IR 05000250/1980029
| ML17340A584 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
| Issue date: | 11/17/1980 |
| From: | Conlon T, Lenahan J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17340A583 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-250-80-29, 50-251-80-28, IEB-80-11, NUDOCS 8101100834 | |
| Download: ML17340A584 (9) | |
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTAST., N.W., SUITE 3100 ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30303 goV 288@
Report Nos. 50-250/80-29 and 50-251/80-28 Licensee:
Florida Power and Light Company 9250 West Flagler Street Miami, FL 33101 Facility Name:
Turkey Point Docket Nos. 50-250 and 50-251 License Nos.
DPR-31 and DPR-41 Inspection at Turkey Point site near Homestead, Florida Inspector:
J. J.
I, ahan Approved by:
,
u:
T. E.
nlon, Section Chief, R ES Branch
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SUMHARY Inspection on October 21-24, 1980 Areas Inspected t<<~/w Date Signed Da e Signed This special, announced inspection involved 25 inspector-hours onsite in the areas of follow-up on IE Bulletin 80-11 and the containment building tendon surveillance inspection program.
Results Of the two areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
"-H.
"E N.
S.
R.
I J AD E. Yaeger, Site Manager F. Baker, QA Engineer Legate, Construction Engineer Brain, Engineering Project Manager (Telephone Conversation)
H. Reinhardt, QC Engineer K. Hays, Nuclear Plant. Manager W. Jones, QC Supervisor Other Organizations G.
J.
W.
C.
"-W.
P. Nutwell, Assistant Project Engineer, Bechtel A. Ivany, Site Civil Group Supervisor, Bechtel Lowery, Project QA Engineer, Bechtel W. Andrews, Project Civil Group Supervisor, Bechtel Wilson, Project Quality Engineer, Bechtel NRC Resident Inspector-A. Ignatonis
-'W.
C. Marsh
"-Attended exit interview 2.
Exit Interview The inspection.scope and findings were summarized on October 24, 1980 with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Not inspected.
4.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to determine whether they are acceptable of may involve noncompliance or deviations.
New unresolved items identified during this inspection are discussed in paragraph 6.
5.
Independent Inspection Effort The inspector examined grease cans covering the horizontal and dome tendons on Units 3 and 4 and the sides of the Units 3 and 4 containment buildings to determine if there was any leakage of tendon sheathing filler (grease)
from the tendon voids.
The inspector noted that grease appeared
C
to be leaking from some grease cans on the Unit 3 dome tendons and from vent holes in the feedwater penetration areas on Unit 4.
The inspector also made a walk-through inspection of the Unit 4 tendon gallery.
No leakage of grease was noted from the grease cans covering the bottom end of the Unit 4 vertical tendons.
The inspector discussed the apparent grease leakage from some Unit 3 dome tendons and from the vent holes in Unit 4 with licensee engineers.
The licensee stated that an investigation was underway to determine the source of the grease in the feedwater penetration area on Unit 4.
The apparent leakage from the Unit 3 dome grease cans will be investigated by the the licensee in the future, prior to the completion of the next Unit 3 3 tendon surveillance inspection.
The results of these investigations will be reviewed by NRC in a subsequent inspection.
This was identified to the licensee as Inspector followup Item 250/80-29-02 and 251/80-29-02 followup,
"Investigation of grease leakage from containment building tendon voids."
No deviations or items of noncompliance were identified.
Reactor Containment Building Post-Tensioning System Surveillance Inspection - Units 3 and
The inspector examined the one, three, and five year containment building tendon surveillance inspection reports for Units 3 and 4.
These reports contained a summary of the results of the surveillance inspections, copies of the inspection data, and a copy of the surveillance procedure.
Review of the surveillance procedure attached to the one, three, and five year reports and review of the test results disclosed that the procedure may not meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B.
The following shortcomings in the procedural requirements were noted by the inspector:
a.
No inspector or acceptance criteria for use in inspection of buttonheads.
b.
No requirements which address training and qualifications of inspectors and or craft personnel performing the tendon surveillance i'nspection.
There were no records available at the site which documented the training of personnel involved in the surveillance inspections completed to date.
c ~
Requirements in the procedure which address the acceptance criteria and frequency of calibration requirements of test and measuring equipment are inadequate.
For example, calibration of dial gages, feeler gages, and go no-go gages is not addressed in the procedure.
Calibration of the hydraulic rams for use in measuring lift-offis required before the surveillance inspection, but not after to verify that the rams are still in calibration.
d.
There are no requirements in the procedure which address the steps to be taken when unacceptable conditions (e.g., defective buttonheads, water in tendon sheaths, etc.)
are found during the inspection to verify that the unacceptable condition is unique and not an indica-ation of degradation of the post-tensioning syste e.
The method of measuring tendon lift-offchanged somewhat in each subsequent surveillance inspection.
This part of the procedure needs to be standardized if the amount of prestress loss since time of initial tensioning is to be determined.
There was insufficient time during this inspection to determine if the above requirements had been covered in tendon surveillance contractor's QC procedure.
This was identified to the licensee as Unresolved Item 250/80-29-01 and 251/80-28-01,
"Tendon Surveillance Procedure Acceptance Criteria".
This item will be reviewed in detail by NRC in a subsequent inspection.
The inspector discussed previously identified Inspector Followup Item 250/80-27-01 with licensee and Bechtel engineers.
These discussions disclosed that the apparent differences in recorded tendon stess values for the Unit 3 one year surveillance inspection were probably due to differences in the method used to measure tendon lift-offvalues.
This will be evalu-ated by NRC in resolution of the unresolved item discussed above (see paragraph 6.e).
Previously identified Inspector Followup Item 250/80-27-01 is closed.
No deviations or items of noncompliance were identified.
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7.
(Open)
IE Bulletin 80-11, Masonry Will Design - Units 3 and
a.
Summary of Licensee's Response to IE Bulletin 80-11.
Florida Power and Light submitted its 60-day IE Bulletin 80-11 response to NRC Region II for Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 in a letter dated July 24, 1980.
This letter summarized the method used to identify masonry walls in the proximity of safety-related equipment and established a schedule for completing the design re-evaluation of the walls.
b.
Review of Procedure for Accomplishment of IE Bulletin 80-11 Requirements The inspector examined Bechtel procedure number 5177-133-C-001,
"Survey Procedure for Concrete Masonry Walls".
The procedure addresses the'field walkdown method to be used in identification of masonry walls and safety related equipment, personnel training requirements, documentation requirements, and requirement for making, checking, and controlling as-built drawings of masonry walls in the proximity of safety-related equipment.
c ~
Field Walkdown in Safety-Related Areas to Identify Masonry Walls The inspector, accompanied by Bechtel engineers, walked down the following areas to verify that all masonry walls in the proximity of safety-related equipment had been identified for design re-analysis in accordance with IEB 80-11 requirements and the licensee's 60-day response (letter of July 24, 1980);
)t
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Diesel generator building Control building, floor elevations 30 and
Auxiliary building, portions of floor elevations 4,
10, and
Intake structure No additional masonry walls were identified by the inspector during the walkdown.
The field survey performed by Bechtel engineers appears to have been adequate to identify all masonry walls in the proximity of safety related equipment.
d.
Review of Qualify Records Related to IE Bulletin 80-11 The inspector examined the following records relating to IEB 80-11:
(1)
Floor plan drawings showing locations of masonry walls in the diesel generator, control and auxiliary buildings.
These drawings are referenced in Attachment 10 to the Bechtel procedure.
(2)
Documentation of training received by personnel performing the masonry wall inspections.
(3)
FPK QA Audit numbers QAE-EPP-80-7 and QAE-EPP-80-6.
These audits cover IEB 80-11 field inspection activities.
(4)
Masonry wall walkdown status logs (5)
Masonry wall inspection checklists and as built drawings for wall numbers A-10-4, A-18-1, A-18-2, A-18-5, A-18-13, C-30-2, C-30-3, C-30-6, C-30-9, C-30-18, and C-42-16.
These records were reviewed by the inspector during the field walkdown (discussed in in paragraph 7.c) to verify the accuracy of the inspection documentation and as-built drawings.
Inspection walkdown pack-ages for wall numbers A-42-2, A-42-3, C-30-10, C-42-2, C-42-4 C-42-8 and C-42-13 were C-42-13 were reviewed in the office for completeness.
This bulletin remains open pending licensee completion of IE Bulletin 80-11
'o deviations or items of noncompliance were identifie,
,