IR 05000361/1993017

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Ack Receipt of Informing NRC of Steps Taken to Correct Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-361/93-17 & 50-362/93-17.Requests Addl Info to Support Conclusion That Failure of MOV 3HV-4705 Was Isolated Occurrence
ML20058H733
Person / Time
Site: San Onofre  Southern California Edison icon.png
Issue date: 11/22/1993
From: Miller L
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
To: Ray H
SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING CO.
References
GL-89-10, NUDOCS 9312130207
Download: ML20058H733 (3)


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UNITED STATES '

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7 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION V

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) 1450 MARIA LANE WALNUT CREEK, CAUFORNIA 94596-5368

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%V 2 2 S Docket Nos. 50-361 and 50-362 - .

Southern California Edison Company Irvine Operations Center 23 Parker Street Irvine, California 92718 Attent. ion: Mr. Harold B. Ray Senior Vice President, Nuclear

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l Reference: (1) Letter from L. Miller (NRC) to H. Ray (SCE), dated September 23, 1993-Gentlemen: .

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Thank you for your letter of October 28, 1993, in response to our Notice of ,

Violation and Inspection Report No. 50-361/93-17 and 50-362/93-17, informing us of the steps you have taken to correct the items which we brought to your ,

attention. Your corrective actions will be verified ~during a future inspectio ,

In addition to your response to the Notice of Violation, reference (1) also requested that you address the programmatic implications of the maintenance

. deficiencies observed following the March 1993 test failure of auxiliary feedwater valve 3HV-4705. Specifically, we were interested in your evaluation of whether certain valves require more than routine maintenance. In i particular, the anomalous signatures on MOV 3HV-4705 and approximately 50 other MOVs, combined with material deficiencies discovered by the evaluation of their signatures, suggests such an evaluation may be appropriate. In your- i response, you stated that the failure of 3HV-4705 was an isolated occurrence  !

and did not imply programmatic maintenance deficiencies. Your response did not supply any supporting discussion to allow us to reach the same conclusio ,

As discussed in Paragraph 2.3.i of Inspection Report 93-17, your staff  ;

identified that the failure of MOV 3HV-4705 was due to the cumulative effects '

of the degraded material condition of the M0V. Loose valve yoke fasteners, degraded actuator grease, corroded actuator bearings, worn actuator gears and

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a warped cover plate 4ere found to. exist following the test failure in March 1993. While each of the individual deficiencies in the material condition of the MOV were judged by your staff to be inconsequential to the capability of i the MOV to perform its safety related function under worst case design basis '

conditions, your staff determined that together they were the root cause of the March 1993 test failure in which the MOV failed to perform its safety function to ope It appears as though these conditions were allowed either to crist following testing under GL89-10 in 1992 or to degrade subsequent to that testing. As stated in reference (1), your GL 89-10 program did not appear to be effective in identifying and establishing the necessary controls to assure that proper operation of the valve was maintaine '

9312130207 DR 931122 ADOCK 05000361 PDR

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Furthermore,-as mentioned above and discussed in Paragraph 2.3.h of Inspection Report 93-17, your staff identified apparent deficiencies in the material condition of 70% of the MOVs tested during Cycle 6 outage Since the objective of GL 89-10 is to establish and maintain the necessary controls to assure a high degree of confidence in the ability of MOVs to perform their safety related functions, we are concerned that your GL 89-10 program and your maintenance program, taken together MOVs which can affect the capability of MOVs to perform their safety related

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i Please provide additional information to support your conclusion that the failure of MOV 3HV-4705 was an isolated occurrence and did not imply I programmatic maintenance deficiencies. _

Your cooperation _ in this matter is appreciate ~

Sincerely,

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i L. F. Miller, Jr., Chief, Reactor Safety Branch

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cc:

Mr. Edwin A. Guiles, Vice President Engineering & Operations, San Diego Gas and Electric C T. E. Oubre, Esq., Southern California Edison Company Chairman, Board of Supervisors, County of San Diego Mr. Sherwin Harris, Resource Project Hunager, Public Utilities Department Mr. Charles B. Brinkman, Manager, ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Power l Mr. R. W.-Krieger, Vice President, Southern California Edison Company ;

Mr. Don 'J. Womeldorf, Chief, Environmental Management Branch Mr. Thomas E. Bostrom, Project Manager, Bechtel Power Corporation Mr. Robert G. Lacy, Manager Nuclear Department 7

- Mr. Steve-Hsu, Radiologic Health Branch Mayor, City of San Clemente .

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bec w/ enclosure:

Docket Ffle Resident Inspector Project Inspector G. Coo B. Faulkenberry K. Perkins S. Richards H. Wong, Project Section Chief M. Fields, Project Manager,NRR bec w/o enclosure:

M. Smith J. Zollicoffer Myers dang Lmiller 11//7/93 11/6/93 11/ /93 REQUEST REQUEST REQUEST REQUEST CDPY COPY COPY COPY YES O YES O YES O YES NO O N0 M NO O NO O SEND TO DCS SEND TO PDR ES 40 0 YES NO O G:\RSB\ ENGR \SO93-17.RSP 100052

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