IR 05000219/2010004
| ML103060033 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oyster Creek |
| Issue date: | 11/02/2010 |
| From: | Bellamy R NRC/RGN-I/DRP/PB6 |
| To: | Pacilio M Exelon Nuclear Generation Corp, Exelon Nuclear |
| BELLAMY RR | |
| References | |
| IR-10-004 | |
| Download: ML103060033 (28) | |
Text
ber 2, 2010
SUBJECT:
OYSTER CREEK GENERATING STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000219/2010004
Dear Mr. Pacilio:
On September 30,2010, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Oyster Creek Generating Station. The enclosed integrated inspection report documents the inspection findings, which were discussed on October 19, 2010, with Mr. M.
Massaro, Oyster Creek Generating Station Site Vice President, and other members of your staff.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel. Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Website at http://www.nrc.govlreading-rm/adams.html(the Public Electronic Reading Room). We appreciate your cooperation. Please contact me at (610) 337-5200 if you have any questions regarding this letter.
Sincerely,
~am~~~
Projects Branch 6 Division of Reactor Projects Docket No. 50-219 License No. DPR-16 Enclosure: Inspection Report 05000219/2010004 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information cc: Distribution via ListServ
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000219/2010004; 07/01/2010 - 09/30/2010; Exelon Energy Company, LLC, Oyster Creek
Generating Station; Integrated report.
The report covered a 3-month period of inspection by resident inspectors, and an emergency preparedness inspector. No findings were identified.
REPORT DETAILS
Summary of Plant Status
The Oyster Creek Generating Station (Oyster Creek) began the inspection period operating at 100% (full power).
On twenty-four occasions during the summer months operators performed unplanned power reductions of less than or equal to 20% power in accordance with operating procedures to maintain Oyster Creek's circulating water discharge temperatures below the environmental discharge permit requirements or to perform condenser backwash procedures to address degrading condenser vacuum conditions. These power reductions were of short duration and the plant returned to 100% power in each instance.
On four occasions during the summer months operators performed unplanned power reductions of greater than 20% power in accordance with operating procedures to maintain Oyster Creek's circulating water discharge temperatures below the environmental discharge permit requirements or to perform condenser backwash procedures to address degrading condenser vacuum conditions. These power reductions were of short duration and the plant returned to 100% power in each instance.
On August 1, operators performed a planned power reduction to 80% power to perform a rod pattern adjustment. The plant returned to full power later that day.
On August 10, operators performed an unplanned power reduction to 80% power to maintain the plant's circulating water discharge temperatures below Oyster Creek's environmental discharge permit requirements due to a trip of the #1 dilution pump. The plant returned to 100%
power on August 10, following the start of the standby dilution pump.
On September 3, operators performed a planned power reduction to 80% power to perform a rod pattern adjustment and turbine valve testing. The plant returned to full power on September 4.
On September 13, operators performed a planned power reduction to 61% power to perform troubleshooting for a ground indication on the 125VDC, "A" non-safety related bus. The reason for the power reduction was for As Low as Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) occupational dose considerations when conducting troubleshooting in the condenser bay, which is a high radiation area during plant operations. The plant returned to full power on September 14.
On September 16, operators performed a planned power reduction to 64% power to perform repairs on grounds identified on the 125VDC, "A" non-safety related bus. The reason for the power reduction was for ALARA occupational dose considerations when conducting repairs in the condenser bay, which is a high radiation area during plant operations. The plant returned to full power on September 17.
Oyster Creek operated at full power for the remainder of the inspection period.
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity
1R01 Adverse Weather Protection
a.
Inspection Scope (2 samples)
The inspectors performed two site specific weather-related condition inspections.
The inspectors reviewed Exelon's preparations for Hurricane Earl from August 31 through September 2. The inspectors performed walkdowns of areas that could be potentially impacted by the weather conditions, such as the intake structure, diesel structure, and transformers, and verified that station personnel secured loose materials staged for outside work prior to the forecast high winds. The inspectors verified that Exelon monitored the approach of the storm according to applicable procedures and took appropriate actions as required.
The inspectors reviewed Exelon's response to the declaration of a tornado watch on September 28. The inspectors verified that Exelon monitored the approach of the storm according to applicable procedures and took appropriate actions as required.
Documents reviewed for this inspection activity are listed in the Supplemental Information attachment to this report.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1
R04 Equipment Alignment
a.
Inspection Scope (3 samples)
The inspectors performed three partial equipment alignment inspections. The partial equipment alignment inspections were completed during conditions when the equipment was of increased safety significance such as would occur when redundant equipment was unavailable during maintenance or adverse conditions, or after equipment was recently returned to service after maintenance. The inspectors performed a partial walkdown of the following systems, and when applicable, the associated electrical distribution components and control room panels, to verify the equipment was aligned to perform its intended safety functions:
- Containment spray system 2 with containment spray system 1 unavailable for surveillance testing on July 7;
- #1 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) with #2 EDG inoperable for corrective maintenance on August 9; and
Documents reviewed for this inspection activity are listed in the Supplemental Information attachment to this report.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1 ROS Fire Protection (71111.05)
a. Inspection Scope
(71111.05A 1 sample; 71111.050 6 samples)
The inspectors observed one plant fire drill and performed a walkdown of six plant areas to assess their vulnerability to fire.
The inspectors observed an unannounced fire drill on September 29 to assess the readiness of Exelon's fire brigade to respond to fires within the plant. The drill scenario involved a simulated fire in the 'C' safety related battery room. The inspectors attended Exelon's drill critique to evaluate its adequacy in assessing personnel performance in responding to the postulated fire.
During plant walkdowns, the inspectors observed combustible material control, fire detection and suppression equipment availability, visible fire barrier configuration, and the adequacy of compensatory measures (when applicable). The inspectors reviewed "Oyster Creek Fire Hazards Analysis Report" and "Oyster Creek Pre-Fire Plans" for risk insights and design features credited in these areas. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed corrective action program condition reports documenting fire protection deficiencies to verify that identified problems were being evaluated and corrected.
Documents reviewed for this inspection activity are listed in the Supplemental Information attachment to this report. The following plant areas were inspected:
- RB-FZ-1 F4, "Northeast corner room" on July 29;
- TB-FZ-11 B, "Turbine Building Basement/Mezzanine North End" on September 1;
- OB-FZ-5, "Control Room" on September 3;
- OB-FZ-9, "Office Building" on September 3;
- RB-FZ-1D, "Reactor Building 51' Elevation" on September 17 and
- TB-FZ-11D, "Turbine Building Basement South End" on September 17.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1
R06 Flood Protection Measures
a.
Inspection Scope (2 samples)
The inspectors performed one internal flood protection inspection activity and one internal flood protection inspection activity associated with bunkers and manholes.
The inspectors performed an internal flood protection inspection activity in the northeast corner room of the reactor building which contains the containment spray system 1 pumps and heat exchangers. The inspectors performed a walkdown of the flood barriers, floor drains, and floor sumps. The inspectors evaluated these items to determine if internal flood vulnerabilities existed and to assess the physical condition of the equipment and components in the northeast corner room. The inspectors reviewed preventative maintenance activities associated with flood protection equipment. The inspectors also reviewed Exelon's procedures related to flooding of the northeast corner room.
The inspectors performed an internal flood protection inspection associated with bunkers and manholes. Inspections of the startup transformer cable vault and four station blackout cable vaults were performed as they are subject to flooding and contained risk-significant cables. The inspectors performed walkdowns of these vaults to verify as-found water levels in the vaults and reviewed Exelon's photographs and documentation to verify the physical condition of the cables and cable supports. The inspectors also reviewed Exelon's actions to monitor cable degradation and actions to minimize water accumulation and submergence of medium voltage cables contained in these areas.
Documents associated with these reviews are listed in the Supplemental Information attachment to this report.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program
a.
Inspection Scope (1 sample)
The inspectors observed one simulator training scenario to assess operator performance and training effectiveness on September 1. The inspectors observed training scenario "2612.CREW.1 0-5.01 ". The inspectors assessed whether the simulator adequately reflected the expected plant response, operator performance met Exelon's procedural requirements, and the simulator instructor's critique identified crew performance problems. Documents reviewed for this inspection activity are listed in the Supplemental Information attachment to this report.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness
a.
Inspection Scope (2 samples)
The inspectors performed two maintenance effectiveness inspection activities. The inspectors reviewed the following degraded equipment issues in order to assess the effectiveness of maintenance by Exelon:
- Control Room/Cable spreading room HVAC (IR 759293) on August 6: and
- Drywell equipment drain tank (IR 1110290) on September 9.
The inspectors also verified that the systems or components were being monitored in accordance with Exelon's maintenance rule program requirements. The inspectors compared documented functional failure determinations and unavailable hours to those being tracked by Exelon. The inspectors reviewed completed maintenance work orders and procedures to determine if inadequate maintenance contributed to equipment performance issues. The inspectors also reviewed applicable work orders, corrective action program condition reports, operator narrative logs, and vendor manuals.
Documents reviewed for this inspection activity are listed in the Supplemental I nformation attachment to this report.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
a.
Inspection Scope (5 samples)
The inspectors reviewed five on-line risk management evaluations through direct observation and document reviews for the following plant configurations:
- Risk evaluation on core spray system check valves due to missed surveillances on August 26;
- #2 emergency diesel generator inoperable due to an overspeed trip on August 9;
- Master automatic recirculation speed control unavailable due to unplanned maintenance on August 19; .
- Core spray system #2 unavailable due to planned maintenance and receipt of spurious half-scrams on reactor protection system #2 on August 23; and
- Declaration of tornado watch with 0-1029 offsite power line unavailable for Jersey Central Power and Light (JCPL) planned maintenance on September 28.
The inspectors reviewed the applicable risk evaluations, work schedules, and control room logs for these configurations to verify the risk was assessed correctly and reassessed for emergent conditions in accordance with Exelon's procedures. Exelon's actions to manage risk from maintenance and testing were reviewed during shift turnover meetings, control room tours, and plant walkdowns. The inspectors also used Exelon's on-line risk monitor (Paragon) to gain insights into the risk associated with these plant configurations. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed corrective action program condition reports documenting problems associated with risk assessments and emergent work evaluations. Documents reviewed for this ins'pection activity are listed in the Supplemental Information attachment to this report.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R15 Operability Evaluations
a. Inspection Scope
(4 samples)
The inspectors reviewed four operability evaluations for degraded or non-conforming conditions associated with:
- Water in the turbine building radioactive gaseous environmental monitoring system (RAG EMS) filter cartridge on July 16 (IR 1091519);
- Average power range monitor (APRM) #1 did not insert half-scram during surveillance testing on August 7 (IR 1099066);
- #1 EDG cooling fan shaft pillow-block bearing failure evaluation on July 27 (IR
===1078312); and
- Core spray system check valves past surveillance dates on August 13 (lR 1097964).
The inspectors reviewed the technical adequacy of the operability evaluations to ensure the conclusions were technically justified: The inspectors also walked down accessible portions of equipment to corroborate the adequacy of Exelon's operability evaluations.
Documents reviewed for this inspection activity are listed in the Supplemental Information attachment to this report.
b. Findings
Introduction.
The inspectors identified an unresolved item (URI) to review Exelon's equipment apparent cause evaluation (EACE) for the #1 EDG cooling fan shaft pillow-block bearing failure to determine whether a performance deficiency exists that was within Exelon's ability to foresee and prevent. The inspectors will review Exelon's EACE when it is complete, which had not occurred by the end of this inspection period.
Description.
During the routine overhaul and inspection of the #1 EDG on June 8, maintenance personnel noticed damage to the cooling fan shaft pillow-block bearing.
Exelon removed the bearing for further analysis by an offsite lab and replaced the bearing and shaft with new components on June 9. Exelon entered this issue into their corrective action program as IR 1078312 and IR 1103610 and is performing an EACE to review the offsite lab report to determine the cause of the failure and any additional corrective actions. (URI 05000219/2010004-01: EDG Pillow-Block Bearing)
1R18 Plant Modifications
a. Inspection Scope
(1 temporary modification sample)
The inspectors reviewed one temporary plant modification that was implemented by Exelon personnel at Oyster Creek. The inspectors reviewed the following modification:
- Temporary configuration change package (TCCP) to lift lead to lock in electromatic relief valve (EMRV) open alarm (ECR 10-00284) on August 17.
The inspectors reviewed the engineering/procedure change packages, design basis, and licensing basis documents associated with each of the modifications to ensure that the systems associated with each of the modifications would not be adversely impacted by the change. The inspectors walked down portions of the systems associated with the modification when applicable and prudent. The inspectors reviewed the modifications to ensure they were performed in accordance with Exelon's modification process. The inspectors also ensured that revisions to licensing/design basis documents and operating procedures were properly revised to support implementation of the modification. The inspectors also reviewed Exelon's 10 CFR 50.59 screening for this modification. Documents reviewed for this inspection activity are listed in the Supplemental Information attachment to this report.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
=
The inspectors observed portions of and/or reviewed the results of seven post-maintenance tests for the following equipment:
- V-21-17 stem lubrication and packing retorque on July 7 (R2126779);
- Standby gas treatment system #2 filter replacement on August 2 (C2023814);
- Replacement of #2 EDG overspeed trip switch on August 8 (C2024062);
- V-28-23 replacement on August 19 (R2119622);
- Core spray system 2 relay replacement and oil change on August 25 (R2163871);
- V-14-30 stem lubrication and packing retorque on September 29 (R2142502);
- 'E' EMRV pressure switch replacement on September 24 (R2119341).
The inspectors verified that the post-maintenance tests conducted were adequate for the scope of the maintenance performed and that they ensured component functional capability. Documents reviewed for this inspection activity are listed in the Supplemental Information attachment to this report.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R22 Surveillance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
(2 In-service test (1ST) samples and 2 routine surveillance samples)
The inspectors observed portions of and/or reviewed the results of four surveiliance/lST tests:
- Reactor building to suppression chamber self actuating vacuum breaker surveillance test and 1ST on July 1;
- Containment spray and emergency service water system 1 pump operability, 1ST and containment spray pump trip surveillance on July 7;
- Reactor coolant system (RCS) leak detection surveillance on July 15; and
- Automatic scram contactor surveillance on August 30.
The inspectors verified that test data was complete and met procedural requirements to demonstrate that the systems and components were capable of performing their intended function. The inspectors also reviewed corrective action program condition reports that documented deficiencies identified during these surveillance tests.
Documents reviewed for this inspection activity are listed in the Supplemental Information attachment to this report.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness [EP]
1EP2 Alert and Notification System (ANS) Evaluation
a. Inspection Scope
(71114.02 - 1 Sample)
The inspectors conducted an onsite review to assess the maintenance and testing of the Oyster Creek alert and notification system (ANS). During the inspection, the inspectors reviewed the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) design report to ensure Exelon's compliance with design report commitments, the system maintenance and test records, and applicable ANS procedures. The planning standards contained in 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5) and the related requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix E, were used as reference criteria .
.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1EP3 Emergency Response Organization (ERa) Staffing and Augmentation System
a. Inspection Scope
(71114.03 - 1 Sample)
The inspectors reviewed Oyster Creek's emergency response organization (ERa)augmentation staffing requirements, training program, and the process for notifying and augmenting the ERa. This was performed to ensure the readiness of key licensee staff to respond to an emergency event and to ensure Exelon's ability to activate their emergency facilities in a timely manner. The inspectors reviewed Oyster Creek's ERa duty roster, sampling of training records, call-in reports, applicable procedures, and condition reports (CR) related to the ERa staffing augmentation system. The planning standards contained in 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2) and related requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix E, were used as reference criteria.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1EP4 Emergency Action Level lEAl) and Emergency Plan Changes
a. Inspection Scope
(71114.04 - 1 Sample)
Since the last NRC inspection of this program area, Exelon implemented changes to their emergency action levels (EAL), emergency plan and implementing procedures.
Exelon had determined that, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(q), any change made to the plan, and its lower-tier implementing procedures, had not resulted in any decrease in effectiveness of the emergency plan, and that the revised emergency plan continued to meet the standards in 50.47(b) and the reqUirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix E.
The inspectors reviewed all EAL changes and a sample of emergency plan changes to evaluate any potential decreases in effectiveness of the emergency plan. However, this review by the inspectors was not documented in an NRC Safety Evaluation Report and does not constitute formal NRC approval of the changes. Therefore, these changes remain subject to future NRC inspection in their entirety. The requirements contained in 10 CFR 50.54(q) were used as reference criteria.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1EP5 Correction of Emergency Preparedness Weaknesses
a. Inspection Scope
(71114.05 - 1 Sample)
The inspectors reviewed Exelon's Corrective Action Program (CAP) procedure for evaluating their EP program and performance. The inspectors reviewed a sampling of drill reports, self assessment reports, 10 CFR 50.54(t) audits, and EP-related CRs from drills and audits. The inspectors assessed Exelon's response to and documentation of two actual declarations of Unusual Events which occurred on February 1, 2009 and July 12,2009. The planning standards contained in 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14) and the related requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix E, were used as reference criteria.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
lOA] 40A1 Performance Indicator Verification (71151)
a. Inspection Scope
(5 Samples)
The inspectors reviewed performance indicator (PI) data associated with five Pis. The inspectors used the guidance provided in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-02, Revision 6, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline" to assess the accuracy and completeness of the PI data reported by Exelon between July 1, 2009 and June 30, 2010. Documents reviewed for this inspection activity are listed in the Supplemental Information attachment to this report.
.
The inspectors reviewed the following Pis:
- Drill and exercise performance (DEP);
- Emergency Response Organization (ERO) drill participation;
- Alert and notification system (ANS);
- Reactor coolant system activity (RCSA); and
- Reactor coolant system identified leak rate (RCSL).
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
40A2 Identification and Resolution of Problems (71152)
.1 Review of Items Entered Into the Corrective Action Program
The inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into Exelon's corrective action program to identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for follOW-Up. This was accomplished by reviewing hard copies of each condition report, attending daily screening meetings, or accessing Exelon's computerized database.
Assessment and Observations No findings of significance were identified.
40A3 Event Followup (71153) (1 sample)
The inspectors performed one event follow-up inspection activity. Documents reviewed for this inspection activity are listed in the Supplemental Information attached to this report .
.1 Drywell Unidentified Leak Rate Increase
a. Inspection Scope
On September 7, operators noted that drywell unidentified leak rate (UILR) rose to a peak of 2.63 gpm from its prior value, which had been trending from 0.92 to 1.02 gpm.
Exelon determined that the problem was a result of a failed open valve in the drywell equipment drain tank recirculation line and installed a temporary modification (ECR 10-00530) to correct the problem. The UILR subsequently returned to its previous values.
The inspectors verified that operations personnel responded in accordance with procedures and equipment responded as intended by reviewing the completed procedures, control room narrative logs, corrective action program condition reports, and through interviews of operations personnel. The inspectors also reviewed technical specification requirements to ensure that Oyster Creek was operated in accordance with its operating license. The inspectors performed a walkdown of the main control room panels and indications to verify equipment status and plant parameters. The UILR increase is described and evaluated in corrective action program condition report IR 1110290.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
40A6 Meetings, Including Exit Resident Inspector Exit Meeting. On October 19, the inspectors presented their overall findings to members of Exelon's management led by Mr. M. Massaro, (Site Vice President), and other members of his staff who acknowledged the findings. The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was not retained at the conclusion of the inspection period.
Commissioner Site Visit. On August 31, a site visit was conducted by Mr. William Magwood, Commissioner for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Mr. Martin Virgilio, Deputy Executive Director for Operations. During Mr. Magwood's visit, he toured the plant and met with Exelon managers. Mr. Marc Dapas, Acting Regional Administrator (RA) for the NRC Region 1 office, accompanied Mr. Magwood on his visit.
40A7 Licensee-Identified Violations None.
ATTACHMENT:
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee Personnel
- M. Massaro, Site Vice-President
- P. Orphanos, Plant Manager
- D. Dicello, Director, Work Management
- J. Dostal, Director, Operations
- A. Farenga, Emergency Preparedness Manager
- R. Peak, Director, Engineering
- R. Reiner, Director, Training
- P. Colgan, Director, Maintenance
- J. Barstow, Manager, Regulatory Assurance
- T. Keenan, Manager, Security
- R. Wiebenga, Senior Manager, System Engineering
- H. Ray, Senior Manager, Design Engineering
- M. McKenna, Shift Operations Superintendent
- D. Peiffer, Manager, Nuclear Oversight
- J. Kerr, Manager, Corrective Action Program
- M. Ford, Manager, Environmental/Chemistry Manager
- J. Renda, Manager, Radiation Protection
- K. Barnes, Regulatory Assurance Specialist
Others:
State of New Jersey, Bureau of Nuclear Engineering
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Opened
- 05000219/2010004-01 URI EDG Pillow-Block Bearing (Section 1R15)