IR 05000244/2003005

IR 05000244-03-005, on 03/30/2003 - 06/28/2003, R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant; Routine Integrated Report. No Violations Were Noted

ML031970009
Person / Time
Site:	Ginna
Issue date:	07/16/2003
From:	James Trapp Division Reactor Projects I
To:	Mecredy R Rochester Gas & Electric Corp
References
IR-03-005
Download: ML031970009 (25)

Text

uly 16, 2003

SUBJECT:

R. E. GINNA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT- NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000244/2003005

Dear Dr. Mecredy:

On June 28, 2003, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your R. E. Ginna facility. The enclosed integrated inspection report documents the inspection findings, which were discussed on June 27, 2003 with Joe Widay and other members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.

The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel. Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified.

Since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the NRC has issued five Orders and several threat advisories to licensees of commercial power reactors to strengthen licensee capabilities, improve security force readiness, and enhance controls over access authorization. In addition to applicable baseline inspections, the NRC issued Temporary Instruction 2515/148, Inspection of Nuclear Reactor Safeguards Interim Compensatory Measures, and its subsequent revision, to audit and inspect licensee implementation of the interim compensatory measures required by order. Phase 1 of TI 2515/148 was completed at all commercial nuclear power plants during calendar year 02, and the remaining inspection activities for Ginna are scheduled for completion in August 2003. The NRC will continue to monitor overall safeguards and security controls at Ginna.

Dr. Robert In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, and its enclosure, will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publically Available Records (PARS) component of the NRCs document management system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

James M. Trapp, Chief Projects Branch 1 Division of Reactor Projects Docket No. 50-244 License No. DPR-18 Enclosure: Inspection Report 05000244/2003005 w/ Attachment: Supplemental Information cc w/encl:

J. Laurito, President, Rochester Gas and Electric P. Eddy, Electric Division, Department of Public Service, State of New York C. Donaldson, Esquire, State of New York, Department of Law N. Reynolds, Esquire W. Flynn, President, New York State Energy Research and Development Authority J. Spath, Program Director, New York State Energy Research and Development Authority D. Stenger, Ballard Spahr Andrews and Ingersoll. LLP T. Wideman, Director, Wayne County Emergency Management Office M. Meisenzahl, Administrator, Monroe County, Office of Emergency Preparedness T. Judson, Central New York Citizens Awareness Network

Dr. Robert

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000244/2003-005; 03/30/2003 - 06/28/2003; R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant; Routine

Integrated Report.

The report covered a 3-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and announced inspections by regional specialists. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process,

Revision 3, dated July 2000.

NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings

No Findings of Significance were identified.

Licensee-Identified Violations

None.

ii

REPORT DETAILS

Summary of Plant Status

Ginna operated at full reactor power throughout the inspection period.

REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity

1R01 Adverse Weather Protection

a. Inspection Scope

During April 3-5, 2003, the greater Rochester area experienced an ice storm that adversely effected the RG&E electrical grid, and exterior components and systems at the Ginna site. Ginna systems that were affected included the security system, the offsite emergency siren notification system, and the 751 offsite power supply line. As a precautionary measure, RG&E staffed the Ginna Technical Support Center, and Emergency Operations Facility. An inspector was present on site for part of the storm, and verified RG&E took the following actions:

• Entered ER-SC-1, Adverse Weather Plan and implemented the actions for an ice storm at the Ginna site.

• Implemented measures to compensate for the degraded conditions in the security system.

• Notified the NRC operations officer per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), that 59 out of the 96 emergency notification sirens were inoperable, and RG&E had implemented contingency plans.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R04 Equipment Alignment

a. Inspection Scope

Partial System Walkdowns. The inspectors performed partial walkdowns of the following systems/ trains:

• Battery Room Ventilation Systems

• A Diesel Generator Train

• Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System These inspections reviewed alignment of system valves and electrical circuit breakers to ensure proper in-service or standby configurations described in plant procedures and drawings. During the walkdowns, the inspectors also evaluated material conditions and general housekeeping of the systems and adjacent spaces. The A diesel generator was selected for a walkdown while the B diesel generator was out of service for maintenance. The ventilation systems for the battery rooms were selected for a walkdown because they support operability of the station batteries which are risk significant. The spent fuel pool system was selected because RG&E had lowered the level in the spent fuel pool by six feet to facilitate the performance of maintenance on the spent fuel pool skimmer system.

Complete System Walkdown. The inspectors conducted a detailed walkdown of the alignment and condition of the auxiliary feedwater system. The auxiliary feedwater system was selected due to its high risk significance. For the auxiliary feedwater system walkdown, in addition to verifying the system was aligned properly as required by technical specifications, the plant Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) and RG&E procedures and drawings, the inspector reviewed system maintenance records and action reports, to verify the outstanding maintenance activities did not significantly affect system function.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection

1. Fire Protection Walkdowns

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted walkdowns of fire areas to determine if there was adequate control of transient combustibles and ignition sources. The material condition of fire protection systems, equipment and features, and the material condition of fire barriers were also inspected against industry standards. In addition, the passive fire protection features were inspected, including the ventilation system fire dampers, structural steel fire proofing, and electrical penetration seals. Documents reviewed during the walkdowns are listed in the attachment. The following plant areas were inspected:

• A Battery Room

• B Battery Room

• Air Handling Room

• Charging Pump Room

• A Diesel Generator Room

• B Diesel Generator Room

• A Diesel Generator Vault Room

• B Diesel Generator Vault Room

• Relay Room

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

2. Fire Brigade Drill

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed a scheduled test of the fire brigade conducted at 10:00 a.m. on June 14, 2003. The test involved a simulated fire in the main station transformer. The inspectors verified the fire brigade personnel responded quickly to the fire, and used appropriate personal protective equipment. While combating the fire, the inspectors verified the brigade used proper fire-fighting techniques, and performed satisfactorily as a team. Following the drill, the inspectors verified the post-drill critique was thorough.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R06 Flood Protection Measures

a. Inspection Scope

To evaluate RG&Es internal flood protection measures, the inspectors reviewed the Ginna Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) and procedures ER-SC.1, Adverse Weather Plan, and ER-SC.2, High Water Flood Plan. The inspectors also toured the following areas:

• Screenhouse

• Turbine Building Basement

• Emergency Diesel Generator A Room

• Emergency Diesel Generator B Room

• Vault for the B emergency diesel generator During these tours, the inspectors evaluated the physical condition of penetration seals, watertight doors, pump pedestals, curbs, flood dikes, and floor drains.

• Findings No findings of significance were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector observed a licensed operator training scenario conducted on June 9, 2003. The training scenario was #FRP1-02, Pressurized Thermal Shock. The inspector reviewed the critical tasks associated with the evaluation, observed the operators performance during the exercise, and observed the post evaluation critique.

The inspector also reviewed and verified compliance with Ginna procedure OTG-2.2, Simulator Examination Instructions.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed how RG&E used the maintenance rule to address performance-related issues associated with the Spent Fuel Pool Structure, the Appendix R Emergency Lights, and the Flood Protection System Reverse Flow Check Valves.

Specific areas reviewed included scoping, performance criteria/ goal monitoring, and problem classification.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Evaluation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of RG&Es maintenance risk assessments required by paragraph a(4) of 10 CFR 50.65. This inspection included discussions with control room operators and scheduling department personnel regarding the use of RG&Es online risk monitoring software. The inspectors reviewed equipment tracking documentation, daily work schedules, and performed plant tours to gain reasonable assurance that actual plant configuration matched the assessed configuration.

Additionally, the inspectors verified that RG&Es risk management actions, for both planned and/ or emergent work, were consistent with those described in procedure IP-PSH-2, Integrated Work Schedule Risk Management. Risk assessments for the following out of service systems, structures, and/ or components were reviewed.

• Unplanned troubleshooting activities performed on April 15, 2003, for the diesel generator tie-in breaker to electrical bus 16.

• Unplanned troubleshooting conducted on the nuclear instrument channel 41 performed on April 23, 2003.

• Replacement of the bus 12B To 11B tie breaker performed on May 19 and 21, 2003.

C Reviewed replacement of a spent fuel pool (SFP) skimmer float on June 10, 2003, which required SFP level to be lowered to six feet below its normal level.

C Evaluated the risks associated with unavailability of the diesel fire pump for three days during planned maintenance and inspection.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R14 Personnel Performance During Non-Routine Plant Evolutions and Events

a. Inspection Scope

For the following non-routine events, the inspectors reviewed operator logs, plant computer data and strip charts to determine what occurred and how the operators responded, and to determine if the response was in accordance with plant procedures:

• On June 4, 2003, while rinsing a new mixed resin bed in the chemical and volume control system (CVCS) in accordance with procedure S-3.2B, Placing a Mixed Bed Demineralizer in Service - Boron Concentration Different Than RCS, reactor coolant pump (RCP) B #1 seal leak-off was observed to be decreasing toward zero; subsequently, a high standpipe alarm was received on the B RCP seal, and actions were entered for RCP Seal Malfunction in AP-RCP.1, Abnormal Procedure for RCP Seal Malfunction. Operator actions included stopping the resin bed rinse and returning the letdown flow lineup to normal.

Once the rinse was secured, RCP seal operation returned to normal parameters.

RG&E believes the abnormal seal performance was caused by the rinse operation, which lowered the RCP seal injection temperature from 140 degrees F to 80 degrees F as cold reactor makeup water (RMW) was used to maintain volume control tank (VCT) level during the process. Communication with Westinghouse, the seal vendor, indicated that a similar event occurred at the Prairie Island nuclear plant in April of this year during a similar evolution, and that continued operation of the pump was warranted given that the probable cause was known and corrected. RG&E has indicated that a change may be made to the procedure inserting a warning or procedural step to alert operators to this potential effect when S-3.2B is conducted in the future.

• On June 13, 2003, control rods began automatically withdrawing without a valid demand signal. The inspectors reviewed the operator response to this event, and verified operators took the appropriate actions outlined in AP-RCC.1 Continuous Control Rod Withdrawal/ Insertion. At the close of the report period, RG&E was still in the process of investigating the cause for the unintended control rod motion. Pending discovery of a root cause(s), operators left the control rods in the manual mode of operation.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R15 Operability Evaluations

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following operability evaluations to determine if system operability was properly justified.

• Action Report (AR) 2003-0826, Bearing Grease on Containment Recirc Fan Components. This AR identified an RG&E discovery that bearing grease had accumulated on the inlet plenums for the A, B and D containment recirculation fans. The grease buildup was detected on April 16, 2003, during the monthly inspection of the fan cooler units. An RG&E technical evaluation of the condition determined the grease buildup resulted from maintenance activities conducted on the recirculation fans during the month of March. The evaluation concluded the fans were operable since the small amount of grease that was present did not constitute a significant fire hazard, and vibration readings taken on the C recirculation fan unit, which also had an excessive grease buildup that was removed during the April 16, 2003 inspection, were normal. RG&E intends to remove the grease from the remaining fan units during the May inspection of the fan units. The inspector reviewed the analysis and physically inspected the fan units, and concluded the analysis provided reasonable assurance the fan cooler units were operable.

• Action Report (AR) 2003-0908, B SI Pump Has Iron Particles, This AR documented an RG&E discovery of a high iron and silicon content in the lubricating oil for the outboard bearing on the B safety injection pump. A high iron content may be indicative of impending bearing failure. The out-of-specification condition was identified as part of a routine surveillance test of the bearing oil, and was the first sample taken from the pump since it was rebuilt during the spring 2002 outage. An RG&E assessment of the condition determined the pump was operable given that pump vibration and temperature readings taken during surveillance tests were normal, and a conclusion from a vendor who analyzed the oil that such readings were not unexpected following maintenance activities. The inspector reviewed the RG&E assessment and determined that it provided reasonable assurance that the B SI pump was operable.

• Action Report (AR) 2003-0946, Exceeded Max Torque on V-3518 Package, This AR was written to document a concern that the packing gland on the B main steam check valve V-3518, may have been overtorqued during a maintenance activity. Excessive packing torque could prevent the check valve from going closed under certain accident conditions. An RG&E investigation of the event concluded that although the valve packing was torqued to 100-foot pounds vice the expected 56, the valve was operable. This determination was based upon a test conducted in October 2000, which proved the valve would still operate properly when the valve packing was torqued to 100-foot pounds. The inspector reviewed the engineering assessment of this event, examined valve V-3518, and discussed this event with personnel who were involved in the maintenance activity. Based upon this review, the inspector concluded the RG&E assessment provided reasonable assurance that valve V-3518 was operable.

• Action Report (AR) 2003-1212, Motor Does Not Meet Acceptance Criteria, This AR was written to document a discovery that the phase to phase resistance readings for the A hydrogen recombiner were greater than the acceptance criteria. An RG&E investigation concluded the increased resistance did not affect operability of the motor since motor current, voltage, and resistance readings were normal. The inspector discussed RG&Es conclusion with the cognizant system engineer, and the plant electricians who were involved with testing the motor. Further, the inspector reviewed several industry documents that discussed motor testing. Based upon this review, the inspector concluded the RG&E conclusion that the A hydrogen recombiner motor was operable was reasonable.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R16 Operator Work-Arounds

a. Inspection Scope

A review of cumulative effects of Operator Work-arounds was conducted during this period to determine if the cumulative effect of the work-arounds could affect the reliability/ availability of the systems or potential for improper operation of systems. To perform this review, the inspectors conducted a walk down of the Main Control Board (MCB) to review in-place Maintenance Identification tags (MIDs). Operator Challenges that RG&E had identified were also reviewed by the inspector to determine how the challenge could impact the operators ability to respond to plant transients and accidents in a correct and timely manner.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R19 Post Maintenance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the post maintenance tests for the following work orders (WO)to verify that RG&E appropriately demonstrated the components ability to perform their intended safety function.

• WO 20203140, Containment Vent Monitor Major PM Inspection

• WO 20300369, Valve 9746, Replace Yoke to Motor Cap Screw

• WO 20301276, During PT-17.4 AKDO8 Did Not Close on the Isolation Signal

• WO 202024234, Spent Fuel Pool Recirculating Pump A- Motor PM Inspection.

C WO 2020433, Replace Capacitor Bank IB Battery Charger.

C WO 20300052, Reviewed PT-13, Fire Pump Operation and System Alignment, Revision 87, performed on June 12 to establish operability of the diesel fire pump following pump and engine maintenance.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors witnessed the performance and/ or reviewed test data for the following activities to verify that the tests demonstrate the associated systems functional capability and operational readiness.

• PT-31, Charging Pump Inservice Test performed on April 3, 2003

• PT-2.3, Safeguard Power Valve Operations performed on April 7, 2003

• PT-12.7A, A Diesel Generator Starting Air Compressor Discharge Check Valve Test performed on April 8, 2003

• PT-2.10.7, Accumulator Discharge Check Valves Quarterly Exercising performed on April 21, 2003

• GME-42-99, Containment Vent performed on April 23, 2003

• CH-PRI-SAMP Room, Sampling in the Nuclear Sample Room performed on May 21, 2003

• S-12.4, RCS Leakage Surveillance Record Instructions, performed on May 21, 2003

• PT-17A, Control Room Radiation Monitor R-38, R-37, R-38 Operability Test

• Monthly Preventative Maintenance on the Appendix R Emergency Battery Lights WO 20204023

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications

a. Inspection Scope

The following temporary modifications (TMs) were reviewed and visually inspected by the inspectors to verify that the TMs were installed in conformance with the instructions contained in procedure IP-DES-3, Temporary Modifications:

• 2003-0011, Disable CREATS Mode B

• 2003-0012, MRPI 3 Rack/Relay Room

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness

1EP4 Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector conducted an in-office review of RG&E-submitted changes for the emergency plan-related documents to determine if the changes decreased the effectiveness of the plan. A thorough review was conducted of documents related to the risk significant planning standards (RSPS), such as classifications, notifications, and protective action recommendations. A cursory review was conducted for non-RSPS documents. These changes were reviewed against 10 CFR 50.54(q) to ensure that the changes do not decrease the effectiveness of the plan, and that the changes as made continue to meet the standards of 10 CFR 50.47(b) and the requirements of Appendix E. These changes are subject to future inspections to ensure that the impact of the changes continues to meet NRC regulations. The submitted and reviewed documents are listed in the attachment to this report.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1EP6 Drill Evaluation

a. Inspection Scope

On June 9, 2003, the inspector observed a licensed operator training assessment that included an emergency activation level classification. Training scenario #FRP1-02 was observed. The inspector verified that the appropriate emergency classification was identified, and external notifications to responsible parties were completed in a timely manner as required by the Ginna emergency response plan.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

RADIATION SAFETY

Cornerstone: Public Radiation Safety

2PS1 Gaseous and Liquid Effluents

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector reviewed the following documents to evaluate the effectiveness of the licensees radioactive gaseous and liquid effluent control programs. The requirements of the radioactive effluent controls are specified in the Improved Technical Specifications and the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ITS/ODCM).

• The 2001/2002 Radiological Annual Effluent Release Reports, including projected public radiation dose assessments

• Most recent ODCM (Revision 17, January 24, 2002)

• Technical justifications for the ODCM (for Revision 18), including the addition of the canal flow calibration requirement

• Selected 2003 analytical results for charcoal cartridge, particulate filter, and noble gas samples

• Implementation of the compensatory sampling and analysis program when the effluent radiation monitoring system (RMS) is out of service

• Selected 2002 and 2003 radioactive liquid and gaseous release permits

• Associated effluent control procedures

• Calibration records for laboratory measurements equipment (gamma and liquid scintillation counters)

• Implementation of measurement laboratory quality control program, including intralaboratory and interlaboratory comparisons

• Self-assessment for the Radiological Effluent Control Program (Incorrect Dilution of Consumable Product, October 18, 2002)

• The 2002 Nuclear Quality Assurance (NQA) audit (Audit No.

AINT-2002-001-JMT) for the ODCM implementations

• Most recent surveillance testing results (visual inspection, delta P, in-place testings for high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) and charcoal filters, air capacity test, and laboratory test for iodine collection efficiency) for the following air treatment systems, as required by Section 5.5.10 of the ITS

• Control room emergency air treatment system

• Containment air recirculation system

• Containment post-accident charcoal system

• Spent fuel pool charcoal absorber system

• Most recent channel calibration test and results for the following radioactive liquid and gaseous effluent radiation monitoring system (RMS) and its flow rate measurement devices which are listed in Tables 3.1-2 and 3.2-2 of the ODCM.

Radiation Monitoring System

• Containment Purge Noble Gas Monitors (R-12 and R-12A)

• Plant Vent Noble Gas Monitors (R-14 and R-14A)

• Condenser Air Ejector Monitors (R-15 and R-15A)

• Containment Fan Coolers Monitor (R-16)

• Component Cooling Water Monitor (R-17)

• Liquid Radwaste Disposal Monitor (R-18)

• Steam Generator Blowdown Monitor (R-19)

• Spent Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger (R-20A and R-20B)

• Turbine Building Floor Drain Monitor (R-21)

• High Conductivity Waste (R-22)

Flow Rate Measurement Devices:

• Plant Vent Flow Rate Measurement Monitor

• Containment Purge Flow Rate Measurement Monitor

• Air Ejector Flow Rate Measurement Monitor The inspector toured and observed the following systems to evaluate the effectiveness of the licensees radioactive gaseous and liquid effluent control programs.

• Walkdown for determining the availability of radioactive liquid/ gaseous effluent RMS and for determining the equipment material condition

• Observed charcoal/ particulate filter sampling technique

• Observed radioactive gaseous effluent sampling technique and sample preparation for gamma spectrometry measurements

• Walkdown for determining operability of air cleaning systems and for determining the equipment material condition

• Spent fuel pool, including telltale leak collection area

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

SAFEGUARDS

Cornerstone: Physical Protection

3PP4 Security Plan Changes

a. Inspection Scope

An in-office review was conducted of changes to the Ginna Training and Qualification Plan identified as Revision 8 and the Ginna Security Plan identified as Revision V.

These documents were submitted to the NRC on December 19, 2002, and March 20, 2003, in accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 50.54(p). The review was conducted to confirm that the changes were made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(p), and did not decrease the effectiveness of the above-listed plans. The NRC recognizes that some requirements contained in these Plans may have been superceded by the February 2002 Interim Compensatory Measures Order.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector sampled RG&E submittals for the performance indicators (PIs) listed below. To verify the accuracy of the PI data reported during that period, PI definitions and guidance contained in NEI 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Indicator Guideline, Rev 1, were used to verify the basis in reporting each data element.

Reactor Safety Cornerstone

• Reactor Coolant System Specific Activity, periods April 2002 to March 2003

• Reactor Coolant System Identified Leak Rate, periods April 2002 to March 2003

• Residual Heat Removal Safety System Unavailability, periods January 2002 to March 2003 To perform this review, an inspector examined control room logs and compared them to the monthly PI data collection sheets. The inspector also observed RG&E personnel sample and analyze water from the reactor coolant system, and calculate the leakage rate from the reactor coolant system. An inspector also interviewed RG&E personnel who collect, evaluate, analyze, and distribute PI data.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution

1. Action Report Review

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector reviewed the selected following 2002-2003 Action Reports (ARs) to evaluate the effectiveness of the licensees problem identification and resolution processes in the areas of radioactive liquid and gaseous effluent control programs:

• ARs for Routine Effluent Control Program (AR-2003-1224, AR-2003-0019, AR-2002-1983, and AR-2002-2876)

• ARs for Radiation Monitoring Systems (AR-2003-0065, AR-2003-0066, AR-2003-0774, AR-2003-0815, AR-20031076, AR-2003-1721, AR-2002-1377, AR-2002-1449, AR-2002-1563, AR-2002-2212, AR-200-2242, AR-2002-2713, AR-2002-2787, and AR-2002-3403).

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

2. Review of Containment Tendon Action Reports

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector reviewed Action Reports (AR) 2000-1656, Grease Levels in Containment Tendon Grease Cans Observed to be Lower Than Desired/Expected, 2003-00770, Grease Leakage at Three Tendon Fill Pipes, and 2000-0678, Grease Found Leaking From End on Grease Fill Piping Located in the Intermediate Building Sub-Basement, to ensure that the corrective actions for the associated plant issues were appropriate.

These issues were selected for follow-up review due to their potential safety significance. The ARs reported grease leaking from the containment tendon grease fill pipes, located in the intermediate building sub-basement area. RG&E determined that excessive corrosion of the carbon steel grease piping led to wall thinning, and eventual pipe failure. The corrosion occurred because RG&E did not maintain the groundwater collection system that existed in the subbasement area where the tendons were located.

This condition allowed groundwater to collect around the grease piping facilitating corrosion of the piping. To stop further corrosion of the piping, RG&E drained the water from the tendon area and repaired the dewatering system. RG&E then encapsulated the piping in an epoxy sealant. Though leakage still occurs through several fittings, as evidenced by an oily slime, it has been greatly reduced. RG&E also developed a surveillance program for the tendon fittings that involves periodic inspections of the subbasement area and a verification that the tendons are covered with grease.

To review how RG&E dispositioned the ARs, the inspector discussed the leaks with cognizant station personnel, and conducted in-plant inspections of the current condition of the containment tendon grease fill piping. The inspector also examined the ARs to ensure that the issues were properly identified in a timely manner, the evaluations and dispositions of the issues were appropriate, extent of condition was addressed, the issues were appropriately prioritized, causes were identified, and corrective actions were identified and planned or completed. The ARs were evaluated against the requirements of RG&E procedure IP-CAP-1, "Abnormal Condition Tracking Initiation or Notification (Action) Report."

b. Findings

The inspector found that the corrective actions associated with the reviewed ARs were appropriate and acceptable upon completion. Cause evaluations, engineering evaluations, and operability determinations were thorough. No operability concerns were identified.

4OA3 Event Follow-up

(Closed) LER 50-244/2003-01 Main Feedwater Discharge Isolation Valves Rendered Inoperable During Maintenance Activities- Operation Prohibited by TS On April 2, 2003, RG&E discovered that on two separate occasions, June 8, 2000, and January 16, 2002, maintenance activities on non-safety-related bus tie breakers, 52/BTA-A and 52/BTB-B, rendered the associated main feedwater pump discharge valve (MFPDV) inoperable and control room operators did not enter the applicable Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.7.3., which states that in the event a MFPDV is rendered inoperable, it should be closed within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

The maintenance activities conducted on June 8, 2000, and January 16, 2002, were 51.5 and 34.9 hours1.041667e-4 days <br />0.0025 hours <br />1.488095e-5 weeks <br />3.4245e-6 months <br /> long respectively. RG&E attributed the event to be caused by personnel failing to consider system interactions when performing maintenance activities.

RG&E corrective actions will include revising the TS basis for LCO 3.7.3, to state that the bus tie breakers are required for operability of the MFPDVs, and training operators on how breakers 52/BTA-A and 52/BTB-B affect the operability of the MFPDVs. No new significant findings were identified in the inspectors review of this issue.

This finding constitutes a minor violation of TS 3.7.3. that is not subject to enforcement action in accordance with Section IV of the Enforcement Policy. RG&E documented this issue in Action Report 2003-0717, Past Operability Concern Associated with Bus Tie Breaker. This LER is closed.

4OA5 Other Activities

Third Party Assessment Report Review The inspectors reviewed the interim assessment report of the Ginna Station conducted by World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO) for the period of April 2001 to February 2003.

4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit

On June 27, 2003, the resident inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Widay and other members of his staff who acknowledged the findings. The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was not provided or examined during the inspection.

ATTACHMENT:

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee personnel

P. Bamford Operations Manager

R. Biedenbach Safety/Fire Coordinator

M. Flaherty Nuclear Safety & Licensing Manager

B. Flynn Primary Systems and Reactor Engineering Manager

J. Hotchkiss Mechanical Maintenance Manager

R. Marchionda Nuclear Assessment Department Manager

B. Mecredy Vice President Nuclear Operations

R. Ploof Scheduling Manager

R. Popp Production Superintendent

J. Smith Maintenance Superintendent

T. White Balance of Plant Systems Engineering Manager

J. Widay VP, Plant Manager

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened

NONE

Opened and Closed

NONE

Closed

50-245/2003-001 LER Main Feedwater Pump Discharge Isolation Valves Rendered Inoperable During Maintenance on Bus tie Breakers (Section 4OA3)

Discussed

NONE