IR 05000206/1990040
| ML20029A095 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | San Onofre  |
| Issue date: | 01/18/1991 |
| From: | Johnson P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20029A091 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-206-90-40, 50-361-90-40, 50-362-90-40, NUDOCS 9102040058 | |
| Download: ML20029A095 (12) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION Y t
Report Nos.
50-206/90-40, 50-361/90-40, 50-362/90-40 Docket Nos.
50-206, 50-361,-50-362 License _Nos.
DPR-13, NPF-10, NPF-15 Licensee:
Southern California Edison Canpany Irvine Operations Center-23 Parker Street
.Irvine, California 92718 Facility Name:
-San Onofre Units 1, 2, and 3 Inspection at:
San Onofre, San Clemente, California-Inspection conducted:
November 11 through December 22, 1990 Inspectors:
C. W. Caldwell,- Senior Resident Inspector A. L.-Hon. Resident Inspector
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C. D. Townsend, Resident Inspector D. Corporandy, Reactor Inspector
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Approved By:
Wn P. H.
hnson, Chief Ddte Signed React Projects Section 3 Inspection Summary inspection on November 11 through December 22, 1990 (Report Nos. 50-206/90-40, 50-361/90-40, 50-362/90-40)
Areas Inspected: ' Routine resident inspection of Units 1, 2 and 3 Operations Pro 9 ram-including the following areas: operational safety verification, radiological protection, security, evaluation of plant ' trips and events,-
monthly surveillance activities, monthly maintenance activities, independent inspection, licensee event report review, and followup of previously identi-fied items. LInspection procedures 30703, 37700, 60710, 61726, 62703, 71707,-
71710,'90712, 92700, 92701, 93702 were utilized.
Safety Issues Management System (SIMS)-Items: None-9102040050 910118 PDR ADOCK 05000206
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Results:
General Conclusions and Specific Findings:
The Automatic Switch Company (ASCO) solenoid operator for the Unit I containment-spray valve CV-82 failed in July 1990. This occurred despite the fact that there had been a history of failures (since 1987)
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of similar model solenoid valves (Paragraph 7).
Significant Safety Matters:
'None.
Summary of Violations:
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No violations.or deviations were identified.
However, one non-cited violation was noted concerning inadequate corrective actions leading to
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failure of the ASCO solenoid operator for Unit I containment spray valve CV-82 (Paragraph 7).
Open Items-Summary:
During this~ report period, seven followup items (including three LERs)
were closed; one new unresolved item was opened.
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4.
DETAILS
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1.
Persons Contacted Southern California Edison Company-H. Ray, Senior Vice President, Nuclear H._ Morgan, Vice President and Site Manager
- R. Krieger, Station Manager
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J. Reilly, Manager, Nuclear Engineering & Construction
- B. Katz, Nuclear _ Oversight Manager
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- K-Slagle, Deputy Station Manager.
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- R. Waldo, Operations Manager L. Cash, Maintenance Manager
- M. Short,. Technical Manager M. Wharton, Nuclear Design Engineering Manager
- P. Knapp, Health Physics Manager W.;Zinti, Emergency Preparedness Manager D. Herbst, Quality Assurance Manager C. Chiu, Quality Engineering Manager
- J. Schram, Operations Superintendent, Unit 1
- V.' Fisher, Operations Superintendent, Units'2/3
. R. Rosenblum, Manager -Nuclear Regulatory Affairs
' D. Brevig,' Supervisor Onsite Nuclear Licensing J.1Reeder, Nuclear Training Manager
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t H.-Newton, Site Support Services Manager
- R. Plappert, Compliance Manager
- *W.- Morris, Onsite Nuclear Licensing Engineer
- M. Jaeger, NED0-Controls Engineer
- B. Basu,.NED0-Controls Engineer
- F. Gershkoff, Compliance Engineer
- D. Werntz, Onsite Nuclear Licensing
-*C.-Brandt, Quality. Assurance Engineer
-*T. Nichols, Quality Assurance Engineer
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-*R. Douglas, Compliance Engineer San Diego Gas and Electric Company
- R. Erickson, Site Representative City of Riverside
- C. Harris, Site Representative
-* Denotes those attending the exit' meeting on December 21, 1990.
The inspectors also contacted other licensee employees during the course of the inspection, including operations shift superintendents, control room supervisors, control room operators, QA and QC engineers, compli-
-ance engineers, maintenance craftsmen, and health physics engineers and technician.-_
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2.
Plant - Sta tus Unit 1 The-licensee continued with the Unit I cycle 11 refueling outage this inspection period. The licensee expects to return the Unit to service in late February, 1991.
Unit 2 The Unit operated at power until November 20, 1990 when it received an inadvertent initiation of the Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) during performance of a routine surveillance. This resulted in spraying approximately 4800 gallons of borated water into the contain-ment. During followup testing, the licensee found degradtid electrical insulation in a non-safety related control element assembly (CEA) drive mechanism.
In order to facilitate repair and to prevent inadvertent dropping of the CEAs, the licensee shut down the Unit on November 23, 1990' The Unit was returned to power operation on November 28, 1990.
(Details are discussed in Paragraph 4.a).
On December 6,1990, while operating at full aower, the Unit automatic-ally tripped on a loss of ' load signal caused )y the failure of the non-1E bus which powers the main turbine controls. After repairing the static transfer switch of the non-1E uninterrupted power supply (UPS), the Unit was returned.to power operation on Decr ~ er 10, 1990 and operated at power through the remainder of this period.
(Details are discussed in Paragraph 4.b).
Unit 3 The Unit operated at power during this period.
3.
OperationalSafetyVerification(71707)
The inspectors performed several plant tours and verified the opera-
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. bility of selected emergency systems, reviewed the tag out log and
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verified proper return to~ service of affected components. Particular
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l attention was given to housekeeping, examination for potential fire L
hazards, fluid leaks,' excessive vibration, and verification that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of-maintenance. The inspectors also observed selected activities by licensee radiological protection and security-personnel to confinn proper implementation of and conformance with facility policies and procedures in these areas.
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Shift Superintendent Corrects Potentially Adverse Condition l
On December 11, 1990, during a routine walkdown, the Unit 1 Shift Superintendent observed a contractor's trailer parked in front of the
It was oriented in such a manner that unloading of the trailer required moving large, heavy objects down a ramp facing the main transformer (which was in service at the time). The Shift
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y Superintendent ordered that the trailer be moved and suggested an alternate location, at which time the trailer was relocated.
The
. inspector considered this action -- identifying conditions potentially adverse to plant safety and initiating decisive action to correct the
deficiency -- to be noteworthy and in keeping with a proper perspective of operator responsibility.
No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Evaluation of Plant Trips and Events (93702)
a.
Inadvertent Containment Spray Actuation While At Power (Unit 2)
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On November 20, 1990, while the -Unit-was operating at. full power, the Safety -Injection-System (SIS), and the Containment Spray System (CSS) were inadvertently actuated during performance of a monthly surveillance test on the Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS). All systems and components functioned as designed. After
> verifying that the actuation was inadvertent, the operator
. terminated CSS flow.- However, during the one minute period that the CSS was operating, approximately 4800 gallons of borated water (from the refueling water storage tank (RWST)) were sprayed into the containment. :All safety systems performed properly. Based on prior experience following an inadvertent containment spray at
. SONGS in 1984, the licensee initially maintained the Unit in stable power operation while assessing the impact of the spray.
The. licensee verified that neither the reactor nor any safety systems were affected by the containment spray by confirming
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control room indications,' conducting visual inspections inside containment, and functionally testing various equipment. No safety systems were found to be affected.
However, during followup checks the. licensee found degraded electrical conditions in the power-supply to the Control Element Drive Mechanisms (CEDMs) (non-safety related).
In order-to facilitate repair and to avoid an inadver-tent CEA drop, the licensee shut down the Unit on November 23, 1990. - During the troubleshooting, the licensee located some degaded insulation to the multi-pin connectors for the CEDM power cables associated with containment penetrations 94 and 97. The inspectors noted that these connectors, which are.not required to be environmentally qualified, are mounted at the top of: the i
penetration assembly cabinet with the cables entering-the top of the connector. This configuration exposed the connectors to direct
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Jimpingement by the spray water. Upon inspection, the licensee
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found corroded connector pins and evidance of moisture intrusion.
The licensee believed that the corrosion was a result'of the 1984 containment spray actuation, because it was unlikely the as-found condition could have-occurred during the three days following the November 20, 1990 spraydown. The licensee believed that borated water from the most recent spraydown contacted the corroded (but dry) connector pins and resulted in degraded electrical isolation between the pins and ground.. The licensee cleaned, repaired, and
- retested the degraded connectors, and inspected other connectors of l
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similar configuration before returning the Unit to power operation on November 28, 1990.
The licensee determined that the inadvertent actuation of the ESFAS was caused by instrument and control (I&C) technicians who were performing a surveillance test.
In particular, the I&C technicians inadvertently omitted procedure steps which directed them to reset one trip path before testing the second one. This resulted in actuation of two out of four of the coincidence protection logic channels, and the ESFAS initiated as designed. The licensee com-pleted the investigation for the cause of the event and submitted Licensee Event Report (LER) 361/90-14 on December 20, 1990. The inspector will review this event further and evaluate the licensee's report and corrective actions during the next inspection period. This item is unresolved (361/90-40-01) (see Paragraph 10).
b.
Automatic Shutdown Due To Non-1E Power Disturbance (Unit 2)
At 10 p.m. on December 6, 1990 San Onofre Unit 2 automatically tripped when a disturbance developed on Phase ' A' of the non-1E uninterruptible powcr supply (UPS), causing the high pressure turbina stop vC a dump solenoids to briefly deenergize. This in turn caused the hyocaulic ram pressure switches to actuate and immediately reset.
However, the period of actuation was long enough (greater than 35 milliseconds) to cause an actuation of channels 1 and 3 of the plant protective system (PPS) loss of load trips. This resulted in an automatic reactor trip.
The disturbance on the non-1E instrument power supply was determined by the licensee to have been caused by a faulty static transfer switch, SW-1, on one phase of the UPS. The static switch was tested repeatedly, and the fault symptoms were repeated once more in three attempts. The static switch was subsequently replaced and the new switch was tested with satisfactory results.
The plant was subsequently restarted, and operated for the balance of the inspection period without further difficulty.
c.
Firc In The Main Generator Exciter (Unit 1)
At 9:59 p.m. on December 12, 1990, while the Unit was shut down for refueling, the remote fire alarm panel in the Unit I control room alerted operations personnel to a fire in the vicinity of the main generator exciter.
A plant equipment operator (PE0) and an electrician in the vicinity of the exciter responded to the incident and extinguished the fire. The fire was caused by a canvas tarpaulin which was placed too close to space heaters being used to dry the exciter after the exterior of the exciter had been cleaned. The fire department arrived within a few minutes and found that the PE0 and the electrician had extinguished the fire and placed the tarpaulin in a metal drum. The fire was declared under control at 10:04 p.m.
As a result, an Unusual Event was not declared. The licensee inspected the area and found that two plastic bearing oil viewing ports were deformed by the fire, as was
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the insulation for a temperature sensing device. However, _ no other damage had been discovered at the time of this report's issuance.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
L 5.
Monthly Surveillance Activities (61726)
During this report period, the inspectors observed or conducted inspection of the following surveillance activities:
a.
Observation of Routine Surveillance Activities (Unit 1)
S01-XXVI-9.3552.0.3, " SIS 480 Volt Load Test Train A"
-S01-XXVI-9.3552.0.3, " SIS 480 Volt Load Test Train B" S01-12.9-16,." Refueling Mode Equipment Status Check Mode 6 And Core Off-Loaded Attachment 4,' Core Off-loadeo" b.
Observation of Routine Surveillance Activities (Unit 2)
S023-3-3.43.30, "ESF Subgroup Relay Surveillance" c.
Observation of Routine Surveillance Activities (Unit 3)
S023-3-3.43.31, "ESF Subgroup Relay Semi-Annual Test" No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Monthly Maintenance Activities (62703)-
During this report period, the inspectors observed or conducted inspection of the following maintenance activ.ities:
i a.
Observation of Routine Maintenance Activities (Unit 1)
M087090693002, " Rebuild And Re-Install ASCO Solenoid Valve, SV-128, cor CV-82" M089010360000, "Need To Inspect Solenoid Slug And Housing Of CV-82 To Complete Root Cause Investigation Into Failure Of CV-202" M089060154000, "CV-82 Would Not Move During Attempts To Stroke 6 Times From The Push Button"
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CWO90100234000, " Crafts To Replace This' Solenoid With A 'High Flow'
Type Per FCN F-2136J"
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Observation of Routine Maintenance Activities (Unit 2)
l S023-II-11.177, "Non-1E Bus Transfer Test" No-violations or deviations were identified.
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7.
IndependentInspection(37700)
ASCO Solenoid Valve Sticking Due To Dow Corning Lubricant (Unit 1)
On July.3,1990, containment spray header isolation valve CV-82 failed to stroke twice during routine inservice testing (IST) in Unit 1.
CV-82 failed to reposition due to the three-way ASCO solenoid valve, SV-128,_ failing to change position and thus not porting air from the containment spray valve actuator. This type of solenoid valve, ASCO Model No.- 206-380-3RU, has had a history of repeated failures, determined to have been caused by Dow Corning 550 lubricant on the surface of the solenoid core.
Since the solenoid is normally energized, the lubricant bakes to form a thin, hard, sticky film. This film has resulted in sticking of the core to the solenoid body, such that the-core does not reposition when the solenoid is deenergized. Since installation of these solenoid valves in Unit 1 in 1986, there have been nine of these ASCO valves which have stuck in the energized position when_ called on to reposition. After the first five failures occurred in-1987, the licensee initiated a program to clean the lubricant off of the core and housing.
Yet, in 1988 and.1989, two more ASCO solenoid valves of the same model_ number failed again.
For corrective action, the licensee re-cleaned all of these solenoid valves more thoroughly than during previous efforts. Additionally, in August 1989, the solenoid valve controller for alternate cold leg recirculation valve CV-304 failed in the same manner. This prompted a special inspection conducted by the NRC (Special Inspection 50-206/89-31) which identified two violations. One. involved failure to satisfy Technical Specifications requirements; the other was for inadequate corrective actions.
As a result of the July 3,1990 failure of the ASCO solenoid. the licensee began an aggressive root cause evaluation to determine the
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cause of this most recent failure.
(The inspector noted that the
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current root cause program was established partially in response to the above-noted failure of CV-304). This evaluation included work at two separate offsite laboratories. The results from the labs were
inconclusive, but once again the presence of a thin hard sticky film of Dow Corning 550 lubricant was found. The licensee concluded that the
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root cause of the failure was a combination of the physical geometry of the internals of.the solenoid valve, the weakness of the solenoid l
spring,_ and migration of the lubricant to the core of the solenoid.
(It is important-to note that the lubricant migration failure mechanism was only present in valves located in high temperature environments, and then only when-the solenoid valve was constantly energized for long periods of time). As a-result of these findings, the licensee decided to replace all -of the the ASCO solenoid valves (model Number 206-380)
l with a different model-ASCO solenoid, NP-8316. This model operates at
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L lower temperatures, but still utilizes Dow Corning 550 as a lubricant.
The licensee's decision to use the different model solenoid was based in
l-part on the Arrhenius plot of Dow Corning 550 lubricant _ life, based on time to gel, which estimates 114 years to gel for the new solenoid valve at the operating temperatures expected.
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The inspectors considered that the licensee had initiated an extensive effort to determine the root cause of the previous solenoid valve
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failures.
In addition, compensatory actions including cleaning and surveilling the solenoids were established.
However, the licensee did not have an adequate basis for the surveillance frequency previously established for this valve.
In particular, informal testing indicated
.that the previously used ASCO solenoids were susceptible to failures in relatively short periods of time under certain conditions.
In fact, one valve tested failed within a few days at elevated operating tempera-ti s.
Consequently, the root cause analysis concluded that SV-128 had is led as a result of hardening of the Dow Corning 550 lubricant, even though there was substantial evidence that the lubricant was the problem and that previous cleaning attempts had not been sufficient.
The licensee's failure to take effective measures to prevent further recurrence of this problem appeared to have violated the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criteria XVI, " Corrective Action".
However, the inspectors considered that the corrective actions taken by the licensee as a result.of the containment spray header isolation valve failure were extensive and aggressive'and appeared to be appropriate. Also, the root cause program currently in place would likely identify this sort of problem much earlier than it was in this case. This licensee-identified violation is not being cited because the criteria specified in Section V.G. of the Enforcement Policy were satisfied.
Therefore, this is a
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non-cited violation. This item is closed (206/90-28-04 and 90-40-01).
8.
Review of Licensee Event Reports (90712, 92700)
Through direct observations, discussion with licensee personnel, or review of the records, the following Licensee Event Reports (LERs) were closed:
Unit 1 90-12, Rev. O, Voluntary Entry into Technical Specification 3.0.3 for DC
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Ground Troubleshooting.
Unit-2 89-bl, Rev. 1, Technical Specifications Required Shutdown for Inoperable Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 90-10, Rev. O, Fuel Handling Isolation System-Spurious Actuation Due to Personnel Error.
Unit 3
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90-13. Rev. 0,-Fuel Handling Building Post-Accident Cleanup Filter L
System Inoperable due to Surveillance Deficiency.
L No violations or deviations were identified.
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9.
Followup of Previously Identified Items (92701)
a.
(Closed). Followup Item (206/89-07-10), " Diesel Generator Starting
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Circuitry Reliability under Loss of Power (LOP) Conditions"
.This _ item involved the safety injection system loss of offsite power (SIS / LOP) signal which initially sends start signals to both
' diesel generators.
The concern was that if both diesel generators were not loaded simultaneously, closing of one diesel generator breaker to its respective engineered safety features (ESF) bus would remove the undervoltage condition on the sequencer input and would prevent closing the output breaker to the ESF bus for the other unconnected diesel generator and sequencing on the loads.
Consequently, if one diesel generator started and energized its ESF bus in a shorter period of tue than the redundant diesel generator, the LOP signal would clear and the output breaker for
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the second diesel' generator would not close.
. As corrective action for this problem, the licensee installed time delay relays in the circuits of the 4KV inputs to the sequencer for
monitoring LOP conditions.
The inspector noted that the relay
' drops out instantaneously upon receipt of an undervoltage signal and picks up 12 seconds after restoration of bus voltage.
The 12-second delay __is sufficient to ensure that both diesel generator
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. breakers close before resetting of the undervoltage signal to the opposite train diesel generator.
NRC Resident Inspection Report No. 50-206/89-07 noted that removal
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of the. LOP signal in the diesel generator circuitry (with start of u
L each diesel generator to be initiated-by undervoltage on its associated bus).would probably make the starting circuitry more
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reliable. This followup item was generated to confirm the
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licensee's commitment to review removal _of the LOP signal.
Since
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signal in the diesel generator circuitry and has concluded that
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such action would improve the reliability of--the diesel generator circuitry. The. licensee generated Minor Modification-Package 1-3634.00SJ, Revision 0, on b.vber 3, 1990 to modify the diesel.
l-h generator sequencer's LOP '.ogic-to facilitate removal of the LOP ~
signal.- This modif:ication was installed during tne 1990-91 refueling outage.
The inspector concluded that the licensee's action was consistent with the observations of the aforementioned resident inspection i
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report and appeared to provide an appropriate means of improving diesel -generator starting circuitry reliability under LOP conditions. Therefore, this item is closed.
b.
(Closed) Follow $pItem(361/88-10-14),"UnreliableComponent
--Coolirg Water (CCW) Surge Tank Level Indication During High Transient Level" This item concerned the CCW surge tank level instrumentation, which consists of one connection for the differential pressure (DP) cell
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at the bottom of the tank and the other (equali:ing connection) e dry reference leg at the top of the tank.
It was noted that the dry leg installation could result in erroneous and potentially misleoding indication to operators during events involving large transient surges in level, since events such as these could poten-tially fill the dry equalizing reference leg. As a result of the inspector's concern, the licensee comitted to review this issue.
As followup to this issue, the licensee reviewed the subject and approved a Conceptual Engineering Design Package (CEP C-6742.1)
which required changing the dry reference leg to a wet reference leg.
It also required some minor instrument recalibrations and provisions to maintain the reference leg full.
The inspector reviewed the subject CEP and noted that the change from a dry to wet reference leg appeared adequate to solve the potential inaccuracies discussed above and that adequate precau-tions to maintain a constantly full upper reference leg had been considered in the CEP solution. The inspector noted that toe licensee has scheduled changes for the Units 2 and 3 CCW surge tank level indicators and expects them to be completed early in 1991.
The inspector considered the licensee's actions to be appropriate.
Therefore, this item is closed.
c.
(Closed) Followup Item (361/88-10-06), " Single Intake Structure supply of Three Salt Water Cooling Pumps" This item involved Units 2 and 3.
In particular, during cold shutdown of one unit, one salt water cooling (SWC) train is required for shutdown operation, while two SWC trains are normally in operation for the other unit, if the other unit is at power. The concern was that no safety analyses had been performed to demon-strate that, when the aforementioned modes of operation occur with one unit intake dewatered, the remaining auxiliary intake structure will be adequate to provide the required water supply to operate the three SWC trains.
Each of the three trains has a pump which requires 17,000 GPM, for a total flow requirement of 51,000 GPM.
As a result of the inspector's concern, the licensee performed calculations to address this issue. The inspector reviewed SCE Civil Calculation DC-339 revisior, 6 which determined the minimum submergence of the SWC pump suction using-the following assumptions:
only the Seismic Category I auxiliary intake structure remains
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operable the ocean is at its lowest level assuming low tide and tsunami
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conditions three SWC pumps are operating and drawing suction at 17,000
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GPM/ pump for a total of 51,000 GPM
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Calculation DC-339 Revision 6, calculated the minimum submergence level subject to_the above assumptions to be 4.65 feet.
Since the
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pump manufacturer requires the minimum pump suction submergence-j level to be 2.5 feet, the calculation concluded that the three pumps would perform adequately urder the postulated conditions.
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The inspector also reviewed Supplement A of SCE calculation H27.3, which was added to verify that the minimum submergence of 2.5 feet for the SWC pumps was satisfied with 3 SWC pumps operating at 17,000 GPM each._ Methodology, results, and conclusions of both calculations appeared reasonable.
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-The inspector also noted that the licensee committed to revise Sections 9.2.1.1F. 9.2.1.2, and 9.2.5.2 of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) in the next revision to reflect the operation of three pumps (51,000 GPM) during and following a
. seismic event at low tide. The inspector considered the.11censee's actions appropriate. Therefore, this item is closed.
.10.
Unresolved Item
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Unresolved items are issues about which additional information is needed in order to determine whether the item involves a violation, a deviation, or an acceptable condition. An unresolved item identified during this inspection is discussed in Paragraph 4.a.
11. Exit Meeting (30703)
On December 21, 1990, an exit meeting was conducted with the licensee l
representatives identified in Paragraph 1.
The inspectors summarized
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theLinspection scope and findings' as dest'ibed in the Results section of L
this report.
l-The licensee acknowledged the inspection findings and noted that appropriate corrective actions would be implemented where warranted.
The licensee did_ not identify as proprietary any of the-information provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection.
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