IR 05000254/1986009

Insp Repts 50-254/86-09 & 50-265/86-08 on 860413-0607.No Violation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Previous Insp Findings,Operations,Radiological Controls,Emergency Preparedness & Security

ML20211K609
Person / Time
Site:	Quad Cities
Issue date:	06/24/1986
From:	Boyd D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20211K602	List: IR 05000254/1986009 ML20211K595
References
50-254-86-09, 50-254-86-9, 50-265-86-08, 50-265-86-8, NUDOCS 8606300190
Download: ML20211K609 (15)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Reports No. 50-254/86009(DRP); 50-265/86008(DRP)

Docket Nos. 50-254, 50-265 Licenses No. OPR-29; DPR-30 Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company Post Office Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Facility Name: Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At: Quad Cities Site, Cordova, IL Inspection Conducted: April 13 through June 7, 1986 Inspectors: A. L. Madison A. D. Morrongiello Approved By: D. C , h 5'M Reactor Projects Section 20 Date Inspection Summary Inspection on April 13 through June 7,1986 (Reports No. 254/86009(DRP);

50-265/86008(DRP))

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection by the resident inspectors of actions on previous inspections findings; operations; radiological controls; emergency preparedness; security; refueling / outages; quality assurance; quality control; administration; routine reports; LER review; regional requests; training; and independent inspectio Results: No violations or deviations were identifie PDR ADOCK 05000254 G PDR

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DETAILS Persons Contacted R. Bax, Station Manager

• T. Tamlyn, Production Superintendent T. Lihou, Technical Staff Supervisor

• R. Robey, Technical Services Superintendent

• M. Kooi, Compliance Coordinator

• Denotes those present at the exit interview on June 6, 198 The inspectors, through direct observation, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of applicable records and logs, examined the areas stated in the inspection summary and accomplished the following inspection module Design Changes and Modifications 61726 Monthly Surveillance Observations 62703 Monthly Maintenance Observations 71707 Operational Safety Verification 71710 ESF System Walkdown 90713 Review of Periodic and Special Reports 92700 Onsite Review of LERs 92701 Followup on Inspector Identified Problems and Unresolved Items 92703 Generic Letter Followup 92705 Followup - Regional Requests 92706 Independent Inspection 93702 Onsite Followup of Events The inspectors verified that activities were accomplished in a timely manner using approved procedures and drawings and were inspected / reviewed as applicable; procedures, procedure revisions and routine reports were in accordance with Technical Specifications, regulatory guides, and industry codes or standards; approvals were obtained prior to initiating any work; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; the limiting conditions for operation were met during normal operation and

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while components or systems were removed from service; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; independent verification of equipment lineup and

review of test results were accomplished; quality control records r.nd logs were properly maintained and reviewed; parts, materials and equipment were properly certified, calibrated, stored, and or maintained as applicable; and adverse plant conditions including equipment malfunctions, potential fire hazards, radiological hazards, fluid leaks, excessive vibrations, and personnel errors were addressed in a timely manner with sufficient and proper corrective actions and reviewed by

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appropriate management personnel.

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Further, additional observations were made in the following areas: Action on Previous Inspection Findings l

(1) (Closed) Open Item (254/85027-03; 265/85030-03 (DRP)). Establish A Monitoring Program for Low Level Radwaste Storage Facilit The licensee has established a monitoring program to monitor airborne contamination in all areas of the overall monitoring program. The inspectors reviewed the program and determined that it was adequate. No further actions are require (2) (Closed) Open Item (254/85027-12; 265/85030-12 (DRP)). Revise Breaker Surveillance Procedures to Include Checks for Loose Control The inspectors verified that applicable breaker surveillance included requirements to check for loose electrical connection No further actions are require (3) (Closed) Unresolved Item (254/85027-11; 265/85030-11 (DRP)).

Standby Liquid Control Tank Air Sparger Adequac A concern was identified at the LaSalle Station and referred to the inspectors by regional personnel that the preoperational testing of air sparger mixing may not be adequate. The inspectors verified that the preoperational tests at Quad Cities were similar to those called in question at LaSalle and requested the licensee to determine if present practices were adequate to ensure proper mixing of the sodium pentaborate solutio The licensee performed testing to verify adequate mixing with current practices and these tests were reviewed by the inspectors. No problems were identified. No further actions are require Operations (1) Unit 1 At the beginning of the inspection period Unit I was at full power. At various times during this period the unit operated on Economic Generation Control (EGC).

From May 15 to the 18, the unit was shutdown for a planned maintenance outag For the remainder of the report period the unit remained in -

operation either at full power or on EG .

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(2) Unit 2 At the beginning of the inspection period the unit was at full power. At various times during this period the unit operated on Economic Generation Control (EGC)

On May 25, an Unusual Event was declared when both the 2A Core Spray pump and the unit diesel generator were declared inoperable. The sequence of events was as follows: During his rounds an Equipment Attendant noticed the 2A Core Spray Room cooler belts were broken rendering the 2A Core Spray out of service. During compensatory equipment testing, the unit diesel generator output breaker tripped rendering the diesel inoperabl With both pieces of equipment out of service, the unit began a shutdown. Prior to completing the shutdown, the Core Spray Room cooler belts were replaced and the room cooler was satisfactorily tested. The Unusual Event was terminated. The apparent cause of the damaged belts was the belt tensioner becoming loose. The diesel generator was tested several times and the output breaker worked correctly each time. The station has requested the assistance of the Operating Analysis Division in analyzing the output breaker's performanc On May 30, the unit shutdown for a planned maintenance outag The unit resumed power operation on June Except for the above events, the unit was either at full power or on EG (3) Both Units On April 16, the licensee restricted access to the turbine building in order to reduce the number of unnecessary personnel contaminations due to an offgas leak problem. The source of the leak was difficult to determine due to its intermittent nature. After much investigative work the source of the leak was tracked down to a worn gasket on a filter element in the sparge air system (a line used for purging the offgas system).

After repairing the filter, no further incidences of offgas problems occurre During plant tours of Units 1 and 2, the inspectors walked down the accessible portions of the Standby Liquid Control (SBLC)

and the High Pressure Core Spray (HPCI) Systems and performed the applicable portions of Inspection Procedure 71710 "ESF System Walkdown."

It should also be noted that for this reporting period, there were no personnel error s _

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c. Maintenance The following maintenance activities were observed / reviewed:

(1) Observed the installation of bearings on the Unit I condensate booster pum (2) Observed the aligning of a Residual Heat Removal Service Water Pum (3) Reviewed workpackage for mainsteam line low pressure relay on

Unit d. Surveillance The following surveillance activities were observed / reviewed

(1) Observed portions of the Unit 1 Standby Liquid Control System tes (2) Observed portions of High Pressure Core Spray test for Unit (3) Observed portions of Unit 2 startup on June e. Outages (1) Unit 1 On May 15 the unit shutdown for a planned weekend maintenance outage. Activities conducted during the outage consisted of Intermediate Range Monitor replacement, the repair of Electrohydraulic Control oil leaks, and repacking various other valves. The unit returned to service on May 1 (2) Unit 2 On May 30 the unit shutdown for a planned maintenance outag Activities conducted during the outage consisted of Intermediate Range Monitor repairs, checking for main condensor tube leaks, repair of one outboard Mainsteam Isolation Valve (to restore valve to Technical Specification closure time),

head vent valve repair, and repairing steam leaks in the heater bay are Both outages were accomplished without inciden f. Review of Routine and Special Reports The inspectors reviewed the monthly performance report for the months of March and April 1986. No violations or deviations were identifie _ . _ . _ l

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• LER Review (1) Unit 1 (a) (Closed) LER 84008, Revision 00: Inadequate Design Review of 125 VDC Station Batterie This issue was also tracked under Unresolved Item (254/84004-01, 265/84004-01 (DRP) and as such was closed in Inspection Report Nos. 254/86002; 265/86002. No further actions are require (b) (Closed) LER 86004, Revision 00: ATWS - ARI Initiation and Reactor Scram while Draining the Reactor Vesse This LER remained open pending a procedure revision to QOP 201-1 " Draining the Reactor Vessel and Recirculation Loops" to add a prerequisite to prevent recurrence. This revision has been accomplished and reviewed by the inspectors. No further actions are require (c) (Closed) LER 86006, Revision 00: Inadvertent Isolation of Reactor Building Vents Due to Personnel Erro This event was fully discussed in Inspection Report Nos. 254/86002; 265/86002 and was an example of failure to follow procedures and a violation was cited (254/86002-03). Therefore actions associated with this event will be tracked with the violatio (d) (0 pen) LER 86007, Revision 00: Spurious Lock Out of 1/2 Emergency Diesel Generato On February 3, 1986, Unit One was in the SHUTDOWN mode with the unit in a refueling outage. At 1047 hours0.0121 days <br />0.291 hours <br />0.00173 weeks <br />3.983835e-4 months <br /> a 1/2 Diesel Generator (DG) Relay Trip alarm was received in the control room. The "A" phase Differential Current Relay on Bus 13-1 had tripped and actuated the lockout rela The relays were reset approximately 5 minutes after the trip. On February 13, 1986, the "A" phase

Differential Current Relay again tripped at 1538 hours0.0178 days <br />0.427 hours <br />0.00254 weeks <br />5.85209e-4 months <br />.

l The trip was reset at 1603 hours0.0186 days <br />0.445 hours <br />0.00265 weeks <br />6.099415e-4 months <br />. The root cause of the trips was not positively identified. The probable cause is believed to be spurious actuation due to vibration.

This type of relay, General Electric model 12CFD1281A, is l

sensitive to vibration and shock. A modification has been initiated to replace these relays with a type that is less sensitive to vibration. This LER will remain open pending completion of the modificatio (e) (Closed) LER 86008, Revision 00: Inadvertant Auto Start of 1/2 Emergency Diesel Generato .- - - . _ _ . . . - .- -

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Unit One was shutdown and in the REFUEL mode on March 25, 1986, when the 1/2 Diesel Generator received an auto-start signal. The diesel generator started and ran unloade Electrical Maintenance personnel were putting a block on a Core Spray logic relay to prevent starting the 1/2 Diesel Generator during the performance of a modification test. While installing the block the relay was inadvertently contacted causing the 1/2 Diesel Generator to start. The root cause of the occurrence is personnel error. A contributing factor was the cramped quarters and the sensitivity of the relay involved. The event is considered an isolated incident and no further action is require (f) (Closed) LER 86015, Revision 00: Scram Discharge Volume High Level Scram While Switching RPS Bu This LER remained open pending a procedure revision to QOP 7000-1 " Reactor Protection System MG Sets to add a precaution to prevent recurrence. This revision has been accomplished and reviewed by the inspectors. No further actions are require (g) (Closed) LER 86016, Revision 00: Inadvertent Unit One Emergency Diesel Generator Star On March 17, 1986, Unit One was in the SHUTDOWN mode for a scheduled refueling outage. At 1658 hours0.0192 days <br />0.461 hours <br />0.00274 weeks <br />6.30869e-4 months <br /> the Unit One diesel Generator auto-started and ran unloade Electrical Maintenance personnel had just completed the action steps of the Core Spray Logic Functional Test, QMS 700-5. A portion of the test was repeated in an attempt to duplicate the event but the auto-start could rot be repeated. Probable cause is believed to be inadvertent physical contact with one of two contact sensitive relays which could have started the diesel generator without producing additional alarms or system actuations. The event is considered an isolated incident and no further corrective action is deemed necessar (h) (Closed) LER 86017, Revision 00: Isolation of Instrument Root Valves due to Personnel Erro On March 18, 1986, Unit 1 was in the REFUEL mode during a refueling and maintenance outage. At 1349 hours0.0156 days <br />0.375 hours <br />0.00223 weeks <br />5.132945e-4 months <br /> an Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS) trip was received from a Division I reactor low water signal. The trip was reset at 1404 hours0.0163 days <br />0.39 hours <br />0.00232 weeks <br />5.34222e-4 months <br />. At 1425 hours0.0165 days <br />0.396 hours <br />0.00236 weeks <br />5.422125e-4 months <br /> a Channel "B" Reactor Protection System (RPS) trip occurred from reactor low water level signa It was then observed that the reactor water level indicator 1-263-100A did not agree with other control room level indication. While

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backfilling the level instrument lines trying to correct the problem, a second ATWS trip was received at 1715 hours0.0198 days <br />0.476 hours <br />0.00284 weeks <br />6.525575e-4 months <br />. At 1900 hours0.022 days <br />0.528 hours <br />0.00314 weeks <br />7.2295e-4 months <br /> it was discovered that instrument root valves 1-263-12A and 14A at drywell penetration X-49 were isolated. These root valves isolated the reactor variable leg and the reference leg instrument lines that feed instrumentation on the 2201-5 rack. It was not known immediately when the valves were closed. An investigation determined that the valves were closed between 0300 and 0330 hours0.00382 days <br />0.0917 hours <br />5.456349e-4 weeks <br />1.25565e-4 months <br /> on 3-18-86. A valve checklist was in progress at that time and it is believed the root valves were inadvertently closed during performance of the checklis The cause of the initial ATWS trip and Channel "B" RPS trip is believed to be the result of the isolated instrument line This event is considered another example of personnel errors discussed in the previous report (254/86002) and as such, actions related to this event will be tracked with the licensee's response to the cover letter reques (1) (Closed) LER 86018, Revision 00: Reactor Scram During Surveillance Due to Coincidental IRM Spike On March 20, 1986, Unit One was in the REFUEL mode during a refueling and maintenance outage. At 0215 hours0.00249 days <br />0.0597 hours <br />3.554894e-4 weeks <br />8.18075e-5 months <br /> a reactor scram occurred. The 4KV Bus 13-1 Undervoltage Functional Test (QOS 6500-1) was in progress and a channel "A" Reactor Protection System (RPS) trip was expected as part of the test. A Channel "B" RPS trip occurred just prior to the test which resulted in a full scram. The Channel

"B" trip was caused by spiking of Intermediate Range Monitors (IRM) 15 and 18. The exact cause of the spiking was not determined, however IRM 15 was found to have a worn and cracked cable which was replaced. No abnormalities were found on IRM 18 until Unit I was started up following the outage. During startup IRM 18 detector failed. The detector is scheduled to be replaced during an outag No further actions are require (j) (Closed) LER 86019, Revision 00: Anticipated Transient Without Scram Caused by Contractors During Shutdow On March 17, 1986, during a Unit One refueling outage, an Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS)/ Alternate Rod Insertion (ARI) System trip occurred at 1815 hours0.021 days <br />0.504 hours <br />0.003 weeks <br />6.906075e-4 months <br />. The Scram Discharge Volume (SDV) vent and drain valves closed and the control rod drive scram valves opened as designe The trip was reset within 30 second Investigation revealed that scaffolding erected to install fire protection modifications was in contact with instrument sensing lines for the ATWS instruments at the 2201-5 rack. Probable

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cause was personnel working in the area which disturbed the sensing lines enough to cause the ATWS reactor level instruments to trip, although it was not determined who was in the area at the time. Corrective action was to rearrange scaffolding so it would not disturb the instrument rack. The scaffolding in close proximity to the rack was subsequently removed prior to Unit I startu No further actions are require (k) (Closed) LER 86020, Revision 00: Spurious Group I Isolatio This event was discussed fully in Inspection Report Nos. 254/86002; 265/86002. No further actions are require (1) (0 pen) LER 86021, Revision 00: Reactor Scram Due to Low Water Leve On April 5, 1986, with a startup in progress, Unit 1 Reactor was operating in the STARTUP mode at 3 percent of rated thermal power. Reactor pressure was approximately 300 psig and one and one-half turbine bypass valves were open due to the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC)

System Turbine Overspeed Test having been completed earlier. Water was being supplied to the reactor vessel by the condensate system through the Low Flow Feedwater Regulator Valve. At 0820 hours0.00949 days <br />0.228 hours <br />0.00136 weeks <br />3.1201e-4 months <br />, the 18 Reactor Feed Pump (RFP) was started and reactor water level began to increase. At 0825 hours0.00955 days <br />0.229 hours <br />0.00136 weeks <br />3.139125e-4 months <br />, a HI REACTOR WATER LEVEL alarm was receive The operator closed the reactor feedwater inlet valves to terminate the reactor water level increase before the reactor feed pumps tripped. The level was rising because the low flow fecdwater regulator valve was not controlling reactor level due to excessive leakage. The reactor water level increase was stopped and as the level then began to decrease, the operator tried to re-open the reactor feedwater inlet valves. The valves traveled to dual indication but no feedwater flow was obtained. A second reactor feed pump was started with no impact on feedwater flow. The reactor water level continued to decrease and Unit I subsequently scrammed due to low reactor water level at 0836 hour0.00968 days <br />0.232 hours <br />0.00138 weeks <br />3.18098e-4 months <br /> After completing the scram recovery unit startup commenced at 1056 hours0.0122 days <br />0.293 hours <br />0.00175 weeks <br />4.01808e-4 months <br /> on April 5, 1986, with the low flow feedwater regulator valve manually isolate Reactor water level was controlled by manual operation of one main feedwater regulator valve. The low flow feedwater regulator valve was overhauled during the May 15 through 18 maintenance outag __ _. _ , . _ _ _ . _ _ - , _. _

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Work requests have been written to inspect and regrease the valve operators and inspect the torque switch settings. A supplemental report will be issued detailing further cause and corrective actions at that time. This LER will remain open pending receipt of that repor (m) (0 pen) LER 86022, Revision 00: CAM Line Not Meeting Code Stress Allowable On May 1,1986, Quad Cities Station was notified by the Station Nuclear Engineering Department that certain Unit One and Unit Two Containment Atmosphere Monitoring (CAM)

system piping did not meet NUREG-0661 acceptance criteria for Mark I containment structures and piping. The affected lines were 1-2402A(B)-1/2"-HB and 2-2402A-1/2"-H An operability assessment based on General Electric's functional capability criteria for essential Mark II piping indicated that all lines were operable with 5 percent damping except line 1-2402A-1/2"-H A modification was performed in 1984 to the CAM system which resulted in the lines not meeting the NUREG-0661 requirements. The modification was designed using the original system drawings instead of the updated Mark I containment drawings. The root cause of the event was inadequate drawing and design control by the two Architect Engineering firms involved and the Station Nuclear Engineering Department. Unit One lines have been modified to meet Mark I criteria, and the Unit Two line will be modified during the fall 1986 refuel outage. An Action Item Record has been issued by the licensee to resolve the design drawing control proble This LER will remain open pending completion of the above modification and resolution of the Action Item Recor (n) (0 pen) LER 86023, Revision 00: RCIC Inoperable Due to 3purious Overspeed Trip On May 5, 1986 the Unit One Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System turbine tripped numerous times on mechanical overspeed while attempting to manually start the system for an operability test. The RCIC System was declared inoperable and the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI)

System tested satisfactorily as per Technical Specifications. Unit One was operating in the RUN mode at 96 percent power when the event occurred. The cause of the overspeed trips was due to the mechanical overspeed trip linkage being out of adjustment. The linkage was adjusted and a portion of the linkage machined and the system was run satisfactorily and declared operable on May 10. Additional corrective action is being pursued by

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Two Action Item Records which address improving the RCIC overspeed trip system. This LER will remain open pending resolution of these Action Item Record (2) Unit 2 (a) (Closed) LER 85020 Revision 00: Unit 2 Condenser 5 Foot Circulating Water Pump Trip Out of Service (005).

This LER remained open pending procedure revisions to Q0S 030-3, Condenser Pit High Level Alarm and Trip Surveillance to prevent recurrence. These revisions have been accomplished and reviewed by the inspector No further actions are require (b) (Closed) LER 86005 Revision 00: Standby Gas Treatment Auto Initiation From Hot Trash on Refuel Floo This event was fully discussed in Inspection Report Nos. 254/86002; 265/86002. No further actions are require (c) (Clcsed) LER 86006 Revision 00: Unit 2 Reactor Building Ventilation Isolation and SBGTS Auto-Initiation Due to 2A Fuel Pool Monitor Tri On April 14, 1986, Unit 2 was operating in the RUN mode at 100 percent power when the 2A Fuel Pool Radiation Monitor tripped at 0435 hours0.00503 days <br />0.121 hours <br />7.19246e-4 weeks <br />1.655175e-4 months <br /> causing the isolation of the Reactor Building Ventilation System and the l auto-initiation of the Standby Gas Treatment System. The apparent cause of the occurrence is instrument setpoint drift. The monitor was found to t^!r at 30 mR/hr instead of the normal 100 mR/h The monito, was recalibrated to trip at a setpoint of 100 mR/h No further action is require (d) (Closed) LER 86007 Revision 00: Failure of the Unit 2 Core Spray Room Cooler Due to Burned Contact On April 9,1986, at 2155 hours0.0249 days <br />0.599 hours <br />0.00356 weeks <br />8.199775e-4 months <br />, Unit 2 was in the RUN mode operating at 100 percent of rated thermal powe It was found that the 2B Core Spray Room Cooler would not run in either the Manual or Automatic mode. The cause of the room cooler failing to run was due to pitting and burning of contacts on the motor control center contactor that supplies power to the room cooler motor. The pitting was most likely due to weak springs on the contacts not making up as designe This was the first occurrence of this type of contactor failure. The failed contactor was replaced and the room cooler was tested and returned to service May 10, 1986. No further action is require r

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h. TMI Action Plan Followup (1) (Closed) Item II.B.2.3., " Plant Shielding Equipment Qualification." The modifications required for this item were accomplished as part of the overall Environmental Qualification (E.Q.) Program completed by November 30, 198 The inspectors reviewed the licensee's actions to ensure compliance with their submittals. No further actions are require (2) (Closed) Item II.B.3.1., " Valve Position Indication: Install Direct Indications of Valve Position (Relief and Safety Valves). The relief valve actuator position is accomplished by environmentally qualified Dresser Electromatic relief valve actuators which contain limit switches. Direct indication of relief and safety valve position is obtained from environmentally qualified acoustic monitors manufactured by General Atomic Corporation. This is in accordance with the licensee's submittals and the overall E. Q. program. No further actions are require (3) (Clo:ed) Item II.K.3.57., " Manual Actuction of ADS." The concern identified by this item was that a source of cooling water be available prior to manual actuation of ADS valve The licensee has implemented the guidelines established by the BWR owners' group in their Emergency Operating Procedures (in place October 31,1985). The inspectors have reviewed the procedures for adequacy in this regard. No further actions are require . _eadquarters H Requests (1) Survey of Licensee's Response to Selected Safety Issues (TI 2515/77)

The purpose of the inspection was to determine the actions that the licensee had taken to address selected safety issues identified in I.E. Bulletins, Circulars, and Information Notices and in the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INP0)

significant operating event reports (SOERs). The inspectors reviewed the following items:

(a) NUREG-0737 (TMI) items:

(1) II.k.3.13 HPCI and RCIC Initiation Level (2) II.k.3.15 Isolation of HPCI and RCIC Modificatio (3) II.k.3.22 RCIC Suctio (4) II.k.3.24 Spare Cooling for HPCI/RCIC Modification (b) Generic Letter 83-2 o i l

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(c) SOER 81-1 )

(d) SOER 82-1 :

(e) SOER 84- No deficiencies were identified except for SOER 84- Recommendation 4 dealt with procedures and training to address operator actions if significant heat exchanger performance degradation as a result of fouling is detected. No actions had been taken by the licensee to address this concern. The licensee has agreed to review this area and provide training and procedure revisions as deemcd applicable. These actions will be tracked as an Open Item (254/86009-01; 265/86008-01(DRP)).

j. 10 CFR Part 21 Reports Region III received a Part 21 report from Magentrol International concerning their Model 402 Series Level control used for safety-related applications. Investigations at Browns Ferry revealed that a torque check on the enclosing tube nut had not been performe Without the proper torque, the enclosing tube nut could loosen during a seismic event causing a leak; or, loss of pressure of process flui Ten of the subject models had been shipped to Quad Cities for use in the Scram Discharge Volume (SDV) modifications. However, a design revision had eliminated their use in this application and they were processed back-into spare parts for use in non-safety related applications only. As such, they are no longer an item of concern and this Part 21 report is considered close k. Generic Letters (1) In general, no specific licensee administrative procedure ,

addresses actions to take with regard to Generic Letter Each I letter is handled individually and any appropriate actions are taken by those groups responsible for that area. However, in some cases, adequate measures are not taken to ensure continuing complete compliance with Generic Letters. For example; Generic Letter 85-14: Commercial Storage at Power Reactor Sites of Low-Level Radioactive Waste Not Generated By the Utility was issued August 1, 1985. The' licensee immediately reviewed this letter and determined that, at that time, they would not store radioactive waste from other facilitie However, no provisions were made to ensure that the requirements of the generic letter were me'. should this position be revised. When this issue was raised with the licensee, the licensee committed to include generic letters in the tracking system to be developed for the Compliance Coordinator. This will be tracked as part of that Open Item (254/86009-02; 265/86008-02(DRP)).

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(2) (a) (0 pen) Generic Letter 84-23: Reactor Vessel Water Level Instrumentation in BWR The licensee responded to this letter on December 4, 1984, detailing the actions they would take. The replacement of mechanical level indication equipment delineated in this response has been accomplished and has been reviewed by the inspectors and found acceptable. The schedule for accomplishing a design change to prevent reference leg overheating as stated in the December 4, 1984 letter will be completed during each units' refueling outage beginning after December 1,1987. This item will remain open perding satisfactory completion of this design chang (b) (Closed) Generic Letter 85-13: Transmittal of NUREG-1154 Regarding the Davis-Besse loss of Main and Auxiliary Feedwater Even The resident inspector determined that the information was reviewed for applicability to Quad Cities Station and that the information was made available to the plant staff through their training program. This generic letter is considered closed and no further action is require (c) (0 pen) Generic Letter 85-14: Commercial Storage at Power Reactor Sites of Low-Level Radioactive Waste Not Generated By the Utilit As discussed above, to ensure continued compliance the licensee must provide some tracking mechanism or procedural requirement referencing the actions in the letter. The licensee has agreed to do this. This letter will remain open pending such action (d) (Closed) Generic Letter 8602: Technical Resolution of Generic Issue B-19 Thermal Hydraulic Stabilit The licensee had reviewed core reload data for both units and determined that they have had sufficient margi Future core reloads will also be examined to demonstrate compliance with general desiga criteria 10 and 12. This Generic Letter is considered closed and no further action is planne (e) (0 pen) Generic Letter 85-06: Quality Assurance Guidance for ATWS Equipment That is Not Safety-Relate This letter provided explicit QA Guidance required by 10 CFR 50.62 for ATWS Equipment that has not been designated safety-related. In accordance with the licensee's letter of October 10, 1985, the schedule for complete compliance with the 10 CFR 50.62 ATWS rule is

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Spring 1987 for Unit 1 and Fall 1986 for Unit 2. After discussions with licensee pe;sonnel, the inspectors have determined that no program is in place to date to address non safety-related ATWS equipment as required. The licensee's Q.A. organization has issued a Finding to this effect during a recent inspection prompted by the resident inspector's inquirie . Open Items Open items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee, which will be reviewed further by the inspectors, and which involve some action l on the part of the NRC or licensee or both. The open items disclosed during the inspection are discussed in Peragraphs 1.1. and . Exit Interview The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)

throughout the inspection period and at the conclusion of the inspection 1 on June 5, 1986, and summarized the scope ar.d findings of the inspection

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activitie The inspectors also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspectors during the inspection. The licensee did not identify any such documents / processes as proprietary.

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