IR 05000254/1986014

Insp Repts 50-254/86-14 & 50-265/86-13 on 860810-1004.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Actions on Previous Insp Findings,Operations,Radiological Controls, Emergency Preparedness & Security

ML20211F832
Person / Time
Site:	Quad Cities
Issue date:	10/20/1986
From:	Boyd D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20211F799	List: IR 05000254/1986014 ML20211F793
References
50-254-86-14, 50-265-86-13, NUDOCS 8610310273
Download: ML20211F832 (11)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGUALTORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Reports No. 50-254/86014(DRP); 50-265/86013(DRP)

Docket Nos. 50-254, 50-265 Licenses No. DPR-29; DPR-30 Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company Post Office Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 racility Name: Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At: Quad Cities Site, Cordova, IL Inspection Conducted: August 10 through October 4, 1986 Inspectors: A. L. Madison A. D. Morrongiello J. A. Gavu!a Approved By:

hhSh D. C. Boyd, CifIef

/o.xo-86 Date Projects Section 2D Inspection Summary Inspection on August 10 through October 4, 1986 (Reports No. 254/86014(DRP);

50-265/86013(DRP))

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection by the resident inspectors of actions on previous inspections findings; operations; radiological controls; emergency preparedness; security; refueling / outages; quality assurance; quality control; administration; routine reports; LER review; regional requests; training; and independent inspection; and a special inspection by a regional inspector of pipe support Results: No violations or deviaticns were identified.

8610310273 PDR 861021ADOCK PDR 05000254 G

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DETAILS 1. Persons Contacted CECO

• T. Tamlyn, Production Superintendent T. Lihou, Operating Engineer

• R. Robey, Technical Services Superintendent

• Kooi, Compliance Coordinator

• C. Norton,-Quality Assurance

• • J. 'Wojnarowski, Licensing Administrator

• • D. Eggett, Quality Control (QC) Project Engineer

-* Denotes those present at the exit interview on October 10, 198 ** Denotes those present at the exit interview on September 4, 198 CYGhA Services

• • J. Orlakis, Mechanical / Structural Section Manager

• • N. Williams, Mechanical Engineer

• • J. Russ, Senior Mechanical Engineer

• • J. Suermann, Nuclear Systems Section Manager

• • R. Pitre, Area Office Manager

• • M. Tracey, Structural Engineer The inspectors, through direct observation, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of applicable records and logs, examined the areas stated in the inspection summary and acccmplished the following inspection modules:

37700 Design Changes and Modifications 42700 Procedure Review 60710 Refueling Activities 61726 Monthly Surveillance Observations 62703 Monthly Maintenance Observations 71707 Operational Safety Verification 71710 ESF System Walkdown 81072 Access Control - Pcckages 90713 Review of Periodic and Special Reports

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92700 Onsite Review of LERs

92703 Generic Letter Followup l 92704 Followup - Headquarters Request l 92705 Followup - Regional Requests 92706 Independent Inspection 93702 Onsite Followup of Events The inspectors verified that activities were accomplished in a timely manner using approved procedures and drawings and were inspected / reviewed i as applicable; procedures, procedure revisions and routine reports were i in accordance with Technical Specifications, regulatory guides, and l industry codes or standards; approvals were obtained prior to initiating

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any work; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; the limiting conditions for operation were met during normal operation and while components or systems were removed from service; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; independent verification of equipment lineup and review of test results were accomplished; quality control records and logs were properly maintained and reviewed; parts, materials and equipment were properly certified, calibrated, stored, and or maintained as applicable; and adverse plant conditions including equipment malfunctions, potential fire hazards, radiological hazards, fluid leaks, excessive vibrations, and personnel errors were addressed in a timely manner with sufficient and proper corrective actions and reviewed by appropriate management personne Further, additional observations were made in the following areas: Operations (1) Unit 1 At the beginning of the inspection period Unit 1 was at full power. At various times during this period the Unit operated on Economic Generation Control (EGC).

On August 28, 1986, an Equipment Attendant discuvered that the 10 Residual Heat Removal Service Water pump (RHRSW) had a broken vent line. With the 1A RHRSW pump out of service for repairs, the unit had both loops of RHRSW cooling out of service. At 0915 hours0.0106 days <br />0.254 hours <br />0.00151 weeks <br />3.481575e-4 months <br /> an Unusual Event was declared and a unit shutdown was commenced as required by Technical Specifications. The vent line on 1D RHRSW pump was repaired at 1230 hours0.0142 days <br />0.342 hours <br />0.00203 weeks <br />4.68015e-4 months <br />. The Unusual Event continued while the diesel generator cooling water pump was checked for water damage from the vent line. There was no damage to this pump. It was returned to service and the Unusual Event terminated at 1630 hour0.0189 days <br />0.453 hours <br />0.0027 weeks <br />6.20215e-4 months <br /> On August 29, while performing the Low Pressure Core Injection (LPCI) Motor Opera _ tor Valve Operability test, the LPCI loop A inboard shutoff valve stuck in a mid-open position. The valve was declared inoperable and a 7 day Limiting Condition for Operation (LCD) was entered. Investigations revealed that the valve stem was slightly bent and was preventing correct operation of the valve. While the repairs could have been made at pcwer, the decision was made to shut the unit down for the repairs. During the shutdown on September 1, 1986, at 2130 hours0.0247 days <br />0.592 hours <br />0.00352 weeks <br />8.10465e-4 months <br /> the unit scrammed from 430 MWe. The cause of the scram was the Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIV) not being fully opene The cause of this signal was the failure of a block employed in a relay during testing of MSIVs. This block was used to prevent such a scram from occurring since this relay had been

" chattering" and the cause had been narrowed to a few l components inside the drywell. These components were to be l looked at during the next outage of sufficient duration.

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During this outage trouble shooting was performed on those components in the drywell, resulting in the limit switches being replaced. The stem on the LPCI valve was replaced. The Electrical Maintenance department devised new blocks from a material (Bakelite) that should preclude block failures similar to the one that caused this scram. The unit was returned to service on September On October 1, the unit reduced load to replace a test solenoid on the 2D Main Steam Isolation Valv For the remainder of the report period the unit remained in operation either at full power or on EG (2) Unit 2 At the beginning of the inspection period the unit was at full power. At various times during this period the unit operated on Economic Generation Control (EGC).

On September 7, 1986, a flow test was being conducted on the Standby Liquid Control System (SBLC). During this test, flow to the test tank could not be establishe The SBLC system was declared inoperable and a shutdown was commence As a result of the required shutdown an Unusual Event was declared at 0555 hour0.00642 days <br />0.154 hours <br />9.176587e-4 weeks <br />2.111775e-4 months <br /> Investigation revealed that the disc had separated from the stem on the test tank throttle valve. The separation occurred when a weld on the stem nut broke, allowing the nut to back off and resulting in the disc / stem separation. The weld failed due to lack of penetration into the base metal. A new disc and stem were installed (one that now uses two tack welds 180 degrees apart), the flow test was completed, and the SBLC system was declared operabl The Unusual Event was terminated at 1620 hour0.0188 days <br />0.45 hours <br />0.00268 weeks <br />6.1641e-4 months <br /> .

For the remainder of the report period the unit remained in operation either at full power or on EG (3) Both Units During plant tours of Units 1 and 2, the inspector walked down the accessible portions of the Standby Gas Treatment System and performed the applicable portions of Inspection Procedure 71710

"ESF System Walkdown."

During the plant tour the inspector noticed a sign in the turbine to reactor building interlock which cautioned that holding the interlock button too long may cause a breach of secondary containment. This item will be tracked as an open item pending further investigation (254/86014-01 (DRP)).

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. Maintenance The following maintenance activities were observed / reviewed:

(1) Observed portions of Target Rock valves being rebuilt by factory representative including leak testing of finished valv (2) Observed portions of work by Electrical Maintenance personnel to install n permanent feed for the reactor building decontamination sho (3) Observed Electrical Maintenance personnel re-adjusting the pickup voltages on two HFA relay (4) Observed por tions of the head seal replacement on Unit 1 reactor feed pum Surveillance The following surveillance activities were observed / reviewed:

(1) Observed weekly Power Operations Functional Test for Unit (2) Observed portions the of Unit 1 startup on September _uts (1) Unit 1 On September 1 the unit shutdown to repair the loop A Low Pre:,sure Core Injection inboard shutoff valve. The unit returned to service on September 5 (see Operations Section for details).

(2) Unit 2 The resident inspector observed one of the General Electric

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fuel representative's classes on inspection of new fuel, e Review of Routine and Special Reports

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The inspector reviewed the monthly performance report for the month of Augus The inspector also reviewed the Secondary Containment Leak Rate Test data for compliance with Technical Specifications. No violations or deviations were identifie Procedure Review QAP 1500-2 Nuclear Work Request, Rev. 2 QAP 1500-S2 Equipment Qualification Requirements List, Rev. _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ . . - - _ . _

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QIP 1800-1 ARM Calibration, Rev. QI_P 1800-1-S1 ARM Calibration Data Sheet, Rev. QMS 200-S3 Diesel Inspection - Monthly, Rev. A 1000-7 Failure of Establish RHR Flow Path, Rev. QRP 1130-3 "R" Door Check, Rev. QRP 1130-S1 "R" Doors Checklist, Rev. Bulletin Followup (0 pen) IE Bulletin 86-01, Revision 00: Minimum Flow logic Problems That Could Disable RHR Pumps.

- ; Modification design, review, and approval should be complete by November 3, 198 Installation of the modifications will be accomplished during the next scheduled refueling outage for each

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unit. This Bulletin will remain open pending completion of said modification TMI Action Plan Followup (Closed) Item II.B.1.3: Reactor Coolant System High Point Vent Procedure The Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) has completed its review of the subject action item and concluded that the procedures were adequat No further actions are required for either Uni Generic Letters (0 pen) Generic Letter 85-07: Implementation of Integrated Schedules for Plant Modification The licensee is committed to work with the NRC in developing an integrated schedule. One method of scheduling was employed at Zion Station as a trial. The final methodology was not selected by the spring 1986 commitment date as stated in a letter to Mr. H. C. Thompson (August 29,1985). The licensee has been reminded of the slippage of this commitment date. This letter will remain open pending selection of scheduling metho Emergency Planning On August 26, 1986, the Annual Emergency Exercise was conducte The exercise involved participation by the States of Illinois and Iowa. While the station passed this exercise, certain deficiencies were noted (see Inspection Report 254/86011 and 265/86010). The station has committed to correct these deficiencie . . _ _ _

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t k. Headquarters Request A trial program was instituted by Headquarters to identify and validate a minimum set of performance indicators. The resident inspectors provided the information requested for the months of/ June and Jul . LER Review (1) Unit 1 (a) (0 pen) LER 86025, Rev. 0: Torus Attached Small Bore Piping Does Not Meet Code Allowable Limits Due to Design Erro During a re-analysis of the IEB 79-14 Mark I program, it was discovered that certain small bore torus attached piping (four inches or less) did not meet FSAR requirements to meet code allowable stress limits for seismic and Mark I loading conditions. Piping on both units is affected. The cause of this occurrence inadequate design review in that only added or modified supports were qualified to Mark I Code Stress Allowable The Architect Engineer performed an operability assessment and determined that all lines in question are operabl A modification program will be developed to bring these lines into compliance with Mark I Code Stress Allowable The Division of Reactor Safety (DRS) will have the lead in assessing the adequacy of the modifications. This LER will remain open pending completion of the modification (b) (Closed) LER 86026 Revision 00: Unit One Reactor Scram While Performing Q0S 250-1 Due to Relay Block Failur On September 1, 1986, Unit One was operating at 55 percent thermal power. The Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV)

Closure Monthly Scram Sensor Functional Test, Q0S 250-1 was in progress. The test requires simulating an MSIV closure by pulling a fuse to de-energize a reactor trip relay, then closing a selected MSIV 10 percent and verifying a channel A or B reactor scram is receive The test was being performed as per Temporary Procedure 4150 which required the blocking of MSIV closure relay 590-102A to avoid a full reactor scram during performance of the test. This relay had been previously taken out-of-service in the tripped position (de-energized) because of an intermittent chattering problem. When fuse 590-702H was removed and MSIV 1-203-1B was partially closed a full reactor scram occurred at 2130 hours0.0247 days <br />0.592 hours <br />0.00352 weeks <br />8.10465e-4 months <br />. The cause of the scram was failure of the relay block to hold the 590-102A relay closed. The block was made of a flexible materia Corrective action is to replace the relay blocks with blocks of harder material. -The relay chatter problem was repaired prior to startu <.

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No further actions are require (c) (Closed) LER 86027, Revision 00: Failure of RCIC-48 Valve to Ope ONSeptember5,1986,UnitOnewasintheSTARTUPmodeat 1 percent of rated core thermal power. At 0615, the unit operator attempted to open the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) Pump Discharge to Reactor Vessel Valve 1-1301-48 and the valve failed to open. RCIC was declared inoperable until the valve was manually opened 10 minutes late Electrical Maintenance personnel found that the motor contractor in the 1B 250 VDC Motor Control Center, compartment V01, which provides power to valve 1-1301-48, was' unable to pick-up when either the open or closing coil was energized. Electrical Maintenance removed the motor contractor assembly and bench tested the equipment. Two problems were found. The first problem was an excessive bend in the auxiliary contact interlock. The interlock was creating enough friction with the operating roller to increase the amount of voltage needed to pick-up the motor contractor coil. The second problem, which was closely relate 0 to the first problem, was the actual pick-up

. voltage of the motor contractor. Electrical Maintenance determined the pick-up voltage to be 260 VDC. This pick-up voltage can be changed with an adjustment screw at the base of the coi Electrical Maintenance corrected both problems and the

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valve was stroked three times successfull There have not been any previous failures of this type for this valv No further actions are require (2) Unit 2 (a) (Closed) LER 86-008, Revision 01: 2A and 2 B Core Spray Subsystems Inoperable Due to Failure of Room Coole The orignial LtR was closed out in Inspection Report 86012. This revision presents no new significant information. No further actions are require (b) (Closed) LER 86-011, Revision 00: Failure of SBLC to Provide Flow to Test Tank Due to Valve Failur On September 7,1986, at 0550 while Unit Two was operating at 78 percent of rated core thermal power, the Unit Two

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Standby Liquid Control System (SBLC) failed to provide any flow to the test tank while performing Q05-110-6, SBLC

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Demineralized Water Recycle Test With Flow Indicator. The SBLC system was declared inoperable and at 0555 an

" Unusual Event" as declared in accordance with the Generating Stations Emergency Plan. An orderly shutdown was begun at 060 Maintenance personnel discovered that the disc on the inch test loop throttling valve had separated from the valve stem due to a broken tack weld. A new valve stem and disk were installed, and the SBLC system was declared operable at 1600. The " Unusual Event" was terminated at 162 No further actions are require m. Regional Requests (1) The licensee was informed of a potential generic problem that occurred at the Pilgrim Nuclear Station. It involved the ATWS trip coil associated with the field breaker for the recirculation pump Motor / Generator set (Model AKF-25). The breaker failed to trip when the ATWS coil was tested due to jamming of the trip mechanis The licensee does have that Model but has not experienced any problems similar to those described by Pilgri (2) In response to some recent concerns involving the operability and reliability of seismic monitoring instrumentation, the region has requested periodic inspection of said instrumentation on an annual basi The resident inspector reviewed the surveillances and failure data for the last two years. The results of the survey indicated successful surveillances and na failures of the instrumentatio (3) The licensee was informed of a potential generic problem that occurred at the Sequoyah Nuclear Statio The problem consisted of the drifting out of calibration of Barton Mcdel 288A differential level switche The subject switches are in use at this facility and do drif The switches are used in one application associated with a Technical Specification (TS). These switches are performance trended und those indicating unacceptable performance are replaced like-for-like with new switche n. Pipe Supports On July 28, 1986, Commor, wealth Edison Company (Ceco) issued a notification concerning nine pipe supports on the Loop B RHR service water piping for Units 1 and 2. The Loop B piping was modified by

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Cygna Energy Services under Modification No. M4-1/2-83-1 by crosstieing the Unit I and Unit 2 service water piping. As a consequence of this piping modification, it was determined that six of the existing pipe supports would require some type of upgrading due to the additional seismic loads from the crosstie piping. Three additional supports were later found to have excessive gaps and therefore would require some shimmin The problem arose, when, upon project closecut, it was found that none of the support modifications had been issued to the statio Since the piping modification had been installed in February of 1985, it was necessary to perform an operability assessment to determine whether Loop B RHR systems had been inoperable during this time perio A region based NRC inspector was sent to Cygna's Chicago office to review the technical bases and backup analyses for the operability assessment. The following calculations and computer outputs were reviewed: Calculation - Job No. 83083, File No. 3F, Revision 0, dated January 22, 1986, "RHR Service Water Loop B Functionality Analysis." Calculation - Job No. 83083, File No. 4F, Revision 0, dated March 6, 1986, " Pipe Support Design Review Summary for Interim Operation." Computer Ouput - Job No. 83083, File No. 3.1.F dated January 22, 1986, " Pipe Functionality Analysis." Computer Output - Job No. 83083, File No. 4.1.F, dated March 4, 1986, " Pipe Support for Interim Operation (Pipe Support No. Q2-S-2156)."

The methodology used to justify continued operation was the utilization of Reg. Guide 1.61 and Code Case N-411 damping values instead of the FSAR values. Using this approach it was determined that one support would still exceed code aliowables. On this basis, an additional analysis was performed using the Code Case N-411 damping and removing the overstressed portion of the one support from the analysis. The results indicated that the pipe stress would still meet code allowables for this situatio Based on the documentation reviewed, sufficient justification was provided for the interim operability of the RHR Service Water System. No adverse observations were made by the NRC inspector during this inspectio Security As a result of the incident on August 13, 1986, involving three 22 caliber rounds brought onsite without being detected by the Security Force, the licensee committed to conducting random unannounced tests

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L of sabotage-device recognition capabilities. 'Approximately 65 tests were conducted with only one failure. The failure resulted in retraining in the proper use of the equipment for the individual involved. The resident inspector has noticed an increased  ;

sensitivity of the guard force to inspect any item after x-ray-

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screening that either looked suspicious or could not be readily identified. The resident inspector will continue to monitor the licensee's performance in this area in light of the Unit 2 i Refueling Outage scheduled to commence October 11, 1986, Open Items

Open items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee, which will be reviewed further by the inspectors, and which involve some action-on the part of the NRC or licensee or both. The open items disclosed during the inspection are discussed in Paragraphs . Exit Interview ,

! The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)

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on October 10, 1986, and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activitie The inspectors also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by th ,

inspectors during the inspection. The licensee did not identify any such documents / processes as proprietar '

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