IR 05000254/1992028
| ML20128D309 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Quad Cities  |
| Issue date: | 01/27/1993 |
| From: | Hiland P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20128D258 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-254-92-28, 50-265-92-28, NUDOCS 9302100109 | |
| Download: ML20128D309 (14) | |
Text
..
._
_. _. _.. _ _.. -
~. _._ _ _ _ -.. _... _. _.. _. _ _. _. _ _ _
. _. _
-
'
.
,
,
~
~
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION-
,
REGION III
.
_
!
Reports No. 50-254/92028(DRP); 50-265/.92028(DRP)
Docket Nos. 50-254; 50-265 License Nos. DPR-29; DPR-30 L Icensee.:
Commonwealth EdisonL Company o
'
. Executive Towers West.III-
'
.
.
!
1400 Opus Place Suite 300
-
Downers Grove, IL 60515 7:
Facility Name: Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units I and 2-Inspection At: Quad Cities Site, Cordova,-Illinois-Inspection _ Conducted:
November 23 through 25, 1992,- and November 27, 1992,
,
through January 11, 1993
Inspectors:
T.:E. Taylor J. M. Shine-
,
P. F. Prescott-V. P. Lougheed-G. M. Hausman.
Approved By:
[ M cr V b _ /n
_ _ //z 7/W Patrick L. Hiland, Chief v Date-/
<
-Reactor Projects-Section IB inspection-Summary
.Ipsoection from November 23_throuah 25. 1992. and-from November 27.1992.
L throuah January 11: 1993 (Recort No. SS-254/205-92028(DRP) -
-
'
L Areas Inspected:
This w'as a routine, unannounced safety inspection by l:
resident and regional' inspectors of; licensee action on previously identified items; lice.'see event report review; regional request; operational safety l
'
.
verification;--monthly maintenance observation; monthly surveillance
- bservation; refueling activities;: training _ effectiveness; report review; and
^
o events.
.
-
Results: 'In the' areas inspected, two_ cited = violations were identified.1 The--
,
first violation concerned a: lack of corrective actinns-for the 1/2 diesel
,
l generator (paragraph 2.a),-and the second concerned ~an unauthorized-installation'of a-temporary alteration -(paragraph 6.) A nonLcited violat' ion was discussed.in paragraph:3.g, and an inspector concern regarding licensee
.
L control of balance-of-plant activities was addressed in paragraph 5.
.
9302100109 930129
,
.. -....=.a.a. -.. -. -a..; I
.
,.,..
.a.-.
a.-
...~.---.a-.=-.-.-
a
_ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ - _ - _ - _ _ - _ _
-
.
LXECUTIVEJVMMARY Plant Operation Operations performance remains steady. Operator respcnse_to the Unit 2 scram and erroneous decreasing vessel level events were very good.
linintenAnce and Survellkrig.g Maintenance and surveillance activities were performed in an acceptable manner with one exception.- During a calibration activity ar, instrument mechanic installed a temporary alteration without authorized instructions.
This resulted in operator action to prevent the feedwater system responding to
.
erroneous reactor vessel level signals.
Enaineerina and Technical Sur;Dort One violation was _ identified concerning a failure to address corrective actions relating to a proposed modification for the % diesel generator.
Daily support of operations activities is improving.
Safety Assessment and Ouajity_y_erificatica Management control over resolution of identified problems was considered poor
.in the case of the % diesel generator proposed modification.
J t
_ _ _
_ _ _ - _ _ _ _
_ - -.
.
.
EEI8lll 1.
Persons Contacted
Commonwealth Edison Comoany (CECO)
- R. Pleniewicz, Site Vice Prosident
- R. L. Bax, Station Manager
- G. C. Tiet2., Executive Assistant
- H. Hentschel, Operations Manager
- B. Strub, Assistant Superintendent - Operations
- D. Craddick, Assistant Superintendent - Maintenance B. McGaffigan, Assistant Superintendent - Work Planning
- B. Moravec, Engineering and Nuclear Constructinn Site Manager D. Gibson, Master Mechanic G. Klone, Operating Engineer - Unit 1
,
J. Kopacz, Operating Engineer - Unit 2
- A. Misak, Regulatory Assurance Supervisor R. Walsh, Technical Staff Supervisor J. Burkhead, Quality Verification Program Supervisor K. Leech, Security Administrator J. Hoeller, Training Supervisor
- D. Kanakares, NRC Coordinator Regulatory Assurance D. Bucknell, Assistant Technical Staff Supervisor J. Masterlark, Fire Protection System Engineer K. Short, EQ Coordinator H. Smith, Fire Marshall
- Denotes those attending the exit interview on January 11, 1993.
The inspectors also talked with and interviewed other licensee empicyees, including members of ths technical and engineering staffs; reactor and equipment operators; shift engineers and foremen; maintenance personnel; and contract security personnel.
2.
Licensee Action on Previously Identified Items (92701. 92702)
a.
(Closed) Violation 254/8801i-10AfDRS): 265/88012-10A(DR$1:
Failure to adequately identify and take prompt corrective action concerning the % emergency diesel generator (EDG) logic problem as described in LER 86-032. The licensee considered the problem to be an isolated event that was unlikely to recur. As an interim measure, station procedures were revised and a modification was to
,
be developed that would eliminate the problem.
The inspectors reviewed the actions to correct this problem, including those described in the-licensee's response letter dated October 17, 1988.- The licensee had not implemented modification requests MR4-1(2)-88-04 and MR4-0-88-013, which were referenced in the response letter, due to higher priority work. During this inspection the licensee identifieu three options to correct the
.
-
_ -.
.-
.
.
j
,
EDG logic problem:
1) provide an improved " loss of excitation" relay; 2) change the EDG logic to bypass the " loss of excitation" relay; 3) change the EDG logic to add a time delay to the " loss of excitation" relay. The licensee stated that a formal pro?osal would be submitted for station approval and funding by fearuary
.
'
1993. The inspectors concluded that the current station
procedures and proposals were acceptable and considered this item closed.
Based upon the licensee's response to the violation, the long term corrective action was to develop a modification to resolve the issue. The excessive delay in implementing this
corrective action is a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B
'
Criteria XVI (254/265-92028-0)(DRP). The inspectors were
.
concerned that-the licensee did not provide sufficient attention
'
to ensure, prompt resolution of the previous violation.
'
b.
(Closed) Violation 265/89023-01(DRS):
Nine examples concerning the control of transient combustible material. The licensee's
response letter dated December 21, 1989, concurred with the
<
inspection finding and stated that corrective actions had been completed. The inspectors reviewed procedures QAp 1700-1, QAP 1700-5, and other applicable documentation, which indicateo thi,t the licensee had taken adequate corrective actions to identify and control transient combustible materials used in the plant.
The licensee had provided appropriate training for personnel, provided
'
for the use of additional fire protection tours when required, and completed development and implementation of a computerized transient combustible materials tracking system. The inspectors reviewed transient fire load permits and compared them with existing plant conditions; no discrepancies were identified.
The-inspectors concluded that the licensee's actions were acceptable and had no further concerns. This item is closed.
c.
(Closed) Ooen Item 254/265-89023-02(DRS-):
Length of time four control room fire detectors remained out-of-service (00S).
Although the four detectors were 00S, sufficient additional detectors were in service within the respective fire zones and were available to meet minimum NRC requirements. The inspectors conducted a review of the plant's fire detection zones, which indicated that the minimum detectors required to be operable were within the established requirements. The iicensee stated that the delay in detector repair was due to a billing misunderstanding and a spare part replacement vendor change. As a result, sufficient numbers of spare parts were not available to perform repairs.
An approved vendor for replacement parts was identified and the'four detectors were replaced. The licensee stated that this problem should not recur due to " minimum / maximum" spare parts-stocking requirements. The inspectors. concluded that the actions taken by the licensee were acceptable and the inspectors had no further concerns.
This item is closed.
-
-
. -
.
- _ _ _ _ _
._ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _
.
.
d.
.(. Closed) Violation __254/90022-01: 265/90021-01: Missed technical specification (TS) surveillances.
The licensee revised surveillance procedures to-ensure that the surveillances discussed in the violation would be corrected. Additionally, the licensee reviewed the overall surveillance program and. implemented several changes including an increased emphasis on performing surveillances before they were due and a daily review of surveillances approaching their critical date.
The inspector reviewed the rev.ised procedures and the program changas, and discussed program 1mplementation with the general surveillance coordinator.
The inspector noted that no TS surveillances-had missed their critical date 'in the past year.
This is considered closed based on licensee subsequent performance in this area and corrective actions taken.
e.
LQosed) Violation 265/90021-02:
Corrective actions to a previous violation were not effective. :The violation concerned a maintenance electrician who lifted leads at a terminal box as part of a maintenance activity. -The lifted leads were not documented in the work package,- and the crew completing the maintenance was not aware of the lifted leads and did not reterminate them.
In response to the violation, the licensee issued a new procedure outlining the steps requ' red tc lift and land leads,- and prepared a log sheet to be included in the work packages.
Personnel were trained on the procedure and use of the log, as well as on the importance of properly describing the work performed. The inspectors reviewed twelve electrical work packages involving lifting and landing leads.
In all cases, the work traveller properly referenced the new procedure, the lifted and landed leads were properly logged, and the description of work-completed was adequate.
Based on this sample, the inspectors considered the corrective actions to be adequate. This item is closed, f.
(Closed) Violation 265/90024-01:
Inadequate management oversight of turbine torsional test. This item dealt with a reactor scram initiated by an intermediate range monitor 14 and 16 high neutron flux condition which occurred.on October 27, 1990.
The initial approach and resolution of the causal factors for this violati;n were considered narrow in scope and were contributing factors to the January 24, 1991, reactor vessel inventory loss event (Inspection Report (IR) 254/91006). Closure of this-violation indicated that specific corrective actions were adequate.
However, actions to prevent recurrence will continue to be tracked under item numbers 254/91006-01 and 254/91006-02..This-item is considered closed.
g.
(Closed) Violation 265/91010-01:
Failure to start a_ reactor feed pump in accordance with 00A 201-8. The licensee discussed the event with all operating crews and revised procedures-M clarify necessary conditions prior to establishing a reactor mldown.
The licensee also repaired the feedwater regulating valve, as the valve's response contributed to the event..The inspectors
_.
..
.
.
....
..
a
___________ _, _ _ __ _ ______ _ _ __ _
______ _
.
.
reviewed these corrective actions and operator response to subsequent events and considered them adequate. Additionally, following implementation of corrective actions to this, and other violations in the 1990-1991 time frame, no further operational problems have been caused by operator failure to follow procedures or by shift control room engineer failure to adequately supervise and conrdinate control room activities. This item is closed,
h.
(Closed) Unresolved Item 265/91010-02:
Insufficient post-mainterance testing of the B feedwater regulating valve. The original concern was with the lack of a stroke test following maintenance on the feedwater regulating valve.
Upon further review, the inspectors could not identify any requirement for a stroke test to be performed, nor were any other problems identified with inadequate post-maintenance testing.
Therefore, this is considered an isolated occurrence, and the item is closed.
i.
(Closed) Violation 214B_l017-01:
Failure to implement adequate corrective action. The violation concerned failure to provide instrument check acceptance criteria for TS surveillances.
The licensee revised the appropriate procedure to provide specific acceptance criteria for each instrument check and to more clearly indicate that it was a TS surveillance. The inspectors reviewed the revised procedure and found it acceptable. Additionally, the inspectors noted that no problems with TS surveillances were identified within the last year. This item is closad.
j.
(Closed) Violation 254/91017_Q2. 265/91013-0R:
Inaiequate as-found testing of secondary containment. The licensee n /ised the secondary containment testing procedure to provise instructions on how to perform walkdowns in the as-found condition. The inspectors reviewed the revised procedure and found it acceptable to resolve the original concern. ~ This item is closed, k.
(Clos'd) Violation 254/91017-03: 265/91013-03:
Failure to perform safety evaluations in accordance with plant procedures.
The licensee implemented a number of corrective actions for this violation, including procedure revisions, training of all personnel performing safety evaluations, and an on-going quality verification (QV) audit of safety evaluations..The inspectors reviewed the latest QV audit findings; which identified continuing deficiencies with safety evaluation screenings and safety evaluations. The inspectors also reviewed a number of recently completed safety evaluations. associated with temporary alterations. The specific corrective actions to this violation were acceptably completed. This violation is closed.
-1.
(Closed) Unresolved item 254/91017-04:. Standby gas treatment system (SBGT) heater circuitry concern. This-item was encor passed by the loss of instrument air concern discussed in IR 254/265-92025, paragraph 2.a.(1).
To avoid duplicate tracking, this item
,
l
- _ - - _ - _ - _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _.
. _ _ _ _ _ _ -
- - _ - -
___-_---_-_.__N
._.
_
.
-
_. _ _
_
.
-
l
-
.
!
is closed and the concern will be tracked under Unresolved item
'
254/265-92025-02.
m.
LG]osed) Unresolved item 214/91020-02: 265/91016-22:
i Reclassification of certain emergency core cooling system room (
coolers. This item was addressed during the service water
!
inspection, documented in IR 254/265-92201. To avoid duplicate tracking, this item will be closed and the concern tracked under i
'
'
Unresolved Item 254/265-92201-01.
i n.
(Closed) Unresolved Item 26J/92008-01:
Low bottom head l
temperature.
This ita was the subject of a violation (265/920ll-Olb) di rjssed in IR 254/265-92011, paragraph 10.d.
Corrective actions will be evaluated during review of that violation.
This item is closed, i
o.
L02qc) UnreJglved llem 254/265-92201-04:
Environmental qualification (EQ) of the fluw reversing valves on the residual-heat removal (RHR) heat exchanger.
The inspectors were concerned that the valves, which were not environmentally qualified, could fail in an-intermediate position and render the RHR heat exchanger inoperable while mitigating an accident.. The licensee revised operating procedures, which removed the possibility of operating the valves during accident conditions. The licensee stated that the valves would be-evaluated for inclusion in the EQ program.
In l
a letter to the NRC dated November 13, 1992 the licensee requested t.n extension until May 29, 1993, _ to complete the evaluation'and documentation process.
This item remains unresolved pending completion of the licensee's inspection and evaluation of resuits and final NRC review.
!
l One violation _was identified.
-
(
-
L 3.
LL gnpag_fvent Rgoort (LER) Review (.93700)
n Through' direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and-I review of-records, the following event-reports were reviewed to verify l
reportability requirements'were fulfilled, immediate corrective action j
was.accomplishad, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been,
- or will be, accomplished in accordance with TS requirements:
c i
In addition, the inspectors reviewed the licensee's-deviation reports
!
(DVRs)-generated during the inspection period.
This was done in an effort to monitor the conditions related to plant or personnel performance, or-potential trend development. ~ DVRs were also reviewed for proper initiation and disposition as required by the applicable.
procedures and the QA manual.
i i
7-
!
P
-
--w-t i+
y
+
.-
.%m
..,w-p 3-
-
.-
o e.
..
_ -.
-
...
..
-..
-
-.
-
-
.
a.
.(Closedl LER 254/900ll-LL:
% diesel fire pump out of service longer than seven days to install new suction line. The inspectors reviewed the-licensee's compensatory actions and found them adequate.
This item is closed.
b.
(Closed) LER 254/90012-LL:
"B" control room heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) failed to attain required temperature differential, believed to be due to heater problem. The heater was repaired and the HVAC system was returned to operation. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's corrective actions and found them adequate.
This item is closed.
c.
(Closedl LER 254/90026-ll:
Control room vent isolation due to toxic gas concentration high.
The inspectors reviewed the
,
licensee's completed investigation and found it adequate.
Additionally, the licenseo received a TS revision removing the toxic gas analyzer from the TS.
This item is closed.
d.
LClosed) LER 254/90032-LL:
Fire diesel inoperable for more than seven days. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's compensatory actions and found them acceptable. This item is closed.
e.
(Closed) LER 254/91014-LL:
Standby gas treatment (SBGT) system heater logic circuitry missing due to tn inadequate review of original safety analysis report. This LER documents the same concern discussed in Unresolved Item 254/91017-04 (discussed in paragraph 2.1 of this report.)- This item is closed.
f.
(Closed) LER 254/91019-LL:
Control room-HVAC inoperable due to low delta-temperature and high delta-aressure. The licensee's
_
'
corrective actions were found accepta110.
This item is closed.
g.
JClosed) LER 254/91020-LL: Missed-TS surve'llance. The inspectors reviewed the reasons for th) missed surveillance-against the corrective actions for previous violations on missed-TS surveillances and found that this was an isolated occurrence, identified by the licensee, not reflective of the licensee's i
surveillance program, and categorized at Severity Level IV.
The corrective actions were adequate to prevent recurrence, as shown by no TS surveillances being missed during the last year.- The missed surveillance was in violation of the requirements of TS section 4.8.A.5; however, no Notice of Violation will be issued because the criteria of 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C, paragraph VII.B.2 were met. This item is closed.
h.
(Closedl LfR 254/91022-Ll:
"B" train control room HVAC inoperable. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's completed investigation and found it-adequate.- This item is closed.
o
-
, -,
.,,w aw.w-wg--
_
_. _.
_
._
_
_
.
.
i.
IClosed) LF1 254/91027-Ll: Unit shutdown due to water impingement i
on electrical bus 14-1.
The LER was revised to change a commitment date which had no effect on the adequacy of t%
licensee's corrective actions. This item is closed.
J.
LQlgsed) LER 254/02028-LL:
SBGT design deficiency due to: reliance on instrument air. On October 16, 1992, the licensee determined
,
that general design criteria 19 control room dose limits would be exceeded during the postulated design basis accident with a loss
-
of instrument air. - The licensee's immediate corrective action was to revise control room HVAC initiation )rocedures and to place the
.
control switches for both circuits in tie prisary ande.
The J
inspectors reviewed the licensee's compensatory measures and i
proposed corrective actions, which appeared adequate. This event l
was discussed in greater detail in IR 254/265-92025, paragraph 2.a.(1).
This item is closed.
l k.
1 Closed) LER 265/91007-Ll:
Reactor low water level scram. The Qinspectors reviewed the revised LER and determined that it did not
.,
affect the conclusions discussed in paragraph 2.e, or closure of the original LER in IR 254/91017; 265/91013.
This item is-closed.
1.
LQ1osed) LER 265/91009-LL: Failure of the core spray room drain check valves. The inspectors reviewed the LER'and determined that-the discussion in IR 254/266-92016, paragraph 3, adequately addressed the event.
This item is closed.
!
One non-cited violation was identified.
4.
Reaional Reauest (92701)
i a.
The inspectors completed an Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
survey regarding the possibility of contamination of suppression pool water supply to emergency core cooling systems from piping insulation materials. The information supplied by the licensee was verified for accuracy and completeness, and was determined to
,
be adequate. The licensee was aware of the concern and has modified the majority of the Unit I containment piping insulation i
to address the concern. Modification of the Unit 2 insulation was
'
being planned and is in progress.
The inspectors have no further
l questions at this time.
'
b.
Tne inspectors received a regional request to determine when Quad >
j
.
.
Cities would no longer have full core off-load capability. The-
'
inspectors determined that the licensee would no longer be capable'
of performing a full core off-load capability (assuming no fuel is i
moved between pools) by November of 1998.
This date included
'
installation of four more high density fuel racks in the Unit I l
'
'
spent fuel pool.
The Unit -2-spent luel pool has already been
.
- - -
_ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ -
- _ _ _.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _.
__
-
.
I modified.
Licensee corporate engineering was evaluating alternate mathods of fuel storage, with the most economical means of storage appearing to be onsite dry cask storage.
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Operational Sqf tty Verification (71707)
During the inspiction period, the inspectors verified that the facility was being operated in conformance with the licenses and regulatory requirements and that the licensee's management control system was effectively carrying out its responsibilities for safe operation. This was done on a sampling basis through routine direct observation of activities and equipment, interviews and discussions with licensee personnel, independent verification of safety system status, and review of facility records.
On a sampling basis the inspectors daily verified the following:
adequate control room staffing and coordination of plant activities with ongoing control room operations; operator adherence with approved procedures; operation as required by TS; adequate monitoring of control room instrumentation for abnormalities; that onsite and offsite power was available; plant and control room visits were made by station managers; and safety parameter display system operation.
During tours of accessible areas of the plant, the inspectors made note of general plant and equipment conditions, including control of activities in progress (maintenance / surveillance), observation of shift turnovers, general safety items, etc.
The specific areas observed were:
a.
Observations On December 13, 1992, a shift foreman, making a plant tour prior to shift turnover, noticed a new hose attached to the temporary domestic water supply to the 1A instrument air compressor.
The hose was routed to a decontamination pad, but was not in use. Use of the hose could have impacted the adequacy of the cooling water supply to the 1A instrument air compressor, causing a trip of the compressor on high temperature. This would be an unnecessary challenge to operations to maintain stable operating conditions.
A similar concern regarding the loss of the same temporary cooling water supply was discussed in IR 254/265-92016, paragraph 10, and was made an open item (254/92016-03(DRP)). This further occurrence will also be tracked under that open item number.
These two occurrences of poor activity control on a balance-of-plant system which could challenge plant operations vere of concern to the inspectors.
l I
___
_
.
__
.
.
.
.
.
.
"
b, Enaineered Safety Features (ESF) Systems Accessible portions of ESF systems and components were inspected
,
to verify: valve position for proper flow path; proper alignment of power supply breakers or fuses for proper actuation on an initiating signal; proper power supply to components required by TS or the final SAR; and the operability of support systems essential to system actuation or performance through observation of instrumentation and/or proper valve alignment.
The inspectors also visually inspected components for leakage, and proper lubrication and cooling water supply.
The inspectors' review did not identify any discrepancies.
c.
Radiation Protection Conty,gli The inspectors verified that workers were adhering to health physics procedures for dosimetry, protective clothing, frisking, and posting, and randomly examined radiation protection instrumentation for tee, operability, and calibration.
No problems concerning radiation. protection practices were identified.
d.
SacuritY The inspectors, by sampling, verified that persons in the protected area (PA) displayed proper badges and had escorts if required; vital areas were kept locked and alarmed, or guards posted if required; and personnel and packages entering the PA received proper search and/or monitoring.
e.
Housekeepino and P1 ant Cleanliness The inspectors monitored the status of housekeeping and plant cleanliness for fire protection and protection of safety related equipment from intrusion of foreign matter.
Recent housekeeping tours and resident inspector plant tours have identified a decline in plant housekeeping. The licensee is aware of this decline and
!
is assessing improvement needs.
The inspectors also monitored various records, such as tagouts, jumpers, shift logs and surveillances, daily orders, maintenance items, various chemistry and radiological sampling and analyses, third party review results, overtime records, quality assurance and/or quality control audit results, and postings required per 10 CFR 19.11.
No vic'ations or deviations were identified.
6.
Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)
Station maintenance activities were observed and/or reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved
,
-
-
-
_
..
-
_.
.
-
-
- -.
..
.-
.
.
,
procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards, and in
-
conformance with TS.
The following items were considered during this review:
the limiting
.
conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from and restored to service; approvals were obtained prior.to initiating the work; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; and proper radiological and fire prevention controls were implemented.
The following specific maintenance activities were observed and reviewed:
Unit 0 Q00939 Installation of 250VDC Battery System for Emergency Bearing Oil Pump (EBOP)
,
Unit 1 Q02880 Install TBCCW Lines to Instrument Air Compressors Q00980 Unit 1 Reactor Vessel Transmitter (LT1-646A) A Channel Calibration Unit 2 Q72748 2B Condensate Pump Motor Changeout Observations On December 14, 1992, during preparations for reactor vessel transmitter calibration performed under Work Request Q00980, an instrument mechanic (IM) performed an unauthorized activity. The IM assigned to perform the transmitter calibration, identified to the job foreman that a tygon tube, used for vessel indication during unit shutdowns, was still connected to the transmitter. The IM foreman contacted the operations department, to notify them of the problem. The operations shift foreman responded to remove the tygon, which was a temporary alteration, and, af ter the tygon was removed, to double verify the removal.
The job foreman relayed this information to the IM performing-the work. After completing the transmitter calibration, the IM reconnected the-tygon
' tubing, intending to notify the foreman of the-need to permanently remove the tubing. The reinstallation was performed even though the IM had no instructions or authorization to do so. The IM subsequently was assigned another job. Neither the IM foreman nor the operations shift engineer were informed that the tygon tubing had been reattached. Based on the double verification of-temporary alteration's removal, the operations department assumed the temporary alteration was disconnected, following reinstallation of the tygon tubing, the selected reactor vessel level indication (channel A) indicated a decreasing' level.
The feedwater system responded correctly to the erroneous indication, and began increasing feedwater flow.
The unit nuclear station operator noted the increasing feedwater flow and decreasing _ level, recognized 'it
L-
_
-
_
- - - _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _
_- _-
.
.
as a possible instrument error due to training on the simulator, and switched control to the B channel, which indicated normal level. The feedwater system promptly returned to normal. Operator response was considered prompt and appropriate.
Following the event, the tygon tubing was permanently removed, the temporary alteration and the specific work request were properly closed out.
,
.TA s Inspector evaluation of the event identified the -le unauthorized installation of the tygon tubing and failure to communicate the activity to operations or IM supervision as the root cause of the event. The operations shift engineer reliance on a non-supervisory person to ensure the temporary alteration was permanently removed and documented, and the IM foreman's failure to follow up on activities accomplished during the transmitter calibration were considered contributing causes to the event.
The unauthorized installation of the tygon tubing without authorized instructions is considered a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V (254/92028-02(DRP)).
One violation was identified.
7.
Monthly Surveillance Observation (6172fd The inspectors observed surveillance testing required by TS during the inspection period and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that test instrumentation was calibrated; that results conformed with TS and procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test; and that deficiencies identified during the testing were properly resolved by the appropriate personnel.
The inspectors witnessed portions of the following test activities:
Unit 0 QOS 6600-1 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Monthly Load Test Unit 1 QCOS 1300-5 Quarterly RCIC Pump Operability Test QCOS 201-8 Vessel Hydro QCOD 1000-5 Shutdown Cooling Startup and Operation QCTS 500-1 Integrated Primary Containment Leak Rate Test (IPCLRT)
Q0S 6500-3 4 Kv Bus 14-1 Undervoltage Functional Test QTS 110-1 Emergency Core Cooling System Simulated Automatic Actuation and Diesel Generator Auto-Start QCOS 1300-7 RCIC Manual Initiation Test Control Rod Drive Friction Testing Unit 2 QCTS 920-12 Reactivity Anomaly Test QCOS 700-7 Weekly Power Operation APRM Function Test QOS 6600-1 EDG Monthly Load Test
1
_ _ _ _ _ _
l
.
.
.
"A" RHR Heat Exchanger Special Test to Help Determine Fouling Mechanism Surveillances were performed as required.
Operations and technical staff personnel performed the surveillances in a competent manner.
No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Befuelina Activities (60710)
During the inspection period, the Unit I refueling outage was ct yleted.
The unit was synchronized to the grid on December 16, 1992. The outage schedule was well planned and executed, and was considered a marked performance improvement over previous outages.
Additionally, outage performance reflected a decrease in personnel errors and engineered safety feature actuations over previous outages.
A summary of major activities completed during the outage included:
a.
Permanent repair of vessel shroud access hole ccvers.
b.
Installation of main transformer backfeed capability.
c.
Completion of TMI inadequate core cooling instrumentation.
d.
Preventive maintenance for a majority of the major electrical buses.
No violations or deviations were noted.
9.
Trainina Effectiveness (41400. 41701)
The effectiveness of training programs for licensed and non-licensed personnel was evaluated by the inspectors, by witnessing performance of surveillance, maintenance, and operational activities.
Except for violation issues noted, personnel appeared to be knowledgeable of tasks being performed.
In general, activities performed indicated an effective training program.
No violations or deviations were identified.
10.
Reoort Review (71707)
During the inspection period, the inspectors reviewed the licensee's monthly performance and monthly station performance update reports for November 1992. The inspectors confirmed that the information provided met the requirements of TS 6.6. A.3 and Regulatory Guide -1.16.
No violations or deviations were identified, 11.
Reactor Scram Due to Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) DC Solfnoid Failure (93702)
On January 7, 1993, Quad Cities Unit 2 scrammed from 100 percent power-at 10:08 a.m. CST.
The scram was caused by failure of the dc solenoid
l I
_ - _ - _ - - _ _ _
.
.
for the A outboard MSIV.
The licensee was in the process of swapping power feeds to the B reactor protection system (RPS) bus. Dur'.ng the transfer, ac power to the MSIV solenoids was interrupted, allowing the 2A MSIV to close upon de solenoid failure. The resultant pressure increase caused a neutron flux spike and tripped the A RPS system. With the B RPS already deenergized, the full scram logic was satisfied.
The plant responded to the scram as expected, with the following exceptions:
1) the source range and intermediate range instrumentation failed to automatically insert, and were inserted manually, 2) the A recirculation system automatic runback on low feedwater flow was slower than expected, 3) the feedwater pumps ran out and tripped on low not positive suction head due to the standby condensate booster pump being unavailable for automatic start, and 4) the B feedwater regulating valve locked up at approximately 63 percent open. The effect of these items on the plant recovery was minimal.
The licensee placed the unit in cold shutdown at approximately 5:00 p.m. CST on January 7, 1993.
Operator action in response to the event was considered prompt and appropriate. The unit remained offline to effect repairs of the above mentioned items.
The failed de solenoid was sent offsite for analysis to determine its failure mode.
During.the subsequent unit startup problems with high turbine vibrations were encountered. The unit was shutdown to investigate the cause of the high vibrations.
Investigations identified the cause to be a bowed turbine rotor due to turning gear and indication problems. The licensee repaired the turning gear indication. The inspectors had no concerns with this event.
No violations or deviations were identified.
12.
Violations For Which 6 atice of Violation" Will Not Be Islued c
The NRC uses the Notice of Violation (Notice) to formally document failure to meet a legally binding requirement. However, because the NRC wants to encourage and support licensee's initiatives for self-identification and correction of problems, the NRC will not issue a Notice if the requirements set forth in 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C, Section VII.B.2 were met. A violation' of regulatory requirements identified during the inspection for which a Notice will not be issued is discussed in paragraph 3.g.
13.
Exit Interview l
The inspectors met with the licensee representatives denoted in paragraph I during the inspection period and at the conclusion of the inspection on January 11, 1993. The inspectors summarized the scope and results of the inspection and discussed the likely content of this inspection report. The licensee acknowledged the information and did not indicate that any of the information disclosed during the inspection could be considered proprietary in nature.
l l
L
~
..
.
,