IR 05000206/1993024
| ML13329A277 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | San Onofre  |
| Issue date: | 08/13/1993 |
| From: | Wong H NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML13329A276 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-206-93-24-MM, 50-361-93-24, 50-362-93-24, NUDOCS 9309290176 | |
| Download: ML13329A277 (56) | |
Text
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION V
Report No /93-24, 50-361/93-24, 50-362/93-24 Docket No, 50-361, 50-362 License No DPR-13, NPF-10, NPF-15 Licensee:
Southern California Edison Company Irvine Operations Center 23 Parker Street Irvine, California 92718 Facility Name:
San Onofre Units 1, 2 and 3 Meeting At:
San Onofre, San Clemente, California Report Prepared By: Christopher M. Regan, Intern Approved By:
I
//___
J. W g, Chi Date Signed Reactor ProjectsSection II Summary A management meeting was held on July 29, 1993, to discuss the following issues:
- San Onofre new organizational structure,
-
Status of Unit 1,
- Units 2 steam generator tube inspection results,
- Unit 3 steam generator leakage monitoring and evaluation,
- Control of equipment near safety-related components, and
- Removal of transformer seismic restraint A copy of the slides used during the licensee's presentation is enclose PDR ADOCK 05000206 G
DETAILS 1. Meeting Attendees Southern California Edison Company H. Ray, Senior Vice President, Power Systems R. Krieger, Vice President, Nuclear Generation R. Rosenblum, Vice President, Engineering and Technical Support W. Marsh, Manager, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs G. Gibson, Supervisor, Onsite Nuclear Licensing L. Cash, Maintenance Manager B. Katz, Manager, Nuclear Oversight J. Reilly, Manager, Engineering, Construction and Fuel Services M. Speer, Manager, Security G. Moore, Plant Superintendent, Unit 1 J. Rainsberry, Plant Licensing Manager R. Giroux, Engineer, Onsite Nuclear Licensing P. Knapp, Manager, Health Physics R. Waldo, Operations Manager M. Short, Manager, Site Technical Services K. Slagle, Manager, Outage Management R. Joyce, Maintenance Manager, Units 2/3 A. Thiel, Manager, Electrical Systems Engineering M. Wharton, Manager, Nuclear Design Engineering J. Clark, Manager, Chemistry G. Sanders, Onsite Nuclear Licensing S. Medling, Manager, Unit 1 and Generic Licensing C. Robinson, Nuclear Security Officer D. Barron, Corporate Communications Representative San Diego Gas and Electric Company R. Lacy, Manager, Nuclear R. Erickson, Site Representative Nuclear Requlatory Commission K. Perkins, Director, Division of Reactor Safety and Projects E. Adensam, Assistant Director, Regions IV and V, NRR M. Fields, Project Manager, Units 2 and 3, NRR L. Miller, Chief, Reactor Safety Branch H. Wong, Chief, Reactor ProjectsSection II C. Caldwell, Senior Resident Inspector J. Russell, Resident Inspector D. Solorio, Resident Inspector C. Regan, Intern, NRR Others A. Horan, Reporter, Orange County Register M. Larabee, Reporter, Blade Citizen Details The meeting was convened at 9:00 Mr. Ray provided brief statements concerning the topics to be discussed during the meeting and Mr. Perkins introduced the NRC staff at the meeting. Mr. Perkins stated that this was one of several meetings this year with San Onofre management and that the purpose of the last meeting (held on July 1, 1993) was to discuss the planned Unit 2 steam generator inspection program. Mr. Perkins stated that the NRC has continued to closely monitor the SONGS steam generator issues since the last meetin In addition, Mr. Perkins stated that he considered the commercial-grade test facility located at the San Onofre site to be state-of-the-art and his tour of the test facility to be time well spen a. New Organizational Structure Mr. Ray initiated SCE's presentation by describing the need for organizational changes as San Onofre transitioned from a three-unit to a two-unit site. Mr. Ray stated that he will be devoting 20% of his time to the nuclear area, but that Mr. Krieger and Mr. Rosenblum would devote 100% of their time to nuclear power generation. SCE had also established a new position devoted entirely to business management, filled by Mr. Wambold, who reports to Mr. Ra Mr. Perkins questioned how information flow from the Nuclear Oversight Division to senior management would be affected. Mr. Ray responded by stating that the groups and information flow paths would remain basically intact, but that the responsible individuals have changed. Mr. Rosenblum added that the senior management team would continue to collectively make decisions based on Nuclear Oversight information. Mr. Rosenblum stated that problems with a two-headed organization that had occurred in the past had been solved through teamwork and concentrating on an optimization of the whole organization. Mr. Wong questioned if the Unit 1 organization would remain integrated into the organizational structure in light of the different conditions and problems that the permanently shutdown Unit would be facing. Mr. Krieger responded that Unit 1 would remain within the current organizational structure, and that the extent of management effort that was required by Unit 1 would be continually evaluated. Mr. Ray agreed with NRC comments that the organizational changes were principally related to departmental alignment shifts and that departments maintained their previous work responsibilitie b. Unit 1 Status Mr. Marsh provided an overview of the milestones and current changes that had occurred regarding the status of Unit 1 shutdown since the meeting held in October 1992. Mr. Marsh stated that the results of recent spent fuel pool heat-up tests demonstrated design heat load calculations were more conservative than the actual heat-up rate
measured. As of August 1993, based on the measured pool heat-up rate, the pool temperature is not expected to exceed 140* Fahrenheit, with no forced cooling and the building doors ope Mr. Marsh also discussed the Unit 1 proposed decommissioning plan and indicated that a proposed decommissioning plan would be submitted to the NRC around November 1993. Mr. Marsh indicated that Unit 1 would be maintained in a SAFSTOR condition and that all three SONGS units would be decommissioned at one time. Mr. Perkins asked if recent information on decommissioning and component disposal at low-level waste disposal sites, in particular a report published concerning the Humboldt Bay facility, had been taken into consideration for disposal of Unit 1 components. Mr. Marsh stated that Barnwell, South Carolina, was the only site still accepting low-level waste, and if SCE was to decommission all 3 Units simultaneously at the end of their service life, as planned, the Barnwell low-level compact would be unable to cope with the quantity of material at San Onofre. Mr. Rosenblum added that presently the cost was prohibiting shipment of Unit 1 components for disposal at Barnwell, thus eliminating early decommissioning as a viable optio He continued by stating that the ultimate end was to return the site to pre-construction conditions. Mr. Rosenblum stated that SCE personnel attend the quarterly meetings with other utilities who have units undergoing decommissionin Mr. Marsh continued the discussion by noting that Unit 1 was very close to completing SAFSTOR preparations and that the spent fuel pool was designed such that criticality could not be achieved even if the pool were filled with pure water (no boron).
Mr. Marsh commented that the pool currently remained at shutdown boron concentration. Mr. Perkins asked if sources of water were ready in the event that emergency makeup water was needed for the spent fuel poo Mr. Waldo stated that connections were available from the auxiliary feedwater system, but that it was highly unlikely that they would be used based on the extended time available to restore water to the poo Concerning an NRC inspector's recent inadvertent contamination in Unit 1, Mr. Waldo stated that although surveys conducted immediately after the contamination had showed some contamination as a result of tank draining operations, 1500 entries had been made into the same area with no contamination events since that time. He continued by stating that he walks down Unit 1 weekly, and has seen no instances of a different standard between the three unit Mr. Perkins asked whether or not SCE had sold any of the Unit 1 equipment. Mr. Marsh stated that the shutdown diesel had been sold, but that there had been no interested buyers for the remaining plant equipmen Mr. Perkins stated that vigilance must be maintained when employees make their rounds, and that in all areas a more critical eye was needed. However, he was pleased that management had reinforced
monitoring of Unit c. Steam Generator Issues Mr. Waldo presented information on the monitoring of the steam generators in Unit 3 and the methodology used for determining leakage. Mr. Waldo stated that there were minor leaks in both Unit 3 steam generators. This had been determined through air ejector sampling and a new steam line detection technique utilizing Nitrogen-16. Mr. Waldo stressed that operator crews had specific guidance on shutdown actions to be taken if the leak rate increases 60 gallons per day within a 1-hour perio Mr. Waldo stated it was SCE's evaluation that each steam generator in Unit 3 had a leaking plug. Nitrogen-16 testing of Steam Generator E-089 did not show a tube plug leak; however, other testing methods had shown evidence of a leaking tube plu Additionally, Mr. Waldo stated that air ejector sampling was a reliable method that was being used to quickly determine total steam generator leakage. Mr. Waldo discussed the current leakage rate from the steam generators and stated that an overall leakage rate was determined by the air ejector activity and then the activity levels in gas samples from each steam generator were used to calculate the leakage attributable to each steam generator. Air ejector activity was also being used to determine the ratio between secondary activity and RCS activity. Any change to this ratio would initiate additional sampling. He added that the ratio of leakage between the steam generators was determined two to three times a wee Mr. Perkins asked if SCE has spoken with industry counterparts on the use of these detection techniques. Mr. Waldo responded by saying that in comparison to other techniques air ejector sampling used a lower sample rate, which allowed for greater sensitivit Mr. Short continued the presentation by describing the Unit 2 steam generator tube inspection program and the results of that progra Mr. Short indicated that there were two unexpected results:
(1) seven axial cracks found just above the top of the tube sheet, in the sludge pile region and at the eggcrate supports, and (2) 13 circumferential cracks identified at the top of the tube shee There were no free span axial cracks in the upper regions of the steam generators as found at Palo Verde. The tubes which were found to have cracks were plugged. He continued by saying that all signs of wear and corrosion had occurred on the hot leg side of the steam generators with no degradation having been found on the cold leg sid In response to an NRC question, Mr. Short stated that the sludge pile in the steam generators varied in depth from almost nothing in some areas at the perimeter of the steam generator to a maximum depth of 5-6" at the center of the hot leg regio He added that
there were some indications that the corrosion of the tubes was related to the presence of the sludge pile. However, at that time it was indeterminate as to whether the corrosion was occurring on the inside or the outside of the tubes. Mr. Short indicated that the investigation was ongoin Mr. Short added that the design limit of the steam generators was 10% of the tubes removed from service over the life of the plan Mr. Perkins asked if sleeving previously plugged tubes would be feasible. Mr. Short responded that sleeving was an optio Mr. Perkins commented that no one was exempt from steam generator corrosion problems and that inspection and mitigation efforts were key areas to focus attention. He considered that a good approach was to understand the failure mechanisms, examine the data closely, and thus determine a baseline that could be used to develop a better inspection program. He was pleased at the effort that SCE was placing in this area. Mr. Rosenblum agreed with the desirability of knowing as much as possible before beginning the examination of Unit 3 steam generator tubes. Mr. Perkins added that SCE should consider the possible need for tube pulling in Unit 3 in the upcoming outage. Mr. Short acknowledged the commen Concerning the present Unit 3 leak rate, Mr. Short stated that data was consistent with a leaking Westinghouse plug-in-plug desig Mr. Waldo indicated that even though the present leakage rate was well below the Technical Specifications limit of 720 gallons per day, operators would initiate an immediate shutdown at a 60 gallons per day increase in any 1-hour interva Mr. Short stated that a five gallon per day deviation from 15 gallons per day would indicate that something other than a plug-in-plug leak was occurring and also added that increases in the leak rate might also be indicative of an additional leaking plu d. Transformer Seismic Restraints Mr. Reilly outlined the facts of the event which involved safety related transformers installed and energized without the vendor installed seismic restraints. Mr. Reilly gave a brief history of the transformer replacements being performed at Unit 2. SCE was conducting a detailed investigation into the reasons the construction contractor had removed the restraint Mr. Fields asked whether SCE personnel had inspected the transformers during the installation process. Mr. Reilly responded that the contractor was fully certified and had their own QA/QC program, which was approved by SCE. However, the reasons the contractor's QA/QC program failed to recognize the deficiency were still under investigation, and would be part of the final report due in August 1993. Mr. Katz added that the design change package work was done by Bechtel, with SCE monitoring the contractor's QA progra Mr. Perkins questioned if SCE had actively overseen the installation of the transformers. Mr. Katz responded that the only inspection performed by SCE personnel to ensure seismic integrity, was to ensure the transformers were bolted down. Mr. Ray stated that nonsafety-related transformers of a similar design did not have the seismic restraints. The workers thought the seismic restraints were shipping supports. In addition, Mr. Marsh stated that of the shipment of five transformers, three were nonsafety-related. Thus, installation of all the transformers was conducted in a similar manner without the seismic restraints in place. Mr. Reilly stated that the original design of the transformer did not have the restraints and the need for the restraints during a seismic event was still under evaluatio The seismic restraints had been added by the manufacturer for extra conservatism. Mr. Reilly stated that it was two days later, while walkdowns for the Individual Plant Examination for External Events program were being conducted, that the discrepancy was discovered. At this point, a Technical Specification 72-hour action statement was entered, which resulted in the suspension of core alterations. Mr. Reilly stated that Unit 3 transformers would be installed during the next refueling outag e. Restraint of Temporary-use Items Mr. Cash presented a brief history of the unrestrained items that had been discovered and that could have damaged safety-related components in a seismic event. Mr. Cash also provided a short description of the corrective actions performed to eliminate these occurrences. Initial indications attributed most of the occurrences to contractor work groups; therefore, most attention was focused in these areas. Further examination showed that this problem was occurring in other groups as well and the scope of the corrective actions was increased to include all SCE personnel. Mr. Wong questioned whether the site procedure was being covered sufficiently during personnel trainin Mr. Cash responded that the procedure for the seismic restraint of temporary-use items was originally a maintenance procedure and had been adapted for site use as a housekeeping procedure. Therefore, it may not be as easy for a chemistry technician, for example, to adhere to the procedure as a maintenance worker and noted that training could be improve Mr. Cash concluded that this issue was not indicative of procedural adherence problems in other area f. Closing Remarks Ms. Adensam stated that the facility appeared well-maintained, and was pleased to note a lack of leaks and standing water during a tour of the site. Mr. Perkins added that during his time in Region V he had seen improving performance. He stressed a need to maintain a watchful eye on some areas, especially Unit 1, and to continue to pay attention to detail during walkdowns. In addition, Mr. Perkins stated that he had seen an improvement in the area of maintenance,
but stressed that continued scrutiny of procedural adherence was needed. Mr. Fields added that the quality of Technical Specification amendments submitted during the last six months had improved. He felt they were well organized, with strong technical argument The meeting adjourned at 11:15 San Onofre Unit 1 Update Southern California Edison Unit I Update Slide I
CURRENT NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT Harold B. Ray VICE PRESIDENT VICE PRESIDENT ENGINEERING AND NUCLEAR GENERATION TECHNICAL SERVICES Russ Krieger Richard Rosenblum MANAGER OF OPERAToNS FINANCIAL SERVICES NUCLEAR OVERSIGH RAy Wald Joe Wambold B ri Katz HEALTi-I PHYSICS EMERGENCY PLANNING HEtl TI-1 PHYSIC~S
-
UBLIC PAFIS'
Peter Knapp BUDGETS/COST
&PUBVCAFFAIRS
-
CONTROL vacant Dennis Baucrn STATION TECHNICAL D
._TING NUCEA RATEg TRAINING Dan rigAR RATE John Reeder RE GULATION OUTAGE MANAGEMENT Davc Brevig SUPPORT SERVICES Ken Slagle Howard Newton PARTICIPATION MAlINTENANCE DREGULATORY AFFAIRS Lou Cash HUMAN RESOURCES Walter Marsh AND CHEMISTRY INFORMATION SERVICES CONSRUCTION&G Jim Clark Doug McFarlane FUEL SERVICES Jim Rellyf*
.
SECURIT Martin Speer EMERGENCY-PRE PARE DNESS
.
~Bill ZinL
.
San Onofre Reorganization SVd
PREVIOUS CORPORATE ORGANIZATION CHAIRMAN CUSTOMER NUCLEAR POWER FINANCE SERVICE H. B. RAY PRODUCTION I H. E. MORGAN SYSTEM HUMAN PLANNING &
RESOURCES OPERATIONS San Onofre Reorganization Slide 3
CURRENT CORPORATE ORGANIZATION CHAIRMAN CUSTOMER POWER SYSTEMS PERUORACE FINANCE SOLUTIONS*
GROUP SPOT IAC H. B. RAUPOR POWER NUCLEAR ENG. & TEC SUPPLY GENERATION SERVICES R. KRIEGER R. ROSENBLUM BUS. & FI SHOP SVCS. &
FUEL SERVICES INST. DI J. J. WAMBOLD San Onofre Reorganization Slide 4
PREVIOUS NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION SENIOR SITE V. NUCLEAR NUCLEAR SITE SITE BUDGETS &
OVERSIGHT REGULATORY SATION TECHNICAL SUPPORT G
ADMINISTRATION DIVISION AFFAIRS SERVICES SERVICES NUCLEAR OPERATIONS IENGINEERING
&
PROJECTS EMOPEATIOSSEMFGENC CNSTRUCTION PREPAREDNESS HEALTN E
PNLYSICS MAINTENANCE 7I CARVEMISTRY STATION TECHNICALC
-
MANANCEMN OUTAGE MANAGEMENT]
San Onofre Reorganization Slide 5
San Onofre Reorganization Nuclear Organization is in transition from a 3 Unit to a 2 Unit site Organization is a reflection of the transition San Onofre Reorganization Slide 2
RECEIVED San Onofre Reorganizateein Southern California Edison San Onofre Reorganization Slide 1
Introduction Update since December 1992 SCE-NRC Management Meeting Final Shutdown Configuration Decommissioning Plan Maintaining the material condition of the plant Unit I Update Slide 2
Unit 1 Major Milestones Background Opened breakers 11/30/92 Transhipment 1/22/93 - 2/13/93 Core offloaded 3/6/93 Unit 1 Update Slide 3
Unit 1 Major Milestones Containment closed and locked 5114/93 SFP heatup test 5/20/93 SFP thermal equilibrium of 1800 F *
8/29/93 (conservative)
SFP thermal equilibrium of 1400 F *
8/29/93 (probable)
Unit I Update Slide 4
Spent Fuel Pool Water Temperature During Loss of Forced Cooling Spent Fuel Poo Wator Tomnperalure (IF)
Bolling Not Credible (Passive Cooling)
200 1 80?F Equilibrn Tomperaturo w o Forced Coolling Analysis (8/93).1 150 Vo low n Ow PreliminaryTest Data (5/93)
100
0
3
6 Time After Loss 01 Cooling (Days)
Unit I Update Slide 5
Spent Fuel Pool Water Level During Loss of Forced Cooling (no water addition)
Spont Fuol Pool Water Level (Plant Elevation, Feel)
Preliminary Test 40g-Dal now19 s
,
Proposed Limiting Condition for Operation, 4O'3
.
Analysis (0/93)
-
30-.
10' Abovo Stored Fuel (SRP 9.1.3 Siphor'Leak Limil)
7 ---------------
Proposed Safety Limit, 16'
Top of Stored Fuel, 15'1"
5
10
30
Time After Loss of Cooling (Days)
Unit I Update Slide 6
Unit I Key Licensing Actions Background Preliminary Decommissioning Plan 12/1/92 POL Certification submitted 3/9/93 Emergency Plan changed 4/12/93 Unit 1 Update Slide 7
Unit 1 Key Licensing Actions PDTS submitted 5/12/93 Security Plan revision submitte /23/93
[50.54(p)(2)]
Proposed Decommissioning Plan 11/30/93
& termination application Unit I Update Slide 8
UNIT-I FINAL SHUTDOWN AND SAFSTOR MILESTONE SCHEDULE 02/07/92 11/30/92 03/11/93 00/01/93-1995 2013 NRC 0PPR(Wh/L or U1CT RC OrFflAODD POL PRNFIYsri'
CCUfLIG
vai'~
TMSHI aANDITRIN ri C I-,I IG ccr CI G.S 14011REWIRE T*W CLOSURE Al EQURH/DrUM-DECMMISSIO 4SU SHUTD2J CUREC~
5~TH I.S/ADN XmH PC91.1GUiC 6 PERRAMIC)TLY DE7FUEL
- ~~~~ CUTOILTC
~
lH C
.S. APPLICATIOU1
PO APLIC~lONSAFS1OR NODE t*,4 0?L AP, CVAL 0 SALVACC UL'/ADLr A~4~,.oP.CIALPLAN1 COWIPnC CVWrX.ATC ShrLVACIES.L C COuiPmcNT
- PRCL t1lt1M.~I
& "IfHIT LICENISINIG Unit 1-Update Slide 9
Unit 1 Final Shutdown Configuration Basis:
Unit I will not operate again Status:
Enhanced Technical Specification with Administrative Controls letter (pending PDTS)
The control room manned 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> a da Boron not required in SFP Unit 1. Update Slide 10
Unit 1 Final Shutdown Configuration Little or no salvage Out of service systems are being isolated, drained, and deactivated (oil drained from components to reduce fire hazard) - except generator Minimal lay-up or preservation efforts will be taken The control room, office buildings, and shops will be maintained habitable Unit 1 Update Slide 11
UNIT 1 FINAL SHUTDOWN CONFIGURATION CCW PUS APUEUDRIG OR flRE flREAC WUPSATRE'O O
__________TANKN nJ-uiePUMPS Unit~~CC 1 pat lie1
Unit 1 Containment Systems:
Drained and De-energized Maintain cathodic protection on sphere Containment locked, slight negative pressure maintained, and vented to stack Fire protection available through CRS Pressurizer safety valve removed Containment lighting/purging available for entries Unit I Updat Slide 13
Unit 1 Decommissioning Plan Project team organized in December 1992:
Management; OPS; Engineering; HP; Security; Licensing; Corporate HP & Environmental Proposed decommissioning alternative SAFSTOR with delayed dismantling Dismanteling activities are planned to begin in 2013, in conjunction with decommissioning Units 2 and 3 Unit 1 Update Slide 14
Unit 1 Decommissioning Plan Current Major Activities Decommissioning Plan outline (complete)
Decommissioning estimate (complete)
Site Characterization plan Plant change configuration control procedure Unit 1 Update Slide 15
Unit 1 - Maintaining the Material Condition of the Plant Housekeeping/Radiological Protection standards:
Unchanged and identical to Units 213 Plant condition: Unit 1's general standards Contaminations: One contamination in last 1500 entries at Unit 1 (above 100 cpm). SCE believes contamination was unrelated to Spent Fuel Pool valve leakag Conclusion:
Conditions at Unit 1 are being properly maintained Unit I Update Slide 16
Steam Generator Update San Onofre Units 2 and 3 Southern California Edison
Introduction Update of July 1, 1993 presentation Results of Unit 2 inspection Unit 3 operational leakage Unit 3 inspection planning Leakage monitoring - Ray Waldo Unit 2 feedring erosion - Jim Reilly Steam Generator Update Slide 1
Unit 2 Inspection Goals Meet Technical Specification requirements Follow EPRI guidance Obtain information on overall condition Monitor for industry concerns Collect information for future use (deposits)
Develop baseline information for future use Steam Generator Update Slide 2
Unit 2 Inspection Program Inspection Plan Actual Comments Bobbin - full length 2000 5950 All since Cy 5 MRPC - TTS 500 9000 100%
MRPC - upper regions 420 420 No indications Profilometry 100 100 All in area of interest Totals are approximate per steam generator Steam Generator Update Slide 3
Unit 2 Inspection Results SG
89 Comments Reason Plugged Vertical Strap Wear
2 Expected Batwing Wear
2 Expected Eggcrate Wear
1 Industry Exp Axial
6
.25 -.75" long Circumferential
10 30% of circum Tie-rod denting
0 Expected Total
21 Expected Steam Generator Update Slide 4
Unit 2 Inspection Results Steam Generator
89 Total Tubes 9350 9350 Previously Plugged 266 348 Plugged Cy 7
21 Tubes in-service 9073 8981
% of total 97%
96%
Steam Generator Update Slide 5
TUBE PLUGGING REASONS -
JULY 1993 PLANT:
SAN ONOFRE UNIT 2 GENERATOR:
X -
CIRCUMFERENTIAL INDICATIONS (3)
X -
AXIAL INDICATIONS ()
X -iEAR AT SUPPORT STRUCTURES (6)
X - TIE RO DENTING (1)
BA-rvjI1u ( Wear TOTAL TUBES
- 9350 TOTAL TUBES ASSIGNED : ii SUPPORT RODS( )
- 7 OUT OF SERVICE (e)
- 266-14o
~t/e.i-mu STZAP-130-120-115
-.
-
-
- .----ea j
-
L-o A-lo I
__
-
- --
-4 5 2tF
-30-20
.-
.
!-
-
--
-10 S
270 DEG INLET (Hat Log)
-Primary Face Ue 90 DEG
TUBE PLUGGING REASONS -
JULY 1993 PLANT:
SAN ONOFRE UNIT 2 GENERATOR:
X -
CIRCUNFERENTIAL' INDICATIONS (10)
X AXIAL INDICATIONS (6)
X -
WEAR AT SUPPORT STRUCTURES (5)
TOTAL TUBES
- 9350 ArTOTAL TUBES ASSIGNED : 21 SUPPORT RODS( )
- 7 OUT OF SERVICE (0)
- 348-100-103-170-soa-25 4*
- L-w 0--Prmar-Fae--
C S-
--
___
-35 o
-.------ j-- -20 270 DEG INLET (Hot Leg)
-Primary Face
<-
COLUMNS3-0DE
65'-6" 22'-118" 0. sNo 1'-4 3/8" 0. DRYERS SEPARATO S 450 450 N Service Req'd 1 Primary Inlet
2 Primary Outlet
4 Steam Outlet
5 B lowdown
6 Pressure Tap
7 Liquid Level
SAN.ted 8 Primary Manway SAN ONOFRE 9 Secondary Manway
NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION
Handhole
Uni2&3 11 1Sample
STEAM GENERATOR Figure 5.4-6
Unit 3 Steam Generator Update Operational leakage assessment Inspection planning for Cycle 7 outage Leakage monitoring - Ray Waldo Steam Generator Update Slide 10
Primary to Secondary Leak Rate June - August 1993 Unit 3
60
50
40 o ()
CL 15
OO
10 20 E
10
1111111111
6/22 6/29 7/6 7/13 7/20 7/27 8/3 8/10 8/17 8/23 8/30 Date EO88FromXel33 AE3-7870uci/sec E089fromXel33 Oel
STEAM GENERATOR TUBE LEAKAGE MONITORING LOCATION TYPE FREQUENCY LLD (At Current RCS Activity)
Air Ejector Monitor Continuous
< I gpd Air Ejector Alarm Continuous 30 gpd Air Ejector Grab Weekly
- gpd Blowdown Monitor Continuous
~ 5 gpd Blowdown Alarm Continuous
~ 1000 gpd Blowdown Grab Every 72 Hours
< 1 gpd Steamline N-16 As needed (new)
- 1 gpd Steamline Monitor Continuous
~ 3000 gpd Feedwater Tritium As needed
~ 0.3 gpd SG Leakage Monitoring Slide I
Transformer Seismic Restraints Southem Califomia Edison Transformer Seismic Restraints Slide 1
History April 24, 1992, Unit 2 tripped due to failure of 480V AC Loadcenter Transformer 2B Root cause determined transformer failed as a result of insulation breakdown. Insulation determined to have insufficient service lif Transformer Seismic Restraints Slide 2
Corrective Action Phased replacement of 15 loadcenter Transformers on Units 2 and Replacement priority based upon safety grade and impact to continued plant operatio Transformer Seismic Restraints Slide 3
Event Facts MMP issued with drawing showing seismic support Transformer shipped to SONGS with seismic supports installe Source inspection performed - correctly installe Supports removed by Construction Contractor prior to installation and not re-installe Transformers installed and put into servic Transformer Seismic Restraints Slide 4
Event Facts Engineering identifies missing supports during IPEEE walkdow Plant conservatively enters T.S. action to suspend core alteration Support configuration restore Transformer Seismic Restraints Slide 5
Safety Significance Preliminary Anchorage to Load Frame most critical concern:
Demonstrated by ABB's destructive tests; Confirmed by SQUG data base ABB added struts to stiffen assembly and provide alternate load path to base in order to increase seismic design margin Formal calculation in progress to confirm Transformer Seismic Restraints Slide 6
Current Status DIR in progress To be Issued For Review 8/18 Final Report To Be Issued 8/30 Construction Contractor conducting a review by Senior Management of Q.C. and Construction performanc SCE Senior Management met with Contractor Senior Management to review Contractor's performanc Transformer Seismic Restraints Slide 7
Seismic Restraint of Temporary Use Items Southern California Edison Seismic Restraint of Temporary Use Items Slide I
History Initial Indications Pre-outage and beginning of outage Contractor work Seismic Restraint of Temporary Use Items Slide 2
Actions taken/continuing Briefings on issues and program requirements Bechtel Contract work force (Complete)
SCE Nuclear Construction & Maintenance Increased field observations by Management and Nuclear Oversight Division Reviewed training program (Complete.)
Reviewed procedure for adequacy Seismic Restraint of Temporary Use Items Slide 3
Results Reduction in instances of non-compliance by Bechtel work force and SCE Maintenance Character of non-compliances changed and identified in other work groups Identified weaknesses in training in this area Identified need for procedure review for Human Factors Seismic Restraint of Temporary Use Items Slide 4
Remaining Actions Brief Contractor and SCE personnel prior to Unit-3 Cycle 7 outage. Determine need for routine pre-outage briefing Procedure review and revisions prior to the start of Unit-3 Cycle 7 outage: Human Factors; Technical Adequacy; Industry Comparison Long term training program will be changed by January 1994: Identify target audience; Improve initial training; Implement continuing training Seismic Restraint of Temporary Use Items Slide 5
Conclusions Minimal safety significance Not indicative of degraded procedural compliance Human Factors / Training Issue Seismic Restraint of Temporary Use Items Slide 6