IR 05000155/1979013
| ML19260C279 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Big Rock Point File:Consumers Energy icon.png |
| Issue date: | 11/16/1979 |
| From: | Boyd D, Ridgway K NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19260C277 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-155-79-13, IEB-79-08, IEB-79-8, NUDOCS 7912260144 | |
| Download: ML19260C279 (6) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION III
Report No. 50-155/79-13 Docket No. 50-155 License No. DPR-6 Licensee:
Consumers Power Company 212 West Michigan Avenue Jackson, MI 49201 Facility Name:
Big Rock Point Inspection At: Charlevoix, MI Inspection Conducted: October 24-26, 29-31, 1979.
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Inspector:
K. R. Ilidgway
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D.h$h C. Boyd Chief,
// '/,' - 7N Approved By:
Reactor Projects Section 3 Inspection Summary Inspection 10/24-31/79 (Report No. 50-155/79-13)
Areas Inspected:
Routine unannounced inspection of the licensee's opera-tional program; completion of the inspection requirements of IE Bulletin 79-08; response to NRR questions on actuation signals during containment purging and safety circuit overides; and followup actions relative to Licensee Event Reports, IE Bulletins, and open inspection items. The in-spection involved 47 hours5.439815e-4 days <br />0.0131 hours <br />7.771164e-5 weeks <br />1.78835e-5 months <br /> onsite by one NRC inspector.
Results: No items of noncompliance were identified in the seven areas inspected.
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DETAILS
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1.
Peg,ons Contacted
- C. J. Hartman, Plant Superintendent
- D. E. DeMoor, Technical Engineer
- R. E. Schrader, Technical Superintendent
- J. A. Rang, Operations-Maintenance Superintendent A. C. Sevener, Operations Supervisor J. J. Popa, Maintenance Engineer C. F. Sonnenberg, Shift Supervisor E. J. Valade, Shift Supervisor E. F. Peltier, Shift Supervisor P. M. Donnelly, Shif t Supervisor Trainee W. F. Blissett, Shift Supervisor G. L. Fox, Chemistry and Radiation Protection Supervisor R. W. Doan, Training Coordinator J. A. Johnson, I&C Supervisor D. Herboldsheimer, Maintenance Scheduler
- L. Oostermeyer, Senior Secretary The inspector contacted several other licensee employees, including members of the technical, operations, and administrative groups.
- Denotes those attending the management exit interview on October 31, 1979.
2.
General The plant was shutdown on February 2, 1979, for a scheduled eight week refueling outage which also included the installation of a modified Core Spray Sparger Ring and Steam Baffle.
During startup preparations following refueling a small leak was discovered coming from the F-2 control rod drive stub tube-reactor vessel interface.
The leak has be Theleakwasrepairedingyattributedtoslaginclusion defects.
early October and was satisfactorily hydrotested during this inspection.
See Paragraph 6d. for details.
Also, during startup preparations, a noise was heard in the bottom internal vessel when the No. 1 Recirculation pump was operating.
This was later determined to be a loose diffuser plate for the No. 1 Recirculation return inlet.
Both diffuser plates have been replaced and tested.
See Paragrpah 4a for details.
The corrective actions for the above items had delayed plant startup which is presently scheduled for early November.
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IE Reports 50-155/79-11 and 12 1616 288-2-
3.
Operations Review
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The inspector observed plant. outage conditions and plant startup preparations including the hydrotesting of the primary system at 1550 psig, valving and switch lineups on engineered safety features, control room manning, lock and tag status of equipment and shift turn overs.
In addition, the following records for the month of October, 1979 were reviewed to determine compliance with Technical Specification Limiting Conditions of Operaticns, and NRC Regulations and also to, determine if the Daily Orders and Operational Memos conflicted in any way with operational requirements:
a.
Shift Supervisors Log b.
Reactor Log c.
Control Room Log d.
Daily Orders e.
Control Room Log Sheets f.
Operational Memos g.
Master Startup Checksheets and 16 System Valving Lineup Checksheets h.
TR-46, Fuel Bundle Core Loading Checklist No items of noncompliance were identified.
4.
Review of Licensee Event Reports (LER's)
The inspector reviewed the following LER's to determine if the reports were correct and if the evaluations and corrective actions taken were appropriate and that they were completed as stated in its LER.
a.
(Closed) LER 50-155/79-20, Failure of hold down bolts on the reactor recirculation diffuser plates causing the #1 diffuser plate to be dislodged and the #2 plate to be loose.
Both diffuser plates were replaced using larger holddown bolts and modified nut locking mechanisms. All bolt ends and nuts have been retrieved from the reactor vessel and testing of the diffuser plates at various recirculation flows indicated no further problems. Replacement of the diffuser plates required the removal of all fuel elements, control rod blades and vessel internals except the bottom core plate. Following the mainte-nance work the reator vessel was cleaned by water suction and all control rod drives were tested without any problems.
b.
(Closed) LER 50-155/79-21, Failure of a fuse in the static inverter power supply to the containment vacuum relief loop.
The.
andant loop was operable. A Facility Change (FC) has
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bea initiated to provide a dummy load to the inverter to prevent input voltage transients. Until the FC is completed the licensee has initiated a shiftwise check of the fuses.
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c.
(Closed) LER 50-155/79-23, Failure of the reactor and fuel pit
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drain line valve to pass the Type C leak test.
The redundant valve tested satisfactorily, thus, containment integrity was maintained. The failed valve was machined to reduce tts disc seating area and new seats will be installed on both valves at a later time.
d.
(Closed) LER 50-155/79-24, Drift of four Reactor Depressurizing System (RDS) pump discharge pressure switches in a nonconserva-tive direction found during a routine surveillance calibration.
The drift did not prevent operation of the RDS. The setpoints have been increased to 105 psig, 5 psig above the minimum 100 psig, calibration procedures were changed to reflect the new higher set points and the licensee is following any drifting
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trends cn these instruments.
5.
Followup of Inspection and Enforcement Bulletins a.
(Closed) IE Bulletin 79-12, Short Period Scrams at BWR Facilities.
Big Rock Point reactor is significantly different than new BWR's.
The licensee's response to questions in the bulletin described the adequate administrative controls presently in place.
b.
(Closed) IE Bulletin 79-24, Frozen Line. BRP has experienced no safety related freezing problems in 17 years of operation.
6.
Followup on Open Inspection Items (OII)
a.
(Closed) OII-340 (Inspection Report 50-155/78-05), Replacement of defective General Electric CR105X auxilliary contact mecha-nisms. A manufacturers service letter and IE Bulletin 78-05 requested the replacement of all defective parts in these contactors. The corrective actions have been completed.
b.
(Closed) OII-353 (Inspection Report No. 50-155/79-10), Concerning critical valve, breaker and switch alignments in engineered safety systems as specified in IE Bulletin 79-08 and Temporary Instruction 2515/23. The inspector reviewed specific valve alignments in the Post Incident System, Emergency Condenser System, Reactor Poison System, Containment and Containment Sprays and the Reactor Depressurization System to determine that the valves and switches were in the position as specified in startup checklists that had been completed and signed off in anticipation of startup. During the inspection, two root valves for the Reactor Poison System local pressure indication and remote indication in the conrol room were found to be closed while the completed checkoff sheet indicated them to be in the open position as required. The small valves were very difficult to operate and required mechanical assistance to turn the handle which may have contributed to this alignment error.
The valves were opened.
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The pressure indicators do not have any effect upon the poison
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system operation and the system pressure is not referenced as an operational check in the Off Normal Procedure, ONP 2.21,
" Conditions Requiring Liquid Poison Injection." However, the incorrect valve positioning was considered a violation of internal procedures and as a result of this finding the licensee required all the completed valve alignment checklists to be redone by operators other than the ones completing the original checklists. The operator who signed-off on the original poison system valve position checklist was given a written reprimand.
c.
(Closed) OII-355 (Inspection Report No. 50-155/79-10 and IE Bulletin 79-08), Regarding inconsistencies in locked valves between procedures, checklists and Piping and Instrument Drawings (P&ID) and necessary corrections and changes to sur-veillance test procedures that were found during the referenced inspection. The licensee had revised all procedures and check-lists and P&ID changes have been initiated.
d.
(Closed) OII-356 (Inspection Report No. 50-155/79-11 and LER 79-18) Concerning the hydro leak test of the repaired Control Rod Drive F-2.
Theinspectorobservedthehydrotes$n f the primary system conducted October 31, 1979 at 1500 1 0 psig and approximately 200 F.
After being at pressure for approximately 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />, no leakage was detected indicating the repairs were effective.
(Closed) OII-359 (Inspection Report 50-155/79-11), Concerning e.
incore detector surveillance test procedure INMS-9. The pro-cedure had been revised (Rev 4 dated September 24, 1979) to include references to Technical Specification requirements.
7.
Actuation Signals During Containment Purging and Safety Circuit Override By letter, dated November 29, 1978, NRR required the inaugeration of permanent administrative controls to prevent the improper manual defeat of containment isolation actuation signals.
BRP operates with continous containment purging with automatic closure of ven-tilation inlet and outlet dampers upon high containment pressure or low reactor water level.
In addition, containment isolation is also initiated by high radiation levels on the reactor refueling deck.
However, this system is not considered to be LOCA qualified equipment.
As a result of the review required by this letter and IE Bulletin No. 79-08, the licensee has revised Off Normal Procedure, ONP 2.31,
" Reactor Scrams" to require manual isolation of containment following automatic scrams from high containment pressure or low reactor water level to prevent isolation valve opening upon loss of trip signal.
In the same letter NRR requested the licensee to review safety circuits that had manual override features to insure that manual
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overrides of one safety actuation signal did not also cause the bypass of other safety signals. The licensee found that the only manual bypass feature at Big Rock Point that interrupts the auto-matic actuation of safety signals were the hand switches to seven motor operated valves. The hand switches to each individual valve can be raised to bypass the automatic function for that individual valve only and must be manually pushed back to the normal or auto-matic position. This lift to bypass feature was provided to facili-tate required surveillance testing. The raised valve switch handle gives visual indication that the automatic valve signals are bypassed.
The licensee has committed to provide visual and audible annuncia-tion when each of these valves is bypassed. The work will be completed under Facility Change 488 prior to the end of the next refueling in late 1980.
In the interim, the seven switch handles have been painted yellow for emphasis and shiftwise checks of valve position has been encluded in the Control Room Log Sheet.
8.
Exit Interview The inspector met with the licensee representatives (denoted in Paragrpah 1) at the conclusion of the inspection. The inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection. The following items were discussed:
a.
The error in valve positioning (Paragraph 6b)
b.
Corrections completed or initiated for Checklist and P&ID changes.
c.
Status of items to be completed before startup.
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