IR 05000206/1993021
| ML20059C912 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | San Onofre  |
| Issue date: | 10/04/1993 |
| From: | Louis Carson, Mcqueen A, Qualls P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20059C897 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-206-93-21, 50-361-93-21, 50-362-93-21, NUDOCS 9311020057 | |
| Download: ML20059C912 (17) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION V
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Report Nos.
50-206/93-21, 50-361/93-21, and 50-362/93-21 License Nos.
DPR-13, NPF-10, and NPF-15 Licensee:
Southern California Edison Company (SCE)
Irvine Operations Center 23 Parker Street Irvine, California 92718
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Facility Name:
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS), Units 1, 2, and 3 Inspection at:
San Onofre Site, San Diego County, California
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Inspection Conducted:
September 13 - 17, 1993
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xA.h Inspectors:
A. D. M Queen, Emergency Pi~eparedness Analyst Date Signed (0lI6 98 k
t P. M. Qualls, Reactor Inspector Date Signed
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L. C. Carscri, Radiation Protection Inspector Date Signed
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J. J. Russell, Resident Inspector, San Onofre L. K. Cohen, Emergency Preparedness Specialist, NRR/PEPB
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Approved by: $
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r;//S/q q Robert J. Pate, Chief Date Sigiied Safeguards, Emergency Preparedness, and Non-Power Reactor Branch
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SUMMARY:
Areas Inspected: Announced inspection to examine the following portions of the licensee's emergency preparedness program:
followup on Open Items identified during previous emergency-preparedness inspections and to-observe the 1993 annual emergency preparedness exercise and associated critiques.
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During this inspection, Inspection Procedures 82301, 92700 and 92701 we're used.
Results:
In the areas inspected, the licensee's emergency preparedness program appeared adequate to protect the public health and safety.
The licensee was found to be in compliance with NRC requirements within the areas.
examined during this inspection.
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9311020057 9310139 PDR ADOCK 05000206 G
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
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Licensee Personnel D. Axline, Engineer, Compliance C. Anderson, Supervisor, Emergency Planning (EP)
K. Bellis, Manager, Nuclear Affairs and Emergency Planning (NA&EP)
M. Brooks, Health Physics (HP) Engineer B. Culverhouse, Emergency Planning Specialist K. Fowler, Engineering Aide R. Garcia, Emergency Planning Engineer J. Wallace, NA&EP R. Warnock, Superintendent, HP Support H. Wood, Quality Assurance (QA) Engineer
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M. Zenker ~, Lead Engineer, Emergency Planning
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W. Zint1, Manager, Site Emergency Preparedness (SEP)
NRC Personnel
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L. Carson, Radiation Protection Inspector, NRC L. Cohen, Emergency Preparedness Specialist, NRR/PEPB, NRC A. McQueen, Emergency Preparedness Analyst, NRC P. Qualls, Reactor Inspector, NRC J. Russell, Licensing Examiner, NRC R. Pate, Chief, Safeguards, Emergency Preparedness and Non-Power Reactor Branch
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The inspectors also contacted other members of the licensee's emergency preparedness, health physics, operations, administrative, and other technical staff during the course of the inspection.
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A list of individuals present at the NRC exit interview on September 17,
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1993, is at Attachment I hereto.
2.
Action on Previous Inspection Findings (MC 92701)
r (Closed) Followup Item (92-24-02) Health Physics Shortcominas in the i
1992 Annual Emergency Exercise During the 1992 annual emergency exercise, an in'spector observing
activities in the Operations Support Center (OSC) documented shortcomings in health physics response activities during the exercise.
Several observations for improvement were documented and reviewed during this exercise at the OSC. A review of licensee training activities 'in response to the findings of-the last EP exercise inspection indicated several actions were taken to improve health physics (HP) response in
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the following areas:
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Procedures, Facilities and Equipment i
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Health Physics (HP) exercise / drill scenario development early in-e the planning process.
HP technicians and supervisors receive very high radiation area
protective measures training.
Exercise Staffing and Oversight
During the 1993 annual emergency exercise, Emergency Response Teams (ERTs) dispatched by the OSC were accompanied by the NRC-inspector to observe activities in very high radiation fields (100 Rem per hour or more) and during efforts to mitigate plant damage or radioactive releases to the environment. The actions of the ERTs during the 1993 exercise indicated specific items found deficient in the 1992 exercise had been corrected. Only one health physics technician ERT shortcoming was noted this exercise, which is discussed in Section 9 below.
(Closed)
Followup Item- (93-07-02) Onsite Sirens Testing and Maintenance During the last routine EP inspection at the site, two Corrective Action Requests. (CARS) which had resulted from site QA surveillances were selected for further inspection followup:
CAR P-1411, " Site Emergency Preparedness Program - Offsite Sirens." This CAR indicated that it specifically identified
"an inadequate program for offsite Siren operability as required by the Emergency Plan." A QA affecting procedure is being developed to adequately define and establish organizational responsibility and interface requirements for
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the Community Alert Siren System.
50S-346-92, Off-Site Community Alert Siren System. The surveillance identified four areas of programmatic deficiencies and indicated the associated root causes.
In that these CARS addressed what was concluded to be an inadequate program required by the Emergency Plan, completed actions were reviewed during this inspection.
Based on the review of licensee actions in closing CAR P-1411 and implementation of appropriate program procedures, this item is closed.
3.
Exercise Plannina (responsibilit_v, scenario / objectives development, control of scenario)
The licensee's Emergency Preparedness (EP) staff has the overall responsibility for developing, conducting and evaluating the annual emergency preparedness exercise. The_ EP staff developed the scenario with the assistance of other-SCE organizations possessing appropriate expertise (e.g., reactor operations, health physics, maintenance, etc.,)
In an effort to maintain strict security over the exercise scenario,
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individuals who had been involved in scenario development were not
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participants in the exercise. The objectives were developed in concert
with the offsite agencies.
NRC Region V and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Region IX were provided an opportunity to comment on the proposed scenario and objectives. The exercise-document included objectives and guidelines, exercise scenario, and.necessary messages and data. Advance copies of the exercise document were provided to the NRC evaluators and other persons having a specific need.
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The players did not have access to the exercise document or information on scenario events. This exercise appears to meet the requirements of IV.F 3 of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50.
4.
Exercise Scenario
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l The exercise objectives and. scenario were evaluated by the NRC and.
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considered appropriate as a method to demonstrate Southern Califor.nia Edison Company's (SCE) capabilities to respond to an emergency in
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accordance with their Emergency Plan and implementing procedures. The exercise scenario started with an event classified as an alert and ultimately escalated to a General Emergency (GE) classification. The licensee management critique scenario summary appeared to effectively describe the events associated with this emergency exercise. A copy of that summary is at Attachment 2 hereto.
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5.
Federal Observers
Five NRC inspectors evaluated the licensee's response to the scenario.
Inspectors were stationed in the Control Room simulator (CR), the
Technical Support Center (TSC), Operations Support Center (OSC), and in the Emergency Operations facility (EOF). The inspector in the OSC also accompanied repair / monitoring teams. - Evaluation of offsite activities of the state and local emergency centers and activities was conducted by inspectors from FEMA. Their inspection findings will be published in a i
separate report by FEMA.
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Exercise Observations (82301)
I The following observations, (Sections 7 through 10 below) as ~
appropriate, are intended to be suggestions for improving the emergency
' No new exercise weaknesses were observed during
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preparedness program.
the exercise.
All exercise times and other times indicated in this-report are Pacific Daylight Time (PDT).
7.
Control Room / Simulator i
The inspector observed the actions of the control room staff during the EP exercise conducted in the early morning of Wednesday, September 15, 1993. The inspector assessed the performance of the staff as they implemented procedures, analyzed plant conditions, classified an event, and communicated with other organizations. The inspector also observed
the critique conducted after the exercise by drill participants-and licensee staff.
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The inspector observed the actions of the operating crew as they took
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actions to mitigate the events in the plant referenced simulator.
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The inspector concluded that the operating crew effectively mitigated the events within the constraints provided by the licensee controllers.
The exercise began with an intruder entering the protected area. The shift superintendent assumed duties as the Emergency Coordinator (EC)
and declared an Alert. At 9:05 a.m., the shift superintendent turned over duties as the EC to the site Vice President, Nuclear Generating Station. At 9:30 a.m., the reactor coolant pump (RCP), P002, shaft sheared causing an automatic reactor trip. The operating crew diagnosed the sheared shaft and entered the loss of. coolant (LOCA) emergency operating instruction.
At 10:02 a.m., the crew manually initiated a containment isolation (CIAS) based on high radiation levels in containment. At 10:35 a.m., the leak rate increased substantially and a automatically safety injection (SIAS) and containment cooling were initiated.
The operating crew entered the functional recovery emergency operating instruction at 10:41 a.m. based on the inventory control
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safety function being violated. The operating crew initiated a unit cooldown and containment spray to minimize the rupture and minimize radiation levels in containment. A subsequent failure of the containment minipurge piping caused an offsite release. The exercise terminated in the simulator at 2:05 p.m.
The inspector noted the following:
The operating crew conducted a unit cooldown without initiating
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emergency boration.
The inspector was concerned that adequate shutdown margin would not be maintained. The crew was responding to the sheared RCP shaft and consequent reactor coolant system (RCS) leak. The crew entered the LOCA recovery guideline and at 10:07 a.m., commenced a cooldown while in alternate boration; which provided less boron flow than emergency boration. The LOCA procedure, prior to the cooldown, directed that the operator initiate emergency boration to provide sufficient shutdown margin as the reactor cooled down. The crew conducted the-cooldown until 10:35 a.m. when the RCS break size increased and a SIAS automatically initiated. During the course of the cooldown the inspector did not note any indications of increasing reactor power, as would have been seen if shutdown margin was inadequate.
The facility controllers also noted this.
The facility planned on providing specialized training to this e
crew in this area.
Manually initiating a CIAS based on high radiation levels in
containment did not appear to be reflected in CEN-152, the combustion engineering owners group guidance for emergency operating procedures (E0P's).
This was step 21 of the licensee's s
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LOCA optimal recovery procedure. The inspector requested the
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licensee provide a basis for the exact-setpoint in the E0P and for
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this action. The inspector was informed that the reason a CIAS was initiated was to support the use of Containment Spray, which was reflected in CEN-152. The licensee stated that the exact setpoint was based on an internal 1984 memorandum which stated that radiation levels at the setpoint should be lowered with containment spray. The licensee was still researching the exact reason for this particular radiation level, which was 40 Rem / Hour,
as a part of their Design Basis Documentation program.
The inspector considered this response adequate.
The _ inspector noted that Attachment 26, p. 507, of the functional e
recovery procedure contained a graph of minimum expected cold leg injection versus RCS pressure. The operating crew attempted to
use this graph after a recirculation actuation signal (RAS) had
.taken place. The graph proved confusing as a RAS stops low pressure injection, however the graph stated that as a minimum, one high pressure and one low pressure train of injection were necessary to be in operation to meet the system design basis. The facility controllers also noted this and agreed to evaluate clarifying this graph.
The inspector note ~d the following simulator abnormalities:-
The unit tripped spuriously at approximately 7:50 a.m.
- Indicated low pressure safety injection flow rates did not appear
to be consistent with pumps in operation, RCS pressure, and pressurizer level indications at 11:15 a.m.
Attempts to start charging pumps with a RAS in effect did not seem
to correctly model actual plant response, the pumps would not start.
Emergency Cooler E336 tripped and various spurious annunciators
came in at 12:15 a.m.
The facility controllers also noted these simulator problems and agreed -
to resolve them as simulator capabilities permitted.
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The inspector noted that the first public address announcement, made to the site at 8:28 a.m., was confusing. The announcement was, in part,
"All personnel do not enter the protected area... report to your emergency stations..."_ The inspector concluded that.some personnel would have to enter the PA in order to report to their emergency stations.
The inspector noted that the operating crew management emphasized good communication and board awareness throughout the six hour scenario. The inspector considered this a_ strength, i
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The inspector noted that the shift superintendent, while acting as
emergency coordinator, received a report of a security condition red.
The shift superintendent correctly classified the event, based on a description of the event, as a security condition orange.
The inspector considered this a strength.
Overall the inspector considered that the operating crew adequately mitigated the events and implemented the emergency plan.
8.
Technical Support Center (TSC)
The following aspects of TSC operations were observed:
activation, accident assessment and classification, notification, and interactions between the various emergency response facilities.
Specific observations by the NRC Inspector included:
The Unit One Shift Communicator arrived at the TSC prior to the
event occurrence. He had been directed to respond to the TSC by the shift communicator in the simulator (Control Room) on' his own initiative. This happened after a problem occurred in the simulator at about 7:55 a.m.
The inspector noted that the licensee took 28 minutes to declare
that accountability had been accomplished.
It was further noted that at the time accountability was accomplished, 655 persons were listed as missing due to site assembly and evacuation not being actually accomplished during this exercise.
The licensee controllers demonstrated to the inspector that a list of missing persons by name and last location could be generated.
The licensee indicated to the inspector that the purpose of this exercise objective was to demonstrate the satisfactory use of a
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new computer method of Emergency Response Force accountability.
It was not intended to demonstrate that-this drill accomplished
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accountability as an objective'to demonstrate meeting NUREG-0654 guidance criteria.
Status boards were consistently kept up-to-date and appeared to be
used effectively by the TSC staff.
A TSC control point was established in a professional manner at
the time exercise conditions warranted, The Security Director removed the security officers from the guard o
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tower and directed them to alternate locations outside of the plume.
Event classification and notification of offsite agencies appeared
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to have been accomplished in a satisfactory manner.
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Communications between the TSC and other emergency response o
facilities appeared to function in a satisfactory manner.
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Dose projection was accomplished in a timely and effective manner.
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The TSC technical staff performed accurate core damage
assessments, and proposed recovery paths to aid the Station
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Emergency Director in directing event response.
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9.
Operational Support Center (OSC)
Inspectors observed and evaluated the OSC staff as they performed tasks
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in response to the exercise. These tasks included activation of the-OSC; assembly of needed personnel; assignment of priorities; repair team selection, briefing and debriefing; radiological control planning; protective action decision making; periodic notifications of the OSC staff; documentation of activities; communications; and interfacing of intracompany emergency response groups.
Inspectors observed activities conducted by the OSC and-selectively accompanied maintenance and response field teams dispatched from the OSC location.
The inspector reviewed Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs)
S0123-VIII-10, " Emergency Coordinator Duties," S0123-VIII-10.1, " Station Emergency Director Duties," S0123-VIII-40.1, "0SC Health Physics Coordinator Duties," S0123-VIII-80, " Emergency Group Leader Duties,"land other EPIPs for Rapid Deployment Teams from the OSC to perform plant-
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saving actions, protection of the public health and safety, and restoration of critical plant functions.
The inspector noted that the OSC was activated in 28 minutes and in accordance with licensee EPIPs S0123-VIII-30.3, 40.1, and 80.
Frequent OSC staff briefings were made during the drill. The OSC and OSC Annex appeared well organized. Dedicated radiation protection equipment and
radiation monitoring instruments were effectively deployed.
Radiation monitoring instruments were properly response-checked prior to issuance
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to field teams.
Periodic habitability radiological surveys were
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accomplished as required.
The OSC staff was proactive in their assessments and anticipation of further OSC actions, such as:
The early deployment of ERTs, including' Health Physics Technicians
(HPTs), for plant leak detection and providing support for operations personnel.
The OSC staff used Rapid Response ERTs as backup for critical
response operations.
Some of these teams performed parallel activities in support of ERTs already deployed.
OSC briefings of ERTs were conducted in route to the work area at e
times.
The inspector noted that Control Room announcements were initially hard to hear in the OSC.
The OSC Emergency Group Leader (EGL) team briefings were announced to the workers in the OSC annex facility.
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1 ERTs dispatched were well briefed and controlled. All-teams were well equipped for accomplishing their assigned tasks.
Two repair ERTs were accompanied by the inspector to observe their work activities in very high radiation areas (100 Rem per hour or more) to perform tasks to mitigate plant damage or preclude radioactive releases to the environment. Also, the inspector observed ERTs searching for potentially highly radioactive leaks and response teams performing Post-Accident Sampling System activities.
The inspector noted the following exercise shortcomings between the licensee's OSC emergency response teams (ERTs) and controller interface:
The ERT deployed to 63' elevation of the Penetration Building to e
investigate and repair the leaking containment purge valve did n'ot
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establish contamination controls. The containment purge valve was
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the primary leak path source during the exercise, and contamination in the area was 1000 to 600,000 CPM (counts per minute).
Consequently, personnel tracked contamination back to the health physics Red Badge Zone (RBZ) control point.
.The OSC and the Controllers allowed an ERT operator who was just e
recovering from a respiratory problem to simulate wearing a self contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) system.
The OSC Lead HP stated that he would not have allowed this person to be used in real emergency.
On at least three occasions, Controllers gave ERTs incorrect
radiation data which hampered the HPT's ability to clearly respond to radiological conditions.
Scenario / Controller survey data for the 63' Penetration Building
area and Site Map indicated that all OSC ERTs.between 11:30 to 1:45 p.m. should have considered the use of potassium-iodide (KI)
tablets and/or respiratory protection equipment during this_ period
of the exercise. However, none of the inspectors observed any such discussions or evaluations during the exercise.
The inspector concluded that the OSC staff responded satisfactorily in their tasks and in accordance with their EP implementing procedures.
10.
Emercency Operations Facility (EOF)
The inspector observed the following activities at the E0F:
activation, facility management and control, coordination with state and local
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agencies,. accident assessment and classification, dose projection, notification to state and local agencies, use of backup communications, and formulation of protective action recommendations (PARS).
Two positive highlights or strengths were noted:
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Excellent coordination and interaction with the offsite officials.
e This included timely, thorough and frequent briefing of. offsite officials by the licensee and timely briefing of the licensee by offsite officials about status of protective actions.
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Effective maintenance of status boards and providing periodic o
status information to the staff. The staff continuously kept the status boards up to date for use by the decision makers.
Every half hour, the emergency advist provided a status of the plant and radiological aspects of the event update briefing.
Other observations and evaluations of the various areas included:
The inspector observed the accountability and habitability
operations. The facility is equipped with alarming radiation monitors and key card readers for use in habitability and i
accountability.
Discussions were held with the EP staff regarding the use and e
maihtenance of the emergency HVAC system. The inspector reviewed the procedure for the operation of this system.
The E0F was activated at 9:16 a.m., 55 minutes after the Alert was
declared; which met the 60 minutes activation. guidance of NUREG-0373, Supplement 1.
Although the facility was activated, the Corporate Emergency Director (CED) did not take over from the Emergency Coordinator (EC) in the TSC until 9:48 a.m.
The CED had a large staff to accomplish the briefing of the staff and offsite agencies.
In general, the staff was efficient and appeared knowledgeable of their responsibilities and duties.
In addition to the large licensee staff, the E0F had a
considerable contingent of offsite liaison officials. Despite the large number of persons in. the EOF, the noise levels and overall operation of the EOF was orderly and effective, The CED properly used the Emergency Action Level (EALT scheme and e
other radiological, meteorological and plant status from his staff to properly classify emergency conditions and recommend appropriate protective actions. The E0F staff continually reassessed plant conditions and other factors.to maintain a posture to change protective action recommendations as appr priate.
The E0F HP staff continuously evaluated and assessed the
anticipated and real releases in order to provide the CED with the information on real or potential doses to the public.
This enabled him to evaluate the situations and provide proper recommendations to offsite officials.
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Notifications and communications in the EOF appeared excellent.
- Eight press releases were issued from the E0F.
Communications between offsite officials in the E0F was frequent and useful.
Plant status data was displayed on status boards and hard copy.
Meteorological data was displayed on maps in several locations in the EOF.
The E0F appeared to have excellent interaction with offsite e
officials on several levels.
In the Offsite Dose Assessment Center (0DAC), technical staff from the offsite agencies worked with utility personnel to perform dose assessment, Offsite agencies were provided detailed and effective briefings by e
utility personnel on'a frequent basis.
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11.
Licensee Critiques A series of exercise critiques was conducted by the licensee upon-completion of the exercise.
First, a facility critique was conducted at-each emergency response facility, with players and controllers, immediately following the exercise. Upon conclusion of these critiques, a controller critique was conducted to review the major items surfaced at the facility critiques. On September 16, 1993, a formal corporate critique was conducted at the site to cover significant exercise problems, strengths and observations.
NRC inspectors observed the facility critiques immediately following the exercise and the formal corporate critique.
Facility critiques immediately following the exercise termination
appeared satisfactory and appropriate to exercise activities.
Most of the shortcomings noticed by the NRC inspectors were also noted by the licensee and were discussed in critiques.
The corporate exercise critique on September 16 also appeared very
thorough and appropriate to exercise activities.
12.
Exit Interview An exit interview was held on September 17, 1993, to discuss the preliminary NRC findings.
Attachment 1 to this~ report _ identifies the personnel who were present.at this meeting. The licensee was informed that no violations of NRC requirements or new exercise weaknesses were identified during the inspection.
It was noted that the exercise demonstrated a high level of emergency preparedness as indicated by the number of strengths identified.
Items discussed are summarized in Sections 2-and 7 through 10 of this report.
ATTACHMENTS:
1 - NRC Exit Interview Attendees 2 - Exercise Scenario Summary i
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ATTACHMENT 1 NRC EXIT INTERVIEW ATTENDEES-
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C. Anderson, SCE.
J. Habis, SCE i
D. Axline, SCE P. Handley, SCE D. Barron, SCE R. Kaplan, SCE K. Bellis, SCE R. Krieger, SCE D. Brevig, SCE F. Liu, SCE M. Bua, SCE-W. Marsh, SCE G. Buzzelli, SCE A. McQueen, NRC L. Carson, NRC R. Pate, NRC L. Cohen, NRC P. Qualls, NRC B. Culverhouse, SCE J. Reilly, SCE
'J. Curran, SCE D. Richards, SCE J. Dale, SCE R. Rosenblum, SCE
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K. de Lancey, SCE J. Russell, NRC R. Erickson, SDG&E S. Scholl, SCE
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M. Farr,'SCE M. Short, SCE J. Fee, SCE J. Wallace, SCE K. Fowler, SCE D. Warnock, SCE S. Freers, SCE H. Wood, SCE
R. Garcia, SCE M Zenker, SCE E. Golden, SCE W. Zint1, SCE
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. EMERGENCY PLAN EXERCISE September 15; 1993
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SUMMARY INmAL CONDmONS The exercise began at t=0800 with Unit 2 in mode 1, operating at full power, with work in progress to replace the actuator motor on the RWST outlet to charging pump suction valve, LV-0227C. A medical omergency involving a
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plant worker with a twisted ankle was staged at the radwaste truck bay adjacent to the switchyard.
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Two _ equipment failures existed undetected at the outset of the exercise. One, inside containment, was the failure of flange bolts upstream of 2HV-9823, the mini-purge containment isolation valve. The resulting flange separation opened the purge system piping to the containment atmosphere. The second pre-existing failure, outside containment, was a circumferential tear in the expansion joint at the suction of mini-purge supply fan A 379, located on the 63 foot elevation of Unit 2 penetration building. This breach opened the purge system piping to the penetration building. As a result of these failures, containment atmosphere was isolated from the penetration building only by outside containment mini-purge isolation valve 2HV-9821.
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SECURITY EVENT At t=0300, a controller acting as a plant worker called 86911 to request medical assistance for the injured worker.
When the ambulance passed through the hold down area, both inside and outside gates were opened to allow the vehicle quick access into the Protected Area. A disgruntled contract employee who had been denied unescorted access privileges to the Protected Area entered the Prutected Area as the ambulance passed through the hold down. The event met the criteria for an ALERT, per event code F2-1(b). The Shift Commander identified the t /ent
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as Contingency Threat Situation 12, SECON Red. When notified, the Shift Superintendent declared the event, and
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initiated emergency notifications. Security positioned officers in accordance with the Security Plan and pursued the intruder through the turbine building. The intruder was apprehended twice and released to continue drill play, until captured a third and final time at t=0935. He was then escorted from the Protected Area and given to custody of the FBL Interrogation of the intruder was conducted in the A82 conference room.
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Emergency Services Officers administered first aid and transported the patient to the Mesa Medical Facility. There the worker's condition was complicated by cardio vascular distress to provide additional play for medical personnel.
CONDENSATE PUMP TRIP l
At t=0845, condensate pump 2P050 tripped due to an erroneous closed discharge valve signal. Standby condensate pump 2P053 started automatically due to the loss of pump 2P050. Because pump 2P053 successfully
auto-started, no significant transient occurred and the plant continued to operate at full power.
l REACTOR COOLANT PUMP SHEARED SHAFT AND RCS LEAK i
At t=0930, RCP 2P002 shaft sheared and RCS flowrate decreased rapidly. Although a reactor trip was generated
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within 2 seconds,9% fuel cladding failure occurred. At the same time, a 70 gpm RCS leak developed due to
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reactor coolant pump seal damage. The event was identified as event code B2-1 based on RCS leak rate.
lNDICATIONS OF FUEL FAILURE As a result of the fuel damage, RCS activity increased from 9.5 E-1 pCl/gm to 1.4 E+4 pCi/gm. Containment area radiation and airborne monitors quickly increased to the alarm setpoint. Chemistry Technicians were dispatched to sample the RCS first at the radiochemistry lab, then via the PASS. Technical Teams determined the extent of fuel damage by inspection of in-containment radiation monitors and evaluation of PASS RCS sample results.
SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION Page 1
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September 15,1993 EMERGENCY PLAN EXERCISE
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SUMMARY (Continued)
LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT At t=1035 the RCS leak rate increased dramatically. Containment pressure, temperature, humidity, sump level and radiation levels increased. This event met the criteria of a SITE AREA EMERGENCY, event code B3-1. Non-Emergency Response Personnel in the K-buildings were directed to assemble. Accountability reports identifying personnel remaining in the Protected Area were obtained in 28 minutes.
FAILURE OF YELLOW PHONE SYSTEM At t=1030 a failure of the Yellow Phone System was simulated. Shift Communicators successfu!!y used the back up system (Bell System telephones and FAX machines) to notify offsite agencies of the escalation to SAE at.
t=1045. The Yellow Phone System was returned to service at t=1052.
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LOSS OF BATTERY CHARGER 2B006A At t=1100, battery cha ger 2B006A failed, placing 250 VDC Bus 2D6 on the battery. This bus supplies CFMS terminals and dedicate d telephone circuits in the TSC, which would have been lost if the charger was not restored before the battery discharged. _ Operators placed backup battery charger 2B006 in service at t=1210.
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CONTAINMENT FAILURE At t=1145,2HV-9821, the mini-purge supply line containment isolation valve outside containment, opened partway when internal components failed. This completed a pathway for fission products in containment to escape to the environment via the continuous exhaust plenum and plant vent stack. The initial release rate reached 4 Ci/sec, and decreased to 3 Ci/sec over 90 minutes. The existing meteorological conditions resulted in a projected whole body dose rate of about 60 mrem /hr and a projected thyroid dose of about 3.2 R/hr at the Exclusion Area Boundary. The conditions met the criteria of a GENERAL EMERGENCY, tab B4-1. The protective action recommendation from SCE was to evacuate all sectors to 10 miles.
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RESPONSE TO HIGH RADIATION AREA Response to this event included team dispatch from the OSC in an attempt to locate and repair ths,;ause of the breach of containment in the penetration area. Termination of the release was accomplished at 1330 by engaging the manual handwheel for 2HV-9821 and closing the valve, which is located in the penetration area at the 85' level.
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EXERCISE TERMINATION The exercise was terminated at t=1400.
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Page 2 SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION 93 %i0
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EMERGENCY PLAN EXERCISE September 15,1993:
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EXERCISE TIMELINE TsC '
ACTUAL mt.o OSC Activated
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SED assumed EC HSC
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Simulated OF umned Sne Sne SDC
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WY CE E m ua k n ab Intruder
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K buildings B4-1 Completed Mce Apprehended Alert Mert B2-1 F2-1b SAE CED a
rc FC 0800 0900 1000 1100
' 200 1300 1 2
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RCP Sheared gg, SM Battesy Charger
Condensale 70 ppm m
Pump 2PSD Laak wp UMM B2-1 Site 2HV9821 Assembly Closed Environmental Release Tebald Security Monitoring LOCA Containment Event initiate Penetration DT Fauure-Rumor Drt!!
F21b Cans Tenninated y
Phone System Simulated FaRure Site
~ Evacuation PLANNED
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SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION Page 3 mte -
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September 15,1993 EMERGENCY PLAN EXERCISE
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EXERCISE TIMELINE (Continued)
0801 Intruder enters Protected Area.
0821 Alert F2-1b declared.
0841 TSC activated.
0845 Condensate Pump 2P050 trip.
0851 OSC activated.
0905 SED assumed EC. . 0907 HSC activated.
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0916 EOF activated.
0920 Request environmental monitoring.
0930 RCP 2P002 sheared shaft,70 gpm leak.
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0930 ENC activated.
0935 intruder apprehended.
0943 Alert B2-1 declared.
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0948 CED assumed EC.
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1030 Failure of Yellow Phone System.
1035 Loss of Coolant Accident.
1038 SAE B3-1 declared.
1043 Umited site area assernbly in K-buildings.
1100 Loss of battery charger 28006A..
1145 Breach of containment (2HV9821 in intermediate position).
1154 GE B41 declared.
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1235. Site evacuation completed.
1330 2HV9821 closed.
1338 Place SDC in service.
1400 Drill terminated Page 4 SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION -
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