IR 05000155/1982008
| ML20055B673 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Big Rock Point File:Consumers Energy icon.png |
| Issue date: | 07/06/1982 |
| From: | Boyd D, Parker M, Wright G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20055B669 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-155-82-08, 50-155-82-8, NUDOCS 8207220613 | |
| Download: ML20055B673 (8) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Report No. 50-155/82-08(DPRP)
Docket No. 50-155 License No. DPR-6 Licensee: Consumers Power Company 212 West Michigan Avenue Jackson, MI 49201 Facility Name:
Big Rock Point Station Inspection At: Big Rock Po tSite,Charlevoix,MI$
7-b ~ O b Inspectors G. C. Wri t M. E. Parke 7" 6 " 0%
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Approved By:
D. C. Boyd, Chief
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Projects Section 1A g,p l
Inspection Summary Inspection on April 24 through June 11, 1982 (Report No. 50-155/82-08 (DPRP))
Areas Inspected: Routine safety, resident inspection involving Operational Safety verification, Monthly Maintenance Observation, Monthly Surveillance Observation, LER followup, Plant Trip followup, Onsite Review Committee, Followup on Outstanding Inspection Items, Followup on Previously Identified Items of Noncompliance, and Independent Inspection Effort. The inspection involved a total of 264 inspector-hours obsite by two NRC inspectors including 25 inspector-hours during offshifts.
Results: Of the areas inspected one item.of noncompliance, Licensee identified, was observed. No other items of noncompliance were identified.
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8207220613 820707 PDR ADOCK 05000155 G
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O DETAILS
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Persons Contacted
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P. lloffman, Plant Superintendent
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C. E. Axtell, IIcalth Physicist D. E. DeMoor, Technical Engineer
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- A. C. Sevener, Operations Supervicor x
x W. D. Blosh, Associate Engineer
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- E. W. Raciborski, QA Supervisor (
- C. R. Abel, Operations and Maintenance Superintendent
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J. A. Johnson, Instrument & Control Supervisor
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E. McNamara, Training Supervisor
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- J. J. Popa, Maintenance Supervisor
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- J. R. Epperson, Associate Health Physicist
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- R. E. Schrader, Technical Superintendent
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ifg The inspectors also contacted other licensee personnel including:
Shift Supervisors, Control Operators and I&C Technicians
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Operational Safety Verification
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, g The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicabG s]'
g logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during' the
7, month of April through June. The inspector verified the operability g'
of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and'vecit'ied
'A proper return to service of affected components. Tours of the rh etor '
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buildings and turbine buildings were conducted to observe' plant coulp <
ment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and \\,
excessive vibrations and to verify that maintenance requests had beerg initiated for equipment in need of maintenance. The inspector by
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observation and direct interview verified that the physical security
_'s plan was being implemented in accordance with the station security plan.
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The inspector observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness sonditions and i
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verified implementation of radiation protection controls. During the
'y month of April through June, the inspector walked down the accdsible
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portions of the core spray and containment spray sysums to verify
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operability. The inspector also witnessed portions of the rddf on:tive
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waste system controls assoristed with radwaste shipments andfbarreling.
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No items of noncompliance were identified.
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3.
Monthly Maintenance Observation
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Station maintenance activities of safety related systerns and components listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted
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in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards and in conformance with technical specifications.
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The"following items were considered during this. review:
the limiting
-'t conditions for operation were' met while components or systems were
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removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were
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j inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were
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performed prior to' returning components or systems to service; quality
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control records we're maintained; activities were accomplished by
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L-qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; l'
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radiological controls were impicmented; and, fire prevention controls were implemented, j
Work requests were reviewed to determine status'of outstanding jobs
and to. assure that priority is assigned to safety related equipment ( maintenance which may affect system performance.
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The following naintenance activities were observed / reviewed:
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- Plugging of Reactor Building Heating / Cooling "B" Heat Exchanger Tubes.
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Th3 React.or Building Heating / Cooling "B" Heat Exchanger has not been
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, returned to service pending resolution to the plant event report.
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No items of noncompliance were identified.
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4.
Monthly Surveillance Observation
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The inspecthr observed technical specifications required surveillance
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' testing dn'the Area Radiation Monitors the Turbine Bypass valve controls
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'and RPS' testing and verified that testing was performed in accordance
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limiting, conditions for operation were met, that removal and restoration m
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- of the affected components were accomplished, that test results conformed
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.i b9 personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any
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i deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and r
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resolved by' appropriate management personnel.
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'No items.of noncompliance were identified.
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5e Idcc.nsee Event Reports Followup i
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""arough direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and
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l review cf records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine
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th'at reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective wactiog was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had s
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' been ac'complished in accordance with technical specifications.
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. LER 82-01 (closed) " Valve Failure Resulting in one RDS Loop being
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out of service"
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LER 82-02,(closed) "hDS Channel A removed from service to replace
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a failed timer"
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LER 82-03 (closed) " Leak in Pipeway Cooler B Potential Degre'dation c.
of Containment Intergrity" i
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LER 82-04 (closed) "RDS Reactor Water Level Trip Set Point Drift" LER 82-06 (closed) " Excessive Leakage of Reactor Cleanup System
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j Resin Sluice Valve - CV-4093"
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LER 82-07 (closed) " Inadequate Type C leak Rate Test Procedure"
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LER 82-08 (closed) "RDS Actuation Delay Timer Set Point Drift"
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LER 82-09 (closed) " Mechanical Snubber Failure in RDS System"
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LER 82-10-(closed) "Feedwater Check Valve Exhibited Leakage in
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j excess of T.S. limit for Containment Leak Rate Limit"
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LER 82-11 (closed) " Backup Containment Spray Valve M07068 inoperable"
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LER 82-12 (closed) " Backup Compressed Gas Supply to one loop of the i
Containment Vacuum Relief System failed due to j
leaking check valve.
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LER 82-15 (closed) " Reactor Mode Switch left in " Refuel" during Reactor Startup." This LER is considered a
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l licensee identified item of noncompliance.
The inspector reviewed the circumstances of.
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the event and. corrective actions. The inspector has no further concerns on this item.
Refer to Paragraph 6'for further details.
l LER 81-10 (closed) " Closing time on Ventilation Check Valve CV4094 m.
I not within specification" i
LER 81-11 (closed) "One loop of containment vacuum relief system n.
out-of-service" LER 81-12 (closed) " Containment Isolation Ventilation exhaust Valve
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i closure time above T.S. Limit"
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LER 81-14 (closed) " Emergency Condenser Radiation Monitors out-of-p.
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service"
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LER 81-18 (closed) "Off-Gas Monitor sampling system out-of-service for corrective maintenance" LER 81-19 (closed) " Station Battery Low Specific Gravity" r.
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LER 81-20 (closed) " Leak in Radwaste System recycle line" s.
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LER 81-21 (closed) "RDS Channel A Battery Cell Low Specific Gravity"
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LER 81-23 (closed) " Reactor and Fuel Pit drain valves exhibited excessive leakage" LER 81-24 (closed) " Containment Boundary - Service Water System" v.
LER 81-26 (closed) " Radioactive liquid released to Radwaste Pump Room" w.
No items of noncompliance other than the one licensee identified item were identified.
6.
Plant Trips Following the plant trips on April 27, 1982, as reported in LER 82-15 the inspector ascertained the status of the reactor and safety systems by observation of control room indicators and discussions with licensee personnel concerning plant parameters, emergency system status and reactor coolant chemistry. The inspector verified the establishment of proper communications and reviewed the corrective actions taken by the licensee.
In addition to revising the start-up checklist the in-spector requested that the licensee revise surveillance procedure TV-10
" Primary System Hydostatic Test" to include a statement about Mode Switch position vs:
Primary System Teperature. The revision is necessary because the licensee's Technical Specifications require that primary system temperature be raised above 212 F to perform the hydro.
Technical Specifications also state:
"During a NSSS Hydrostatic Test the Primary System Water Temperature can exceed 212 F without entering the Technical specification power operation definition found in Section 1.2.1..."
As such, control of the Mode Switch is necessary to preclude the possibility of remaining above 212 F, after the hydro is completed, and not complying with Technical Specification Section 6.1
" Reactor Safety System during Power Operation." The licensee has made the appropriate revision.
Following the plant manual trip on June 11, 1982, due to a fire in the Turbine Generator exciter unit the inspector ascertained the status of the reactor and safety systems by observation of control room indicators and discussions with licensee personnel concerning plant parameters, emergency system status. The inspector verified the establishment of proper communications and reviewed the corrective actions taken by the licensee.
All systems responded as expected.
The plant was taken to a shutdown condition to facilitate repairs to the exciter.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
7.
Onsite Review Committee
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The inspector examined the onsite review functions conducted during j
the period April and May 1982 to verify conformance with technical specifications and other regulatory requirements. This review included:
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changes since the previous inspection in the charter and/or administra-tive procedure governing review group activities,.eview group membership l
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and qualifications; review group meeting frequency and quorum; and, activities reviewed including proposed technical specification changes, noncompliance items and corrective action, proposed facility and pro-cedure changes and proposed tests and experiments conducted per 10 CFR 50.59, and others required by technical specificacions.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
8.
Followup on Outstanding Inspection Items Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel and review of records, the following items were reviewed to determine that appropriate corrective actions have been accomplished.
a.
OII - 80-xx-01 (closed): The inspectors observed activities around the open Reactor Vessel during the 1982 Refueling Outage and conclude that protection from dropping objects into the vessel appear to be adequate.
b.
OII - 80-01-01 (closed): The inspector discussed the recent modification to the containment spray system with Mr. E. Chow (NRR), who opened the original item, and determined that the item is now considered closed.
c.
OII 80-18-01 (closed):
Inspectors request that Emergency Diesel -
Generator maintenance procedure be revised to include filling and venting of fuel oil line after filler replacement has been complied with, d.
OII 81-02-01 (closed): A Technical Specification change has been submitted to NRR for approval.
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OII 81-05-04 (closed):
" Biennial review of Master Training Plan, Volume 18 by Plant Training Coordinator". The Master Training Plan was reviewed by the Training Coordinator and approved by the Plant Superintendent on April 19, 1982. This has been documented on the cover sheet to Volume 18.
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Followup on Previously Identified Items of Noncompliance Through direct observations, discussions with Licensee personnel and review of records the followirg previously identified items of noncom-pliance were reviewed to determine that the corrective action stated by the licensee have been ac;omplished.
a.
81-12-01 (closed):
Failure to include acceptance criteria in specific surveillance, procedures.
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81-08-01 (closed):
" Radiation area existed around a barrel containing contam'.nated equipment without being conspiciously posted." The barrel was subsequently moved to the contaminated materials warehouse and a training course consisting of the re-quirements defined by 10 CFR 20 and respective plant procedures
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was conducted for chemistry, Health Physics and Maintenance personnel to prevent recurrence.
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81-16-01 (closed):
" Failure to adhere to written operating procedures, in that power level was increased by control rod withdrawal while the turbine bypass valve was inoperable."
Operations personnel were briefed on the importance of being aware of and following procedures.
Standard Operating Procedure SOP-17 was considered overly restrictive by the licensee and was revised to allow power level changes when the turbine bypass valve is inoperable.
10.
Independent Inspection Effort During the inspection period the inspectors also reviewed Surveillance procedures and the caution tag log procedure.
a.
In reviewing surveillance procedures the inspectors noted that although acceptance criteria is either stated or is in the process of being determined, the acceptance criteria is not always highly visible, or consistant in its placement. The inspectors further reviewed the new Nuclear Operation Department Standards (NODS) on procedure preparation and noted that further guidance on acceptance criteria is supplied by the NODS. The inspectors encouraged the licensee to standardize how acceptance criteria is written; where it is placed; and to make it highly visible to not only the person (s) performing the test but individuals responsible for reviewing the procedure.
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A review of the caution tag log and a review of selected tags s
observed in the plant revealed a number of discrepancies. The discrepancies dealt with tags physically in place not being included in the caution tag log and some of the caution tags listed in the log had been in place for extended (3-4 years)
periods of time. The inspector discussed the following with the licensee:
(1) Possible review by plant walkdown that all caution tags which have been hung are included in the caution tag log.
(2) Better guidance to the shift supervisors as to whether a caution tag is still appropriate or whether a facility change; procedure change, or specification field change is more appropriate.
(3) Caution tags hung prior to a refueling outage and not cleared during the outage should receive a special review by management.
4 (4) Caution tag procedure revision to include logging any switching and tagging order or procedure which require a caution tag to be hung.
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The licensee has taken the above items under consideration.
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The inspectors observed the licensee's exercise with local hospitals c.
on response to injured / contaminated personnel. The inspectors observed both'onsite and offsite activities.
d.
During the inspection period the inspector attended portions of the-ASLB hearing on the licensee's request to expand the capacity of the spent fuel pool.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
11.
Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)
throughout the month and at the conclusion of.the inspection on June 21, 1982, and summarized the scope and findings of the' inspection activities.
The licensee acknowl iged the inspectors comments.
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