstitution in the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) dropped a fuel pin from fuel assembly L-059.
The pin ended up lying horizonally i~ a NE orientation from the fuel inspection elevator.
The licensee suspended fuel. reconstitution activities until a fuel pin recovery plan was approved and the reason for the pin drop evaluated.
In.
addition, the licensee stopped fuel moves in the SFP until it was confirmed that the ptn did not interfere with fuel movesi
- The* 1 i censee performed the appropriate *steps of Off No.rm al Procedure (ONP) 11.2 "Fuel ~~ndling Accideht" until it was confirmed that there was not an increase in airborne or radiation activity in the SFP. * The licensee.reviewed the emergency plan ~nd determined that this event did not require an emergency plan classification.
- The piri was retrieved without incident~ It wai drppped after-it had be~n removed from the fuel assembly.
After he inspected it, the contractor did not move the pin far enough away from the elevator.while the elevator was being raised.
The pin caught on the top lip of the elevator and ~ropped*when the ptn exc~eded the maximum angle of engagement for the removal tool. A replacement pin. was*inst~lled in the fuel assembly~ During a subsequent* inspection, the licensee determined that the wrong pin had been removed because of a communication error when identifying and
- transporting.the assembly from the refueling *cavity to the spent
'fuel pool.
The correct pin-was removed and a new pin installed.
b. -. Diesel Generators (1) In.response to an event at Calvert Cliffs, the licen~ee reviewed the design of their Design Basis Atcident (OBA) sequencer *for the diesel generator and discovered that, in.
th~ case of the 1-1 diesel, several loads cduld be sequenced.
at the same time.
This could.cause the diesel generator to.' trip on over-curre.nt.
The OBA sequencer for the 1-1 diesel generator sends per~issive start signals to two of the three containment spray pumps (P-54C and P-54B).
Should these . pumps ~ubs~quently reteive a Contain~ent Hi~h Pressure (CHP) iignal - the second signal required to start the pumps - at the same time another component was sequencing on, the djesel could trip and the generator breaker "1ock-out."
In ~esponse to this condition, a m6dification to the OBA * sequencer was made which -prevents the simultaneous start of both containment spray pu~ps upon receipt of a CHP signal.
.* (2) the problem did not apply to the I~2 diesel generator.
Either diesel can sustain simultanious starting of a single spray pump and one other component.
The diesel generator room veritilatton system may not be able to maintain.the room temperatute b~low I04 d~gtees F.
One ventilation fan can maintain the room t~mperature below 104 degrees F with an outside ambient air temperature of 75
degrees F or less. Both ventilation fans would be required to o~erate with ambient air temperatures above 75 degrees F.
The FSAR stated the design outside air temperature is 95 * _ degrees F.
This equates to a room temperature of IIO.. degrees F with both fans running. *An evaluation of the ventilation system will be performed and will be discussed with the NRC if an operability problem exi st.s.
,- . . . : Only one of 'two ventilation fans in each room was. on a vital ~ower supply.
Diesel geri~rator room.ventilation fans V24S and V24D are. nort-class "IE" loads powered from 480 volt motor control centers (MCC) no. 7 and 8, respecti~ely. *When .ambient temperatures reach 75 degrees F and the diesel is running, Standard Operating Procedure. 22 requires MCCs *7 . and 8 to be st~ipped of their non-essential loads and f~d directly. from their respective diesel, providing dedi.cated power to the rion~class "IE" fans.
This is an interim solution.
The licensee is' still evaluating the design b~sis of the *ventilation system and continues to ev~luate long-t~rm resolutiop of this problem.
This is ah open ite~ (255/920I5-02(DRP)) pending furthe~ review of the evaluation.
- The. lic~nsee's resolution of the first issue demonstrated its.
ability to r~solve.technical issues in a timely manner arid d~monstrated a conservative operating philosophy. * One open item was identified.
No violations, deviations, o~ unteiolved * it~ms wet~ 1dentified.
8.
Reportable Events(92700, 92720) ___.... - The irispector reviewed the following Licensee Event Reports (LERs) for
- compliance to reporting requirements and, as applicable, for
- implementation of appropriate corrective actioris.
a.
(Closed) LER 255/900I8: Inadequate Flows Thrtiugh PCS Hot Leg Injection Check Valves, Revision 1.
Inadequate flow through Hot Leg Injection (HLI) check valves (CK~ . ES~3408, 3409 and 34IO) was observed during the performance of test procedure R0-65, *"HPSI/LPSI Check Valve Test."
In I988, a modification was performed on these valves to address a similar reduced flow problem.
At th~t time, R0-65 was performed three 11.
times with satisfactory results. *Following this event, Universal Testing Laboratories investigated the root cause of the inadequate
- flow through these HLI check valves and concluded.that this
_particular type of valve was not designed for the application for.
which it was being used.
These valves were subsequently replaced
- with swing check valves.
- b.
{Closed) LER 255/90012: Discrepancy In Saf~ty Injection Tahk Level Switch Settings.
c.
{Closed) _LER 255/91006: Failure to Compensate for Open Fire 'Barrier Seal, Revtsion l~ d.
{Closed).LER 255/91007: Unplanned Reactor Trip Caused by Inadequate Surveillance Procedure.
e.
{Closed) LER 255/91008: C~re Exit Thermotouple Inoperabl~ for Greater than Seven Days, This event was reported pursuant to the requirements of a Proposed Tethnical Specificatio~, dated September 2, 1988.. Table 3.17.4, Item 22, stated "... with the number of OPERABLE core exit
- thermocouple less.than four per quadrant but greater than or equal to two per core quadrant... either restore the inoperable ~
channel{s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days, {or)... submit a special report to the commission.*.. outlining... the cause of the i noperabi 1 i ty *.... and* schedule. for restoring the system to OPERABLE status." The inoperable thermocouple had been repaired and tested in three days; however, the work order had not
- been -administrat_ively reviewed by the Operations Department until April 17, 1991, eight days after the thermocouple had been de~lared in6perable. This event does not constitute a violation of the current Technical Specifications.
- -
~ ' f~ {Closed) LER 255/91012: Reactor Trip When "A" Channel Reactor . Protective System TM/LP Bistable ~as Inserted.
g.
(Closed) LER 255/91015: Plant Trip Following Main Feedwater Pump Trip.... . No violations, deviations, unresolved items, or open it.ems were identified.
- 9.
Region III Requests {92705) a.
.-* .,* Prompt criticality while transfetring fuel By request of the Region II I Technical Support Staff, the . potential of two fuel bundles achieving prompt criticality when* ~laced in the fuel transfer tarrier was examined. *The licensee determined that prompt criticality wa~ not an issue for any of the cycle 9 fuel assemblies but may be a problem for future refueling.
b.
This*wa*s based on. calculations acc*omplished by Siemens Nuclear Power Crirporation, using the,KENO Va. model and a 3.43 wt. percent enriched fuel bundle with a companion bundle enrichment between 1.0 and 3.43 wt. pefcent.
Containment Sump In accordance with Rill direction, the inspector reviewed litensee.** recor~s to confitm that.the containment sump was in~pected and cleaned, if required, during the refueling outage.
Review of licensee records indicated that the sump was inspected by operatirins depart~ent personnel and did not require cleaning.
The sump had been cleaned d~ring each of the last two refueling outages:
c.
Flukes 77 Series 2.
lhe Fermi nuclear ~l~nt identified and reported a potenti~l * problem with the fluke 77 series 2 portable meters.. Apparently, the selector switch can create.an internal short cjrcuit when the sca)e i~ changed.
This may have a negative effe~t on the* . . equipment in test. This information was p~ovided to the licensee.
No viol~tions, deviations, urtr~solved items, br 6pen items were identified.
- 10.
Resident Inspector M~etinqs With the P~blic (RP 0952) On March 17, the resident inspector was th~ ~uest speaker at a. biweekly
- meeting of the local Beta Sigma Phi service chapter.
The meeting was hosted by the Chapter President and held at a private residence.
The purpose.of the meeting was to discuss NRC inspection activities at the Palisades Nuclear Power Plant.
The inspector showed* the tape, "The NRC Story" and a general information tape of Pali sades produced by Cons.umers Power Company; The presentation lasted approximat~ly 45 minut~s. The ~roup corisisted of several teachers, a principal, and several self~ employed persons.
The quest i ans were non_-techn i cal in nature and ranged from fitness-for-duty to ge~eral questions on outage activities.
- No violations, deviations, unresolved items, or open items were *
identified.
- IL Manaqeme_nt _Interview (30703)
The inspecto~$ met with licensee representatives d~noted in Paragraph I - on April 27, 1992, to discuss the scope and findings of this inspection.
The likely informational content of the inspection report with regard* to documents or processes reviewed by the inspectors* was also discussed.* The licensee did not identify any such documents*or processes as proprietary.
--"; Highlights of the exit inte~view are discussed below: a.. Strengths noted: ( 1) (2). (3) (4) (5) (6) Improved cle~~liness itandard (Paragraph 3.c~(4) ~ "Operation Safety Verification - Tours"~) * * Management expectations pertaining to startup activity . (Paragraph 3.d - "Opera~ion Safety Verification".)
tonservative emergen~y plan declaration *(Paragraph 4 - "Loss of Power to the "C" Safeguards-Bus.")
Licensee initia~ed ~onference ~all to distuss the Engineered Safeguards System actuations (Paragraph 5 - "l~advertent Actuation o~ the Engineered Safeguards System".)
. . . Corrective action for the diesel generator problems '(Paragra~h 7;b ~ "Outages - Diesel generators.") 10 tFR 50.72 notification of 'an ESF act~ation demonstrating a strong knowledge of the sy~tem and of the reporting requirements (Paragraph 5.e - "Inadvertent Actuation of the Engineered Safeguards System~.) *
- b~
Weaknesses noted: (1) The five procedural compliance problemi we~e discussed* .(Par~graphs 2 - "Action on.Previciusly identified Items", 4 - "Loss of Power to the "C" Safeguards Bus", 5 - "Inadvertent
- Actuation of the Engineered Safeguards System".)
(2) . (3) (4) Use of duct tape to repair a_flaw (Paragraph 3~~.(2).(t) - "Opera ti on Safety Veri:fi cat ion".)
- Shi ft judgement errors that contributed to the loss* of shutdown ~ooling (Paragraph 4 - "Loss bf Power to the "C" Safeguards Bus:") Dropped fuel ~in (Paragraph 1:a - "Outages - Dropped fuel pin* II) c.
The notice of violation was discussed.
d.
The loss of shutdown. cooling eve~t was discussed (Paragraph 4 "Loss of Power to the "C" Safe~uatds Bus.") e.
Information pertaining.to Fluke 77 series.2 instruments (Paragraph 9.c - "Region III requests~ Fluke 77 series 2.
11 ) The licensee stated that the Flukes have been withdrawn from service pending testing and evaluation of vendor information.
- e
. f.
- >
The potential ventilation problem with the diesel generator room and the need to establish early communication with the NRC if the.
room ventilation can not maintain the desired-temperature with.an elevated outside air temperature (Paragraph 7.b.(2) - "Outages - Diesel Gener~tors.
)
15 }}