IR 05000250/1980002
| ML17339A872 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
| Issue date: | 02/15/1980 |
| From: | Brooks E, Upright C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17339A871 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-250-80-02, 50-250-80-2, 50-251-80-02, 50-251-80-2, NUDOCS 8004100202 | |
| Download: ML17339A872 (6) | |
Text
~S REay, (4
Op
~i 0O lch e
~y
+~
gO
++*++
UNITEDSTATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTAST., N.W., SUITE 3100 ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30303 Report Nos.
50-250/80-02 and 50-251/80-02 Iicensee:
Florida Power and Light Company 9250 West Flagler St.
Miami, FL 33101 Facility Name:
Turkey Point Docket Nos.
50-250 and 50"251 License Nos.
DPR-31 and DPR-41 Inspection at Turkey Point site near Homestead, Inspected by:
E. H. Brooks Florida
> -~/- 9'e Date Signed Approved by:
d C.
M. Upright, Acting Section Chief RONS Branch r7
/6 Z4 Date Signed Areas Inspected This routine, announced inspection involved 14 1/2 inspector-hours on site in the areas of engineered safeguards and emergency power systems integrated testing and personnel airlock testing.
Results Of the two areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
800.4100
DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees J. K. Hayes, Plant Superintendent R. Gouldy, Plant Engineer W. Haley, Plant Engineer J ~ Whitehead, Shift Supervisor L. Henniger, Test Coordinator NRC Resident Inspector R. Vogt-Lowell t
-"Attended exit interview 2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on January 20, 1980 with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Not inspected.
4.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.
5.
Engineered Safeguards and Emergency Power Systems Integrated Test The inspector witnessed the licensee's Engineered Safeguards and Emergency Power Systems Integrated Test for Turkey Point Unit 3. This test requires a
temporary loss of off-site power and a simulated safety injection signal.
Operating procedure 4104.2, dated December 7,. 1979 and approved on December 18, 1979, was used to conduct the test.
The purpose of the test is to verify automatic operation of all Engineered Safeguards Systems and Emergency Power Systems in accordance with Technical Specification requirements.
The acceptance criteria for this test requires that (1) all components receive the safety injection signal in the proper sequence and timing, (2) appropriate breakers open and close, and (3) all automatic valves complete their travel.
At time zero a loss of offsite power was effected by opening A and B bus breakers.
At time zero plus five seconds, safety injection was initiated by simulating high and high-high containment
pressure.
Automatic loading sequence of the diesel-generator on safety injection signal occurred within the required time and the test was considered to meet the acceptance criteria.
6.
Personnel Airlock Testing Licensee event report dated August 6, 1979 concerning reportable occurrence 250-79-10 for Turkey Point Unit 3 identified the cause of leakage through both doors of the containment personnel airlock during the integrated leakage rate test conducted March 13-19, 1979 and described the corrective action taken to prevent reoccurrence of airlock leakage.
The licensee had scheduled a leak test of the personnel airlock as required by Technical Specifications and Appendix J to 10 CFR 50 for January 20, 1980.
The test was delayed to a later date due to scheduling problems and was not witnessed by the inspector.
The inspector did, however, discuss with the licensee their proposed methods for airlock leakage rate testing.
By letter of July 27, 1977 the licensee requested exemption from the requirement of Appendix J that airlocks be tested at peak accident pressure after each opening and that a vacuum test between door seals after each opening be substituted in place of the positive pressure test of the entire airlock.
The licensee was requested by the NRR, Division of Operating Reactors to provide additional information concerning proposed vacuum testing of the door seals.
The inspector advised the licensee that a concern also exists over the possibility of airlock leakage when the airlock doors are subjected to low positive pressure (or vacuum) in the magnitude of 1 to 2 psig.
Both the inner and outer doors of the airlock may be dependent on higher pressures to seat the door seals such as occur during the ILRT and airlock testing at peak accident pressure.
A proposed test was discussed between the Inspector and licensee.
the purpose of the test is to demonstrate the ability of the airlock outer door to seal when subjected to any positive pressure within the airlock, and also to demonstrate any difference in leakage results when the volume between concentric door seals is subjected to either a
vacuum test or a positive pressure test.
The licensee agreed to conduct additional tests in the above manner in addition to the regularly scheduled airlock test, and to provide any information resulting from the tests to the NR i i