IR 05000255/1992021
| ML18058B157 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palisades  |
| Issue date: | 10/15/1992 |
| From: | Jorgensen B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | Slade G CONSUMERS ENERGY CO. (FORMERLY CONSUMERS POWER CO.) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18058B158 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9210200098 | |
| Download: ML18058B157 (15) | |
Text
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Docket No; 50-255 Consumers Power Company ATTN:
Gerald General Manager
.
Palisades N~clear Generating Plant 27780 Blue Star Memorial Highway
- Covert, MI 49043-9530
Dear Mr. Slade:
This refers to the inspection conduCted by Messrs. B... L. Jorgensen, *
J. K.. Heller; and D; G: Passehl of this office on September 1 through
- 'October 5, 1992.
The inspection included a review of authorized activities
- for your Palisades Nuclear Generating Plant.
At the conclusion of.the inspection, the findings were discussed with those members of your staff identifled in the enclosed report.
~he enclosed ~~~y of our inspection ~eport identifies ar~as examined*du~ing the inspection. Within thes~ areas, the inspec.tion consisted of a selective.
examination of procedures arid representative reco'rds, obse'rvations, *and
-*
interviews with personnel;.
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No vi6lations of NRC requi~ements wer~ identified.during~ the ~ourse of thi~*
inspect 1 on..
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In accordance"wlth lOCFR 2.790 of the Commission's regulations, a. copy of this letter, the enclosure(s), and.Your response(s) to this letter will be
- p 1 aced in the !NRC P~b.l i c Document Rooin...
... *
We will gladly discuss any questions you have.. concerning this 1nspection:: **
Enclosure:
Inspection Report
No. '50-255/9202l(DRP)
Se~ Attach~d Distribution
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Sincerely,
C::.
r
L,:...
!......
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....... :j
B. L. Jorgensen, Chief
Reactor Projects Section 2A
. ;
~1?ter.
RII I
J~en*
.~,f~;z,,
9210200098 921015
ADOCK 05000255
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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION Ill
799 ROOSEVELT ROAD
GLEN ELLYN, *ILLINOIS 60137
Docket No. 50-255
Consumers Power Company
ATTN:
Gerald General Manager
Palisades Nuclear Generating Plant
- 27780 Blue Star Memorial Highway
Covert, MI
49043-9530
Dear *Mr. Sla.de:
OC1 1**.*
....,;
1.......,;.._
This refers to the ins~ection conducted by Messrs. 8. L. Jorgensen,
j_ K. Hellet, and D. G.
~assehl of this office on Se~tember 1 through
.
October 5~ *1992.. The inspection included a review of authorized activ.ities
for your Palisades Nuclear Generating *Plant.,.At the conclusion of the
inspect.ion, the findings were discussed with those members of your staff
- i dent i fi ed,in the enc 1 osed r.eport..
- *
The enclosed copy af o~r 1nspect~on report~ident~fies areas ex~mined during
the inspection.
W.ithih these areas, the inspection consisted, of a selective
examination of procedures and representative records, observations, and
interviews with personnel~
No violations -0f NRC ~equirements w~~e identified du~ing the course of this
inspection~..
- In a
REGION I I I *
Report No.
50~255/9202l(DRP).*
Docket No. 50-255
License No;
DPR~20
- Licen~ee: Consum~rs Power Company
. 212 West Michigan Avenue
Jackson; MI
49201
Facility Name:
Palisades Nuclear Generating Plant
Inspection At:. P*alisades Sit~,_Govert, MI
Inspection Conducted:' September 1 through.October 5~ 1992
Inspectors: J. K. Heller
D. G. Passehl
B. L. Jorgensen
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- ~pp roved.BY:
.Reactor
/,
. r!J-o:--Y~
Date.
Inspection Summary *
Inspection from.September 1 through October 5, *1992 (Report
No. 50-255/92021CDRPll
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- Areas.Inspected: *Routine unannounced inspect"iori by the resident inspectors of._
actions:on previously identified.items, plcin.t op_er::~U_qils, plant-~lectrocution*
acc1dent, maintenance, surveillance, ana securiti.* No Safety Issues
..
.
Man.agement**system (SIMS) items were reviewed_.
..
Results~ No ~iolations ~r deviations were identified in any of the six areas
inspected.
~o new strengths or weakn~sses were identifi~d. :Highlights of the
inspection are summarized in the fir~t paragraph ~f the report details.
9210200101 921015
ADOCK 05000255
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DETAILS
1.
Management Intervie~ (71707)
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The i nsp.ectors met: with licensee representatives _....: -denoted in
paragraph 9 - on, October 5, 1992, to discuss _the scope and findings of
- the inspection.
In-addition, the li_kely informational content of the
inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the
inspectors during the inspection was also discussed.
The licensee did
not identify any such documents or proc;:esses -as proprietary.
Hi~hlights of the ~~it interview ar~ discussed below:
a.
No new strengths *were noted.*
b.
No new* weaknesses were noted.*
.c..
An unresolved item pertaining to diesel generator inop.erability-
was discussed. Region III reviews determined that escalated
enforcement would not be appropriate for this item (~aragraph.2~e,
"Actions on Previously Identified,Items").
d.
Th~ result~ of the various plant tours were discussed
(paragraph 3. b, "Pl a_nt *Tours").*
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e.*
The re~ults of th~ licensee's investigatio~ into the electrocution*
were discussed.
The inspector provided a copy of the licen~ee's
. f..
i nvesti gat ion report to Region II I for review by a Region II I
- electrical specialist (paragraph 4, "Plant Elect_rocution
._,
Accident").
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An inspector* followup Hein pertaining_ to continued stea_m leaks in
- the running.vents for-the High* Pressure-Water.Heaters was
. _
discussed.
Th~ plant manager 'indicated that the problem was ~till
under investigation by his staff (paragraph 5.b, "Mainten~nc~")
g.
'Before and after the exit meeting, the in~pector discussed the
-positive fitness for duty test result with the plant manage~,
operations managei, and the operation superintendent: The.
inspector stated th~t -~ formal request for information will be
sent from Region III to the licensee..
Based on this information, -
appropriate enforcement action.will be determined (paragraph 7,*
"Security").
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2.
Actions on Pteviouslv Identified Items (92701, 92702)
a.
(Closed.) Open Item 255/~001~-07(DRP) :' Determine if boric acid.
leaks in the Boric Acid Pump and Storage Tank room have had any
detrimental affect on fasteners or structures in the room;
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The licensee cleaned the room arid evaluated the integrity of the*
structures and fasteners located in the room.
The evaluation
con~l~ded that the condition of all eq~ipment located* in t~e ~oom
was acceptable.
A multi-discipline work group was convened to find ways to improve
the material condition of the room.
The work group identified
approximately 25 improvement items. These ranged from valve and
pump repair to scheduling of routine room cleaning.
The inspector observed the licensee's progress and noted the
improveme~ts.
- b.
(Closed) Open Item 255/90025-07(DRS).:
Verify that excessive
Saf~ty Injection Tank (SIT). nitrogen cover gas pressure ha~ not
affected the accuracy of ~he SIT level instruments.
The licensee's analysis docum~nted that permanentl; mounted*lev~l.
floats are used to verify that the SIT level complies with*
Technical Specification*s. A separate SIT level indication is
provided by differential pressure (dp).celJs.. The output of the
dp cells is used for information only, and the accuracy is not
only affected by a constant nitrog_en head but affected by non
constant factors such as local and global containment temperature *
cbanges.
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The in~pector verified-that the operators use the dp c~ll level
instruments for information only and that the floats are used to
comply with Technical Specification ~evel requirements.
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c.
(Closed) Unresrilved Item 255/91014-02(DRP):
This unresolved item
addressed a potential problem pertaining to entry points for off
normal operating procedures.
This -unresolved item identified that a crew did not trip the plant
when the steam generator water level exceeded the manual trip
setpoint. A literal translation of the applicable off-normal
.
procedure indicated that a manual trip was required.
However~ the
operators an~lyzed the sit~ation, properly diagnosed the problem,
and implemented corrective action without requiring a manual plant
trip.
In this example,
the wording of the off-normal procedure
- was incomplete and req~ired some interpretation on the part of the
operators.
A conference call was conducted between senior Region III
- management and the plant management to discuss the potential
~afety significance of incompletely worded manual trip setpoints..
The licensee performed procedure reviews to determine if the.*
wording for entry points to emergency and off normal operating
procedures was clear.
Some wording problems were found and
. procedures revised.
d~
(Closed) O~en Item 255/90031-0l(DRP):
Determine if the mechanical
s:top for the spent fuel_ pool inspection elevator should be tested.
e.
.
.
The licensee determined that the mechanical stop was not part of
the*original design specification, nor cduld they determine why or
who installed th~ mechanical
sto~.
To compensate for the safety feature provided by the mechanical
stop, the licerisee installed redundant upper limit electrical
stops;
When these modificationiwere completed, the licensee
concluded that the mechanical stop could be removed but chtise to
lea~e the stop in place as.an additional safely feature.
. The newly installed redundant electrical ~tops are. tested on an
established frequencyr
(Closed) Unresolved Item 255/92020-0l(DRP):
D~termine whether the
Emergency Diesel Generator was inop~rable for a time greater than
allowed by Technical Specifi~ations.
- *
On August 2, 1992, the results of surveillance test M0-7A-l,
"Diesel Generator (DG) 1-1" ide~tified that the f~ll l~ad exhaust.
temperature from-c"ylinder 8R was significantly below the normal
operating temperature by approximately 700 degrees F; and below
'the minimum full 'l()ad operability aoministrative limit by '..
- approximately 300 degrees F.
The licen~~e found that the.fu~l
- .*rack fo,r cylinder 8R was positioned at the "no fuel" or "lock out"-
. position..
This event was*the subject of a Licerisee Event Report that was
evaluatea for e*scalated enforcement by.Region III personnel.- the
Enforceme.nt C_oordinator and.various DRP managers.. This evaluation.
determ*illed that escalated' enforcement i.s inappropr'i ate because.* the
- 1 ength.of* time that the* DG was *i noperab~ e prior. to* di scover-y df* -*
the fuel.rack mispositioning was ind~ter~inate. **After the fuel *
racks had la~t previously been 16cked out to perform co~pression.
testing, the licerisee ran the engirie and demonstrated that th~.
fuel racks were worki~g properly.
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Th~ Licensee Event Re~ort will undergo a closeout review when
corrective and preventive actions have been implemented.
Thi.s
re~iew will determine* ~f rbutine enforc~ment actibri is
appropriate.
No' violations, deviations, unresolved *or inspector followup items were
. identified.
_3.
Plant Operations (71707, 717lb, 42700):
Routine facility operating attivitiei were observed as conducted in the
plant and from the main control room.* Plant maneuvering a*nd steady
power operatjon were observed as applicable.
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- The performarice of reactor operators~ senior reactor operators, and*
auxiliary equi pme.n.t_ OP.era tors was obser.ved and evaluated.
Included in
the review were procedu~e use and adherence, records and logs,
ctimmunicatioris,~ shift/d~ty t~rnover, and th~ degree of professionalism*
of control room activities.
.*
Evaluation, corrective action, and response for off normal conditions
. were ex~mi ne*d. * This i nCl uded compliance to.any reporting requirements.
Observat~ons of the control roo~ monitors, indi~ators, and recorders
were made to verify the operability of emergency systems, radiation
monitoring systems, *and nuclear reactor protection systems.
Reviews of
surveillanc~~*equipment condition, and tagbut logs ~ere conducted.
Pr*oper. return *
.. to service of selected components was verifi~d.
a.
Genera1**
The plant operated at ess~ritially full power exce~t for a brief*
period to investigate an electrocution (paragraph 4, "Plant
El~ctrocution Accident") and to fesolve a main turbine valve
problem (paragraph 5.a, "Maintenance").
b.
Plant Tours
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The charging pump seal tank provides an inventory of
recycled primary water to the pump _packing.
This source of
water corils and lubricates the picking to ext~nd the patking.
- . 1 i fe.. *The primary water is not reqlii red for pump
operability.
- *
(2). *wall anchor bolts supporting two 'lines in the T~~ated and
Filtered Waste Pump Room appeared loosely' attached* to the
- .wall with exposed thread.
The anchor bolts were.not
installed perpendicular to the wall.
The licensee generated a work request to make the necessary
repairs. These lines were non-safety related pipes
supplying low.level radioactive liquid wast~ to the
evaporators.
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(3)
Personnel were observed entering the Auxiliary Building
without re~ding their Radiological Work Permit (RWP) and
without ~hecking with the on~duty radiation safety personnel
(4)
(5).
at the Auxiliary Building actess control point.
The on-duty radiation safety personnel at the Auxil fary
Building access control point stated to the inspector that
personne*l are supposed to read the RWPs daily prior to
.initial entry, but are not required to review the RWP upon
subsequent ~isits throOghout the day.
Licensee management ac~nowledged the obseryation and stated
that although not a specific requirement, it was an *
- expectation that personnel read their RWP or, inquire with
- the on-dut~ radi~tion safety.staff stationed at the
.
Auxiliary.Building access control pofot prior to any entry.
-
.
. There were some Auxiliary Building areas with radiological
survey sheets not readily visible.. For example, the s~rvey
sheet for a posted contaminated/high radiation.are*a,in the**
Volume Redu'ct ion System used for resin fl us hes was not -
located at the immediate entrance *to the room.
It was 'at
- . t~e entranc~ to a larger area showing this and other rooms.
<:The licen.see stated that the posting. should.be more *: ' **
conspicuous and would.add additional* 5urvey ~heets t6
improve the accessibility of this information. *
. Door 401 fo the service building robf was found propped -0pen.
with a stone. *Two signs were affixed to the door.* Th~
first i dent i fi ed the door-as a security door and the second..
- labeled the door as a fire door.
This observation was*
.
- identified to.the~licensee.
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.The licensee;s evaluation *det'ermined that the door.-\\flas *.*...
administratively labeled as a security/fire:~oor and that ho~*
credit was taken for this door.'
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The inspector toured.the roof and determined that no
security.zones were compromised.
This observation.was**
identified to a Region Ill sec~rity speciali~t~ho confirm~d
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that the d.oor w~s no~ a security boundary.
- *
During tour~ of the *t~rbi~e ~uilding, the inspector: noted
that lighting improvements were being made in several* areas
of the turbine building. This was 'discussed with the:~
maintenance superintendent who indicated that he has an
ongoing *program*to improve the lights in the plant.
In most
cases, improvement to the area lighting was made by
upgrading the light bulbs.
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c.
' Control Room Tours
- The* inspec.tor made routine tours of the control room.
During
these tours,* the: insp~ctor observed that manning requirements* were
- always met, that the operators were cognizant of changing plant
conditi6n~, the lCO board -were majntained up~to-date, and the.
operators were performing assigned tasks in accordance with.plant
~rocedures.*. Some of the activities observed we~e:
- *
(1)
Contr~l rod move~ent per SOP 6.*
(2)
(3).
(4)
Plant shutdown to.hot standby per GOP~ 8.
Power:escalatio,ns after synchron.ization per GOP s.*.
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Starting and,loading of:the bies~l Ge~etator pe~*sop i2,
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No violations,.deviations, *u.nresolved~. or,_in.spector f'd:llow4p' items.were.
identified.
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Plant Electrocution Accident
At.. approximately 12:02 p.m. on September,18, an e'iectri,elan from the..
licen~ee's Battle Creek Field Office was fatally.electrocuted while
- .'
- troubleshooting the cause of er~atic readingi frqm lhe turbine generatof
. metering' circuitry. The '.unit was_ at full power at the tim~ of the :
.,
. event.
No safety related equipment and no. turbine generator protecti~i~
relays were affected when the accident occ*ur.red., The event 'did restflt. *.-,
- .' in loss or some redundant generator phase.. current *and pQwer indication.s. '.
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'Th~. victim.arid a co~worke;~~~e tr~uble~hooiing the metering circuii~
,
- which are located in-.the plant D.igital.Electrohydraulic Control (DEH}'..
. co-mputer room.... The vi.ctini~ had properly.con*necJed the..test eq~fpment and.
. :,had.*successfully taken elect_rica]*-readings~on the drcuits.* -The co..,*_;-~
w~rker had turned away to tecord ~ati wh~ri 'he saw twri flashes; * He.
, turned_and saw the victim slump to the floor... The vi~tim was~
disconnecting the test equi p'menL
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Members of the.plant's EMT gtoup were called to the scene to administer
initi~l,CPR.
The Covert Ambulance ~as ~alled tp transport the victim* to
a local hospital where t~e **victim was.'.pro_nounced de.ad at 12:~2 p.m*~
The 4tility con~ened an accident investigation team - headed by ~enior.
Corporate Offitials -
during~the evening of September 18.
The acciden~
area was quarantined until the team completed its initial investigation
on September 1.9.. A power reduct.ion was commenced at 8:00 p.m. on *
-
S~ptember.18. The turbine generator was* removed from s~rvice at 9~52
a.m. on.September 19.
The licensee removed the generator from servi~e *
durin~ the investigation arid troubleshooting activities to ensure,
personnel-safety. lhe reactor-remained' ctitical throughout thi.s event.
Plant personnel found no signifi.cant damage to any plant equipment.
Minor* repairs were completed and the turbine-generator was re-started
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the morning of September 20. The licensee's investigation determined
that jumpers were not properly installed prior to removal of the meter.
This led to open Circuiting of the current t ran*s farmer and the victim
becoming the path to ground.. The licensee investigation.has been sent
to Region III for review.
The* Michigan department of the Occ*upational *safety and Health
Administtation (MIOSHA) investigation of the accident had not been
completed at the conclusion of thi~ inspection period.
- No violations, deviations, ~~resolved, or irispector followup items were
- identified.*
5.
Maintenance (62703, 42700)
Maintenance activities in.the plant were routinely inspected, including
both corrective maintenance (repairs) and. preventive maintenance.
Mechanical, electrical, and instrument and control group maintenance
activities were included as.available.
-
The focu.s of the inspection was to assure the maintenance activities :
- reviewed we.re conducted in accordance with appr'oved procedures, * *. *.
regulatory' guides and industry codes or standards, and in conformance..
with Technical Specifi~ation~~ The followihg items were considered *.
during this review: the Li~iting Conditions fo~ Operation were met 'htle *
- c9mponents or systems ~ere removed from servite;: approvals were obt~~ned
prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using
. approved pr.ocedures; and post maintenance te~t i ng was performed as
applicable.
The following work order (WO). activities were i'nspe.cted:
WO 24204564, 242044568, 24264569~ 2420~439, 24204577, 24264566;:
""Trouble shooting ~nd* repair of ~u~bine-~enerator-El~ctroh~draulic
Control (EHC) problems.".
The licensee.experienced problems with the EHC system during
startup testing following the electri.cal accident describe*d in**
paragraph 4, "Plant Electrocution Accident," During main tu~bine
trip testing, si~ of the sixteen. valves that supply steam to the
low pressure turbine failed to close promptly (within one second)
upon receipt ~fa t~ip signal. Closure times ranged from about 15
to*90 seconds.
The valves ar~ required to close quickly following
a plant trip to p~event a turbine overspeed condition..
Apparently, the EHC fluid was not being drained quickly enou~h
causing fluid pressure to remain high longer than required.
Troubleshooting throughout the week beginning September 20 failed
to identify a specific component causing the'problem.
The licensee performed extensive troubleshooting to find a cause
and make repairs. Several corrective actions were implemented to
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improve overall EHC system performance and reliability.. These
included:
(1)
Installation of three new EHC solenoid dump valves;
(2)
Addition of a separate EHC drain line back to t~e EHC sump;
(~)
Installatidn cif*new orifice pl~tes with larger bore holes on_
the reheat and intercept valves;
(4)
Operation of the EHC ~ystem at a higher temperature to
improve fluid viscosity; and
(5)
Renovation_of one reheat/intercept valve accumulator.
b.
Steam leaks *in the running vents for reheaters E-6A ~nd E-68.
The
WOs. listed below were reviewed.
(1)
WO 24103068 Repair a st~am.leak in the Running Vent Header
for High Pressure Water Heater E-68
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. ( 2)
WO 24204373 Temporary Repair.of the Running Vent Header for.
High Pres~ure Water Heater E~68
{3) *
WO 24204388 Repair ~ steam leak in th~ Run~ing Vent Header
. for High Pressure w,ter.Heater E-68
(4)
WO 24103059 Rep~ir a steam leak in the Runnt~g Vent.Header
- for High Pressure Water.Heater E-6A _
(5)
WO 24202488 Temporary repair of the Running Vent *Header for
.High P_ressure Water Heater E-6A
(6)-
WO 24202511 Repair a steam. leak **in the Running Vent.Header
for Hig~ Pressure Water Heater E-6A
Currently, the three inch running vents for both of the E-6
r~heaters have through wall steam leaks at the elbows wh~re the
exhau~t lines enter the vents.
E-6A started leaking.approximately
1 month and E-68 started leaking appr6ximately 4 months after
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returning the unit to service from the last refueling outage.
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The temporary repairs (WO's 24204373 and 24202488) consisted of an
enclosure which was injected with liquid sealant. This type of
temporary repair was authorized because the lines are non ASME
code class lines.
The permanent repairs (WO's 24204388 and
24202511) are.scheduled for the hext refueling outage
A review of the High Pressure Water Heater's WO history (WO's* -
24103068 and 24103059) revealed that the turrent leaks are in
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piping that was replaced during the last r~fueling outage.
For
. E_-6B the piping replacement included a design change to replace
carbon steel piping with stainless steel piping.
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The reason for the accelerated steam erosion of the running vent
is not know at this tim~. This is conside~ed an inspector *
followup itim to evaluate.the licensee's determination of the
cause and corrective.action (Followup Item 255/920210-0l(DRP)).
One inspector followup item ~nd no violations, deviations, or unresolved
items were identified.
6.
S~rveillan~e (61726, -~2700)
The inspector reviewed Technical Specifications req~ir~d su~veillan~e
- testing as described below and verified that testing w~s performed in
- accordance with adequate proced~res. Additionally, test in~trumentation,
was* calibrated, Limiting Conditions for Operation wer*e met, removal and *
restoration of the affected components were properlY atco~plished, *and
test results conformed with Technical *specifications and protedure
.*
requirements.
The results were reviewed by per~onnel *other than the
individual directing the test and deficiencies identified duting the
testing were properly reviewed and res.olved by appropriate management
personnel.
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The following activities were inspected:
a. '
.LLRT - LOCAL LEA.K RATE *TESTS FOR INNER AND OUTER PERSONNEL AIR
LOCK DOOR SEALS (DW0-13)~
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The inspector reviewed performance of the-above Technical
_Specification surveillance procedure *following one of the
- 1 icensee' s weekly containment.e.ntries.
The measµred.leak: *rate was: *
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'*:within allowable lirnits.. * Th_e -lea*k *rate for 'the~ _inner,_-~nd ()_~ter,
.. *.:.. door seals was wen below the acceptance criteri'~. of. 2500 cc/min'.*
_by approximately 2100 cc/min.
The in~pettor verified that a pressure test of the test rig was.
satisfactorily completed, the'test equipment was calibrated, a*
prejob briefing w~s conducted, ~ha data were properly recorded, *
- the calculations were correct, ~nd the *irlock*was p~operly
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returne~ to ~~r~ioe~:
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b.
AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM PUMP~ INSERVICE TEST-PROCEDURE (M0~38).
The inspector reviewed thi~ Technical Specification (TS)
surveillance test to verify operability of the *Auxili-ary Feedwater
- . System (AFW).
Both motor driven pumps ahd the steam driven _pum'p
- were tested satisfactorily. Proper operation of the AFW flow
isolation valvei was verified. All test instrumentation was
calibrated.
The. data were neatly recorded an~ ~ystem testoratioh
. was properly performed.
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INSERVICE TEST PROCEDURE - HIGH PRESSURE AND SA~ETY INJECTION
(HPSI). PUMPS AND ENGINEERING SAFETY, SYSTEM (ESS) CHECK VALVE*.
d.
e.
f.
OPERABILITY TEST (Q0;,.19)'
.
The inspe~tor reviewe~ this TS surveillance test performed on both
~PSI Pumps and their ESS ~heck valves and found it was co~pleted
- satisf~ctorily.
- *
The test method consisted of* operating each ~ump using the mini
flow recirculation line as the flowpath.
During this time, the
following data were taken: flow rate, stiction and discharge
pre*ssure, Safety Injection and Refueling Water (SIRW) Tank level;
.bearing oil. level, vibration, and Component Cooling Water flow
rate. These valUes were then compared to reference values to
determine operability of the HPSI pumps.
A]l values were within
- the Accept,ble Range per ASME.
.
.
.
In additi6n, part stroke testing of the Hot Leg Injection and HPSI
pump discharge check valves was performed.by changing the valve
lineup to momentarily establish* flow to* the Primary System Drain
Tank.
A positive flow.rate through the c~eck yalves was observ~d,
thus satisfying '~he acceptance crj teri a.-
~he irispe~tor noted a typograRhical error i~ the d~sign basis *
document for this'test. *The document referr~d to the formula for
dynamic suction pressure as the formula for the static suction
pressure calculat_1on. * The. inspector verified thi~ error. with the
system engin~er who.stated it*w~uld, ~e ccirrected.
CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY -VENTILATION (M0-33)
FUEL OIL TRANSFER PUMPS (M0-7C)*
Fi RE. WATER, PUMPS_"P-9A?- P-gB* AND P-41 (M0.-78)..
No violations, ~eviations; unresolved, or inspector followup items we~e
identified.
7.
Security'.(11707)
On October 2, 1992, the.licensee reported that random fitne~s for duty
testing had identified an individual.with~ positive test for*marijuana.
The inspecto~ verified that the individual's protected area access was
revoked for 14 days and that the individual entered.the license~'s
- employee assistance program.
The inspector verified by interviews with
plant superv~sors, ~ho had di~ect contact with the:individuali that the
individual did not appear.to be under the influence while working
onsite. This information was provided to Region III managers.
Additional NRC questions.will be addressed by separate correspondence.
11.
.
'
8.
No v1olations, de~iations, unresolved, or inspector followup items were
identified at this time.
The positive test result may be the subject of
subsequent enforcement action.
Inspector Followup
Inspector Followup Items are matters which have bee~ discussed with the
- licensee and will be reviewed further by the inspector. Thes~ inv.olve
some action on the part of the NRC or licensee or both.
An Inspector
Fo11owup disclosed during the :inspection is discussed in Paragraph 5.b.
9.
Persons Contacted
- Consumers Power Company
- G. B. Slade, Plant General Manager
- T. J. Palmi~ano, Plant Operations Manager
~P. M. Donnelly, Safety & Licensing Director
- K. M.
Haas~ Radiologi~al Services Manager *
- J. l. H~nson, Operations Superintendent
- *R. B.
Kaspe~, Maintenance Manager
- K. E.
Osborn~~ System Engineering ~anager*
D. J.. Malone,* Radiological Servi~e *superintendent
C.
s~ Kozup, 1echnical Engirieer
.
D. G.. *Malone, Operatio~s: Staff Supp6rt Supervisor
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
B. L. Jorgensen, *ch*i ef; *Reactor Projects Section 2A
- J; K.* Heller, Senio~ Resident Inspector.
~p. G. Passehl, Resident*Inspector *
' '.
- Denotes soJTie of those present at 'the Mariagenient Interview on.
. - Odober, 5~~ 1.992. * _. '
- --*..
-.
.. ~-.
Other members* of* the pl ant staff, and sever a 1 members of the contract
security force, were alio contacted.duri~g the in~pection period.
. .
. ~* '
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