IR 05000250/1980005
| ML17339A908 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
| Issue date: | 02/20/1980 |
| From: | Ang W, Herdt A NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17339A909 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-250-80-05, 50-250-80-5, 50-251-80-05, 50-251-80-5, IEB-79-02, IEB-79-14, IEB-79-2, NUDOCS 8004230026 | |
| Download: ML17339A908 (7) | |
Text
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UNITEDSTATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTAST., N.W., SUITE 3100 ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30303 FEB 22 1980 Report Nos. 50-250/80-05 and 50-251/80-05 Licensee:
Florida Power 8 Light Company 9250 West Flagler Street Miami, FL 33101 Facility Name:
Turkey Point Nuclear Plant Docket Nos.
50-250 and 50-251 License Nos.
DPR-31 and DPR-41 Inspection at Turkey Point Nuclear Plant near Homestead, Inspector: W.P-Approved by:
A. R. Herdt, Section Chief, RCES Branch Florida Z -I'i-5~
Date Signed Date Signed SUMMARY Inspection on February 5-7, 1980 Areas Inspected This routine, announced inspection involved 20 inspector-hours on site in the areas of pipe support baseplate designs using concrete expansion anchor bolts (IEB 79-02); seismic analysis for as-built safety-related piping systems (IEB 79-14).
Results Of the areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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DETAII.S 1.
Persons Contacted Iicensee Employees
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E. Yeager, Site Manager K. Hays, Plant Manager Nuclear G. Brain, Engineering Project Manager D. Johnston, Project Quality Assurance Engineer W. Rothermel, Field Support Supervisor F. O'rien, Senior QC Supervisor F. Baker, Senior QA Engineer R. Jackson, QC Supervisor Other Organizations Bechtel Power Corporation (Bechtel)
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'C AJ L. Brannen, Project Engineer Wilson, Project Quality Engineer K. Wang, 79-14 Program Coordinator Iee, 79-02 Program Coordinator W. Andrews, Civil Group Supervisor R. Sharpe, 79-14 Jobsite Group Leader NRC Resident Inspector
"'R. Vogt-Lowell
"Attended exit interview 2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on February 7, 1980 with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above.
The unresolved item concerning IEB 79-02 inspection and record's for support 3ARH-99 (Paragraph 5) was discussed with the licensee.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Not inspected.
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Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to determine whether they are acceptable or may involve noncompliance or deviations.
A new unresolved items identified during this inspection is discussed in paragraph ~
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Pipe Support Base Plate Designs Using Concrete Expansion Anchor Bolts (Units 3 and 4)
In response to IE Bulletin 79-02, the licensee is performing an inspection of safety-related pipe support base plates that use concrete expansion anchors.
An inspection was performed to verify licensee compliance with IEB 79-02 requirements and licensee commitments.
IE inspection report numbers 50-250/79-38 and 50-251/79-38 identified two inspector items of concern regarding the licensees IEB 79-02 inspection program.
Licensee action to resolve the items of concern was inspected.
The licensee now requires hands-on training of new QC inspectors under the guidance of experienced inspectors prior to being allowed to inspect alone.
This provides for the inspector item of concern regarding training of QC inspectors.
In response to an inspector item of concern regarding a lack of inspection for oversized bolt holes, the licensee's A/E, Bechtel, provided inspection requirements and an acceptance criteria for oversized bolt holes.
Bechtel further reviewed all "large bore" pipe supports and provided a list of pipe supports that would experience combined axial tension and shear or shear only loads.
The. licensee subsequently reinspected those supports for oversized bolt holes.
This provides for the inspector concern regarding inspection of base plates for oversized bolt holes.
Inspection records for the following supports were reviewed to verify licensee compliance with IEB 79-02 requirements and licensee commitments:
3FWH37 SR 299 SR 5 3VCH44 3ARH99 SR313 The inspection records for bolt number 1 of base plate "A" for auxiliary radwaste pipe support 3ARH99 indicate that the bolt was rusted and the head was rounded and thus could not be removed or inspected and tested.
No repair instructions or desposition was provided for the bolt.
The repair record for bolt number 2 of the same base plate indicated that both bolts
and 2 had been repaired.
A subsequent reinspection record for oversized bolt holes indicated that the original condition still existed for bolt number 1.
Subsequently, during the NRC inspection, an analysis was performed by Bechtel to determine if the base plate would still be acceptable if the bolt in question failed.
Using original support loads, the support was determined by Bechtel to be technically acceptable.
A reanalysis of the base plate will be performed at a later date using new support loadings that may result from IEB 79-14 piping reanalysis.
Due to the inconsistencies in the inspection record the licensee commited to review IEB 79-02 inspection records to determine if this is an isolated case or if further inspections and documentation are necessary for IEB 79-02.
Pending completion of the licensee's review this item shall be identified as unresolved item 50-250/
80-05-01 - IEB 79-02 inspection record inconsistency.
Pending licensee completion of Bulletin requirements, IEB 79-02 shall remain ope.
Seismic Analysis for As-Built Safety-Related Piping (Units 3 8 4)
In response to IE Bulletin 79-14 the licensee is performing an inspection of safety-related piping systems to verify the seismic analysis input.
An inspection of the licensee's activities was performed to verify licensee compliance with IEB 79-14 requirements and licensee commitments.
IE inspec-tion report number 50-250/79-38 and 50-251/79-38 identified two inspector items of concern regarding the licensees IEB 79-14 inspection program.
Licensee action to resolve the items of concern was inspected.
In response to the concern regarding a lack of verification of correct piping material and correct valve weights, the licensee has committed to accomplish the following:
a.
For valve weights - verify weights used in the seismic analysis are as provided on certified vendor drawings or obtain verification of weights from valve vendors.
b.
For piping materials - verify piping material by means of records that may be available or justify not performing physical inspections.
In response to the inspector concern regarding the lack of QA involvement in IEB 79-14 inspections, the licensee performed an audit of both on-site and A/E site work.
The licensee commited to continue QA involvement in both IEB 79-02 and IEB 79-14 inspections and related work.
The inspector has no further questions regarding the lack of QA activities.
As a result of IEB 79-14 inspections and re-analysis, the licensee identi-fied an overstressed condition in the Unit 3 main feedwater bypass lines.
The overstressed condition was caused by erroneous modeling of six inch IPS valves and adjacent piping in the original seismic analysis.
The licensee reported that the original seismic analyst, used the wrong valve weights and valve size in the original analysis.
The valve weight mistake was discovered and corrected approximately a week later.
However the modeling of the wrong valve size was not discovered until the IEB 79-14 re-analysis.
The licensee reported that a subsequent review by the A/E revealed that no similar conditions that would cause an overstressing problem existed at Turkey Point Units 3 and 4.
The noted condition will be included in the licensee's response to IEB 79-14.
The inspector has no further questions regarding this matter for Turkey Point Units 3 and 4.
Pending licensee completion of IEB 79-14 requirements, the Bulletin shall remain open.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.